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ABSTRACT 
This thesis outlines the micro-history of the planning of the Snowy 
Mountains Irrigation and Hydro Electric Scheme and critically evaluates its 
procedures and outcomes. It considers five conjunctures of social and 
technological choice from the late 1930s to the early 1960s. These 
successive choices are examined at the level of the broad planning 
processes and outcomes. The layout of the dams, power stations and tunnels 
provide the occasion and artefact of analysis. By successively and 
selectively examining the piece-by-piece aggregation and re-focussing of 
its multi-purpose design, the cross-cultural processes of nation building 
are assessed as to whether they were democratising, inclusive of 
differences or corporatising. Counterfactual choices, often marginal to 
dominant values, are posited in order to highlight the co-joint 
technological, political and cultural choices being made. Inter-
governmental and federalist resource planning processes, vital to the 
formation of large irrigation systems and the inter-state electricity grid, 
provide a common thread of analysis. It is argued that the cultural 
geographic outcome for the Australian Alps was the production of 'fordist 
rivers.' While there were some differentiated social outcomes, the Scheme 
overlooked indigenous aspirations and preferred technocratic and 
corporatist outcomes that lacked ecological sensibility. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction--The Snowy Mountains Maze 
(i) The Significance of the Scheme 
The complexities of infrastructure! Technologically, the Snowy Mountains 
Scheme (figure I) greatly expanded the irrigation systems within the 
Murray Darling Basin and brought the south east Australian electricity 
grid into existence. Concurrently, many rural, regional and metropolitan 
communities orientated their aspirations toward development and competed 
for the fruits of technological change via the Scheme. Beyond dichotomies 
of city versus country, or competition between regions, these communities 
also participated in common or dominant assumptions about such change. 
Not least, to populate inland regions to enhance national security meant 
that this large engineering project was also a massive social experiment. 
Primarily, the variously imagined futures and the federalist political 
struggles which mark the history of the Scheme were competitions over 
energy (manufacturing) versus water (irrigation). The 'central' Scheme 
provided a post-war arena within which many of the most capital intensive 
projects of statist development were co-ordinated and hence brokered. It 
therefore connected to broader, comparative advantage economic choices. 
As a site for New South Wales, Victorian, Commonwealth as well as South 
Australian aspirations for renewal, processes of Commonwealth-State co-
operation in building the Scheme had implications for the democratic 
qualities of post-war federalism. Whilst reconstructing the water cycle of 
the Australian Alps, some emergent characteristics of the Keynesian state, 
especially in terms of process, were constructed via this large Scheme. 
As the Scheme remade many of the inland (plus some coastal) riverine 
terrains of south eastern Australia, it was crucial for the cultural 
geographic transformations of these diverse regions. The associated social 
imagery of 'revitalised' terrains informed images of national identities. 
Given the scale of the Scheme, the productivities as well as environmental 
risks, have also been large. 
A broader shift in imperial power, as the emergent United States displaced 
Sterling, post-war, was contested via the 'Australian province' and, hence, 
1 1 
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via the Scheme. In turn, during a period of Cold War, labour processes as 
well as the project itself stood to change significantly via the expertise and 
engineering methods on offer from the United States. The effects upon 
construction, engineering practice and the burgeoning, post-war, 
political-bureaucratic technocracies were significant. 
In more overtly cross-cultural ways, the Scheme has also been important. 
Post-war, many European migrants, arriving to supply the out-worker 
force needed for 'nation building', were (unevenly) sustained by the 
Scheme. It thus also provided a rationale for migration. Although 
indigenous rights to water and land were sought, the absence of indigenous 
values within planning outcomes is symptomatic of post-war development. 
Cultural, political and economic elements of post-war Australian society 
have, therefore, been reformed--and overlooked--via the Scheme. Just as 
one of its technical functions is to serve as a 'spinning reserve', as an 
emergency back up for the entire grid, the communicative paths of 
'spinning reserve' are multiple and complex. As such, and although 
representing only a small part of national investment, the Scheme 
encapsulated many of the dichotomies of post-war development. In sum, via 
its 'premier' role and rhetorics, it has reconstituted many facets of post-war 
life. It provides a labyrinth for the interpretation of the success or 
otherwise of technological modernising processes and attempts to live 
sustainably with differences within post-war Australia. 
(ii) More Than One Applecart (Short Scope) 
By way of developing a critical and cultural studies approach to the history 
of infrastructure, the method, purpose and content of research into the 
histories of the Scheme is described in three stages. 
In the first stage, theoretical approaches, which relate critical studies to 
issues of planning, are described. To extend these concepts, cultural studies 
of technology are considered. The fundamental planning debates of the 
Scheme, as they have arisen from existing literature, are considered in 
relation to this theory. 
The second part more fully covers the literature, often written whilst the 
Scheme was still under construction, which has interpreted the planning 
1 3 
history of the Snowy Scheme. It relates social and political forces to 
successive planning choices, offering a periodised literature review. 
Selected journal, chapter and monograph histories of the Scheme--across a 
range of disciplines--are considered as debates have evolved. Similarities 
and differences as well as the inconsistencies between each historical 
interpretation are noted. Senses of the controversies ignored or glossed 
over may well be as important as those discussed. 
Secondary or contextual material is considered alongside the 'Snowy' 
references, as the former throw extra light on the latter. This serves to 
elaborate the process of 'decentring' or of 'socialising' analysis--to 
establish its differential social connections. Accordingly, contextual 
literature helps to point to ways in which the Scheme may (or may not) 
have been fluently and equitably socially constructed, brokered or steered. 
In short, given the often uncritical approach of earlier studies toward 
planning outcomes, important changes to plans, as they may be related to 
planning choices, are identified. 
Thirdly and finally, the synthesis of theoretical and existing planning 
literature on the Scheme is summarised to orientate further research into 
the multiple social relations of the planning processes. By way of also 
providing an overview of the argument of the thesis, five research topics 
that relate five, successive and selective planning shifts to critical and 
cultural analysis are outlined. 
(iii) The Necessity of a Multi-Disciplinary Approach (Theory 
Review) 
Towards A Critical and Cultural Studies of Infrastructure 
In seeking pointers towards histories of planning the Scheme, the 
fundamental approach adopted is to consider the extent and manner in 
which this large technological system has been responsive to often 
disparate social values in need of brokering. Analysis seeks to contrast the 
ways in which technological outcomes have been 'self-serving'--serving 
technological or corporate elites--or have been responsive to social values, 
enabling broadly and differentially distributed outcomes. As such, the issue 
of social justice arises. Beyond its success in fulfilling majoritarian 
aspirations, its sensitivity towards cultural differences must also be 
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considered. How and whether cultural geographic, indigenous, migrant 
and other differences have been included is indicative of whether the 
Scheme has been inclusive. 
The approach elaborated, therefore, is to draw upon critical and cultural 
studies of science and technology, 1 developing them for large 
technological systems. For such a large Scheme, one which elaborates or 
excludes many possibilities, the role of planning expertise and its rhetorics 
of efficiencies and productivities, as they relate to qualities of democratic 
process and to cultural differences are, therefore, crucial. The twin focus 
of research is upon the 'back room boys' as well as upon the social 
(majoritarian and marginal) values expressed and asserted through the 
Scheme. Accordingly, the strategies of dominant planning expertise and 
federalist processes, as they relate or fail to relate to differential interests, 
becomes the common thread of analysis. This may also highlight, via its 
unresolved conflicts, both the dominant values of the Scheme and the 
failures of democratic planning processes during the period considered. 
In doing so, planning is regarded as "an enacted, future orientated, 
narrative in which participants are the actors and joint authors ... "2 
Planning, although often dominated by expertise, is regarded, potentially 
at least, as being everywhere. Planning may also be more than a discursive 
practice, involving various sorts of story telling or enactment. As a 
practical activity, with normative concerns and symbolic connotations, 
planning is also (or should be), at once, an empirical, critical and aesthetic 
practice, or, variously interpretive.3 To counter the fragmentation 
between various (planning) disciplines and lay publics, a further task of 
critical theory (and thence planning history) is to: 
trace the paths along which science and the humanities, morality and 
art...can still communicate with each other.4 
1
• See ch. 5 in Hess, David J., Science Studies: An Advanced Introduction, New York, 
New York University Press, 1997. 
2
• Throgmorton, James A., Planning as Persuasive Story Telling: The Rhetorical 
Construction of Chicago's Electrical Future, Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 
1996, p. 48. 
3
• Forester, John, Critical Theory, Public Policy and Planning Practice: Toward a 
Critical Pragmatism, Albany, State University of New York Press, 1993. 
4
• Brand, Arie, The Force of Reason, An Introduction to Habermas' Theory of 
Communicative Action, Sydney, Allen and Unwin, 1990, p. 117. 
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Technological Determinism 
It is mainly deterministic attitudes and their associated rationales which 
sustain a ready acceptance of dominant models of technological change and 
which shield decision making processes. Technologically deterministic 
attitudes involve two basic assumptions. Technological change is external 
to society or 'autonomous' and technology impinges on society, often, some 
maintain, as the major force of social change.5 Technological determinism 
thus 'naturalises' or neutralises technology as a contestable, value-laden or 
socially shaped (as well as shaping) outcome. 
Either by a failure to cogently relate planning outcomes to questions of 
technological choice, or, by an emphasis on the 'logic' of technological 
outcomes, existing histories of the Scheme often demonstrate such 
determinism. Both Hardman6 and Wigmore,7 for example, emphasise the 
role of technical, investigative discovery. For Wigmore, the extra outputs of 
combining the Murray and Murrumbidgee diversions of the late 1940s 
dictated an outcome: 
study, analysis and discussion, all served to uncover the facts and build 
the ideas from which a new scheme emerged ... So fruitful were the 
investigations that they gave birth to a further scheme which 
eventually bridged the gap between the interests of N.S.W. and Victoria.8 
Albeit a 'discursive' process, Wigmore does not clearly foreground the 
interpretative, or conjoint, socio-technical nature of this process. The 
'uncovering of facts' is privileged as leading the way to other outcomes. 
The extra power and water potential of the 'higher-ground' options 
elaborated by the Commonwealth's Investigation Committee of the late 
1940s is not conceived as it may have a been political stratagem by which 
the Commonwealth could enlist wayward interests, perhaps leading to 
5
• Mackenzie, Donald and Wajcman, Judy, "Introductory Essay11 in Mackenzie, D. and 
Wajcman, J., The Social Shaping of Technology, Milton Keynes, Open University Press, 
1985, p. 4. 
6
• Hardman, D. J., "The Snowy Mountains Hydro-Electric Authority; Origins and 
Antecedents", Public Administration (Australian Regional Groups), Vol. 27, No. I, 
1968, p. 221. 
7
• Wigmore, Lionel; Struggle for the Snowy; The Background of the Snowy Mountains 
Scheme, Melbourne, Oxford University Press, 1968. 
8
• Ibid, p. 134. 
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'over-built' outcomes. It is characterised as itself enabling an outcome for 
all concerned. 
Although Wigmore seeks to 'calm the troubled waters' by eluding an overt 
politics of planning, he does not, however, completely down play questions 
of divergent interests. His story intends to show that the Scheme avoided 
another States' rights fiasco and argues that these interests were 
eventually satisfied. The success of these Commonwealth-led efforts 
(specifically its engineers and bureaucrats) was "a victory for constructive 
planning and ... for eventual co-operation in the common interest" .9 It is 
the States who are regarded as harbouring sectional agendas where as the 
Commonwealth is identified with the national or common good. He 
recognises, however, that, under Chifley, the Commonwealth "was 
naturally allied to Victoria in seeking maximum power generating 
capacity" .10 A systems-centric and engineers planning approach co-exists 
unevenly with public interest rhetoric and lose points about the politics of 
planning. 
Wigmore's history, one of the more significant studies, is a semi-official 
history written with the co-operation of the Authority (via the assistance 
of a Safety then Archival Officer for the Authority, Gilfillan). It seeks to 
reinstate the image of the Scheme against the challenge made during the 
1960s, sometimes seemingly to offer the views of the Authority and others 
in response to the controversies. His basic argument is that it was justified 
that the Commonwealth oversaw the systematisation of much of south east 
Australia and that technocrats loyal to their calling ably assisted it. 
Later accounts provide much greater detail but often accept such 
assumptions, tending to disconnect the technological changes from the 
drama of their narratives. Although elaborating upon events, 
technological change in subsequent works often retains an autonomous 
character. A critical approach would find it necessary to be more skeptical 
towards the opinions of experts, their systems-centric rationales. It would 
also devote attention to the political and cultural forces at work. 
9
• Ibid, p. 152. 
10
• Ibid, p. 138. 
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From Reverse Salients to Social Construction 
For critical interpretations, the notion of 'reverse salient', developed by T. 
P. Hughes in his study of early electrical systems, offers another approach 
to technological change. Hughes initially proposed the notion of a reverse 
salient as a site of incremental improvements. A recalcitrant element 
within the system thus becomes the focus of attention and this explains 
where and how systems change. 11 
Closely associated with the Scheme, H. E. Dann (eventually to become the 
Commissioner of the SMHEA), has written an important article which 
reviews the design changes made to the Scheme in comparison to the 
conclusions of the 1949 investigations.12 Dann holds that the design 
changes arose largely as a result of the improvements made to large coal-
fired power stations, which effectively lowered the value of extra water for 
hydro power production. This encouraged, for example, a specialised role in 
power production for daily peak loads. 
Dann's description provides many details of planning changes, providing 
evidence for the view that the Scheme may be considered a 'reverse salient' 
within the broader electricity grid as it met a need for generating 
increasing amounts of peak power. It is not, however, simply a question of 
the Snowy Scheme being designed to enhance the growing State systems. 
The scale of the Scheme and investment choices made suggest that the peak 
power role sought by the Authority may have, in effect, 'wagged the dog' 
by favouring or pre-supposing complementary investment in larger, base 
load coal-fired plant. Alternatively, more in line with a politics of systems 
serving expertise (see below), the Scheme may have led the way too 
quickly into an (overly) large scale and (overly) interconnected electricity 
grid. In short, for Dann, these questions of choice are not conjoint with 
technological outcomes as he concentrates upon 'phases' of conception, 
design, construction and refinement. 
"· Hughes, Thomas. P., Networks of Power, Electrification in Western Society, 
Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1983, pp. 79-80. 
12
. Dann, H. E.; "Two Decades of Engineering--The Snowy Mountains Scheme", The 
Journal of the Institution of Engineers, Australia, Vol. 41, March 1969. 
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Despite its value, for Hughes, the concept of the 'reverse salient' became a 
problematic, because merely internally referential, concept. He proceeded 
to develop notions of 'systems momentum'. Momentum, for Hughes, arises 
because of the capital committed (and its interests) as well as because of the 
welter of professional governmental, educational and other organisational 
commitments: 
the people and the investors in technological systems construct a 
bulwark of organisational structures, ideological commitments, and 
political power to protect themselves and the systems. 13 
While also emphasising social forces, other approaches in the sociology of 
technology challenge reductive, technological deterministic accounts. In 
their place they propose that technological change is thoroughly value-
laden and socially informed. Bijker characterises the 'social construction of 
technology' (SCOT) program as having several key heuristic concepts. The 
first of these, the main plank against variants of technological 
determinism, is that of 'interpretive flexibility'. The hermeneutic or 
interpretive aspect of technologies arises as technologies may be conceived 
differently by different groups. The interpretive flexibility of a bicycle 
arises as different groups have different uses for the artefact--masculine 
bravado and display or transport--such that "they may be understood as 
several different artefacts" .14 
SCOT, therefore, suggests a further concept, that of relevant social groups, 
which variously interpret the artefact. The location or relative position of 
the vying groups and their effectiveness in mobilising resources become 
important aspects of analysis. The corollary to this is that the workability 
of an artefact may be as much a political and symbolic outcome as it is a 
'purely technical' outcome; "the working machine was not considered as 
the cause of its success but as the result of its being accepted in relevant 
social groups".15 This in turn leads to the further concept of closure. As an 
artefact is developed: 
13
. Hughes, Thomas P., American Genesis, New York, Penguin, 1989, pp. 460-61. 
14
• Bijker, W. E., "Do Not Despair; There is Life After Constructivism", Science, 
Technology and Human Values, Vol. 18 No. I, Winter 1993, p. liS. 
15
• Ibid, p. ll9. 
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the focus should be on the problems and associated solutions that 
relevant social groups see with respect to the artefact. Such a description 
would then result in mapping out increasing or decreasing degrees of 
stabilisation. 16 
Expertise and Technocratic Consciousness 
Along with SCOT's emphases, Hughes (latter) emphasis upon political (or 
corporate) power also suggests that in assessing socially shaped or steered 
outcomes, the powerful, 'new class', or corporate cadres of planning, those 
who plan and controlled large technical systems, are important for any 
account. For Fischer, via the modern bureaucratic state: 
... in the decision processes of these systems, the traditional roles of 
political parties and politicians have largely given way to 
administratively based cadres of policy experts ... policy decisions are 
better understood as the outcomes of 'learning processes' among experts 
within the governmental institutions than as the struggles of external 
political forces ... at least for significant periods of time ... 17 
For example, a constitutionally frustrated Hudson, as ex-Commissioner of 
the Snowy Authority, defends the apparently 'pure engineering' emphases 
of the Scheme: 
The success of such schemes of national development is best assured if 
detailed technical agreement representing all interests at top level is 
reached prior to final political decisions being made .. .if some of the 
earlier proposals by sectional interests for the development of the 
Snowy River had been adopted this could well have resulted in serious 
permanent national loss. 18 
Via such rationales, instead of treating technological solutions as being in 
need of variation or limitation to meet differing social, cultural and 
environmental contexts, Hudson seeks to quarantine systems from contexts. 
The corollary is that contexts become amenable to being 'colonised' by 
16
• Ibid. 
17
• Fischer, Frank, Technocracy and the Politics of Expertise, Newbury Park, 
California, Sage, 1990, pp. 18-19. 
18
• Hudson in foreword to Wigmore, op. cit., pp. viii-ix. 
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externally formulated values and solutions. Applied behind a mask of 
'objectivity', administration, according to preconceived notions of 
effectiveness, comes to dominate, forming "a subtle, and sometimes not so 
subtle, form of authoritarianism. "19 Uniform, hence broadly systematised 
outcomes are preferred, as expertise (and capital) seeks to apply mass 
production methods universally. Substantive, qualitative differences such 
as alternative cultural values and democratic outcomes as well as ecological 
diversities, tend to be over-ridden and locality is remade in favour of the 
narrowly universalising. In the extreme, technocratic (quantitative, 
autonomous) rationales dominate as experts defend their corporate 
autonomy and power. As technocracy ultimately seeks a rule by trusted, 
'apolitical' expertise, it mobilises symbolically, politically and, of course, 
technologically, demanding that society should conform to systems and 
functional 'imperatives'. 
As such, technocratic rationales provide expertise with ready means for 
legitimating its own control by neutralising the contestable, value laden 
nature of technologies. Rhetorics of 'progress', 'efficiency' and the 'logical' 
seek to legitimate technological choices. Measures of technological change 
may be shorn of their qualitative frames, descriptions of technological 
change removed from cultural contexts. Supposed apolitical, scientific or 
objective--scientistic--judgements come to obscure values. Accordingly, 
critical theory suggests that such 'technocratic consciousness' often 
displaces an awareness of the values of technology.20 
Systems Momentum 
The technocratic perspective resonates with the general conditions of 
managing the production process in that it "abstracts the mechanical 
conditions of production from living labour and cultural contexts. "21 As 
this process removes qualitative (politically or culturally laden) issues by 
replacing them with mathematical or generalised, quantitative issues, it 
also has a depoliticising affect. For Feenberg, the result of this particular 
19 Fischer, op. cit., p. 43. 
20 Held, David, Introduction to Critical Theory, London, Hutchinson, 1980, p. 267. 
21 Feenberg, Andrew, Critical Theory of Technology, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 
1991, p. 123. 
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mode of reasoning, complements conservative or institutional influences to 
maintain 'systems momentum' .22 
Accordingly, for Habermas, in contradistinction to the taken-for-granted 
understandings, which give daily life (or 'lifeworld') its coherence, "the 
system refers to those vast tracts of modern society that are 'uncoupled' 
from communicatively shared experience in ordinary language. "23 
Instead, often narrowly abstracted possibilities, denuded of ethics, are 
coordinated "through the media of money and power [and] .. .it is these two 
media which shape and extend the 'technocratic consciousness'. "24 
Amory Lovins, for example, has suggested that large technical systems 
have become predominant, with electrical systems being maintained for 
the experts themselves.25 Similarly, McCully suggests that large dams have 
destructively colonised lifeworlds via lost river valleys, salted soils, wasted 
water and degraded eco-systems due to river regulation.26 Ravenscroft has 
made some strong criticisms of how the Snowy Authority itself dealt with 
communities; "over the years it was to grow into a hidebound, rigid, 
repressive, authoritarian set-up." Further, the Authority is criticised for its 
"expedience", its "machine" like character and its 11 inhumane engineers".27 
McFarlane elaborated, in effect, these fears of Ravenscroft that the Scheme 
was being prosecuted in a technocratic (all-for-the-system) manner. Both 
irrigation as opposed to power and Snowy as opposed to State power were 
being favoured.28 Primarily, McFarlane suggested that an 'engineers'--
22
• Feenberg, Andrew. "The Bias of Technology" in Pippin, R. et al (eds) Marcuse; 
Critical Theory and the Promise of Utopia, London, Macmillan Education, 1988, p. 247. 
23 Pusey, Michael, Jurgen Habermas, London, Tavistock, 1987, p. 107. 
24
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25
• Lovins, Amory., Soft Energy Paths; Towards a Durable Peace, Harmondsworth, 
Penguin, 1977. 
26
. McCully, Patrick, Silenced Rivers: The Ecology and Politics of Large Dams, New 
Jerzy, Zed Books, 1996. 
27 Ravenscroft, Mona, Men of the Snowy Mountains, Adelaide, Rigby, 1962, pp. 109, 
102, 133 & 234. 
28
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Study", Current Affairs Bulletin, Vol. 31, No. 13, May 13th, 1963, Anon, "The Snowy--
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r 
even 'Soviet-style'--approach to planning the Scheme arose such that the 
cost of capital had been down played in favour of Commonwealth-centric, 
systems building 'imperatives'. A review by Mathews, which is probably 
the best overview of the economics of the Scheme, largely agrees with 
McFarlane. The Snowy Authority's methods of economically justifying the 
Scheme were inadequate or failed to take sufficient account of "the need to 
evaluate costs and benefits according to the way they are spread over 
time. "29 
Elaborating the economic critiques, Davidson linked firmly held beliefs in 
the benefits of water development to over-investment and instability: 
the Australian people would have had a higher standard of living if the 
area of irrigated land had been smaller. .. the instability of agricultural 
production during severe droughts is increased by irrigation.30 
Davidson concluded that peak power could have been produced at around 
70% of the cost of the Snowy Scheme.31 Critical of the expansion of 
irrigation around Coleambally, Davidson would have preferred the water to 
be used amongst established farms: 
Farmers will obtain large profits from the additional Snowy water, but 
this has only been achieved by the remainder of the community paying 
a higher price for electricity than would have been necessary if power 
had been provided from thermal plants.32 
The Contestable State and System--and Social Learning 
Somewhat altering his earlier doubts about scale, engineering expertise 
and central planning, McFarlane in 1968 considered that "hydra headed" 
planning outcomes arose as a result of a federalism failing to "work towards 
common objectives."33 He shows how a range of departments and 
29
• Mathews, R., Ch 6 "Power, Fuel and Light" in his Public Investment in Australia; A 
Study of Australian Public Authority Investment and Development, Sydney, Cheshire, 
1967, p. 180. 
30
• Davidson, B. R., "Projects in Southern Australian in his Australia Wet or Dry?, 
Melbourne, Melbourne University Press, 1969, p. v. 
31 Ibid, p. 167. 
"- Ibid, pp. 181-2. 
33
• McFarlane, Bruce, Economic Policy in Australia: The Case For Reform, Melbourne, 
Cheshire, 1968, pp. 68ff. 
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commissions tangled up in competing agendas and how this resulted in two 
main affects. Open and orderly planning was curtailed, whilst the 
Commonwealth sought to transfer debt to the States. Accordingly, for 
McFarlane: 
The idea that Australia is a single nation is often forgotten by the States. 
How much a State grabs or fails to grab depends on its ability to 
embarrass the Federal government.34 
Held and Krieger suggest, however, that the process of gaining consent 
from differential groups is, necessarily, a complex affair, often requiring 
"strategic intelligence" by vying, policy making arms.35 This significantly 
qualifies any 'functional' technocratic approach. More astute experts will 
politically and symbolically vary their plans to accord with political and 
cultural opportunities, to match the political cycle or steering hopes of 
government. Secondly, as mentioned (above) by Fischer, a process of 
review internal to the bureaucracy may test and facilitate the social, 
political and technical feasibility of a project. Thirdly, and contra any ideal 
of simple co-ordination of state instrumentalities, a state dealing with 
vying bureaucracies may find it necessary (quoting Hall) to foster some 
deliberate policy "malintegration" such as to render any single, 
bureaucratic force ineffective.36 
Indeed, the qualitative, if institutionally dominant, social choices involved 
in planning the Scheme may be sensed from the Scheme's planning 
debates. This also points to the federalist, political constructedness of the 
Scheme. McColl is quite explicit; "inter-state politics provided the main 
reason for the final choice.n37 
Similarly contestable, the (re-)distribution of benefits via a state managing 
technological change, alt4ough complex, is not necessarily functional for 
corporate or techno-bureaucratic interests. Even though government 
processes may be colonised by money and power to enable greater scope 
34
• Ibid, p. 81. 
35
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for the narrowly instrumentalising, gains may be won for workers, 
women, environmental protection and for different cultural values such as 
indigenous claims. Access to the planning practices of technological 
change may be expanded. 
In particular, by placing the margins of the Scheme back into relation to 
its dominant centres, the character of planning as inter-disciplinary, 
'social learning', may be assessed. As social learning involves "thematic 
dialogues and the exchange of stories with others" such that "learners can 
become the 'transforming agents' of their own social reality", planning as 
social learning relates to the qualities of democratic processes.38 What may 
be considered to be an efficient supplier of irrigation water or energy may, 
from a different perspective, be regarded as an equally 'efficient' threat to 
biological diversity. The question is often one of efficient for whom, within 
what framework of evaluation? In short, both process and criteria may 
need to be re-formed and reconciled. 
Accordingly, outcomes may be assessed as one may do a 'constructive 
technology assessment' that considers the gains different social groups 
achieve as they become part of the complex, challenging process of social 
learning and of the continuing (and often institutionalised) dialogue.39 
That is, akin to Habermas' 'ideal speech situation', the (preferably on-
going) open processes of discussion and planning may also be assessed, 
especially as historical 'counterfactuals' and institutional means arose to 
constantly argue, review, distribute and reformulate outcomes. 
More generally, Habermas suggests that social change (or the construction 
of large technological systems) does not necessarily result in colonisation 
alone. If properly controlled by active and effective symbolic and political 
steering effort and by the evolution of communicative, institutional 
mechanisms, these systems may complexify and diversify society. 
Similarly, Sclove, as he considers democracy and scale, although seriously 
concerned by the erosion of local self-reliance and the momentum of large 
bureaucracies, can allow for large technological systems if "the quality 
38
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39
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of .. .interrelations and activities" is high.40 That is, to return to Habermas, 
such effort may justify expanded, if often institutionalised possibilities, for 
critique and learning, rather than merely systematising society. In short, 
such progressive 'rationalisation' may arise and "Habermas wants us to 
study the evolution of society as the rationalization of the lifeworld. "41 
This may also serve to qualify criticisms of the scientistic character of 
planning rhetoric. After the 'social waste' of depression and war, 
'technocratic consciousness' may have been mixed-in with desires for 
progressive rationalisation, for social 'order against chaos' and the 
institutions needed. 
Cultural Geographies and Environmental Risks 
Given the huge amounts of social, political, institutional and industrial 
effort, via an extractive, production-consumption economy, that has gone 
into large technological systems, their combinations of the socio-technical 
have involved substantial 're-wiring' of nature's cycles, of rivers and 
water flows, of carbon and other material flows. For Vogel, therefore: 
nature ... is not independent of the subjective: rather it is something we 
constitute in our social (and communicatively organised) practices.42 
As Williams also suggests, as systems arise the resulting cultural 
geographic (or eco-cultural) affects are paramount: 
These constructions are tangible structures existing in geographic 
space ... In the creation of structures, nature is understood primarily as 
space, and the system as a means of organising space ... [and quoting 
Nordberg-Shultz] 'in the cultural landscape man "builds" the earth'.43 
40 Sclove, Richard E., Democracy and Technology, New York, The Guilford Press, 1995, 
p. 124. 
41
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The electricity grid, for example, as it steps up the sinusoid voltage, lowers 
current and thence resistive losses enabling more power to be 
economically transported down long wires. Accordingly, electrical 
transformers alter our relation to geographic locale. What were once 
remote coal fields may now become close. The grid delivers power to where-
ever we want it and space is 'collapsed' as an affect of the grid. As dam 
building modifies the cycles of water availability, broad swathes of 
landscape are transformed. Interacting with broader value systems, 
disjunctural 'epistemes' of experience arise, systematised into other, 
cultural geographic terrains. 
The modernising production-consumption economies of the post-war 
period have, however, been undertaking "creeping ecological 
expropriation" as large systems have sought the 'full utilisation' of 
resources and as they have displaced or deferred the ecological risks.44 
Whether engaged in by companies or by states, this has resulted in 
"everyone pursuing a scorched earth policy against everyone else--with 
resounding but seldom lasting success" .45 Industrialised methods of 
agriculture, for example, as they focus on the intensified use of material 
resources, may lose sight of, or displace, environmental risks. Over-
clearing of land and irrigation salting of soils may arise if a 'full 
utilisation' idiom gains too great a hold. Frith and Sawer have reviewed the 
physiographic, ecological, historical, constitutional and urban and 
regional planning assumptions by way of seeking to better manage the 
Murray (and broader) water resource.46 
In short, cultural habits--as whole ways of understanding and living--
reform nature and involve environmental risks. Enlistments into modes of 
occupation involve various 'eco-cultural' experiments, which often 
degrade natural resources. The values of large technological systems have 
cultural geographic results that may involve particular oversights. For 
Vogel, therefore, his communicative theory of nature results in the 
question "what ... should the communicatively and practically constituted 
world we inhabit be Iike?"4 7 In place of simple dichotomies between nature 
44
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and culture, competing versions of 'narrated natures' with various 
institutional capacities for learning about differing perceptions of risk, 
arise. Historically, therefore, it may be asked what risks were perceived 
and the extent to which institutional reflection arose. 
The Symbolic Representation of Systems 
The socio-technical and cultural geographic character of large systems 
suggests that technology is, thirdly, symbolically laden and contested. Such 
encodings contest and legitimate the possibilities of technology, to have it 
challenge or conform to dominant social relations. Latterly, a "technical 
code" (Feenberg, 1991 p. 78ft), as it seeks to correlate knowledge to power, 
often mobilises symbolically. Technocratic consciousness, symbolised, 
forms this bridge. Further, Debord suggests that image making is often for 
the powerful as they seek to organise a whole array of social and technical 
practices. Jappe, quoting Debord, suggests pessimistically that this 
instrumental use of the image, or "the spectacle", thus seeks: 
"incessant technological renewal" and the "integration of State and 
economy". And in its most recent phase it has three main consequences: 
"generalised secrecy; unanswerable lies; an eternal present"48 
Nevertheless, as art or critically orientated symbolic practice gives 
expression to the taken-for-granted, they open up the taken-for-granted 
by their revelations. Accordingly, art may allow for a critical 
interpretation of technology and its assumptions. Similarly, art may enable 
the understanding of other understandings, of other cosmologies or 
cultures. On the other hand, given the significance of 'technical codes' or 
'technocratic consciousness' in curtailing choices, image-making also 
becomes a primary device by which technologies and planning options are 
limited and limiting. Similarly, technological change is often projected as 
being inevitable or as being eternally new.49 
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Specifically, Sekula provides a rich analysis of representations of mining 
technology and the reification of social relations of capitalism.50 Nye 
considers the consumerist individualism favoured by and favouring the 
growth of large electrical systems.51 In a manner which is sensitive to the 
uses of the awe-inspiring aspects of massively remade cultural geographies 
(via dams, open cuts, bridges, transmission and transport grids etc), as well 
as to the productive or legitimating aspects of representations, Nye also 
examines the (spectacle of the) technological sublime as: 
emotional configurations that both emerge from and help to validate new 
social and technological conditions.52 
The modernising icon par excellence for large irrigation and hydro 
electric systems has been the Tennessee Valley Authority. It and the New 
Deal of US President Roosevelt offered a model for nations world-wide of 
how statist development could contribute to nation building--such as the 
Snowy Scheme. Relatedly, Davidson's economic critique of irrigation 
begins by stressing the cultural beliefs that inform these massive changes: 
No belief is more firmly held in Australia than the scarcity of water has 
hindered the nation's development...settlement would have occurred 
more rapidly and the population would be much larger. .. no sacrifice is 
considered too great...in order to increase its supply.53 
Pownall, in her The Thirsty Land, positions the Scheme firmly in terms of 
how it serves this 'imperative' (also see her bibliography for related, 'water 
myth' works).54 
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Cultural Studies 
Such iconic models and the consequent relations of power between 
metropolitan and provincial (or settler) societies also allow, however, an 
active appropriation. Although Australian settler society has experienced 
little colonial violence, a corollary to the heterogeneity of imperial-
provincial power, is that there is (if weakly) an "ambivalently positioned" 
'colonial' subject.55 
More substantive colonial relations in Australia have arisen between first 
and subsequent (settler) nations.56 As a consequence, it is necessary to go 
beyond 'constructionist' approaches as they may neglect minority rights or 
ignore those groups without effective voices or which are systematically 
excluded from the agenda.57 Similarly, Cohen, in the case of the Cree and 
Inuit peoples of Northern Quebec, facing hydro electric schemes at James 
Bay and elsewhere, suggests that the "failed promises ... of the discourses of 
rights and the public use of reason" be exposed and the "structuring 
absence at the heart" of nation building in Quebec has been "that of the 
native communities."58 
A cultural critique of technological systems that goes beyond problems of 
distribution to also consider the "grammar of forms of life" is also 
required.59 Relatedly, and as we have seen, to further problematise the 
matter, propositions of science or technology imply (for Wynne) certain 
social or cultural values: 
sc1ence is articulating and imposing not only propositional claims but 
tacit formulaic and hermeneutic ones too--in other words, symbolic 
ones about the performance and legitimacy of social institutions, and 
55
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about the 'naturalness' of particular models of human nature and 
relationships .60 
Importantly, therefore, a regime of science or technology may thus 
overlook or fail to recognise cultures which: 
are highly dynamic systems of knowledge involving continuous 
negotiation between 'mental' and 'manual' labour, and continuous 
interpretation of production experiences [which] induces a highly 
complex and detailed knowledge system and a flexible adaptive culture 
which does not lend itself to standardisation or planning.61 
Accordingly, however diffused with other possibilities, indigenous 
traditions may be overlooked or dismissed by the 'universalising' and 
standardising Western science tradition, because of its imperial desire to 
re-organise the world and "to optimise the production of this standard 
universal ideal type. "62 Within Western traditions themselves, stark 
dichotomies between expert versus lay knowledge also underwrites, for 
Wynne, "a more basic lack of recognition of the cultural/hermeneutic 
character of scientific knowledge." This also: 
seriously constrains the imagination of new forms of order and of how 
their social legitimation may be better founded. 63 
Cultural perspectives should, therefore, be more able to capture the 
"fundamental indeterminacies in knowledge" and an analysis of the role of 
lay publics or the 'grass roots' may enable such a broader conception. In 
place of lay publics being mainly subject to or 'duped' by expertise, Wynne 
suggests that a more dependent or mutual and ambivalent relation often 
exists between lay publics and expertise. 
Relatedly, there exist a multitude of sites for analysis such that non-
traditional design constituencies could be considered as they decentre 
conventional accounts and highlight the choices actually being made. The 
60
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use of migrant labour, for example, requires an awareness of the problems 
of differences in the workforce, especially of language as it relates to 
safety and training. The social engineering of the 'populate or perish' 
Snowy Scheme calls for critical analysis of the resultant 'multi-cultural 
workforce'. Wajcman suggests that technological skill is often a source of 
identity formation for men as they dominate the technoscientific 
professions and gain affirming identity queues from the cultures of 
engineering and technoscience, which concomitantly denies women.64 
Access for women to the technical or scientific trades and professions has 
often been barred and production remains primary, suggesting that a male 
culture is also being maintained. Penley and Ross consider politically 
engaged 'technocultural' combinations of the social and technologica1. 65 
Counter-practices may also include technocultural challenges, such as 
symbolic or political practices, as well as (alternatively contextualised) 
technoscientific practices. Similarly, identities-in-process, whether of 
nation-state, groups or individuals, can provide different modes of nation-
forming. 
Again, therefore, the methodology remains multi-disciplinary: 
In the final analysis we are not confronted with exclusive choices: 
either empirical theory or interpretative theory or critical theory ... An 
adequate social and political theory must be empirical, interpretative 
and critica/.66 
Without privileging technological, political, symbolic or environmental 
practices, the conjoint aspects of large 'nation building' systems may be 
interpreted via "conjunctures of adventitious occurrence. "67 Presuming 
inter-disciplinary social relations of planning weaving together, the 
relation between these is more open to critique. In particular, the 
following critical and cultural studies approach to planning, combines 
interdisciplinary themes of culture and power such that the politics of 
expertise is considered along-side often compounding issues of cross-
64
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cultural relations, environment, gender and class. In turn, these themes 
are actively related to issues of democracy, its institutions and social 
justice.68 In sum, by variously joining an identity politics (or cultural 
studies) of large systems with a politics of expertise and of the 
representative state (via critical studies), the procedures, aims and 
outcomes of planning can be better critiqued. How and whether experts 
and publics sought and achieved democratic, differentiated and, for their 
times, environmentally sensitive outcomes may be assessed. 
(iv) Infrastructure's Cultures (Periodised Literature Review) 
By way of seeking to locate, thematise and to critically interpret planning 
conjunctures according to the ways in which the planning of the Snowy 
Scheme has related to a range of cultural differences, the existing and 
contextual literature is now reviewed in greater depth. 
The choice between Murrumbidgee, Murray or Snowy options 
Two early articles in the Current Affairs Bulletin of 1948 and 1952, written 
to encourage discussion about the choices being made in the planning and 
construction of the Snowy Scheme, provide useful historical detail. The 
first reviewed the two most favoured options being considered during the 
early 1940s under the Chifley government, options of diverting the Snowy 
River either to the Murrumbidgee or Murray rivers. It acknowledges that 
local, inter-state and electric power versus irrigation differences were 
involved in these choices. The article then suggests that Victoria has few 
legal rights over the Snowy but that a strong economic case exists for the 
Murray, power diversion option. This first article thus highlights a power 
versus agricultural or comparative advantage theme. In fact, by also 
framing its comments within the Rural Reconstruction Commission's belief 
that water is a most important commodity for Australia, it concludes by 
reiterating the "great importance of the agricultural argument."69 
For this initial planning period (1938-45), relevant contextual history is 
provided by Hallam, as he recounts the crucial rise of the McKell Labor 
68
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government of New South Wales from 1941.70 This government actively 
supported--and came to power on--the irrigation proposal to divert the 
Snowy to the Murrumbidgee. As such, and also given a third planning 
option of leaving the water in the Snowy River for a run-of-the-river 
hydro electric project, a major, initial set of planning choices, related to 
'irrigation versus power' choices, regional aspirations and inter-State 
rivalries, arises. 
Given that the emerging, cross-border planning responsibilities were 
largely state-based, legal-constitutional histories dealing with the rights of 
the Commonwealth over especially river resources, become relevant. 
Irving, for example, characterises the effect of section 100 of the 
Constitution, which prevents the Commonwealth from abridging the right 
of a State to "reasonable use of the waters", as leaving the control over the 
rivers in a "constitutional muddle."71 Sandford Clark offers an historical 
account of water law noting the importance of State-controlled rights 
rather than riparian or river bank access rights in Australia.72 
Along with State (and metropolitan) rivalries, it was a time when regions 
were being legally defined and those around the Australian Alps began to 
manoeuvre. In a set of seminar articles, edited by Scott, aspects of regional 
development linked to Snowy Scheme outcomes are considered. 73 In 
particular, Wettenhall considers the Snowy Authority as a local example of 
a public corporation along the lines of the Tennessee Valley Authority 
(TVA) which was formative for regional development in the United States. 
He suggests that the federally controlled TV A example was used by the 
Commonwealth mainly to "fend off' the States to prevent any local or 
regional initiatives continuing once the Authority was established.74 
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Harnett has written a detailed account of the history of regionalism 
including as it relates to 'TVA-ism' in Australia.75 Powell's history of 
'bioregionalism' or TVA-like multipurpose development within the Basin is 
also relevant, especially as it considers the 'quantitative' or instrumental 
tendencies of this recontextualised engineering approach.76 The common 
assumptions joining city-country cultural geographies, as well as between 
'garden-cities' and 'riverine-country', is apparent via Freestone as he 
reviews the garden cities and towns of Australia.7 7 Crease considers how 
the TVA is a 'template' for and of a changing North American society.78 
Similarly, for this first planning choice, Snowy Scheme planning decisions 
were related population outcomes. This involved a large measure of 
consensus around a White Australia policy. Post-war reconstruction and 
regionally linked development was a way of shoring up whilst also 
refiguring a White, Anglo-Celtic cultural outpost, to populate Australia with 
British or European migrants or face 'race suicide'.79 In short, this first 
planning period and choice relates cultural--especially nationalist--nation 
building aspirations to Snowy Scheme linked regional aspirations. These, 
in turn, relate to federalist politics. 
The Choice Between Separate or Combined Options 
The second Current Affairs Bulletin article accepts the political reality of 
the 1949 'compromise' design, a combined Tumut (thence to the 
Murrumbidgee) and Murray diversion of the Snowy.80 Given the 
surprising and/or late decision to combine two of the options, this suggests 
intra-state and/or bureaucratic strategies were in play. Conjunctural with 
what may be characterised as the second major planning choice of the 
combined option, legal and political-bureaucratic contexts become 
important. 
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The extra energy-producing capacities of the combined option allowed the 
Commonwealth to claim that such 'defence-related needs' implied federal 
control, as did the TV A in the United States. Accompanying the 
Commonwealth powers under the Seat of Government Acceptance Act 
(1909), which transferred rights to generate power from the Snowy River 
to the Commonwealth for the Australian Capital Territory, this defence 
rationale formed a basis by which to claim a constitutional right--given an 
antagonistic High Court--to plan and construct the Scheme. Wigmore 
provides a good coverage of this rationale. 8 1 
That the process and outcome of the Commonwealth's investigation work 
was, indeed, political or value-laden is illustrated by Lewis. Ronald Lewis 
was Director of Engineering within the Commonwealth Department of 
Works and Housing and took the position of executive officer of the Snowy 
investigation committees, co-ordinating the work of sub-committees (I 946-
9) whilst chairing the hydro-electric sub-committee. Lewis' insights arise 
as a result of one of his justifications for his and (his fellow engineer's) 
Rowntree's authorship, which was not to deny but to 'admit' that viable 
proposals had also to be "politically acceptable.''82 
Further, the combined proposal was only revealed to the investigating 
committees in any significant detail at a late date.83 Contra technologically 
determinist accounts, a case for a value laden combined diversion, planned 
according to both political interests, procedural method and rival statutory 
authority/departmental interests arises. Further, the possibility that the 
Scheme was beginning to be over-engineered arises as a result of this 
emerging liaison between expertise and the Commonwealth government 
and/or via this technocratic-political process of securing 'agreement'. 
Contextually, for such an obscured choice, Alexander recalls post-war 
reconstruction as a time when the inter war prevalence of State based, 
semi-autonomous, resource bureaucracies were challenged by a resurgent 
Commonwealth, especially via the "bureaucratic intelligentsia" of post-war 
81
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reconstruction.84 Love recounts the popularity of 'money power' economic 
theories of the 1930s and 1940s, seeking to reform post-Depression 
capitalism.85 Similarly, Wiltshire sees planning emerging from the 1930s 
as a polarised concept but it gained credibility after the experiences of 
war .86 Rowse emphasises the importance of the emergent managerial 
classes and their associated legitimating ideologies of a "humane 
technocracy" seeking consensus around full employment for security.87 
To Enlarge Adaminaby to Eucumbene Dam? (Choices between Rival State 
and Commonwealth Systems I) 
To return to the article of 1952, as it accepted the combined choice, the 
controversy is about the speed or extent of construction of the Scheme and 
about "choices involved in national investment", given the then current 
credit squeeze affecting all infrastructure projects.88 Relieving such 
pressures, however, McFarlane and Catley suggest that the benefits of loans 
from the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development during 
the 1950s were "considerable", allowing a "more rapid rate of economic 
growth and a higher rate of immigration. "89 
By the mid 1950s, Hudson, appointed from a position of chief engineer at 
the Sydney Water Board to be 'Commissioner sole' for the Snowy Mountains 
Hydro Electric Authority (SMHEA), provides a particular rationale for the 
operation of the Snowy Scheme. In the context of the neighbouring 
electricity grids, the older and smaller metropolitan coal fired stations 
(being less efficient and hence used intermittently for peak loads) will 
become uneconomic. Thence, as the load continues to grow, Hudson 
anticipates that the Snowy will become the major way in which this 
84
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demand for peak power will be met.9° Connolly, of the State Electricity 
Commission of Victoria (SECV), foresees difficulties, however, in co-
ordinating irrigation and power outputs and suggests that New South Wales 
and the Commonwealth should be paying more of the costs.91 
Accordingly, this period of initial construction and co-ordination with 
competing State-systems, also forms a third, significant 'moment' of choice. 
In particular, interesting material is provided by McHugh on the re-
location of the Adaminaby dam such that: 
the new version of the Scheme hinged around a central storage at 
Eucumbene that would not only be much bigger than planned, but would 
also link the northern and southern sections of the Scheme.92 
Detail of the bureaucratic moves and counter moves is, however, again 
absent from accounts. On the matter of the Commonwealth-States or inter-
governmental 'Agreement' negotiations, about to begin once Menzies took 
power, Wigmore sheds little light on why there was a delay for over three 
years until a committee was convened.93 The federalist, resource politics, 
negotiated by the institutional innovation of the Snowy Mountains 
Advisory Council, from 1950 to 1958, when the Agreement was completed, 
receive only cursory attention. Similarly, the protracted negotiations over 
the costs of power from the Scheme, especially if it were to exceed the cost 
of power which the States could generate themselves, is only briefly 
considered and not as it relates to planning outcomes.94 
The 'brown coal first' approach of the State Electricity Commission of 
Victoria,95 especially as it had plans to use briquettes as a peak power 
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supply, is also absent. The outcomes are, instead, a "victory for planning"96 
(perhaps in answer to McFarlane et a!) or result in "improvements to the 
basic scheme" .97 Wigmore spends most space outlining the resulting 
Agreement rather than examining the Council's dynamics.98 Collis, regards 
the agreement 'negotiations' as being a delaying tactic until work was so 
advanced, that New South Wales especially, could not reasonably refuse to 
continue 99 
As also mentioned by McHugh, 100 and coincident with this delaying 
strategy as well as to the 'third' planning choice, is the theme of 
burgeoning myth-making. Often attracting nationalistic rhetoric, begun 
and continued in the light of 'public' controversy, image-making, from the 
first moments, became a major aspect of the Authority's and the Scheme's 
existence.101 
Gilfillan's card bibliography in the National Archives of Australia 
(Canberra) lists nearly four hundred magazine articles, mainly from the 
1950s and 1960s which eulogise the Scheme and record local historical and 
technical matters.102 Geoff Ramsey has produced an extensive 
bibliography on the films produced by the Authority, listing over 100 
items. 103 Extensive files of photographs exist in the Authority's offices at 
Cooma and at the Australian Archives, Canberra. Esau reviews the 
photographic output of the Authority noting its main themes of the 
conquering of nature, its large scale and combinations of "machine and 
labour [and] progress through technology" .1 04 Fashioning images and 
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conducting tours of the sights and sounds of revitalised national industry 
was becoming a major corporate device. 
The politics of the Cold War and the Split, were also brewing. Murray and 
Hagan provide detail of the politics whilst d'Aipuget provides details about 
the federal industrial court. 105 The Menzies Era, edited by Prasser et al., 
provides further contextual political-economic detail as does Lee in his 
Search for Security, the latter being especially useful on the relation 
between foreign and economic policy given that large loans arrived at the 
same time as US contractors.1 06 McFarlane and Catley point out that the 
Arbitration system was used during the 1950s to maintain a shift in 
distribution of national product from labour to capital of about I 0 per 
cent.107 Lowe details how the early years of the Menzies government (1950-
1954) sought to construct a "national security state" for an anticipated 
world war. As well as inflation, this produced "excitement and anxiety" 
around issues of technological development whilst polarising politics into 
Cold War oppositions and away from regional (and local) issues of 
decolonisation .1 0 8 
In sum, whilst experts negotiated a relocated and much larger dam, nation 
building for national security pressures grew, whilst Cold War tactics were 
being set against labour. A struggling Advisory Council, a growing 
emphasis upon corporate public relations amidst fears of 'foreign 
communists', all vied at a time of a directive conservative government. 
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The Upper Murrumbidgee to the Upper or Lower Tumut? (Choices between 
Rival State and Commonwealth Systems II) 
From the mid 1950s, construction intensified. The eventual acceding by the 
Authority to a New South Wales industrial award is, for Collis, the turning 
point of acceptance of the Scheme's constitutional validity.1 09 Exactly how 
the concerns of the State governments were resolved by this demarcation 
issue is not, however, addressed. Relatedly and fundamentally, for 
Hardman, the new contractual arrangements introduced by the Snowy 
Authority arise as speed is seen by 'all' involved as the important criterion: 
it would appear that the Authority was under political pressure to 
commence actual construction on its inception and subsequently 
maintain a rapid rate of physical progress. 1 10 
In a recuperative manner, Hardman then considers industrial relations 
(where bonuses mitigated against stoppages), housing (where 
transportable towns saved time and money) and safety (where the 
emphasis appears to have been on educating workers but not on re-
designing work rates and practices). Hardman also provides the most 
detailed consideration given to the (crucial) Snowy Mountains Agreement 
negotiations of the 1950s. 111 He is critical of the lack of economic expertise 
which the Authority displayed. 112 
The introduction of US contractors and their take-over of the Adaminaby 
(or Eucumbene) dam project is regarded by Collis as a crucial episode in 
this regard as they "revolutionised employment terms, conditions and work 
expectations".113 The production-line of the mine, the piece-rates, the new 
tunnelling equipment and the machismo competitiveness of the miners (at 
the encouragement of the contractors}, are all extensively covered by 
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McHugh and Collis. The question of safety and the speed of the work is also 
addressed. 
Even though conditions faced by the predominantly migrant workers are 
well covered, more questions could be asked about this rate, especially as it 
allowed planners to achieve alterations. The working conditions for 
migrants in particular, the relations with the community and with the 
Americans plus the broader connections to State and Federal governments, 
are largely seen as facilitating or impeding the layout of the Scheme, not 
constituting its actual form. 
Nevertheless, crucially for planning outcomes as influenced by industrial 
relations, McHugh describes how the Australian Workers Union (A WU) and 
the New South Wales Industrial Relations Commission in league with Kaiser 
contractors, arranged a deal to avoid federal coverage and, in effect, to 
charge cost escalations to the Snowy Authority. 114 The A WU is portrayed--
via the interviews--as being more concerned about its own power and 
membership strength than about the welfare of the workers. 
Further, Ravenscroft is broadly critical of the lack of support provided by 
the Authority for secure and stable communities for Snowy workers and 
their families, continually abandoning settled villages. In terms of gender 
power relations, McGoldrick throws further light on the masculine 
imperatives at work within the Authority. 115 
In doing so, a further critically orientated theme is raised. The distribution 
of benefits to those who worked on, or who supported workers of the 
Scheme, and how this related to Agreement negotiations and thence to 
planning outcomes, is broached. Via the intensification of Agreement 
negotiations and thence work practices on Upper Tumut works (as plans 
were being made to divert Upper Murrumbidgee water to the Upper rather 
than Lower Tumut}, the pressures on planning choices may be related to 
redistribution issues during the mid to late 1950s. 
Contextually, Kobal provides many insights into the dislocated cultures of 
isolated migrant workers on the Scheme seeking to adjust to a new 
114
• McHugh, op. cit., pp. 151-4. 
11
'. McGoldrick, Kirsty, Snowfraus: The Women of the Snowy Mountains Scheme, East 
Roseville, Kangaroo Press, 1998. 
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homeland. 116 Particular experiences as well as statistics of 'DP's' or 
displaced persons, migrating to Australia after war and being recruited to 
spend their two year work-as-directed contract on the Scheme are provided 
by Kunz. 1 17 Kunz also notes, as summarised by Jupp, the ambivalence of 
migrants as it combined "gratitude at rescue from Europe with resentment 
at exploitation by the Australian authorities. "118 The context of the 
growing 'migrant communities' of industrialising Australia (including the 
Snowy) and the political, industrial, training and cultural difficulties faced 
by them, this "reserve army" of labour, is also addressed by Jupp.119 
How Flexible a 'North-South' Interconnection? 
In a manner which may form an implied relation between indigenous 
rights and planning outcomes, Unger provides details of design decisions, 
via comments from the engineers involved and which relate to the 
continually expanding demand upon regulated water flows. The state 
electricity commissions are said to have come around to the planning 
philosophy of peak power by the time it came to design the Tumut 3 power 
station. 120 The design change to integrating the north-south division, 
which marks a new orientation of the Scheme within a larger grid system, 
are outlined. 121 Latterly, the plan for completely reversible water flow, via 
this interconnection, was disputed by South Australia's Premier, Playford. 
As he was concerned to protect water quality for South Australia, this may 
also form a (fifth) planning choice, which can be linked to indigenous, 
'qualitative' (indigenous and/or environmental) claims as well. 
Seddon has written an environmental-heritage history of the Snowy River 
itself. He highlights the dubious economics of the Scheme but rarely 
discusses the historical claims and counter-claims for this river's 
waters. 122 He discusses the indigenous peoples of the Tumut or northern 
"
6
• Kobal, Ivan; Men Who Built the Snowy; Men Without Women, Sydney, Saturday 
Centre, 1982. 
117
• Kunz, Egon F., Displaced Persons: Calwell's New Australians, Sydney, Australian 
National University Press, 1988. 
118
• Jupp, James, Immigration, Melbourne, Oxford University Press, 1998 (2nd ed.), p. 
I 05. 
119
. See chapters 3 & 4 in Jupp, James, Arrivals and Departures, Melbourne, 
Lansdowne, 1966. 
120 Unger, op. cit., p. 174. 
121
• Ibid, pp. 114-16. 
122
. For comments on the Scheme's economics see ch. 2 in Seddon, G., Searching for the 
Snowy: An Environmental History, Sydney, Allen and Unwin, 1994. 
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regions as well as those from the Snowy Valley. Seddon also details the 
cultural geographic changes to the river valley and considers the 
Aboriginal history and culture of the 'custodians of the land'. 
Except by Seddon, the history of the dispossession and/or dispersal of 
Aborigines from the alpine and associated regions have often been glossed 
over or ignored by the principal accounts. Early land wars were crucial in 
this history of dispossession, 123 as were destructive assimilationist policies 
since the arrival of Europeans. 124 Flood, albeit from an archaeological 
perspective, provides much detail of pre-European indigenous habitation 
and culture of the alpine and nearby regions. 125 Latterly, and importantly, 
this has given rise to further debate and clarification about the practices of 
traditional indigenous peoples and the continuing occupation by their 
descendents. 126 Taped interviews have been made recording the 
experiences of Aboriginal people of the regions, with occasional 
reflections about the Scheme itself.127 That more historical work is 
required to meet changing Australian legal requirements for land rights 
post-Mabo,128 has been recommended by the 'Stolen Generations' 
inquiry.129 Work is currently being undertaken by Wesson on an atlas of 
south east New South Wales and north east Gippsland. Aboriginal 
researchers in co-operation with t~e New South Wales Parks and Wildlife 
Service are seeking to contribute to this process. 13 0 
123
. See, for example, Gardner, P. D., Gippsland Massacres: The Destruction of the 
Kurnai Tribes 1800-1860, Ensay, Ngarak Press, 1983. 
114
• Gardner, Peter D., "Aboriginal History in the Victorian Alpine Region", in 
Scougall, B (ed.), Cultural Heritage of the Australian Alps: Proceedings of the 
Symposium Held at Jindabyne, New South Wales, 16-18 October 1991, Canberra, 
Australian Alps Liaison Committee, 1992. 
125
• Flood, Josephine, The Moth Hunters: Aboriginal Prehistory of the Australian Alps, 
Canberra, Australian Institute of Aboriginal Studies, 1980. 
126
• Scougall, B., Cultural Heritage of the Australian Alps: Proceedings of the 
Symposium Held at Jindabyne, New South Wales, 16-18 October 1991, Canberra, 
Australian Alps Liaison Committee, 1992 and Young, Michael with Ellen and Debbie 
Mundie, The Aboriginal People of the Monaro, Sydney, NSW National Parks and 
Wildlife Service, 2000. 
127
• Hodges, Sue, Australian Alps Oral History Project 1994, unpublished report [and 
tapes], Canberra, Australian Alps Liaison Committee, 1994. 
128
• Rowse, Tim., After Mabo: Interpreting Indigenous Traditions, Melbourne, 
Melbourne University Press, 1993. 
129
• Wilson, R. D./National Inquiry into the Separation of Aboriginal and Torres Strait 
Islander Children from their Families (Australia), Bringing Them Home: Report of the 
National Inquiry into the Separation of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Children 
from their Families, Sydney, Human Rights and Equal Opportunities Commission, 
1997, p. 297. 
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More recently, Mussared has 'translated' the results of recent scientific 
studies into the alarming degradation of the rivers of the Basin as they 
have been subject to systematised flows.'3 1 White has reviewed the paleo-
archaeological reasons for land degradation in the Basin. 132 Breckwoldt 
provides historical account of the Soil Conservation Service of New South 
Wales.133 Of the Alps themselves, Hancock provides an environmental 
history as does the earlier work of Costin, reviewed by Robin. 134 
Constitutional issues of control over water also remain of relevance; the 
Yorta Yorta inland waters and land claim was recently heard before the 
Victorian Federal Court. It failed and is to be appealed. 
(v) Critique in Outline--Fordist Rivers 
In this study of the planning of the Snowy Scheme, the argument of the 
thesis will be presented in a five chapter structure. Via the critical and 
cultural studies approach outlined above, five significant moments of 
planning identified in the literature review are investigated, each 
concentrating on one significant episode of interpretative choice. 
Covering aspects of planning changes from the late 1930s to the early 
1960s, these technocultural choices concern the fundamental layout of the 
Scheme's principal components of tunnels, dams and power stations. 
By selectively examining the piece-by-piece aggregation and re-focussing 
of its 'multi-purpose' design, it will be shown that diversifying, 
democratising and/or corporatising as well as dependent processes of 
'nation building' were involved. Inter-governmental or federalist resource 
planning processes, as large irrigation systems and the inter-state 
electricity grid were being formed, provide a common thread of analysis. 
Oppositional threads, from communities and cultures advantaged or 
sidelined, provide crucial counterpoints. 
131
• Mussared, David, Living on Floodplains, Canberra, The Murray Darling Basin 
Commission, 1997. 
132
• White, Mary, Listen ... Our Land is Crying, Kenthurst, Kangaroo Press, 1997. 
133
• Breckwoldt, Roland, The Dirt Doctors: A Jubilee History of the Soil Conservation 
Service of New South Wales, Sydney, The Service, 1988. 
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. Hancock, W. K., Discovering Monaro: A Study of Man's Impact on his Environment, 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1982. Robin, Libby, "Radical Ecology and 
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Technocultural Borderlands and Schemes of Nation 
Initially, the crisis of being 'alone in Asia', arising especially during World 
War II, is followed by the emergence of the US as a global power and by 
TV A models for development. These models interplay with multi-stable yet 
also limited possibilities for planning regions, linked to Snowy Scheme 
options and hence for nation building. Specifically, regionalism, re-
contextualised in Australia as a new, 'grass roots' planning movement, 
becomes important. As the variously imagined Snowy Schemes feed 
horizons of local development, they are considered in relation to 
possibilities of a federally or state aligned regionalism. Decentred 
possibilities of regionalism--indigenous and other aspirations--are also 
considered. Nevertheless, a directive, or 'scientific', strand of 'TVA-ism' 
came to dominate, as the Commonwealth sought control of the Scheme. This 
'quantitative' regionalism, part of an evolving post-war reconstruction, 
encouraged an expansive, mass production approach to the development of 
the water cycle and of ecological systems. 
The Hydro-Electrified River on the Hill 
These regionalist manoeuvres, linked to Commonwealth financial strategies 
aimed at 'outflanking' the State's constitutional powers over resources, 
allowed the Commonwealth to gain partial planning control of the Scheme. 
The second chapter considers how planning processes fared in this context. 
The constitutional challenge to nationalised banking by the States and 
capital added to the Commonwealth's troubles. These circumstances 
encouraged a defence-linked (TVA) justification for Commonwealth control 
as well as expert secrecy over Snowy options as the Chifley government 
struggled to ensure security for labour. In particular, the embattled 
Commonwealth government sought an 'automatic', hydro-energy-intensive 
emphasis approach by combining two, already large options. This led to the 
marginalisation of the Snowy River region. As planning advanced 
according to the hegemonic 'efficiencies of scale' of engineers to better 
enlist the wary States, all water went west with little consultation. Amongst 
constitutional and post-war global-politic strains, the growing technocracy 
was accompanied by a quantitative, majoritarian outcome. 
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Now Bloomed by Diesel Fumes 
With the coming to power of Menzies from late 1949, a Liberal-Country 
Party alliance shifted the Scheme's focus. Via the enlargement of 
Adaminaby to Eucumbene dam, it shifted towards a more financially viable 
(energy intensive) agribusiness Scheme. This is explained within the 
context of a shifting range of corporate, global capital and internal 
coalitions and tensions, tending toward a dependent, commodity export 
economy. Extra finance and expertise was required and World Bank loans 
arrived in parallel with (mainly) US construction methods and capital to 
build 'irrigation' projects for such trade. The role of filmic public relations 
campaigns and of a mooted Snowy Mountains Council is also considered as 
such a shift was negotiated with the States. As lignite in particular was cut, 
and amongst the drums of hot and cold war, engineers indulge in graphic, 
technological frontiersmanship. Filmic public relations in support of large 
technological systems vie with the possibilities of institutional 
communicative practices. 
Infrastructure's Migrants & Uncle Toms 
As plans for the Upper Tumut shift towards meeting shorter rather than 
longer term (or intermediate rather than peak load) power requirements, 
and amongst the continuing strained negotiations between governments 
and engineers, cross cultural labour relations become vital. Specifically, 
industrial standards failed to keep up as new construction equipment and 
pressures for quicker outcomes arrived. Circumstances were dominated by 
disputes over uniform taxation powers, rights over resource planning 
powers, vying systems building emphases, growing corporate unionism 
and piece-rate work regimes. A case study of the organisational work of a 
union representative for migrant workers, however, reveals how realities 
on the ground were a challenge to both unions and management. Jerzy 
Bielski challenged the false populism of assimilationism and the economic 
pressures eventually helping to ease the exploitation of a multicultural 
workforce labouring in dangerous circumstances. 
Enclosing Circles of the Basin 
Fifthly, the redesign of the Eucumbene to Geehi tunnel to prevent water 
flowing from the Upper Murray to Upper Tumut catchment, is examined as 
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an example of a partially successful, if contradictory, challenge to the 
dominant post-war, 'full utilisation', water planning ethos. Playford, as 
Premier of South Australia, challenged a simple quantitative paradigm with 
his concerns about falling riverine water quality. Playford required that 
Upper Murray (although not Upper Snowy) water be retained in its river 
basin. In parallel, by reviewing indigenous heritage and the often 
dislocated relations to land and water, non-quantitative indigenous claims 
to water (which had implications for major planning changes) are also 
examined. 
Conclusion--Interpreting a Spinning Reserve 
Finally, by way of characterising outcomes, the metaphor of 'spinning 
reserve', beyond its technical or emergency stand-by meaning, is used to 
assess just how inclusive, environmentally benign and democratic this 
megatech project has been. 
Along with the construction of highly regulated or 'fordist rivers', many 
social outcomes were in tune. Within the framework of post-war 
reconstruction, regional planning focussed on an extractive approach to 
the water cycle and on co-ordinating regional resources for a 'full 
utilisation' economy in a semi-arid terrain. Decision making processes also 
became quantitative and 'scientific'. Communicatively constructed 
outcomes were often circumvented amidst competing corporate forms and 
constitutional strain. Amongst shifting, global trading blocs and Cold War 
deals, sophisticated public relations then came forward in the early 1950s. 
Potentially more open institutional options were stifled by nationalist 
rhetoric. Then, Cold War unionism and industrial democratic processes 
privileged Anglo-centric values, exacerbating problems faced by a cross-
cultural labour force. Indigenous cultures lost out to highly 
instrumentalised outcomes that sought to achieve Anglophone goals. 
Nevertheless, the 'country first' Scheme, part of the government backed or 
'socialised' credit regimes of the Keynesian 'golden age', contributed to the 
support of (most) faltering rural and regional areas and to full 
employment, dramatically improving the standard of living of regions (and 
of cities). Many groups also developed their capacities to argue their case. 
The Snowy Mountains Council eventually emerged as an institutional 
mechanism for brokering vying systems philosophies. Corporatist and 
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assimilationist unions facing problems of an expanding migrant 
workforce, gradually learnt how to deal with cross-cultural difficulties. The 
Scheme included in its built outcomes, recognition of claims seeking to 
protect water quality. Although little regard was given to indigenous 
claims to resource rights and to custodianship, their claims have persisted 
through the half-century since the project began. 
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Chapter 2: Technocultural Borderlands & Schemes of Nation 
During the late 1930s in Australia, a number of interests were competing 
for economic and social advantage. The traditional mainstay of the 
economy--agriculture--was again seeking to achieve leadership. Water 
engineering, too, was seeking to overcome the social malaise of Depression, 
arid interiors and a lack of human resources and adequate population. In 
1936, for example, Alex J. Gibson, an engineer from the Murrumbidgee 
Valley, offered a survey whilst addressing the topic: "shaping the future of 
Australia". He sought to apply reclamation to apolitical or scientific ideas. 
By combining a mixture of Veblen and co-ordinating, 'multi-purpose' 
development approaches, as a way of conserving and developing resources, 
he considered the engineers' role. In the current "machine age", the 
prevention of "avoidable waste" had not, he argued, been undertaken. His 
conclusion was that expertise, as a conservation-as-planning engmeer, 
could mitigate the cycle of droughts and floods and control its waste. 
Sufficient water exists "for our purposes" but the problem was to "regulate 
the periods of prodigality and scarcity. "1 
By late 1937, amidst continuing efforts to improve the main storage on the 
Murrumbidgee, the Burrinjuck Reservoir, it had been agreed that a federal 
conference of senior irrigation commission officers would be convened. It 
would discuss possibilities and measures to, at least, "plan a program of 
development. "2 Frank Brewster, the Chief Engineer of the New South Wales 
Water Conservation and Irrigation Commission (WC&IC) had two years 
earlier submitted a fifteen (and later twenty) year program of 
development. Its focus was on the water resources of the State, for the 
Murray Darling Basin in particular, but its details remained to be 
investigated. The New South Wales Cabinet was unable to ensure that the 
Loans Council would agree to the on-going expenditure required. 
Nevertheless, the Agricultural Council, itself relatively new and 
Commonwealth backed, was also resolving to push for "co-joint action. "3 
'- Gibson, J. A., "Shaping the Future of Australia", Journal of the Institution of 
Engineer's Australia, Vol. 8, No. I, 1936, p. 37. 
2
• "Next 30 Years Vital to Australia", SMH, 6/12/37. 
3
• Extract from report of proceedings of meeting of Australian Agricultural Council, 
August, 1937, SRNSW: 18/1337, 38/8422, Water Conservation & Irrigation. proposed 
national scheme. 
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J. ]. C. Bradfield, as the colourful doyen of Australian engineering, was soon 
doing much to publicise such ideas. Bradfield, indeed, was developing such 
'conservation' ideas as the proposal that the central and eastern portions of 
the continent be rid of desert! A fiscally provocative 'climate change' 
proposal for watering the interior, amounting to a cultural geographic 
challenge for nationhood, was his device. This combined soil and farm 
conserving scenario involved various inland diversion and storage 
schemes. Canals and tunnels spread across the north of Queensland would 
bring water inland, under the Selwyn and Great Dividing Ranges and two 
other schemes, in the Eyre Basin and along the Fink River, would dam flood 
waters.4 Its aim was to replace the often absent drift of monsoonal rains 
into much of the interior (figures I & 2). Applying the latest civil 
engineering technologies of United States inspiration to the problem, the 
Eyre Basin and everything eastward was to be saved. 
Given the semi-arid and drier natures of the interior, Bradfield argued that 
for such a dry continent, radical engineering proposals were required. 
Bradfield believed that the current problems arose as a cumulative process 
of drying lands, leading to further drying out, especially to the east, as the 
weather and the dry air drifted across the continent from the parched 
interior. He therefore emphasised the outback, as if it were a defence line 
for the agricultural viability of the whole country. There was a need to 
supply water to the interior, a lot of water: 
The thing is cumulative in this way; the arid air-drifts from those 
desolate, wind-swept wastes in the interior can bring withered pastures 
and dried up water holes to districts far removed from the actual scenes 
of drifting sands ... How then would you propose to deal with this invisible 
foe? ... The cry that goes up from the perishing inland is for water. Water 
is the key of heaven so far as those inland regions are concerned. Water! 
Water!. .. If the inland withers it will bring desolation to the cities on the 
coasts; not famine in a day, but slow and certain economic death, 
keeping pace with the great basic industries (wool, wheat and meat) as 
they shrivel.5 
4
. Burton, John R., Water For The Inland - A Review of the Bradfield Plan, Sydney, 
Water Research Foundation, 1961, p. 2f. 
5
• 'Bacblox\ "The Conservation and Control of Water", The Pastoral Review and 
Graziers Record, 16/2/38, p. 138. 
5 1 
Figures 1 & 2; Map from Idriess, 1., The Great Boomerang [1941], facing page 
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In terms of its biological and soil histories, the continent had taken a 
dramatic turn since an earlier Gondwana Age, to produce the driest 
continent on the planet, with over two-thirds of the continent classified as 
arid.6 This served to broaden the elder engineer's scope. Astonishingly 
perhaps, given the rates of evaporation and layers of salt, as a supporter 
argued, "our only hope for recovery is the flooding of our central 
depression." This would "renew" the "ancient rainfall" and, as a result, 
"restore ... Paradise. 117 
Not only was the country side suffering from soil erosion and drought, 
Bradfield believed, it was a countryside suffering from neglect by city 
politicians. As drought and financial hardship had bitten hard into 
farmers' incomes and tne state of the lands, city-country tensions were also 
high; "the attitude of the average suburban M.P. (and he predominates in 
Australian Legislatures) is that the backblocks can go to the dogs ... " He also 
suggested that broader forces were at work. Writing under the name of 
'Bacblox', he sought to explain that a certain monetary chain of causation 
travelled across the countryside. Deteriorating or flat financial conditions 
also made the countryside vulnerable to metropolitan financial interests. 
The downward investment spiral "affects the banker in his office in 
London who is backing the pastoral company that supports the stockowner 
who holds the territory in the threatened area" (figure 3). Thence, with 
this combined neglect, "areas are now being threatened by chronic 
drought and soil erosion ... "8 
In contrast to prevailing orthodoxy, therefore, 'water conservation' of the 
late 1930s often entailed a fiscally expansive vision as well. It sought to 
counter the debt-shy tenor of the 1930s with a proto-Keynesian thence 
expanding ('full utilisation'), consumerist economy, or, for the moment at 
least, sought to apply ideas of social credit. It was often against restricted 
credit that had (recently) seen so much "financial oppression. "9 For the 
popular writer of outback and travel stories, Ion Idriess, for example, by 
6
• White, M. E., After the Greening; The Browning of Australia, Kenthurst, Kangaroo 
Press, 1994, p. 13. 
7 Warren, J. C., "The Creeping Menace of the Inland", Life, 2/11/42, p. 23. 
8
• 'Bacblox', op. cit., p. 138. 
9
. Love, Peter, Labour and the Money Power: Australian Labour Popularism /890-1950, 
Melbourne, Melbourne University Press, 1984. See chapter 7 "The 'A plus B' of 
Financial Oppression - Douglas Credit". 
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1941, "money and costs have taken on a new meaning." It was no longer 
necessary to suffer from privatised credit but to count "the snowball effect 
of the resulting benefits" 1 0 of a socially underwritten program of 
expenditure. Even as Bradfield's continental-scaled futurism would come to 
be dismissed as impracticable, proponents sought to offer an engineering 
and financial challenge by mooting a massive, if speculative, national 
development project. 1 1 Inspired by the challenging ideas, Ion Idriess--
more daring than most--then joined forces with the agrarian nationalism 
of the diesel powered water engineers. In his The Great Boomerang ( 1941) 
he stated: "it cannot be said that our job is impossible ... these are the days of 
the bulldozer ... and with all the advances in engineering science, surely we 
can do it." 12 
At their pre-war, nationalist root, these budding technological, political, 
financial and media-savvy forces were also seeking to be the means by 
which an enlarged and thence more secure 'White Australia' nation could 
be built. To return to Bradfield's scenario, the ultimate aim, as described by 
Idriess, was to defend Australia by avoiding the "deadly peril" of a thinly 
populated country, to have "a fighting chance of survival in any future 
war. "13 Similarly, for the editors of the Queensland Producer, such projects 
offered the "vision of a new inland province", a province that would "prove 
an important factor in any plan of defence." 14 As suggested by the title of 
Idriess' book, The Great Boomerang (1941 ), a modernising, 'aero dynamic' 
swathe of development across the centre of the continent would act as a 
defensive device; this plan would "bring new cities, new industries and a 
great, far-spread population in our inland." 15 The civil engineering 
academic John Burton later remarked, "in 1940 many people felt the 
Bradfield plan to be essential to our national survival. "16 Bradfield was at 
least an immediate tonic, if also long term proposal, for discouraging a 
Japanese threat of invasion. 
10
. Idriess, I., The Great Boomerang, 
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• Davidson, B. R., Australia Wet or 
1969, p. 227-9. 
l2 Idriess, op cit, p. 227-8. 
13 Ibid, p. 235. 
Sydney, Angus and Robertson, 1941, p. 250-1. 
Dry?, Melbourne, Melbourne University Press, 
14 Anon, "The Birth of an Inspiration. A Different Queensland Visualised by Dr. 
Bradfield", The Queensland Producer, J/3/39, pp. 28-33. 
15 1driess, op. cit., p. 235. 
16
. Burton, op. cit., p. 15. 
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As such, this 'Great Boomerang' offered to populate the interior and to 
bring the country back to a time when "parakeelia clothed the 
landscape" 17 whilst harnessing an apparently vacant, yet frustratingly 
profligate nature. To continue laying foundations for agrarian nation 
building was to boldly control and remake nature. That is, for that 'old 
curmudgeon' Bradfield again, "the conquest of those interior lands, at 
whatever the cost, is a job of work that Nature has given us in our own 
country." 18 His was a challenge to a worthy yeoman of Empire ethos--and 
occupation--seeking to boost the historically dominant, agrarian 
frontiersmanship of nation building. Such themes of preventing rivers 
running to waste, to build up an agrarian population, would provide a 
major popular backdrop to post-war planning (figure 4). 
As well as proposing a swathe of development through an appropriated 
image of the boomerang, Bradfield was, ironically, seeking to restore lands 
to the state established by the Aborigines. As a result of the long history of 
being cultivated by 'fire stick farming', Aborigines had produced 
grasslands with a "fine park-like appearance" as John Oxley wrote about 
the Lachlan Valley in 1817.19 Thence settlers moved in "and benefited 
from, the ancient society and economy. "20 Now, however, in place of 
abundant bird life, the land was suffering from overgrazing, rabbits and 
drought. Far from being "empty spaces", Aborigines had also constructed 
their own riverine structures. In the north of the Basin at Brewarrina, for 
example, stone structures existed "to maintain a constant yield of fish no 
matter how dry or flooded the rivers might be. "21 But when paddle steamers 
were able to travel far enough upstream they progressively broke down 
the fishing weirs.22 Ironically, stones from the weirs formed other 
foundations. Just as the 'parklands' served to found agriculture, the stones 
were used to form river crossings, enabling settler access to the north of 
Brewarrina. They were also used in the foundations of town buildings and 
17
• 'Backblox' [Bradfield], "Water for the Perishing Inland", The Pastoral Review and 
Graziers Record, 16/8/38, p. 881. 
18 Ibid. 
19 Oxley quoted in Reynolds, Henry, With the White People, Melbourne, Penguin, 
1990, p. 9. 
20 Reynolds, Henry, With the White People, Melbourne, Penguin, 1990, p. 17. 
21
• Goodall, H., Invasion to Embassy: Land and Aboriginal Politics in New South Wales, 
1770-1972, Sydney, Allen and Unwin, 1996, p. 11-12. 
22 
"'Ngunnha': The Aboriginal Fisheries", SMH, 611134. 
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Figure 4; Cover photograph from "Australia's Empty Spaces", Current 
Affairs Bulletin, Vol. 12, No. 1, 14/9/42. 
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road works.23 Nevertheless, proposals to defend a more prosperous nation 
extended beyond a conquering attitude towards nature and denying 
indigenous culture. Many competing proponents, arising unevenly 
amongst dominant approaches, sought to enhance mutual dependence, or, 
co-existent possibilities of nature-technology-polity-culture. Concepts such 
as 'grass roots' planning and devolved regionalism, for example, suggested 
that multipurpose river basin development could encompass vying and 
overlapping approaches, beyond the narrowly instrumental. 
Diverse strands of multipurpose development were also inspired by US 
precedents. Multipurpose river basin development had been pursued by 
the Tennessee Valley Authority, a major New Deal initiative of Franklin 
Delano Roosevelt. It sought to provide employment and re-development of 
the over-farmed and poverty stricken Tennessee Valley. Involving a 
'whole river basin approach' to the planning of development, TV A-ism 
entailed the co-ordination of activities by central (Federal) engineering 
administrative organisations. Its ambit grew to cover activities as diverse as 
flood control, soil-conservation, hydro-electricity generation (coal and 
nuclear electricity generation later), reforestation, irrigation and other 
activities. Before the corporatism of the TV A emerged, it was a highly 
complex and contested vehicle for planning idioms. As it exampled the 
success of 'active government' in overcoming Depression, it provided a 
major, worldwide icon for the pursuit of modernising development. 
The American historian and planning critic, Lewis Mumford, advocated 
more democratically responsive and locally related approaches. He 
proposed an ethic of technology that elaborated potentials of a region, to 
enhance or to bring "out a hitherto undiscovered color"24 , such that 
regional elaboration enhances distinctions between regions, multiplies 
differences and brings out (selected) emergent qualities. The revealing 
character of technology is understood as potentially in sympathy with 
rather than in opposition to a now difficult to separate-out 'environment'. 
Beyond, therefore, city-country polarities of power and colonising control, 
concepts such as "earth-culture" or "bio-technics" were coined. Through 
regional development, nature and its local characteristics could gain 
greater expression. 
23
. Dargin, P., Aboriginal Fisheries of the Darling-Barwon Rivers, Brewarrina, 
Brewarrina Historical Society, 1976, pp. 57, 63. 
24 Mumford, Lewis, The Culture of Cities, London, Seeker and Warburg, 1938, p. 313. 
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Consequently, the TV A project was viewed optimistically by Mumford in 
1938, as a trajectory that considered such possibilities. It was a potential 
harbinger of a "new social order and a new type of urban environment", 
provided, of course, that "the requisite political courage and social 
imagination are collectively brought to bear. "25 In place of 'agglomerating 
cities' and the accompanying dust bowls and degraded towns and farms, a 
political program to empower those on the land was anticipated. It offered 
to challenge existing dependencies of the country on the city--to revivify 
the countryside--through overturning degrading forms of land-city 
symbiosis. 
Although often the result of inequitable bargaining, the United States had 
also evolved many land rights treaties, dating back for over a century. 
Federal control over indigenous affairs, aimed at establishing "domestic 
dependent nations", arose during the first half of the nineteenth century. 
These granted limited autonomy for indigenous peoples within a context of 
overall control by the States. In 1909, water rights for reservations were 
granted.26 Although not mentioned in land treaties, the US Supreme Court 
ruled that water rights were, in effect, granted with an earlier treaty and 
as much water as necessary should be available to make the reservations 
livable.27 Later, the Supreme Court held that these indigenous water rights 
were prior and superior to other claims.28 Nevertheless, a major 
countervailing influence arose from the Bureau of Reclamation as it 
interpreted indigenous American water rights "as narrowly as possible. "29 
Further, within the federalist system of the United States, the success of the 
efforts of indigenous peoples have also varied according to the power of 
the States as they "compete most directly with the tribes for economic 
benefits arising from control of resource development. "30 
As part of the New Deal of Franklin Roosevelt, indigenous Americans then 
gained improved federal protection for their treaties and greater respect 
25 Ibid, Illustration 23; "Agents of Regional Development". 
26 Burton, Lloyd, American Indian Water Rights and the Limits of Law, Lawrence, 
Kansas, University of Kansas, 1991, p. 6. Also see Norris Hundley Jnr., "The Dark and 
Bloody Ground of Indian Water Rights", Western Historical Quarterly, 9, 1978, pp. 
455-82. 
27
• Berkman, Richard L. and Viscusi, W. Kip, Damming the West: Ralph Nader's Study 
Group Report on the Bureau of Reclamation, New York, Grossman, 1973, p. 154. 
28 Ibid, p. 154. 
29 Ibid, p. 157. 
30 Burton, op. cit., p. 7. 
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towards their particular claims to resources. Better protection against 
efforts by the States to gradually whittle away their resources was 
provided, although no Supreme Court support would be forthcoming to 
bolster water rights per se. The new Commissioner for Indian Affairs, John 
Collier, also favoured the granting of "opportunities at self government", 
and encouraged the revival of tribal customs, "including the original 
language and religion of each tribe. "31 Collier was also concerned to place 
professionally trained indigenous Americans in positions of responsibility 
within their own communities. The vast majority of work, however, 
consisted of indigenous Americans doing labouring jobs for the Civilian 
Conservation Corps. Nevertheless, the 'New Deal' for indigenous Americans 
would profoundly influence local efforts, especially as they arose in 
concert with the Snowy Mountain Hydro Electric Scheme. 
The actual design for the use of the Snowy River current during the late 
1930s was a relatively inexpensive run-of-the-river proposal.32 It was 
designed to be installed in two, parallel stages, as money became available. 
Water was to be diverted across a long and steep bend in the river from 
near Jindabyne to Biddi Point, a distance of about 18 miles. It would utilise, 
in two generating steps, a seasonally tumultuous drop in the altitude of the 
river (or a hydraulic head) of about I ,850 feet. It was also associated with 
regional aspirations. As early as 1920 the 'South Eastern Gate' of Australia--
the area of south-eastern New South Wales and east Gippsland--had been 
hoping to benefit from the hydro-electric potential of the Snowy River. 
The local progress association, the Twofold Bay Development League, was 
keen to pursue this project and foresaw the port of Eden, and other towns, 
being developed into large provincial centres. Local electro-metallurgical 
processes could also take advantage of the Eden's superb, deep-water 
harbour and, with manufacturing industries established to do likewise, it 
was hoped that Eden would become "the Manchester of Australia",33 
exporting to the world. 
But even this modest scheme was deemed to be too large for the region and 
out of the State Government's financial reach. Consequently, in 1935, the 
31
. Lowitt, Richard, The New Deal and the American West, Bloomington, Indiana 
University Press, 1984, p. 122. 
32 New South Wales Government. Report on Electrical Development in New South Wales, 
Sydney, Govt. Printer, 1937 [the Rendell, Palmer and Tritton Report], p. 102. 
33
• Twofold Bay Development League, The South Eastern Gate, Eden?, The League, 1926, 
p. 24, 62. 
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Snowy River Hydro Electric Development League was formed. It had the 
spur of representing a place remote from the metropolis, to stand up for 
local possibilities, and to insist that this favoured hydro project was a way 
of redressing this "callous" neglect.34 Indeed, those who lived in the south 
east of the State of New South Wales lobbied for this 'Rendell, Palmer and 
Tritton scheme' (named after consulting and design engineers) according 
to the political methods of the Country Party, of the doctor of medicine, 
Earle Page (in particular) and his pursuit of the Premiership of New States. 
Within this approach, Federation implied that future new states would anse 
as a result of the 'logical' or expansive agrarian development of the 
continent.35 
A new design for the Snowy Scheme was, however, about to be mooted by a 
regwn on the other side of the range. It would combine an expansive-
diversion vision with the priority of the irrigation commissioners--for 
irrigation--and led to renewed political scope for the scheme. The 
Murrumbidgee Irrigation Area (MIA), the 'home turr of the WC&IC with its 
planned, garden towns of Griffith and Leeton, had been relying upon the 
undersized dam at Burrinjuck. With the drought of 1938, plus more farms 
and more rice growing, and continuing debt problems faced by fruit 
growers whose trees were only just bearing fruit when the Depression hit, 
water was soon at a premium36 
The Large Area Holders Committee of the MIA organised a meeting in mid 
January 1939 to consider the options--a bigger wall at the Burrinjuck Dam 
or a dam on the Tumut (a tributary of the Murrumbidgee). The meeting was 
impressed by the proposal put forward by a local surveyor, Reginald 
Harnett, to divert water from the Snowy to the Murrumbidgee. Instead of 
acceding to the run-of-the-river proposal, he had revived a design based 
upon proposals brought before the 1884 Lyne Commission. He suggested 
that the State government review the cost and practicability of such a 
diversion and received a standing ovation from the meeting by way of 
endorsing this approach. The meeting closed with the setting up of the 
34 Trist, E. F., The Snowy River As A National Asset, Berridale, The Snowy River 
Hydro Electric Development League, 1943, p. 19. 
35
• Page, E., Truant Surgeon, Sydney, Angus and Robertson, 196?, p. 171. 
36
• An extensive treatment of these developments is given in Ke1ly, B. M., From 
Wilderness to Eden; A History of the City of Griffith. Its Region and its People, 
Griffith, Council of the City of Griffith, 1988, esp. Ch. 9; "Triumph Out of Diversity; 
'The Snowy River Scheme"', from which I have drawn upon for the following. 
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Murrumbidgee Valley Water Conservation Committee. It would become the 
Murrumbidgee Valley Water Users Association (MVWUA) and would lobby 
for extra water for their valley (figure 5). 
Before parting, Harnett gave to Reid, the New South Wales Minister for 
Agriculture, plans of the diversion. Reid, in turn, handed them on to the 
chief engineer of the WC&IC, Frank Brewster. Not surprisingly, the 
Commission soon came to believe that a diversion to the Murrumbidgee 
should be investigated instead of the proposed Rendell, Palmer and Tritton 
scheme.37 In fact, this diversion would provide a major boost for Brewster's 
still dormant fifteen year program of developing the States water 
resources.38 Firstly, the broader plan for the Basin would store water along 
the lower Darling. This would enable New South Wales to better meet its 
responsibilities to supply South Australia with water. Thence, the Snowy-
Murrumbidgee diversion would greatly enhance irrigation prospects in 
the Murrumbidgee Valley.39 But the New South Wales Mair-Bruxner 
coalition government continued to be as wary as ever of the extra 
expenditures involved, let alone any new plan. It continued to suggest that 
Commonwealth assistance be sought.40 
The Labor opposition leader in New South Wales, William McKell, was less 
inclined towards such fiscal conservatism. McKell had been studying the 
New Deal policies of the Roosevelt administration, finding them an 
"inspiration."41 With his election to the party leadership in 1939, an effort 
was made to improve Labor's country standing, under the slogan "the only 
real country party is the Australian Labor Party. "42 McKell laid out a 
comprehensive set of rural policies at a special policy launch at West 
Wyalong. Under the general rubric of a 'Master Plan', a broad survey of 
agricultural potential was to be undertaken and a major 20 year program of 
dam construction across the State was to be commenced.43 This was, in 
31
• WC&IC, Extract from Minutes of Commission Meeting No. 1113, 26 June, 1939, 
SRNSW: 3K 60046, 39/15134, Investigation, Diversion, Ariel Survey. 
38
• Report from Brewster to Rawlings, "Alternative Scheme for diverting the waters of 
the Snowy River into the Murrumbidgee ... ", 1417/39, SRNSW: ibid. 
39
. "Water Conservation on the Darling", Murray Valley Newsletter, Vol. 4, No. 9, Sept. 
15, 1949, p. 141. 
40
• Letters from Mair and Bruxner to Minister for Agriculture, 17/8/39 and 1112/39, 
SRNSW: 3K 60046, 39115134, op. cit. 
41
• Hallam, Jack, The Untold Story: Labor in Rural New South Wales, Sydney, Allen and 
Unwin, 1983, p. 41. 
42 Ibid, p. 49. 
4
'- Ibid, p. 47. 
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Figure 5; Sketch by Harnett, R., "Sketch. Showing proposal to tap the Snowy 
River. .. ", 6/1 /39, attached to "Alternative Scheme for diverting the waters 
of the Snowy River into the Murrumbidgee ... ", Report from Brewster to 
Rawlings, July 14, 1939, SRNSW, 3K 60046, 39/15134. 
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effect, an enthusiastic endorsement of Brewster's own plan to provide 
water to the western lands. Consequently, whilst campaigning at Griffith, 
McKell announced that the Snowy River waters should be used, as in the 
case of the TVA, for both electricity generation and irrigation. 
Using this fiscally expansive development of the State's water resources 
and a 'New Deal' planning rhetoric, the McKell Labor Party then won many 
country seats and political office. Crncially, the success of McKell and 
Brewster also stood as a major victory for 'Bridge Street', or, for the 
languishing expertise within the land, agriculture and irrigation 
departments, lined up along Circular Quay's dress circle street (figures 6 & 
7). 
The Commonwealth Government, soon also a Labor Government after 
Menzies lost his majority on the floor of the House, was keen to undertake 
planning initiatives. In October 1942, the Government sought to pass a bill, 
the Constitution Alteration (War Aims and Reconstruction) Bill, which was 
to be secured by a referendum. This Bill would seek greater powers to 
enable the Commonwealth to undertake post-war reconstruction work. The 
Commonwealth issued a booklet prepared by H. V. Evatt outlining the 
Commonwealth's case for the planned development of resources to meet 
economic equality, security and full employment objectives: 
When the war is over, Australia will be confronted with the greatest task 
of economic rehabilitation in her history .... The whole history of the 
Commonwealth Constitution shows that these problems cannot be solved 
without wider powers in the hands of the central Government.44 
The simple dichotomy was that it was either "plan or no plan? plan or 
chaos? ... do we leave it to the blind forces of economic anarchy?"45 With the 
continuing shortages of material and labour in the post-war period, this 
"represents one of the most significant reasons for an integrated plan for 
all government, semi-governmental and local public works. "46 It would 
also be a defensive measure as development was intimately enmeshed with 
the need to populate the continent, to ward-off potential aggressors. It was, 
44
• Evatt, H. V., Post- War Reconstruction. A Case For Greater Commonwealth Powers, 
Canberra, Govt. Printer, 1942, p. 116. 
45 Ibid, p. 7 
46
• Ibid, p. 59. 
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Figures 6 & 7; Facade and figure (Stuart), old Lands Department Building, 
Bridge Street, Sydney and photo of McKell on Tractor, from ALP, Five 
Critical Years, Sydney, the ALP, 1946 . 
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as earlier enthusiasts for inter-basin diversion projects had been 
advocating, necessary to "develop the physical resources of Australia in 
order to help support a larger and more prosperous population. "4 7 
Regionalism could also give effect to social priorities. It could re-distribute 
development through the cultured environ of a 'natural economic region' 
enabling regional employment; "the just claims of relatively neglected 
areas must also be considered. "4 8 The new powers sought covered power 
projects, irrigation schemes, improved transport and other services such 
that "when private spending fails to employ all available workers, the 
Government must step in and ensure their employment. "49 
Boldly planning for the future, the Director General of the new Ministry 
for Post War Reconstruction, H. C. ("Nugget") Coombs, saw technological 
decision making as passing through a period in which more intensely 
democratic orientations were gaining priority. In response to the ideas of 
writers as diverse as Mumford, Frank Lloyd Wright, the Griffins, William 
Morris and Kropotkin, the bureaucratic and political leaders were hopeful 
that "human communities could, by corporate action, shape the context in 
which the lives of their members were to be lived."50 Similarly, for Coombs, 
echoing Mumford, many voters were also recognising "the intrinsic 
character" of their regions and were "dreaming dreams of development 
which would bring out that character in more distinctive ways." The 
precedent of the TVA had stimulated a "flood" of literature about planning 
"for large areas with a common ecological basis" and increased awareness 
of how "the potential of modern technology could be placed at the disposal 
of communities ... "51 They were halcyon days for the new planners as they 
contemplated local control and ecologically responsive proposals. 
Hopes for politically open planning and for 'order' against a Constitution 
preventing the Commonwealth from co-ordinating outcomes arose (figure 
8). Douglas Dundas yearned for idealised, co-operative, masculine certainty 
and calm. Together, scientists and workers can avoid the disasters of 
recurring recessions, can transcend their political polarities. Between the 
47 Ibid, p. 86. 
48 Ibid, p. 70. 
49 Ibid, p. 58. 
50
• Coombs, H. C., Trial Balance, Melbourne, Macmillan, 1981, p. 60. 
5
'- Ibid, p. 59-60. 
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Figure 8; Painting, Dundas, Douglas, "Science and Industry", reproduced Ill 
Australia To-Day, 30110/43, p. 58 . 
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death masks of war and the smoking chimneys of peace, the new 
technologists emerge as a brotherly priesthood to prepare the ground for 
the large projects.52 Yet, at this moment of infinite stillness, in the new 
dawn of a post-war 'scientific mankind', a strong sense of a narrow, 
scientific rule, also emerges. The burgeoning role of a large administrative 
class is captured in Dundas' image of the scientist-manager, celebrated with 
metaphors of fact. 
Because of the growing Commonwealth role over planning as well as 
because of their alternative proposal, deputations from the Southern 
Tablelands as well as from East Gippsland were not just seeking facts. They 
were preparing to lobby the Commonwealth. The Treasurer, Chifley, then 
pushed the Commonwealth's role in national development. Under a 
Commission appointed to "examine national works throughout Australia", 
Chifley assured the Snowy River Shire representatives that he would 
"arrange for the programme set out by the Shire of Snowy River to be fully 
examined and reported upon by the Commission in due course. "53 Less than 
one month later, in March 1943, as the Department of Post War 
Reconstruction and national works priorities were being formed, there 
came an announcement that the Commonwealth had decided to consider the 
Snowy Scheme as a possible post-war project. 
In July 1943, the National Works Council was established. In line with his 
expressed intent to the Snowy River League, the Snowy Scheme was already 
on the list, Chifley having requested that the Co-ordinator General of 
Works take up the matter "for discussion with the appropriate State 
authorities. "54 The Prime Minister, Curtin, had written to the Premiers as 
well. In line with the river basin or 'multipurpose' context for such 
development, he had written on the use of regionalism as a means of co-
ordinating public works. In particular, the Commonwealth sought a 
strategic link with the regional bodies, "a direct link with their activities." 
This, however, could undercut the power of the States.55 Indeed, the 
52
• Rowse, T., Australian Liberalism and National Character, Melbourne, Kibble Books, 
1978, p. 174. 
53
• Chifley to Perkins, 22/2/43, and related letters, NAA: MP831, 1955/714 Part I 
(file 6/9), Snowy River Hydro Electric Development. 
54
• Lewis, R. B., Development of the Sno..y River Scheme, Canberra, The Department of 
Works and Housing, 1971, p. 6. 
55
• Australia. Commonwealth Department of Post-War Reconstruction (in conjunction 
with State Departments responsible for Regional Planning), Regional Planning in 
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conference between Commonwealth and States Officers of the 30th of 
March 1944, held in preparation for the forthcoming Premiers' 
Conference, saw the States put up great resistance to the idea of expanded 
Commonwealth control via regionalism. The· States sought to prevent the 
Commonwealth from having direct contact with regional bodies. The 
conference came to a tentative conclusion that "[regional] committees 
could act in a planning and advisory capacity only."56 
Meanwhile, in the previous December (1943), a New South Wales Water 
Conservation and Soil Conservation Advisory Committee had reported. 
Formulated by Commissioners Evatt and Rawlings of the WC&IC and its Chief 
Engineer, Brewster, with the Director of the Soil Conservation Service, Sam 
Clayton, the report on water conservation and irrigation elaborated the 
plan for the long term development of the State.57 The report also favoured 
putting into effect the recommendations of a 1939 Interstate Conference on 
Water Conservation and Irrigation, that is, to seek priority for water 
supply5 8 , and to co-operate with the Commonwealth for funding. It also 
sought, following local and American practice, the (federal) subsidy of 
construction costs.59 In particular, if water conservation schemes could be 
installed as planned, much greater flows could be conserved for full 
utilisation along the Murrumbidgee as well. Brewster had produced an 
integrated set of schemes to make more water available along the length of 
many inland rivers (figure 9) but especially for the Murrumbidgee 
Irrigation Area. Again, the proposed diversion of the Snowy to the 
Murrumbidgee would be the icing on the cake for irrigation farmers and 
the Commission. 
Across the Murray, in the relatively closely settled Victoria, thoughts were 
also turning to post-war reconstruction possibilities. Irrigation was always 
an option--especially with a Country Party in power. But others were also 
mindful of the huge reserves of lignite, a low grade of (brown) coal, which 
had been the basis of the State Electricity Commission of Victoria's (SECV}, 
Australia; A History of Progress and Review of Regional Planning Activities through 
the Commonwealth, Canberra, Govt. Printer, 1949, p. I. 
56
• Ibid. 
57
• NSW Premier's Department. Ministry of Post War Reconstruction. Water and Soil 
Conservation Advisory Committee, Water Conservation and Irrigation [Unpublished 
Report], Sydney, Premier's Dept., Dec. 1943, Part 2, p. 2, SRNSW: 18/1588, Box 68, 
43/15449, Water Conservation Advisory Committee. Report of the Committee. 
58 Ibid, Part I, p. 3. 
59
• Ibid, Part 3, p. 2. 
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Figure 9; Poster, "Watering the Thirsty Land", Discussion Poster No. 22, 
Commonwealth Office of Education, 1948. From SRNSW, Department of Water 
Resources, 18/161 4, Box 94, File 48/ 17797. 
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development in the La Trobe Valley. For the last 20 years, the 'Monash Plan' 
to establish a brown-coal fired grid across the State, through the work of 
the State Electricity Commission, was pushing forward. After being backed 
by the loose but influential Melbourne based 'Collins House' mining thence 
financial group, his plan had become a major technocultural article of 
faith for many Victorians. Unlike the disordered social and industrial 
development of many of the coal fields of New South Wales, the plan 
included the beautiful civic amenity of a well-planned garden town, 
Yallourn. Whilst advancing worker's amenities, as well as agriculture 
through the electrification of the country side, the SECV had come to form a 
major part of Victoria's identity as a modernising, manufacturing State as it 
underwrote industrialisation. As such, it was celebrated by Ethel Spowers in 
the early 1930s.60 Her lino cut offers a wonderful evocation of the 
significance of the undertaking by sensitively evoking the turmoil of the 
change arising at the same time as it celebrates the technocultural 
trajectory symbolically (figure 10). 
Yallourn and its emergent power stations are evoked through bold, 
'secondary colours.' Streaks of damp, freshly mined coal, engineering ink 
and lignite ash seem to turn and transmute through each other. From the 
swirls of machined earth, from the open cut, the coal trains and then the 
bunker and boiler house roofs arise a newly machined sky. A sky streaked 
or gashed by the factory roofs, as if they form the cutting tool of a 
powerful lathe slowly building up from the earth to mark the rotating sky 
above. A smoky, grey-yellow sky, with its perpetual band of plumes, with 
its regular ribbons of progress festooned forever on-high. The viewpoint 
of the coal miners is strikingly embodied. In contrast to the vision of the 
irrigation engineers, it was around this bowl of coal for the city that other 
projects of the State Electricity Commission would be orientated. 
Indeed, for George H. Johnston, writing a special four part series in the 
conservative, 'Collins House' (and London owned) Argus on the eve of the 
forthcoming regional planning discussions, Victoria (again) had a "Vision 
Splendid" awaiting.61 Having recently returned from the United States, he 
had come to confirm that "power is the lifeblood of modern progress, the 
60
• Spowers, Ethel, "The Works, Yalloum" (1933), linocut reproduced in Thomas, D., 
Outlines of Australian Art. The Joseph Brown Collection, New York, Abrams, 1989 
(third ed.), plate 164. 
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. Johnston, G. H.~ "Victoria's 'Vision Splendid"', The Argus, 412144, p. 2. 
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Figure 10; Linocut by Ethel Spowers, "The Works, Yallourn" (1933), 
reproduced in Thomas, 0 ., Outlines of Australian Art. The Joseph Brown 
Collection, New York, Abrams, 1989 (third ed.), plate 164. 
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yardstick of industrial advancement" and sought to map out a "vision of 
Victoria's future in terms of power development."62 It was thus electric 
power that should come to underwrite what promised to be the focal point 
for secondary industry in Australia; "it is not idle fancy to visualise a State 
leading the rest of Australia in secondary industry development. "63 
Crucially, lignite development was also a means of securing energy 
independence from New South Wales' supplies of coal; it was "a 
vision ... independent of outside power producing agents." In explicit 
opposition to the Murrumbidgee diversion proposal, therefore, and against 
the communist-led coal miners' unions of New South Wales still battling a 
legacy of mining speculation, community neglect and exploitation, the 
run-of-the-river Snowy Scheme should be developed to enhance Victoria's 
electricity system. It would provide a reserve or even peak supply. 
Similarly, on the matter of the procedures to be adopted to achieve post-war 
reconstruction in Victoria, it was made clear from the first that the State 
Government of Victoria saw itself as having the prime responsibility. 
Specifically, regionalism was not to undercut State-based constitutional 
rights over resource development. Regional committees were not to usurp 
or outflank, with the Commonwealth's help, State Government 
prerogatives .64 
Tom Lang, an engineer from the State Rivers and Water Supply Commission 
of Victoria, who would soon become "probably, the most influential of 
regional planners"65 , was also offering ideas about regionalism. Lang was 
one of the first to take up a 'whole catchment' approach. He began, 
however, by stressing a 'natural basis' upon which to consider regions. 
Consistent with emergent 'scientific' planning methods and by relying 
primarily upon US technical commission and engineering literature, when 
Lang set out to define a region, "the primary considerations are generally 
physiographic." Further, "in the development and management of natural 
resources there are sound reasons for adopting a regional basis rather 
62 Johnston, G. H., "Power, Posterity and Politics", The Argus, 1/2/44, p. 3. 
63 Johnson, G. H., "Victoria's Endless Power Wealth", The Argus, 3/2/44, p. 2. 
64 Australia. Commonwealth Department of Post-War Reconstruction (in conjunction 
with State Departments responsible for Regional Planning), op. cit., p. 60-61. 
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than a political one."66 This took-up ideas of regionalism 'allied with 
nature' but this separation, this tendency to emphasise a 'physically 
determinate' basis missed much of the thoroughgoing interdisciplinary--
and political--emphases of Mumford, for example. Accordingly, even 
though local participation and governments were needed, they were to co-
ordinate a scientifically determined planning process which was "the cold, 
rational and logical process of co-ordinating physical facts by means of 
technical skill or mechanical means to achieve certain ends."67 Lang, 
therefore, favoured autocratic expertise or the "re-education of the people 
who will benefit from the plan, so that they may accept and use every good 
thing the plan has to offer them. "68 As with Gibson, the expert is regarded 
as apolitical and hence the servant of an apparently singular or 
determinate trajectory of development. He expected the same attitude of 
others. Instead of values being co-joint with catchment management, 
informing method and research agendas, a technocratic rationale and 
power base sought to set the agenda. 
Lang's vision of the futuristic prospects of a 'well planned' river basin 
region, was represented in terms that evoked an administrative ideal for 
the technocrat (figure II). Drawing upon US Bureau of Reclamation images 
depicting irrigated oases, Lang foregrounded technological 
transformation. A trans-mountain diversion tunnel fed a plentiful, 
multiple purpose reservoir which, in turn, fed agriculture, power 
production, town water supplies and etcetera. An apparent harmony of 
mutual purpose arose between normally competing land-use options. An 
idyllic, 'unencumbered', civil engineered terrain, perhaps even a 'train 
set' sort of landscape, was staged to suggest a planning wonderland, 
offering a purity of co-existent technological possibilities. A civil 
engineered 'Eden' of order and harmony was projected as a way of arguing 
for a more modern landscape. 
Further, because it was such a 'bright and shiny' landscape, it is blinding to 
what was being concealed. It involved a denial that 'science only' 
catchment management was re-introducing dominant cultural values 
across the land. What was revealed was mainly more of the same; "Full 
66
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Figure 11; Landscape graphic, Tom Lang's idealised civil engineering 
terrain (circa mid to late 1940s) from Powell, J. M., The Emergence of 
Bioregionalism in the Murray Darling Basin, Canberra, The Murray 
Darling Basin Commission, 1993, p. 70. 
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Utilisation" as the caption announced, writ larger, inscribed more 
completely. As with Dundas, paradoxical 'metaphors of fact' or metaphors of 
technological autonomy were crafted to secure greater scope for this sort 
of engineering expertise as well as for its apparently neutral and hence 
often unacknowledged assumptions. An 'avant-garde', 'whole catchment' 
approach, denuded of cultural informing criteria whilst foregrounding 
technological possibilities, merely introduces a means of expanding 
systems and displaces the interpretation of regional differences and 
potentialities. 
In the interregnum between the Commonwealth advancing an active role 
for the regions as a way of influencing the decisions of State Governments 
and the loss of the Powers Referendum in August 1944, local groups, 
especially around the Australian Alps, moved to take up regionalist 
approaches. In particular, the cross border Murray Valley Development 
League was formed during I 944. From the very first, however, the major 
legitimating resource for such approaches was less the 'organic' argument 
of Mumford than the 'age of the machine' outlook of Veblen. Indeed, this 
approach, outlined by Lilienthal in his Democracy on the March, was 
published just as the Murray Valley Development League was getting 
underway. Eschewing politics and emphasising co-ordinated decision 
making; "the League has never adopted the methods of the old fashioned 
pressure groups. "69 The Murray Valley's representative, Padman, would 
come in 1947 to ask for a board of inquiry into development possibilities, "a 
complete and impartial investigation ... to do away with the evils of divided 
control. "70 Accordingly, "there was no agitation by those who were 
interested in the Murray Valley Scheme. "71 That is, in contrast to the 
Murrumbidgee lobby especially, the Murray Valley was seeking to win the 
day by appearing to act above politics, by arguing according to the 
emergent, administrative criteria alone. 
Nevertheless, such an approach began with strong purpose in the Murray 
Valley and, of course, with implicit political and constitutional aims. 
Collings, the Albury Council Secretary, came to favour a challenge to the 
69
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State Government's proposals for regional development. In a report to his 
Council on the Regional Planning Committee's proposals, Collings 
suggested, instead, a cross border survey as "the State Committee is not in a 
position to thoroughly survey the possibilities of its development by reason 
of the limitation placed upon its activities by the State boundary. "72 He 
therefore asked the Regional Boundaries Committee of New South Wales to 
recommend to the appropriate Federal Minister that a special, interstate 
survey be set up to report on the potentialities of the Murray Valley.73 
Even before the possible diversion of the Snowy to the Murray was 
conceived, the vying potentials of the river valleys, and who would control 
them, was a hot issue. 
Regionalism was central at the formal inaugural meeting of the Murray 
Valley Development League, convened by the Albury Council and held at 
Yarrawonga in mid August 1944. With 250 delegates from local councils and 
progress associations plus farmers' producer associations in attendance 
along with representatives from Federal and State parliaments, 
government departments and from the press and business, much interest 
arose. The goal was a special planning committee to co-ordinate 
development within the 'Murray Valley Basin', like a TVA. In a significant 
conjuncture, the meeting had been called on the eve of. the 'Powers' 
referendum. It was a final venue for the Commonwealth to argue its case 
for centralised powers--or a re-figured Federalism--to a region that stood to 
gain significantly from a positive outcome.74 
The conference endorsed a principal resolution consistent with the 
Commonwealth Government's agenda on regional development. It wished to 
establish an inquiry and audit possibilities for developing the valley "in all 
its economic, cultural and social and defence aspects .. .'0 5 Consistent with 
the broader aims of 'post-war' nation building, it had the ultimate goal of 
achieving a population of one million people in the valley. On the 19th of 
72
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August 1944, however, the referendum proposals were rejected by a 
Commonwealth-wide majority and by a majority of States. 
This was a further blow for indigenous 'New Deal' hopes which had arisen 
over the last decade. Since the mid 1930s William Cooper, who was a major 
force in the formation of the Australian Aborigines League, believed that 
precedents from the United States were worthy of emulation.76 Cooper was 
also proposing an extension of reserve lands available to Aborigines, 
arguing that they should be farmed on a community basis, with profits 
returning to the community. The Aborigines Protection Board dismissed his 
views, and little came of them. Cooper persisted with more limited demands, 
focussing instead on the availability of water to support Cumeragunga.77 
Due to no-maintained pumping equipment, this station near Echuca, on the 
Murray, was deprived of a good water supply. Even as its Aboriginal 
population had been swollen by Depression, its lands were also being leased 
out. 
By May 1937, the Aborigines Protection Board under pressure from Cooper 
agreed to further investigate the proposal but within government circles it 
was believed that Aborigines would either die out or be absorbed into the 
white mainstream.78 Cooper continued his (in part) US-inspired efforts by 
organising a symbolic 'day of action'. To coincide with the !50th 
anniversary of the landing of the first fleet, and after a disappointing 
Select Committee of Inquiry on the Administration of the Aborigines 
Protection Board, John Patten as President and William Ferguson as 
Secretary and founder of the Aborigines Progressive Association published 
a pamphlet; Aborigines Claim Citizen Rights/79 The pamphlet announced 
that on the anniversary day itself, the 26th of January, a public meeting 
would be called as a "day of mourning." The need for economic equality and 
access to land and economic opportunity were discussed, with Ferguson 
suggesting that "the government could at least make land grants to 
Aborigines ... "80 
16 Goodall, op. cit., p. 189. 
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78 Conference of Commonwealth and State Aboriginal Authorities, April 193 7, p. 3, 
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Victorian and New South Wales governments continued to ignore the dire 
plight of station residents. Walking off their land at Cumeragunga and then 
refusing to work on the station attracted unprecedented press attention.8 1 
In June 1939, the Board conceded that "the station is capable of 
development by irrigation." It also contemplated "the provision in the 
future, of small farmlets for deserving families. "82 Public concern also 
hastened "the reconstitution of the Board as an 'Aborigines Welfare Board' 
under an amended act in 1940"8 3, although with dubious results. 
With the McKell Labor government having come to power in New South 
Wales in May 1941, Ferguson and his Association were looking for 
substantial policy changes. Although Ferguson's address to the June 
conference of the Party was left until the last session of the conference, he 
won applause for his appeal that "if there is a new deal coming, we want to 
share in it. "84 Michael Sawtell, an A WU organiser who had long supported 
Aboriginal causes and assisted them organise and agitate, was able to 
provide some support within the Labor Party. Sawtell, an intellectual and 
socialist who had also advocated, like Bradfield, a well watered inland, was 
President of the Committee for Aboriginal Citizen Rights, a group of 
concerned white people drawn from union, women's, church and welfare 
organisation to support Aboriginal reform. The Committee became "a weak 
'fringe' association of the Australian Labor Party." Only those of the left in 
the New South Wales Trades and Labour Council were sympathetic and 
active.85 
This group, along with the emerging activist William Onus, recently 
appointed as Secretary of the Association by Ferguson, lobbied the Labor 
Party for citizen rights for Aborigines and for elected Aboriginal 
representatives to be on the Welfare Board. Assimilation was the blanket 
response, however. Even as Ferguson and Walter Page were elected to the 
board as Aboriginal representatives (joining Elkin and Sawtell) in 
November 1943, assimilation remained the predominant approach. Within 
the Board "a concept of welfare for the Aborigines called 'Preparation for 
81
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Citizenship' took shape. "86 Rather than developing the reserves, this often 
meant that, after 1943, the Board would "make no repairs or improvements, 
to let all the buildings and amenities run down until at last any alternative 
living arrangements away from the reserves would have to be welcome. "8 7 
Domestic and living conditions on the Brungle reserve, for example, 30 
kilometres from Tumut, deteriorated dramatically; "370 acres of good land 
had not been touched for four years because the Board had removed all the 
pumping and farm machinery ... and in the lucerne paddock rotted a 
thousand bale crop which the Board had refused to harvest. "8 8 The "same 
technique was surreptitiously applied to other Wiradjuri reserves. "89 
Aborigines were systematically denied the funds and equipment to develop 
their reserve lands even according to European styles of farming. 
By March 1943, however, the Commonwealth Powers Bill proposed that the 
States pass powers over Aboriginal affairs to the Commonwealth. As Price, 
the member for Boothby in a House of Representatives debate in March, 
1943, put it, "apparently, although certain Parliaments are not prepared to 
transfer some of the powers that have been sought, all of them are 
prepared to transfer power over the Australian aborigines. "90 If the 
Commonwealth government assumed some of the responsibilities for 
Aborigines, then it should "give them a new deal, such as President 
Roosevelt has given to the Indians of the United States of America. "91 This 
would be to raise the standing or understanding and material well being of 
Aborigines by providing "scientific treatment and the right kind of 
employment"92 even if this often meant working for the cattle industry--
sustaining it--for very cheap wages. The States, however, withdrew support 
for the Bill and, as mentioned, the 'Powers' referendum was lost in August 
1944. As Evatt had demanded that it be all or nothing, the provision that 
would have allowed greater Commonwealth assistance for Aborigines and 
full citizenship rights was also lost. As the farmer settler regions of the 
Murray Darling Basin were being defined, developed and mightily fought 
over as the primary site of a new, post-war federalism emerged, issues such 
86 Ibid, p. 129. 
87 Read, Peter, A Hundred Years War: The Wiradjuri People and the State, Canberra, 
Australian National University Press, 1988, p. 101. 
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as granting indigenous lands and reinvigorating their cultural relations to 
place receded into the background. These matters would remain for many 
years the province of the States. 
With the loss of the referendum, many issues had apparently been resolved 
from the State's points of view. To return to the efforts of New South Wales, 
it was soon publishing a report into the diversion of the Snowy to the 
Murrumbidgee, as well as forming a central electricity commission. As 
mentioned, it was moving on with developing a state-based TVA-ism or a 
State controlled regionalism. Most spectacularly, the WC&IC plans for the 
use of the diverted water to the Murrumbidgee proposed a doubling of 
output of the MIA plus further irrigation and stock water supply 
development. It was anticipated that a further 50,000 people could be 
supported. 
The committee concluded that the figures supplied by the WC&IC on the 
prospects for further irrigation development "establishes a very strong 
claim to the waters of the Snowy River for this purpose.'>93 The Committee 
saw no reason to disagree with the sympathetic assessment made by the 
Electric Advisory Committee that electricity costs would be the same if 
generation occurred at either steam generation or Snowy hydro stations.94 
The regional use of the power available from the Snowy River, for the 
South-east of New South Wales and East Gippsland regions, even with future 
development, was also now to be met "by the lesser hydro-electric 
development associated with the use of the Snowy River waters for 
irrigation and water supply. "95 This Murrumbidgee diversion option, as it 
offered some minor hydro development (of 50 megawatts), also sought to 
assuage the fears of the south eastern part of the State. It would also negate, 
according to the Committee, the Commonwealth's need to develop the Snowy 
for hydro-electric power. The Committee also recommended that New South 
Wales seek termination of its now long standing Seat of Government 
Acceptance Act agreement with the Commonwealth which gave the 
Commonwealth rights to control the Snowy River resource for power 
supply for the ACT. 
93
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With a partial return to a more State-based focus for resource development, 
an extensive public relations campaign for a generalised, unspecified 
water 'conservation' development was then launched in the Sydney 
Morning Herald. In the editorial pages from mid November, to coincide 
with the tabling of the inland diverting Snowy Scheme report, the Herald 
ran letters to the editor that re-invoked Bradfield's scheme on the back of 
Idriess' recently published book, Onward Australia; Developing a Continent. 
Indeed, Timbury's The Battle for the Inland had also just been published 
and sought to fire enthusiasm for huge water conservation projects and, 
again, for these re-diversion 'boomerangs', these: 
fighting boomerangs--with their leading edges facing north, the 
direction in which danger lies for Australia. Behind those two 
boomerangs we have a chance to fill our two great basins [the Eyre and 
now also the Murray-Darling] with white defenders, but the time may be 
short and we have to hurry.96 
Then, after one Jetter to the editor by an experienced engineer that 
challenged Bradfield's proposals, many followed in great support. 
According to a familiar refrain, MacKee linked the war effort to that now 
needed to nation build: 
Whether we fight nature or human aggressors, the methods are 
precisely the same. There must be a grand strategy, the establishment of 
salients, the enlargement of bridgeheads, the general advance. There 
will be counter-attacks to repulse. There will be setbacks. But we must 
fight with grim determination, relentless vigour, and the stout hearts of 
fighting men. Dr. Bradfield's scheme appeals as an instalment of the 
grand strategy which, with other projects of engineers, scientists, 
reafforestation, and plant experts, should comprise the attack upon the 
enemy and the beginning of the development of Australia upon a scale 
which will make our country great.97 
Then followed the formal beginning to the Herald's campaign with a series 
of special articles and sketches that called for a national emphasis upon 
irrigation and water conservation projects, as a 'national' priority. The 
96
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editorial itself of the 2nd of December gave voice to "The Cry For Water" 
implicitly arguing for a New South Wales design for the Snowy Scheme; 
"the drought has already demonstrated beyond all doubt that water is our 
greatest need. "98 
Against Bradfield, however, the articles by the Professor of Geography, 
Griffith Taylor, warned that the arid terrain--the Eyre Basin--"cannot be 
used for important human settlement. "99 Taylor was also sceptical of the 
scope available for significant population increases. Nevertheless, in the 
main feature articles by Newman, semi arid parts of Murray Darling Basin 
were still suitable for renewal. Accompanying these articles, in a public 
relations coup, was a series of sketches by Russell Drysdale poignantly 
depicting the drought in the Western Division for the readers of the 
Sydney Morning Herald. Drysdale responded in sympathy with Newman's 
descriptions of the drought. He responded with sketches of sensitive if 
harrowing landscapes of forlorn and grotesque forms of denuded trunks, 
erosion-exposed roots, and the bleached ribs of beached carcasses, all under 
a dust-laden sky (figures 12 to 16). 
He sketched an upturned, surreal waste land where life could do little but 
cling to what remained of the soil, where the hapless inhabitants adopted a 
vacant stare. Where, as Newman commented by way of a particularly 
Drysdalesque metaphor, "the windows of the houses are like black sockets 
whose eyes have perished with despair." 100 Nevertheless, the farmers were 
determined to win out; "like the trees that some of them are planting, they 
are on the land to stay." 101 But this would require solving "the riddle of the 
sands" to find the reasons behind the erosion of large tracts of territory 
amongst the possible causes of Jack of water, rabbits, over-stocking or soil 
chemistry. 102 Even amongst the eroding land, however, there was hope. 
The cycle of severe drought had coincided with efforts to dam or divert 
water to the inland and for an attack on such problems of a wasting 
landscape. There was, as the articles headline explained, an "Urgent Need 
for Scientific Assault. "1 03 
98
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Figures 12 to 16; Sketches by Russell Drysdale from SMH, December 16th and 
19th, 1944. 
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A New South Wales, nationalist-agrarian mythology was being reinvented 
and under-written by this kind of journalism, just as electricity was re-
presented by The Argus for Victoria in the previous February. And now 
these agrarian metaphors acquired surrealist tones. Its 'Western Division', 
as the headlines also represented, were "Australia's 'Lost World"', or 
"Australia's Barren Spaces." These were the places that had suffered due to 
the national war effort's food production program. As a dust bowl for this 
nation, they now required national action, a national priority. Indeed, such 
a restatement of a dominating view of national identity as being rural, dry 
and dusty and as a priority for relief suited many in Sydney. It suited 
especially the engineers and their plans for water conservation along the 
Darling, along the Murrumbidgee, along the Snowy. 
Victoria was to respond vigorously. The SECV, especially through the work 
of one of its Norwegian engineers, Trygove Olsen, had been applying its 
recently developed expertise in tunnelling technology to the possibilities 
of developing the Snowy. Following on from the development of the 
designs for Kiewa hydro-electric power stations and from his knowledge of 
northern European methods, a new proposal was offered. In concert with 
his differing technocultural assumptions about the relative importance of 
irrigation and electric power1 04 , at Olsen's suggestion in September 1944, a 
preliminary reconnaissance of possible dam sites on the Upper Murray was 
made. By October the possibilities firmed. By early February 1945 the SECV 
was recommending to the Minister in Charge of Electrical Undertakings, in 
response to the 1944 New South Wales report, that a Murray diversion was 
possible. Unlike those visions emanating from the New South Wales 
establishment, Olsen, as a Norwegian, 'went to source' in a different way, 
going to investigate the icy slopes of the Australia Alps, and a modern 
Murray diversion option arose. For the moment, however, its only sponsor 
would be the SECV and it would remain under wraps. 
Concurrently, since late October 1944, the Commonwealth had been 
reviewing its constitutional position and considering its rights under the 
104
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Seat of Government Acceptance Act. As mentioned, to supply electric power 
to the Australian Capital Territory, New South Wales had passed rights to 
the Commonwealth to develop the Snowy River. Thence the Commonwealth 
was itself drafting new terms of reference for another inquiry. The terms 
emphasised the Commonwealth's rights over the Snowy and, accordingly, 
over the now vying proposals on offer. 105 Yet Sir Harry Brown, the Co-
ordinator General of Works (Dr Loder becoming the Director General of the 
new Department of Works and Housing in July 1945) was reluctant to 
recommend any immediate action. Cautiously, he was unwilling to 
contemplate any long term projects at the present time. 1 06 With the 
publication of its report into the Snowy Scheme in mid November 1944, New 
South Wales was also pressing for the Commonwealth to surrender its 
rights to develop the Snowy.I07 
On the other hand, Moss and Jensen, responsible for organising war time 
power supplies by the Commonwealth, like Coombs, were keen to get early 
surveys underway. 108 Crucially, Coombs then managed to prevail on Forde 
(the acting Prime Minister) by emphasising the TVA as a federalist 
precedent for controlling regional development.' 09 In particular, it was 
suggested that it be linked to current offers of federal funding for the 
expansion of the Hume dam. 11 ° Forde wrote to the Premiers concerned 
about the matter, looking forward to similarly "successful results" to those 
achieved by the TV A. 1 1 1 Thence, as outlined by Chifley as Minister for Post 
War Reconstruction, in his submission to Cabinet of mid December, the 
strategy was now to financially lever the States, as a condition of the 
Commonwealth paying for 25% of the Hume works. They were to agree to 
10
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either a rejuvenated River Murray Commission "with wider powers", or, a 
totally new and "independent joint Commonwealth-State body of a 
permanent character. "112 
Victoria's State Government also had much to think about beyond a 
Commonwealth controlled--and increasingly instrumental--regionalism 
and its implications for the Murray Valley. As Mervyn Weston of The Argus 
now argued, probably on information supplied by Ron East, the Chairman 
of the State Rivers and Water Supply Commission, Victoria had at least two 
alternative and hitherto hidden plans. In response to the Hay meeting of 
Murrumbidgee interests the prior Sunday, itself convened just after the 
release of New South Wales Snowy-Murrumbidgee diversion report, Weston 
hinted at other, hitherto unconsidered possibilities. He reported "plans for 
diverting the Snowy head-waters, either by direct tunnel to the Murray or 
by contour gravitation to lake Omeo, and then to the Mitta and Murray .. .'ol 13 
Weston also argued for a federal commission for the valley. 114 Ever since 
1942, in fact, East had been keen to suggest a semi autonomous authority to 
defend the right of the State--Victoria--to develop the (then) run-of-the-
river proposal.115 He had consequently encouraged one of his engineers, 
Tom Lang, to research the question (see above). 
The Premier, Dunstan, was, however, slow to become interested in 
supporting the new proposal for an autonomous Murray Valley 
Commission. His Gippsland East constituents were particularly concerned to 
secure the run-of-the-river option. Hence this first indication of the 
possibility of a Murray diversion hardly caused a ripple. Yet soon the SECV 
and the SR&WSC were combining during early 1945 in response to the New 
South Wales report. Both were to plead for a Royal Commission.1 16 It could 
(also) allow Dunstan to bring out his own concerns for the East 
Gippslander's, or, to at least 'soap box' on the issues for the electorates he 
112
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served. Indeed, when the East Gippslander's and their south-coast New 
South Wales partners formed a deputation and conveyed the conclusions of 
their January conference in Bairnsdale to Dunstan, he appeared quite 
supportive. He did not reveal that a Murray diversion had been proposed by 
his bureaucracies although he could describe the New South Wales report 
as "not worth the paper it was written on." 117 Or, as reported, he could only 
suggest that the development options had "been shelved for too long" but 
would not say what, in their entirety, they were. 118 
Dunstan was now in a dilemma. He had come out forcefully against the 
Murrumbidgee diversion and in support of the older Rendell, Palmer and 
Tritton option for the generation of power and hence in support of East 
Gippsland hopes for development. But his reasons for being able to criticise 
the New South Wales proposals were based mainly upon the growing 
confidence of the Victorian bureaucracy in the (still largely hidden) 
Murray diversion option. Hence it would take a further two months before 
he was willing to write to the Prime Minister to seek a Royal Commission. 
Then, however, further pressure arose. At a meeting of the Albury Rotary 
Club in February, Roy Collings, Albury Council Secretary and one of the 
mam founders of the Murray Valley Development League and a long time 
supporter of a federally co-ordinated resource survey, reiterated the 
formative influence of a possible Murray Diversion. The current push for 
Murray development, he suggested, was "bound up" with this other 
diversion option and should arouse "tremendous interest. "119 He was at the 
same time announcing that such a diversion was possible and indicating 
that it had been crucial in encouraging interest in the valley. His source, 
not surprisingly, was the Commonwealth Controller of Electricity Supply, 
H. P. Moss,120 who was obviously touting for support for this 
'Commonwealth' proposal. He had learnt about the option from Ron East. 
Given the lack of enthusiasm by the Victorian Premier, it fell to the 
Commonwealth--if not Harry Brown--to support the proposal, which it was 
doing enthusiastically. 
117 
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War-time powers enabled a greater Commonwealth ambit over agriculture 
through the Rural Reconstruction Commission. The Commission had been 
touring the country taking evidence and since early 1944 it bad been 
releasing its reports. These would continue to be published well into 1946. 
As well as supporting improvements to rural credit, rural amenities and for 
employing returned soldiers on the land, the Commission bad a proto-
environmental brief. In contrast to some boosters it warned that 
"unfortunately, the public is far too easily led to assume that Australia bas 
an almost unlimited future in the development of irrigation schemes. "121 It 
was not surprised by the difficulties faced by some recent schemes. Rising 
water tables and the salting of soils bad become well understood 
phenomena "and the methods by which they can be obviated are now well 
known" such as by using only the amounts of water needed. Against 
Bradfield, it warned against the belief that water alone was needed and 
against the "time worn belief that Australia's soils are highly fertile ... that 
only the shortage of rain restricts plant growth. "122 In short, the 
Commission was evolving a more sceptical approach to irrigation and 
expressing proto-environmental concerns potentially enabling a 'fusion of 
horizons' with the States. 
Again, however, with failure of the Powers Referendum the illness and 
death of Curtin especially, a more conventional economics and a 'Treasury 
line' would dictate which programs were to be supported. In fact, since the 
October 1944 regional conference a diminution in enthusiasm for 
regionalism was apparent. Officers within the Department of Post War 
Reconstruction were now moving to criticise the more ambitious regional 
planning concepts. They believed the more ambitious regionalism was 
"grossly unrealistic, claiming it under-estimated economic, political and 
constitutional complexities. "123 State rights over resource development 
were resurgent. Nevertheless, in place of the more semi-autonomous and 
ecologically foregrounded forms of regionalism, an instrumental or 
resource extractive regionalism could still have its uses. 
121 Australia. Rural Reconstruction Commission. Irrigation, Water Conservation and 
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With the White Paper on full employment of May 1945, the Commonwealth 
would again seek to take the initiative on planning or, at least, on co-
ordinating strategic investment into large technological systems. In place 
of a waning enthusiasm for regionalism, this approach, in concert with its 
enlarged powers over taxation collection (since 1942), could allow the 
Commonwealth to move in 'under' the States.124 Indeed, the efforts of the 
Commonwealth to gain full control and out-manoeuvre the States was far 
from over. In May 1945, the Commonwealth re-affirmed its resolve to 
establish a TVA-like river basin authority for the Murray Valley, even as 
the Premiers disagreed.12 5 
With the matters of regional development linked to the prospects of the 
Snowy Scheme burgeoning, the younger bureaucrats within the 
Department of Post War Reconstruction remained keen to prevent the 
opportunities from slipping away. As Victoria's Premier, Dunstan, was 
suggesting that a Royal Commission be set up to investigate the Snowy, and 
yet was not advocating the Murray Valley regional option, Allen Brown, as 
head of Policy and Research within the Department of Post War 
Reconstruction, then suggested a trade-off. He wondered; " ... would it be 
possible to exploit this situation in such a way as to gain Victoria's support 
on the Murray Valley proposition in return for our support of a full 
investigation of the Snowy[?]"126 
With Dunstan in power in Victoria, this way of continuing to develop a 
liaison with his State and hence force New South Wales to the regional 
bargaining table, and/or to the Snowy re-design board, was a less workable 
proposition. Dunstan was firmly anti-Commonwealth and allied to East 
Gippsland or to a run-of-the-river option. However, as Chifley explained to 
the House, "the finding of the money will, no doubt, be a matter for the 
Loan Council." 1 2 7 The Commonwealth was, as with the Hume, again dealing 
with the States by playing them off each other and by applying its 
relatively new financial or taxation powers. 
124
• Greenwood, G., The Future of Australian Federalism, Brisbane, University of 
Queensland Press, 1976 [2nd ed], p. 173. 
125
. Chifley to Collings, Acting Secretary, MVDL, 27/7/45, NAA: A461, 8423/1/2, 
Development of Murray Valley. 
126 Brown to Coombs, 17/5/45, NAA: A9816, 1945/270 Part I, op cit. 
127 Chifley, Parliamentary Debates, Canberra, Govt. Printer, 1945, 23/5/45, p. 1974. 
90 
In July 1945, Ron East was publicly arguing for a TVA-like commission for 
the Murray Valley. 128 Yet, due to Dunstan's opposition, the news of a 
Murray diversion, surprisingly, still did not figure strongly in subsequent 
reporting. Most newspapers continued to report the major alternatives as 
either the Murrumbidgee diversion or the run-of-the-river scheme. Thus 
when Newman himself returned to the topic in the Sydney Morning Herald 
in early August, the ground had apparently shifted less than previously 
reported; "Many Victorians with considerable support from Monaro public 
men are keen to see the river harnessed for its power potentialities, some 
of them with an alternative plan to divert its course into the Murray."129 
By late July, however, pushed by his bureaucrats, Dunstan was finally 
acknowledging, publicly, that the proposal, which the Commonwealth was 
keen on, had been a Victorian suggestion. He remained adamant however 
that a Royal Commission was required, at arms length from his 
government. 130 
The Commonwealth agenda was then tested internally against a legal 
opinion about the suitability of an interstate commission. In July 1945, the 
Minister for Post War Reconstruction, Dedman, instructed his officers 
investigate whether such provisions were "still operative" as they implied 
a Commonwealth role. 131 By May 1946, the opinion had investigated 
provisions within the Constitution as they related to free trade between the 
States and, secondly, as the Constitution protected water rights. The power 
of the Commonwealth to act as an active guardian of river waters was 
minimal under this latter provision (Section I 00). The States could 
therefore negotiate between themselves. 132 In what would have been a 
blow to Commonwealth hopes, the Commonwealth would be forced back 
upon its financial powers and its capacity to politically influence 
outcomes. 133 
Showing a belief in a similar interpretation of the Constitution, at the 
Premiers' meeting of August 1945 (whilst McKell was overseas, inspecting 
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the TVA), New South Wales confidently offered a possible split of the 
Snowy, part to the Murrumbidgee and part to the Victorian run-of-the-
river proposal.1 34 The success of such a simple compromise solution, which 
went towards meeting Dunstan's constituency, was the worst fear of the 
Commonwealth as it could freeze the Commonwealth out of any role and 
neatly split the water between the two States. 
The Snowy River Hydro Electric Development League and the Shires of the 
south east of New South Wales and of East Gippsland ·responded to the now 
two, rival options by again advocating an 'Earle Page', New State strategy 
for the region135 (figure 17). A new state of 'Borderland' was proposed, 
highlighting by its name the increasingly marginal position this region 
felt itself to be in. Murrumbidgee and WC&IC interests had also prepared 
another public relations vehicle to argue for the priority of the 
Murrumbidgee. A booklet Water for the Thirsty Land, aimed at countering 
especially Victorian claims for diversion of the Snowy into the Murray. The 
Association was also boosted by a supportive legal opinion from Garfield 
Barwick. 136 
Yet others were working for qualitatively different outcomes. In contrast 
to the emphasis upon retaining State rights or upon the overarching 
control and the narrow, quantitative notions of 'efficiency' or 'logic' of 
large systems, Jocelyn Henderson was advocating community-based 
planning, based on her own farming experience. More particularly, 
through her support for 'community forests', she was an advocate for 
placing limits on the now burgeoning 'open frontiersmanship' approach to 
development. She proposed forest preserves and soil protection. Via her 
farming experience, she had already applied ideas of leaving timber m 
water courses on farms, of protecting water catchment areas, leaving 
wind-breaks, extensive borders and special clumps of trees, to leave well 
over ten per cent of her father's farm covered when cleared. 137 She also 
brought to the fore in her concerns the overstocking of land, destroyed 
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Figure 17; Proposed borderland region, from "They're After a New State 
Down South", Sunday Sun, 219145. 
THEY'RE AFTER A NEW 
STATE--DOWN. SOUTH 
MOVES will be made in the next. fortnight to advan~e a scheme_ to 
form a new State in :the south· east c~er of Ailstralia, takin~ in 
parts of New South Wales and Victoria .. · .. 
-Tentatively called Borderland, the proposed State would have an 
area of about 20,000 square miles. · 
NEW.SOUTH WALES_· - Nowrt 
. CANBERRA . . 
• 
... 
~ 
.~ . 
\! 
~ 
. . 
NSW shires Rnd munlclllftllt-
1es concerned will be represent-
ed_at_a _meeUng aLJlndabyne, 
on the Snowy River, next Wed·. 
nesday. · . 
· -VIctorian rlpresentatlves Wtli 
meet _,. week later.- - - ·- . · 
~ Snowy -IUrer Shire presi: 
dent. Councillor Leo Barry, . 
told "The Sunday Sun" yes-. 
terday that 15 per cent. of 
the people In the lrea "ere · 
... belllad tbe .ebeme. 
· They bell~ved they were too 
far from the State caprtals, Syd-
ney and .Melbourne. Legislation 
from . the metropolitAn areas did 
not reach far enough. 
Cr. Barry declared: "The Cln-
dereUa of the Commonwealth Is 
waking up, but «She will have to 
ftght _for better conditions." 
.Bega may be capita_l · 
At a .meeting at Moruya lut 
month. when a sub-committee 
was appointed to inquire Into 
legal procedure-. speakers said 
· that in th.e whole of the 20.0<!0 
square mUes from 11"hlch It was 
proposed to form Borderland . 
..there wlS no high school, no 
railway, no big water or electric 
., . • _ · power scheme,. and only poor 
. ro;..-4c.. • 
Where the propos'ed new State would. fit on the map. 
.. 
93 
Members or the ~;u!r-commlt­
tee are Cr. Barry, BegR MRyor 
I
Afd ... C. Ayre!i. and Snowy River 
Shire Clerk J . Heel. . 
Bega. ·centre ot the rfch dalry-
ln~r district · of the far South 
Coast. has been surz~:e~;ted as 
capital. Its port Is Tathra. 
Chief port would be Eden, 
on T"ofold Bay, a marnlft- · 
«'ent harbor north or the 
.\'letorlan border. 
Part.s of NSW proposed for ln-
cJu!;lon a r'! the 11hlrr.s of f;urobo-
dalla. Blbbcnluke. Monaro. 
Imlay, MumbuiiR, ancl · Snowy 
River. Rnd the munlctplllttcs of 
Bc~tR . BombaiR ;~ncl Cooma. 
The VIctorian p:Jrt I!\ EA&t 
Gippsland .. which Includes thl! 
shlre.s or. Orbo~t. Tambo. Omeo. 
Avon. Balrnsdale, and Sale. 
Supporte,. of the schMne 
claim that such a new ·State 
could make a bl~t ~ontrlbutlon to 
Australia '15 postwar advancement 
by creaUng opportunities tor ln-
cre~d populatloo and prodat-
U\•Ity In an area which other-
'lrl.se •·ould remaln undev,.Jope-d. 
forests, eroded lands and streams with the subsequent silting of rivers and 
reservoirs. 138 
Where good rainfall occurred, Henderson further offered a localised and 
proto-sustainable approach to resource and materials use through: 
forests owned by a community, planted as closely as possible to that 
community, and supplying it with raw materials--fuel-wood, building 
and construction timber ... and at the same time providing it with 
recreation areas and lovely surroundings. 1 39 
Such an approach would avoid the rapid depletion of forests; a "sustained 
yield" approach would ensure the availability of timber and which could be 
used for a variety of purposes, continuously. 140 It would also advance the 
control of soil erosion and the protection of habitats of native species, 
which would, in turn, help control insect pests; "local forests, replacing the 
shelter that has been destroyed, would help to restore the balance of nature 
we have upset." Local, de centralised employment would be a further result. 
The community forests idea was also an empowering or facilitating 
program. It aimed to encourage communities to develop their own views 
and methods, to enable them take charge of the administrative mechanisms 
that would need to be deployed; "such forests not only provide ... assets ... but 
they cultivate the spirit of co-operation and independence necessary in a 
community which has the progress of the district at heart." 141 Henderson 
was seeking a democratic and involved community. This approach also 
suggested that the economy should be placed at the service of the local 
community. It stood in contrast to the narrow, 'full utilisation' approach 
favoured by the forestry expertise of the States, challenging the 
colonisation of the domestic sphere, implicitly challenging gendered 
power relations. It was, therefore, yet another regionalism. It aimed to 
serve localities and biological diversities. In sum, as for the Natural 
138 Jocelyn Squire Papers, 1942-1965, Part C, Talks and Reports, 1942-1965, 
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Resources Conservation League and soil conservationists, Henderson was 
seeking an integrated approach, one that sought sustainable and equitable 
inter-dependencies between nature, economy and culture (figure 18). 
Aborigines also continued to demand a 'New Deal'. With the cessation of the 
Pacific war in August, one in which Aborigines had of course fought, 
Shadrack James, an Aborigine from Mooroopna in Victoria on the Goulbum 
River, sought to arrange for a deputation of Aborigines to meet with the 
Prime Minister to discuss their poor conditions. Chifley asked that he 
forward a statement. James succinctly connected infrastructure, land and 
administration. Along with calling for better administration and 
representation for Aborigines, employment initiatives should also be 
created: 
I suggest that they be given land in perpetuity of sufficient areas in 
irrigated districts where they could settle permanently and make homes 
of their own. At present the Aborigines are landless proletarians 
without any hope in the world; every bit of land on which they are 
living in reserves or compounds is vested in the Aborigines Protection 
Board ... as the original owners of this country we should have a share in 
the administration of our own race.142 
Coombs prepared a response to the letter and acknowledged the urgency of 
the issues. In a similar 'New Deal' vein to James, a Commonwealth Bureau of 
Aboriginal Affairs was proposed, in which "research and training of 
teachers and field officers could be undertaken."143 Access to land and 
water was not mentioned. In contrast, therefore, to the efforts of the 
Commonwealth to advance regionalism as a way of influencing outcomes 
and of furthering full employment, the development of indigenous powers, 
especially in relation to land (and water), was being shelved. Similarly, at 
the level of State government, the potential of US development models for 
indigenous peoples was neglected as concerns concentrated upon the 
federalist issue. 
142 James, S. L. to Chifley, 27/8/45, NAA: A461, A300/l Part 4, op cit. 
143 Coombs to Secretary, Prime Ministers Department, 27/9/45, NAA: ibid. 
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Figure 18; Cover graphic from "An Inseparable Trinity", from Save the 
Forests Campaign Council, Story of the 'Save the Forests Campaign', 
Melbourne, The Campaign Council, 1949. 
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After he had been to the TV A, McKell hoped that "co-operation" with the 
existing authorities was feasible rather than some new, super commission 
being created to usurp their powers. 144 His US tour suggested, however, 
positive examples of how large, multi-purpose development projects were 
being financed in the United States. This was a point not really grasped by 
the 1942-44 Snowy River Investigation Committee, with its strict priority 
for irrigation, and antagonistic attitude towards electricity options. In a 
separate report, electricity production was noted by McKell as being the 
major source of revenue for such schemes. In commenting on the US 
Reclamation Act, McKell was quite plain how "this Act also recognised the 
importance of power in determining the feasibility of a project. "145 
Concurrently, in the lead-up to the next Victorian election, from mid 
September 1945, the Melbourne Argus launched another campaign, this 
time in support of the often mooted Murray Valley Authority and thus, 
quite directly now, for a Snowy-Murray diversion. Written by Mervyn 
Weston, who had travelled throughout northern America in 1945, the 
campaign again complained that Victoria was still reliant upon black coal 
from New South Wales, for its locomotives and gas production. As the 
editorial for The Argus put it, Victoria was still subject to "Black Coal's 
Blackmail" and having "to submit to being a vassal of New South Wales." 146 
Underlying the articles was also a complaint directed against the Dunstan 
Government, which had failed to take up expenditure and development 
initiatives. Thus for Weston, in tune with East and the State Rivers and 
Water Supply Commission (and the SECV), "there is the same wearisome 
dilly-dallying over the Murray today, although the opinion is held among 
Victorian authorities that full development of the Murray water resources 
could be accomplished in I 0 years. "14 7 Further emphasising the Murray 
diversion option, the TV A was such that "the power achievement of TV A are 
of the utmost importance ... power is really the paying partner of the 
enterprise, the remainder [of investments] being written off in the 
general advancement of the nation."148 
144
. New South Wales. Parliament/McKell, W. J., The Tennessee Valley Authority 
(USA), Sydney, Government Printer, 1945, p. 22. 
145 Parliament of New South Wales/McKell, W. J., Water Conservation and Irrigation in 
the United States of America, Sydney, Govt. Printer, 1945, p. 5. 
146 
"Black Coal's Blackmail", The Argus, 12/10/45, . 2. 
147 Weston, M., "How Murray River is Controlled", The Argus, 17/10/45, p. 2. 
148 Weston, M., "TVA Has Justified Itself', The Argus, 29/9145, p. II. 
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The election gave victory to Cain--much assisted by a fairer electoral 
redistribution. He was, like McKell, keen to move away from restrictive 
expenditure policies. Cain's policies were now to include boosting the 
strength of the State Rivers and Water Supply Commission. This, itself, was 
part of an on-going employment (and expenditure) program which would 
"direct the flow of labour from one state development work to another."149 
Indeed, the election victory, although narrow, was again as with McKell 
based upon Labor gaining country seats including Gippsland North, 
Goulburn and Mildura. Cain began to publicly advocate a Murray 
diversion. 150 The Victorian government was now "greatly concerned" 
about the matter. 1 51 
Regionalism soon re-emerged as the vehicle by which the agreements 
would be negotiated. For Victoria, the development of the Murray Valley 
was now closely linked to the question of the Snowy River.152 Regional 
development suited the Victorian Government as it sought to join with the 
Commonwealth to offset the power of New South Wales. That is, the Cain 
government was more enthusiastic about a 'co-operative' regionalism with 
the Commonwealth, at least for the Murray if not the Snowy Valley. The 
Snowy Scheme stood to be re-interpreted and redesigned from this 'Murray 
Valley' perspective. 
In support of an 'anti-New South Wales front', moves were soon underway 
within the Commonwealth Departments of the Interior and Post War 
Reconstruction to elaborate a plan for "the development of the ACT, Jervis 
Bay and [the] surrounding region." 153 Firstly, the Department--or Coombs 
again--was also drawing upon ideas long ago advanced as part of the plans 
mooted thirty years earlier for Canberra. A large lake, to greatly extend the 
central, 'ornamental' lake of today, could be constructed. 154 With echoes of 
Bradfield's popular schemes, such a reinstated plan for a large reservoir 
would contribute to the post-war reconstruction effort of building 
149 
"Employment Plans in Labour Policy", The Argus, 19/10/45, p. 3. 
150 
"Premier to Push Snowy River Plans", The Sunraysia Daily, 29/1/46, p. I. 
151 Cain to Chifley, 112/46, PRO: VPRS 1163/P, box 751, file 46/2045, op. cit. 
152 Cain to Chifley, 28/2/46, NAA: MP 831, 1955/714 Part I, file 119, op. cit. 
153 Telegram from Secretary Works and Housing from A. S. Brown, 27/3/46, NAA: MP 
831, 1955/714, Part I (file 119), ibid. 
154
• The Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, Federal Capital, Melbourne, 
Victorian Government Printer, 1915, p. 61 and The Argus, "Enormous Lake; Rival to 
Sydney Harbour", 16/4/15, p. 8. 
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"reservoirs in every valley." Accordingly, as suggested by The Argus of 
early March 1946, the question was "can Canberra become a great city?" 155 
Just as graphically, an expansive Australian Capital Territory was being 
pushed forward to become part of the new regionalism (figure 19). An 
industrial-geographic region was mooted by The Argus such as to extend 
the economic sphere of Canberra's regional influence. It could include the 
whole south east comer of New South Wales. That is, a much expanded 
Capital region was also being proposed as the Department of Post War 
Reconstruction had been "trying to select centres with adequate 
possibilities of development, where secondary industries could be set up, 
mainly to relieve the congestion of industry in Sydney and Melbourne. "1 56 
In short, the Commonwealth, or Canberra itself, could claim territory or 
claim to provide an alternative focus for industry--a focus away from 
Sydney. 
Consequent to this push and in contrast to Dunstan, in face of the mounting 
regional and financial pressures McKell began to waver. As Victoria and 
the Commonwealth sought a broad inquiry into the Murray Valley and/or 
the Snowy Scheme, McKell agreed to the need for "further discussion" on 
the matter of the Snowy Scheme. 157 In mid-May, however, McKell replied 
cautiously to the Acting Prime Minister on the matter of setting up the 
mooted and much discussed regional resources survey into the Murray 
Valley. 158 A mere audit of development possibilities without much in the 
way of policy control by the region(s) would be the only outcome New 
South Wales would agree too. 
Yet the President of the Murray Valley Development League, Padman, was 
pleased; "this- is what everyone concerned had been striving for. .. " He 
reiterated the League's apparently 'objective' approach, believing that "an 
impartial investigation ... would be a decided step towards the full 
development of the valley and over-all, instead of divided contro1."159 As 
155
. O'Reilly, Mary, "Can Canberra Become A Great City?", The Argus Week-End 
Magazine, 913/46, p. 2. 
156
. Ibid. 
157
• McKell to Chifley, 9/4/46, NAA: MP 831, 1955/714, Part I (file 119) op. cit. and 
in NAA: A9816, 1945/270 Part 2, op. cit. 
158
• McKell to Acting Prime Minister, 15/5/46, NAA: A9816, 1944/404 Part 3, Murray 
Valley Regional Planning .. 
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. Murray Valley Newsletter, No. I, Jan.-Feb. 1946, p. 2. 
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Figure 19; Map, proposed expansion of ACT region, from The Argus, 
Weekend Magazine, 9/3/46. 
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such, however, the League was not departing from conventional or 
dominant forms of TV A-ism. This also meant that legal control by the 
regions, including the Snowy River region as well as those of the Murray 
or Murrumbidgee, over the most crucial development proposal, the Snowy 
Scheme, had also been passed over. 
Specifically, with the inquiry into the resources of the Murray Valley 
effectively sidelined into a non-statutory review or 'audit' of physical, 
social and cultural matters, whilst leaving aside any question of devolved 
statutory powers, the New South Wales Government was gradually acceding 
to a Commonwealth controlled inquiry into the Snowy. Although McKell 
would continue to waver during the July 1946 Premiers' Conference for 
example,160 the strategy of the Commonwealth was having its effect. The 
Commonwealth's effort to trade control was slowly taking hold. Instead of 
supporting a massive, federal-backed Murray Valley Authority, or, an 
expanded Australian Capital Territory region, it was gradually gaining 
control of the Snowy project. Thirteen months later, the next (Labor) 
Premier of New South Wales, McGill, would still be intransigent. By then, 
however, he was unable to force the Commonwealth out of a primary role. 
Not surprisingly, a new agreement on financing the upgrading of the 
Hume Reservoir was finalised just after the Commonwealth obtained this 
mid 1946 'agreement' to investigate the Snowy Scheme.161 Soon, it was also 
agreed to conduct a resource survey of the Murray Valley. At the Premiers' 
Conference of 20 August 1946, in response to the League's request for a full 
interstate board of inquiry, the Premiers agreed to an interdepartmental 
committee. It was, however, one that would not investigate the transfer of 
statutory powers. It would only "collect and collate all the information 
available regarding the development of the River Murray Valley."162 As a 
'state-based' TV A-ism, it was leaving conservation or environmental 
protection at the State level only. Suffice to say, the most important of all 
prospects, the Snowy Scheme and its various possibilities, was not to be 
included in the audit. Over the remaining years of the 1940s, hopes for 
devolved political structures--and schemes--to accompany regional 
160 East to Jungwirth, 22/7/46, PRO: VPRS 1163/P, box 790, file 47/2716, Snowy 
River. 
161
• Wigmore, op. cit., p. 125-6. 
162
• Murray Valley Newsletter, No. 7, Sept., 1946, p. 2. 
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development, petered out. 163 The strategic financial levering of the States, 
combined with a resurgent but instrumental regionalism with Cain, pushed 
the Snowy Scheme investigations into the now three vying proposals 
(figure 20) back under federal control. 
Finally, by the end of 1945, the Department of the Interior had responded to 
Coombs suggestion, raised in his reply to Shadrack James, for a Bureau of 
Aboriginal Affairs. It gained little support from the Department, however, 
as "it would be doubtful whether such a Bureau would be a success unless 
the Commonwealth had control over the aboriginals of the whole of 
Australia. "164 Even as Aboriginal prospects were stalling, a scheme for 
Aboriginal farming at Wellington under the auspices of the New South 
Wales government was proposed but, again, it ran into difficulties due to 
lack of government support. 165 Nevertheless, when the Aboriginal activist 
Ferguson stood for federal parliament in 1949, he would still be advocating 
water conservation for the Western Division of New South Wales and still 
for a share in the 'New Deal' for his peoples. 166 Tragically, however, he 
died soon after. 
In sum, varied TVA-influenced approaches to developing large 
technological systems arose from the late 1930s. Many, vying 
technocultural possibilities were mooted as part of water, energy, 
manufacturing, conservation, and/or variously localised development 
emphases. They also involved a range of symbolic practices, including the 
representation of preferred technocultures. As well as the more 
autonomous or 'scientific' possibilities, often preferred by the departments 
or commissions, devolved and co-ordinating political possibilities, 
competed. Possibilities beyond the dominant resource extraction approach 
to the water cycle were also encouraged by the TV A emphases upon 
'conservation' as was a role for a more rational, co-ordinating, central 
government. 
163
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Figure 20; The three main diversion proposals ( 1945) from; Australia, Rural 
Reconstruction Commission, Irrigation, Water Conservation and Land 
Drainage (Eighth Report), Canberra, The Commission, 1945, p. 66. 
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Henderson, for example, challenged the conservation as 'full utilisation' 
paradigm and suggested living within environmental constraints whilst 
defending community. As part of regionalism, soil conservation practices 
also figured. These encouraged ideas of participation, to provide support for 
more genuine regional aspirations, such as to re-orientate experts towards 
local, regional needs, to potentially refigure relations between systems, 
experts and publics. Before the loss of the Powers referendum, via the 
emergence of Commonwealth financial powers, regionalism even 
challenged the dominance of the States. Indigenous aspirations were also 
inspired, although they were often ignored or sidelined. These first nation 
'borderlands' were not recognised as having any legitimacy under the 
regionalism which arose in Australia, even as the TV A had provided some 
scope for indigenous Americans. As with Bradfield's designs of the late 
1930s, the White Australia policy remained dominant, the purpose often 
being to shore up an exclusively Anglo Celtic, agrarian, 'outpost' and to 
assimilate others to it. 
The primary result, to this point, was to re-install dominant, instrumental 
approaches. Dominant scenarios involved utilising the resources of rivers, 
soils and forests for selectively recontextualised, Anglo-American visions 
of agrarian nationalism whilst producing electricity. Regionalism arose 
mainly, although not exclusively, as a way of arguing for such an 
intensified or 'full utilisation' use of water and other resources. 
Paradoxically, this occurred under a rubric of 'bio-regional' planning, 
designed to increase the integrity and autonomy of regions against 
apparently unresponsive or pecuniary central governments. In tandem, 
the resource extractive emphasis tended to fragment the regions away 
from any common cause. Rather than joining to protect regional integrity, 
or, to win the constitutional reforms needed to contextualise technology 
within regional control, full utilisation regionalism saw regions compete 
within an extractive paradigm. 
The strategy the Murray Valley Development League applied against New 
South Wales was crucial. The MVDL worked in concert with 'scientific' 
planning approaches and for a co-ordinating role for the central 
government, thereby supporting Victoria's claims. With the Commonwealth 
then propagandising that it could take economic control of south eastern 
New South Wales, New South Wales began to loosen its grip. Gradually 
conceding to the more rational institutional possibilities, New South Wales 
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began to relinquish control over the Snowy Scheme to the Commonwealth. 
Accordingly, however, a compromised TVA model emerged. In return for 
regaining control over its major inland river valleys, New South Wales was 
allowed to conduct a harmless audit of regional options for developing the 
'whole' Murray Valley--but not its headwaters. Without a wider 
geographical ambit and an environmental role constructed for the 
Commonwealth, this TV A-ism was not a 'whole river basin' approach. 
A particular reading of the TV A planning model had arisen. Being modern-
as-democratic mainly meant the proliferation of a corporatist and 
truncated (Lilienthal-like) regionalism. Despite the enthusiasms of many 
within the Commonwealth bureaucracy towards co-operative possibilities 
or towards the more environmentally benign and socially communal 
philosophy of Mumford, these possibilities became 'impracticable'. For 
Coombs, as he would later recall, "regional planning ... flew in the face of 
the logic of the developing world economic system. "167 Failure to provide 
the Commonwealth a co-ordinating role in maintaining environmental 
integrity, as was pursued by the Rural Reconstruction Commission (and 
Coombs), had meant, paradoxically, that local capacities were also impeded. 
This, plus the emergent money power of the Commonwealth, meant that 
processes of technological change were being shaped by more 
narrowingly universalising, 'full utilisation' economic criteria, rather 
than particularising local, community and ecological rights. Conversely, 
the Constitution and other social institutions were being interpreted to 
accord with the exigencies of this large system. The Commonwealth now 
risked being dominated by the 'internal logics' of partially empowered 
elites. 
Ultimately, TVA-ism had been interpreted to permit resurgent planning 
expertise to direct debates. It compromised--institutionally, geographically 
and culturally--as ideals of a politically devolved regionalism and balanced 
federal powers over development were exchanged for pragmatic control. 
With the arrival of the Snowy Scheme in particular, localising and even 
modest approaches to resource development became secondary to 
expansive, assimilating-nationalist visions. Expertise became less able or 
interested in methods by which to cultivate diversities of place and thence 
employment. It came to be more committed to 'the logic' of uniform and 
167 Coombs, op. cit., p. 65. 
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extractive systems. Elaborating Bradfield's approach, the scientistic 
regionalism of Tom Lang was indicative of this more powerful trend. As 
such, a combined formula was also building within planning elites seeking 
to favour the quantitative expansion of systems. Within an increasingly 
strategically minded bureaucracy, the aim was to build, defend, manage and 
to intensify a production-consumption economy--with financial 
continuity--to serve a populating nation. 
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Chapter 3: The Hydro Electrified River on the Hill 
The next planning choice to be considered arose as plans to combine the 
two main diversion options (the Murray and Murrumbidgee options) only 
slowly emerged into open, public awareness. The June 1946 conference had 
launched an investigation to prove the Murray proposal in comparison to 
the Murrumbidgee proposal. It aimed to conclude its deliberations in 
December of that year. In collaboration with the States, the investigations 
were to be conducted by Department of Works and Housing engineers, by 
Loder (Director General), Lewis (Director of Engineering) and his 
principal hydro-electric engineer, Rowntree. The partial or confused 
transfer of planning responsibilities appeared to these engineers to be 
inadequate, however. By way of seeking a loophole perhaps, Rowntree was 
soon suggesting that "no clearly defined scope" existed for their 
in vestigations. 1 
As early as May 1946, in fact, Lewis and Rowntree had been formulating 
plans that set out to do much more than just compare the two diversion 
options. They envisioned a much expanded plan for the use of the waters of 
the Alps. This involved, as Lewis recalled, "the co-ordinated harnessing of 
the Upper Snowy, Upper Murray and Upper Murrumbidgee Rivers."2 Sites 
for a possible dam on the Upper Eucum bene were crucial, as water could be 
transferred along a higher, more accessible tunnel than from Jindabyne 
and could augment flows to the Murray.3 This was also planned in 
conjunction with Upper Murrumbidgee waters.4 For Rowntree, "a broad 
enough vision" had yet to be taken.5 Unbeknown to the States, the 
Commonwealth engineers were already playing with the idea of combining 
the two rival schemes. A much expanded, 'full utilisation' approach to the 
water cycle was being planned, with the experts galloping off after an 
enlarged Scheme (figure 1). 
1
• Rowntree, E. F., "Snowy River Investigations; Notes on Works Required and Proposed 
Procedure", circa late July, 1946, p. I, NAA: MP 831, 1955/714, Part I (file 1/9) 
Snowy River Hydro Electric Development. 
2
• Lewis, R., Development of the Snowy River Scheme, Canberra, Department of 
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3
• Ibid, p. 10. 
4
• "Snowy River; Notes of Inter-Departmental Meeting held at Parliament House 
Canberra .. " 28/5/46 [draft], NAA: MP 831, 19551714, Part I (file 119), op. cit. 
5
• Ibid. 
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Figure 1; Cartoon by anon, accompanying "Science Begins to Gallop", 
Smiths Weekly, June 29, 1946. 
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Even with their limited awareness of options now being considered, with 
their hopes for a Murray diversion, the Victorians were soon 
enthusiastically supplying design ideas to the Commonwealth.6 Brewster 
was, however, equally quick to reiterate his concerns about a Murray 
diversion. De-watering, ventilation and transport of men and machines to 
long and deep tunnels, with little easy access from above, "tend to indicate 
the impracticability of the whole proposal. '0 (figure 2) Brewster had 
further doubts. He questioned the availability of any storage site on the 
upper Murray and doubted the value of diverting water to the Murray 
rather than to the Murrumbidgee as the former areas "are already well 
supplied. "8 In fact, an assessment of the worth of supplying water to either 
the Murray or Murrumbidgee valleys would be canvassed by an Economic 
Investigation Committee of the Commonwealth.9 To pre-empt a preference 
for Murrumbidgee lands, however, the Commonwealth was already 
proposing an extension of the Mulwala canal. 1 0 By November, a re-
diversion canal running from Yarrawonga, east of Urana and then towards 
Narrandera, had been mapped. 11 This would channel water diverted from 
the Snowy to the Murray to the Murrumbidgee and would, hopefully, 
mollify the principal concerns of New South Wales (figure 3). 
By late December 1946 the Commonwealth's investigation had produced a 
draft report that made a strong case for the viability and preferability of 
the Murray diversion. It maintained that "great power possibilities" existed 
and that the Murray diversion is "quite practicable" and "very economical" 
and warranted "complete investigation."12 The investigation suggested that 
the advantages of the Murray diversion over the Murrumbidgee diversion 
6 Bate to Loder, 30/7/46, NAA: ibid. 
7 Brewster to Loder, 118/46, p. 3, NAA: ibid. 
8 Ibid, p. 7. 
9 Secretary, WC&IC to Economic Investigation Committee [?], 18/9/46, p. I and 
SR&WSC; "Particulars of Areas where irrigation development could be extended ... ", 
attached to letter from East to Coombs, 18/9/46, NAA: ibid. 
10 Murdoch, T., to Loder, 28/6/46, NAA: ibid. 
11
• Rough tracing attached to 0. C. I Fd Sec. to Fitzgerald, 23111146, Australian Army, 
Survey Directorate, Australian Headquarters file 101-339, Mapping Programme 
Aust. Mainland - Special Surveys - Snowy R. Scheme. 
12
• Australia. Department of Works and Housing, Report on the Engineering Aspects of 
the Snowy River Diversion to the Murray River Valley, December 1946, p. I 0 (as part 2 
of Australia, Departments of Works and Housing and Post War Reconstruction, Report 
on Proposals to Divert the Snowy River into the Murrumbidgee and the Murray Rivers, 
Canberra (?), The Departments, June 1947). The finalised technical report was 
separately published (see below) and the final economic and agricultural report was 
published as part 3 of the June 194 7 report. 
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Figure 2; "Longitudinal Section of Proposed Tunnel to Murray River", from 
Australia, Facts and Figures, December, 1947. 
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in terms of power production were substantial; 450 megawatts compared to 
46 megawatts would be generated. Thence, if it was found desirable to divert 
the water back to the Murrumbidgee Valley for agriculture, the balance in 
favour of the Murray proposal would still be "very large indeed. "13 
As expected, by mid 1947, the investigation of the agricultural economics of 
the two proposals favoured the Murrumbidgee. Because markets for 
intensive irrigation produce--fruit and vegetables from irrigation--were 
already saturated, diversion to the Murrumbidgee provided a "somewhat 
more satisfactory answer" than did diversion to the Murray. 14 
Nevertheless, if it was decided "for other reasons (eg. power development)" 
to favour a Murray diversion, good use would still be made of the water for 
irrigation, "although with rather less advantage agriculturally. "15 Again, 
this subtly pointed to the possibilities of re-diverting water from the 
Murray to the Murrumbidgee if needs be. 
Uncertainty still existed, however, as to the costs of irrigation. Coombs had 
written to East in August 1946 about the efficiencies and costs of both 
canals and drains. New South Wales was represented on the economic 
committee by G. J. Evatt, Deputy Food Controller for New South Wales. Yet 
the mid 1947 economic report could merely state that initial, 
'reconnaissance' soils surveys were either "far short" of being complete or 
had not begun. It concluded that "in many regards information of great 
importance to the decision was not available. "16 Nevertheless, as diversion 
would increase the availability of water, "diversion [should] be 
energetically pursued." The wariness of the Rural Reconstruction 
Commission towards large irrigation proposals was being sidestepped. 
In the meantime, the possibilities of Rowntree's 'broader vision' were not 
about to be revealed. Indeed, the Chifley government was increasingly on 
the defensive as it sought to defend its post-war employment policies. 
Specifically, the Bill to make permanent the central or controlling 
lJ. Ibid, p. 9. 
14
• Economic Investigating Committee, Report on Agricultural Aspects of a Proposed 
Diversion of the Snowy River to Either the Murrumbidgee River or the Murray River, p. 
3 (in Australia, Departments of Works and Housing and Post War Reconstruction, 
Report on Proposals to Divert the Snowy River into the Murrumbidgee and the Murray 
Rivers, Canberra (?), The Departments, June 1947). 
15 Ibid, p. 43. 
16
• Ibid, p. 2. 
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banking powers of the Commonwealth Bank had been firmly resisted since 
1945. Then, on August the 13th 1947, the High Court found part of the 
legislation to be unconstitutional.17 The Court ruled that the Commonwealth 
"could not deny the States and public authorities the right of free choice in 
banking. "18 Although not necessarily a decisive blow against 
governmental steering hopes for the economy, Chifley continued to 
believe that further challenges on the other sections would soon be 
mounted. Indeed, three days later, Chifley announced to a surprised then 
jubilant Cabinet that he now favoured nationalising the banks. 19 The fear 
of privatised or restrictive credit regimes was still strong within Labor 
ranks. This sparked on-going controversy that resounded throughout the 
nation until 1949. 
Three days later, at the Premiers' Conference of the 19th of August 1947, 
ways of proceeding with the Snowy Scheme were discussed. The issue was 
whether the two options warranted further investigation--and by whom. 
Latterly, the Commonwealth was pushing to convert its comparative 
investigations into a formal, planning role. Cain argued forcefully for a 
Murray diversion.20 Similarly, the new Commonwealth Minister for Works 
and Housing, Nelson Lemmon, argued that industrial expansion justified an 
energy intensive Murray diversion and, tn v1ew of defence-related 
criteria, Commonwealth contro1.21 McGirr, who had replaced the retiring 
McKell, was not interested. Following Brewster's advice, he argued that the 
committee's preliminary investigations were incomplete as they had not 
thoroughly investigated the feasibility of the long tunnel. In line with his 
own .expert and Ministerial advice, the feasibility of the re-diversion from 
the Murray to the Murrumbidgee needed further research as we11.22 
17
. Love, Peter, Labour and the Money Power: Australian Labour Popu/arism 1890-
1950, Melbourne, Melbourne University Press, 1984, p. 168-9. 
18 Schedvin, C. B., In Reserve: Central Banking in Australia, 1945-75, Sydney, Allen 
and Unwin, 1992, p. 77. 
19
. Love, op. cit., p.l69. 
20
• "Statement made by Mr. Cain at Premier's Conference, Thursday, 2118/47" and 
State Rivers and Water Supply Commission, "Snowy River Diversion, Murrumbidgee 
versus Murray" in Snowy Rivers Historical File, SR&WSC Library. 
,~_ "Item No. 25 - Report on Diversion of Snowy River", p. 250, [notes from proceedings 
of meeting between Ministers and Premier's, 19/8/47], PRO: VPRS 1163/P, box 790, 
file 47/2716, Snowy River. 
22
• "Extract of Proceedings of Conference of Commonwealth and State Ministers held at 
Canberra - 19th August, 1947" (Document 2326), NAA: A 2618, Documents 2325 to 
2330 and 2332 to 2343, Minutes and Notes of C'/Wealth/ State Meetings ... 
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Chifley was, however, quickly pushing on with the agenda. Given the 
political priority and tumult of bank nationalisation, Chifley "took the 
motion as agreed to and proceeded to the next business. "23 As McKell had 
already 'agreed', or had grudgingly acceded, to investigation by the 
Commonwealth, McGirr could do little other than offer a restive silence. 
Just as the Commonwealth had outflanked the State via regional 
development and by using its financial powers, now, with the 
determination and unity-of-purpose currently required within the Labor 
movement, Chifley prevailed. The Commonwealth and States Snowy River 
Investigation Committee, or "Main Committee" controlled by the 
Department of Works and Housing, was formally established. McGirr and 
his Cabinet would, however, be far from silenced by the Commonwealth, 
especially as Weir and others backing Brewster were far from satisfied24 
This formal capture of control by the Commonwealth did much to 
encourage the Department's own investigations. More than ever they 
turned to consider the broader potentials. Developing power from the 
Snowy River waters was now "only part of a vast possible development" 
that should fit (as with McKell's earlier approach), into "a general master 
plan. "25 Lewis had, as mentioned, been interested in developing the 
Murray diversion at a higher level than from Jindabyne. This would 
involve a shorter tunnel to the Murray, reducing the cost and time 
required in developing a workable first stage. It would also reinstate more 
conventional power station design by avoiding hydro power stations 
discharging directly into intake pressure tunnels of the next stage.26 These 
changes would also allow construction in stages and make tunnelling much 
easier, with shorter tunnels and with access available at the mid point.27 
Water would have to be pumped up to the higher tunnel, although most of 
the energy would be returned as the water gravitated down to the Murray 
from a greater height. 
As Island Bend on the Snowy was a considerable distance to the 'south' (of a 
still speculative proposal for a dam site at Adaminaby), Rowntree concluded 
23 Lewis, 1971, op. cit., Appendix 8. 
24 
"Snowy Waters; Statement By Mr. Weir", Area News, 22/8/47. 
25 Lewis, 1971, op. cit., Appendix I, p. 3 & 4. 
26 Rowntree, "Notes on Future Investigations for Snowy River Diversion Proposals", 
23/9/4 7, p. 2, NAA: MP 831/1, 1955/714 Part 2, Snowy River Hydro Electric 
Development. 
27
• Ibid and Lewis, 1971, op. cit., Appendix I, p. I. 
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that "the Eucumbene could not be economically diverted into the Murray at 
the Island Bend level. "28 This was a lamentable outcome for him. Megatech 
hydro power needs large, high level storage, for it does not guarantee 
much in the way of replacement or adjunct power for coal without it. 
Spencers Creek, amongst an ancient moraine of the Upper Snowy, would 
also be investigated by way of attempting to secure high level storage 
along with Jindabyne. These would all combine, it was hoped, to provide 
adequate storage. 
In a move highly significant for later developments, Rowntree went on to 
suggest a grouping of rivers into southern and northern groups; "if, as 
appears probable, the high level [Murray] diversion were found desirable, 
then the waters of the upper Eucumbene could be considered as a separate 
unit. "29 Thus, according to a 'master plan', which would review the power-
potential of the whole area, a double pronged approach seemed to offer the 
best outcome for Rowntree. The southern grouping of rivers would include 
the Snowy, Geehi and Crackenback rivers. The Snowy and (Lower) 
Eucumbene--a tributary of the Snowy--would be dammed at Jindabyne and 
pumped up to a storage at Island Bend and then diverted to the Swampy 
Plains River, or the Upper Murray. The northern group included the 
(Upper) Eucumbene, Tumut and Murrumbidgee rivers and perhaps the 
Tooma "might be brought into this group or developed independently."30 
Rowntree preferred the Tooma for hydro development, but because of the 
loss to the Murrumbidgee, of Tumut and its own upper river flow, this was 
quickly discounted.31 
By September 1947 at the latest, a new, combined Murray and Tumut 
diversion option had thus been sketched out by the Commonwealth. 
Crucially, it had already superseded the need for an expensive and 
controversial Murray to Murrumbidgee re-diversion. The Tooma being 
diverted into the Tumut would obviate the requirement for such a re-
diversion. The Tooma would no longer flow into the Murray but to the 
'northern' group of rivers and would thus provide such a 're-diversion' of 
Murray waters high up in the Alps.32 With such a new 're-diversion', 
28 Lewis, ibid, p. 21. 
29 Rowntree, 23/9/47, op. cit., p. 2. 
30 Rowntree, ibid, p. 3 and Lewis, op. cit., 1971, Appendix I, p. 5. 
31 Lewis, ibid, p. 22. 
32 Rowntree, 23/9/47, op. cit., p. 3. 
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however, much of the Snowy should go to the Murray. This would make up 
for the transfer of Tooma water from the Murray to Murrumbidgee basin. 
This was enhanced under the plan, too, as it grouped the Snowy within the 
southern group of rivers. 
With many more pieces of the game available to it, the Commonwealth had 
created a crucial advantage. The strategic possibilities for the Department 
and for the Commonwealth were immense. It could territorially and hence 
politically outflank the States for this most strategically located 
development project. As Lewis advised Rowntree of Loder's advice upon 
receiving Rowntree's formal submission on the new options, "the Director 
General considers your latest suggestion ... is best kept in the Department for 
the time being as it may have to be used as a counter later."33 
In the meantime, the Royal Commission into the SECV of 1946-7 had 
defended the right of the SECV to retain its 'apolitical', institutional 
autonomy, to avoid the "evils of patronage" .34 This disappointed the Cain 
government, which had preferred political or social controls. From 
September to November, especially in Victoria, the bank nationalisation 
controversy raged. The Opposition in Victoria managed to block supply in 
the Upper House and precipitated an election on the issue that saw the Cain 
government swept out of office. The anti-Dunstan, pro-coalitionists of 
Hollway (Liberal) and McDonald (Country Party) took power. This also 
boosted the confidence of the emerging Liberal Party, nationally. Chifley 
persisted, however, and the Banking Bill became law in late November. 
With the coming to power of the new conservative State government, a 
rival hydro-electric project, an expanded Kiewa Scheme (from 119 to 289 
megawatts), was favoured. 35 Being remote from the La Trobe Valley, the 
project supported rural electrification in the north of the State as well as 
the 'independent' fossil fuel policy. Extensive pipe and open race-line 
additions (150 miles in total) provided for a much greater inter-catchment 
transfer of water and larger dams along with 18 miles of underground 
33
• Marginal note by Lewis to Rowntree on Lewis to Loder, 26/9/4 7, NAA: MP 831, 
1955/714 Part 2, op cit. Also see Lewis, 1971, op. cit., Appendix I, p. 2. 
34
. Holmes, Jean, The State Electricity Commission of Victoria: A Case Study in 
Autonomy, MA Thesis, Department of Political Science, University of Melbourne, 1969, 
p. 231. 
35
• "£25 Million Kiewa Plan Recommended", The Argus, 27/12/47, p. 5. 
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tunnel s36 (figure 4). The potential Snowy Scheme would, however, be in 
clear competition for labour and materials with an expanded Kiewa 
Scheme, a point subtly alluded to in the report.37 
The SECV's program for 'coal independence' by briquette production, was 
also strongly backed by the Royal Commission.38 In March 1948, Victoria's 
State Cabinet announced plans to support the development of a new open 
cut mine at Morwell, along with two briquette factories, with provision to 
expand by two more.39 As part of the broader plan the SECV decided to buy 
an inner-city power station from the railways, Newport A, and to feed it 
and other stations with briquettes. 
This gained significant support by the Minister for Electrical 
Undertakings, Lienhop, who, by mid 1948, was doubting the ability of the 
Joint Coal Board to ensure that black coal was properly shared amongst the 
States.40 In their on-going battle with BHP and other coal mine owners to 
win amenities and security, the New South Wales miners were on strike. 
This led to blackouts in New South Wales and with less frequency in 
Victoria. For Lienhop, "we have learnt by bitter experience that this State 
can never progress industrially so long as it is relying to such a major 
extent on imported fuel. "41 A nearly three fold increase in briquette 
production was planned. In a defiant move against nationalised banking as 
well as the Joint Coal Board and Chifley, the amount of money the State 
government permitted the SECV to borrow was then quadrupled.42 Yet due 
to poor coal assaying and the introduction of fuel oil, difficulties would 
quickly mount for the Morwell project. 
36 State Electricity Commission of Victoria, Report of the State Electricity Commission 
of Victoria on Extension of Kiewa Hydro-Electric Project From 117 Megawatts to 189 
Megawatts and Matters Related to System Generating Capacity, Melbourne, Govt. 
Printer, 1947. Also see Anon, "Revised Plan for Kiewa Hydro-Electric Development", 
Electrical Engineer and Merchandiser, January 15, 1948. 
37 SECV, ibid, p. 7. Also see Williams, H. H. C., Kiewa Hydro Electric Scheme; 
Technical History, Melbourne, SECV, 196? [Victorian State Library MS Collection], p. 
19. 
38
• The Royal Commission, quoted in Mathews, R., Public Investment in Australia: A 
Study of Australian Public Policy Investment and Development, Melbourne, Cheshire, 
1967, p. 161 
39 
"Developing Towns in Brown Coal Area", The Argus, 3/3/48. 
40 Lienhop, J. H., Shaping Victoria's Destiny, Melbourne, SECV, 1948, p. 3. 
41 Ibid, p. 8. 
42 Edwards, C., Brown Power; A Jubilee History of the State Electricity Commission of 
Victoria, Melbourne, SECV, 1969, p. 171. 
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Figure 4; Colour graphic, "Kiewa Hydro-Electric Scheme", in SECV, Three 
Decades, Melbourne, SECV, 1949, p. 124. 
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By December 1947, the first meeting of the Commonwealth and States Snowy 
River Investigation Committee or Main Committee had convened. New South 
Wales preferred a restrictive study, of how best to divert to the Murray 
then re-divert to the Murrumbidgee. East was keen on a broad ranging 
agenda and protested that a long re-diversion canal would be wasteful of 
water due to seepage losses. Loder was happy to be even-handed seeing the 
opposition between irrigations as convenient, rather than an opportunity 
to critique irrigation costs and its long term risks. Further to-ing and fro-
ing arose and the committee took much discussion to finalise its charter. 
Eventually, with Victoria's representatives sympathetic to the 
Commonwealth's approach, a broader if ambiguously crafted charter was 
eventually agreed. The committee would "evaluate all the facts necessary"43 
for a decision on where the Snowy should go. 
Brewster was soon requesting further details as pumping plant costs were 
being calculated.44 The amounts of water that the Commonwealth believed 
would be made available and, hence, to be re-diverted via the canal, as well 
as its peak rate, was sought. Loder was agreeable, although he hedged on 
many of the details which Brewster was seeking.45 Suffice to say that 
Brewster was not informed that a Tooma-Snowy exchange of waters or a 
Tumut diversion was being contemplated, nor that it could be regarded as 
another means of achieving the same ends, of retaining a high hydro-
electric yield whilst also directing (regulated) water to the Murrumbidgee. 
This concept was still under wraps, of course, within the Department of 
Works and Housing. Indeed, Loder would have welcomed Brewster's 
research program as it effectively kept him busy and away from exploring 
other options more likely to be favourable to New South Wales. 
Meanwhile, by way of an Australian Broadcasting Commission radio forum, 
various members of the public debated the Snowy Scheme.46 More broadly, 
writers and artists were also debating the 'mechanical' or quantitative 
imperatives. That is, as competing, 'full utilisation' strategies were 
43
• Snowy River Committee; Minutes of the 1-2/12/47, p. 2, NAA: MP 831, 1955/714 
Part I (file 8/9), Snowy River Hydro Electric Development and also see Lewis, 1971, 
op. cit., Appendix 2, p. 2. 
44
• Secretary, WC&IC (Messner) to Bagot, 16/12/47, NAA: MP 831/1, 1955/714 Part I 
(file 3/9), op. cit. 
45
• Draft replies to Brewster, circa late December or early January 1947/8, NAA: ibid. 
46
• Australian Broadcasting Commission, "The Best Use of the Snowy River", The 
Nation's Forum of the Air, Vol. 4, No. 3, January 21, 1948, p. 4-5. 
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emergmg in Australia, Sigfried Giedeon, in the USA, was wondering how to 
effect a more balanced relation between systems and society in his 
Mechanization Takes Command, first published in 1948. Similarly, the 
expatriate artist, James Gleeson, was considering the 'machine age', musing 
about an excessively mechanical being, gathering power. 
In his The Infernal Machine (figure 5), of 1948, a body-machine hybrid 
evokes unsettling processes of 'being transformed'. The cyborg's ear-brain 
is a mere cog-cam connection caught in its own mechanical cycles. With 
cable knots at mouth and throat, it is asleep in its own coils whilst dreaming 
of (mere) electro-mechanical procreation. Steel glands for post-war 
reconstruction predominate in this dystopic landscape, reduced to a 
mechanically colonised or, perhaps, 'populate or perish' imperative. What 
seems to be ... is! Within a dark and dissonant Blakeian cove, a 'Newton's 
Sleep' is projected to characterise the emerging technoculture. Ironically, 
the concurrent Australian Broadcasting Commission forum was unaware 
that broader visions were being prepared for the Australian Alps. 
Soon the Hydro Electric Sub Committee met to constitute its own role. 
Consisting of Lewis as Chairman and Rowntree (Department of Works and 
Housing), Olsen (SECV) and Dann (Elcom), it heard Lewis immediately 
suggest that the terms set by the Main Committee provided scope for 
expanding upon hydro-electric designs.47 In fact, Lewis began by raising 
the possibility of a diversion down the Tumut. This was couched in terms of 
a need to increase the amount of power generated by the existing 
Murrumbidgee diversion option, nothing more.4 8 Further, as the option 
faced the difficult task of diverting the Snowy all the way to the Tumut, 
Rowntree suggested that it looked unlikely. During this and the next 
meeting of the sub-committee, Rowntree and Lewis showed only qualified 
interest in a Tumut diversion. 
At the next meeting in early January, Rowntree produced a plan and 
tentative estimates. Via a storage on the Eucumbene River (a tributary of 
the Snowy), they described flows and tunnel distances for a higher level 
diversion of Snowy waters to the Tumut. Again, a two stage, northern and 
southern scheme was not mentioned, merely the possibility that the Snowy 
47
• "Minutes of Hydro Electric Subcommittee", 22/12/47, p. 1, NAA: MP 831, 
1955/714, Part 1 (file 8/9), op. cit. 
48
• Ibid, p. 3. 
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Figure 5; Painting by James Gleeson, "The Infernal Machine" (1948) 
reproduced in Art Gallery of New South Wales, James Gleeson and Robert 
Klippel: Madame Sophie Sesostoris (a pre-raphaelite satire) 1947-48, 
Sydney, Art Gallery of NSW, Australian Collection Focus Series No. 2, 1998-9. 
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could go down the Tumut, even as this was an option the Commonwealth 
engineers had already discounted, at least without the Tooma-Snowy water 
swap. Conveniently, Olsen also moved to quickly throw doubt on the 
prospect by pointing to the distance between this proposed dam and the 
Upper Snowy,49 which suited Lewis and the Commonwealth. By January 
1948 for Lewis therefore, "the Tumut diversion scheme then appears to be 
right out of the question." Olsen added that "from our [the SECV's] point of 
view I think you have proved that this proposition is not much good." 
Jindabyne was the only realistic location for diversion, Olsen continued. 
Lewis was even bold in disparaging the possibilities of a Tumut diversion, 
not wanting to "waste our energies on unnecessary investigation work." 
Thence, "the question is, can we see any better proposal?"50 
On the other hand, Dann, the New South Wales representative, was 
becoming increasingly suspicious. A viable prospect seemed to be 
emerging on the Tumut. Again, however, Rowntree quickly rejected this 
due to the lack of storage. Similarly, Olsen and the chairman, Lewis, were 
"definitely" against it although "if we see any reason for coming back to it 
we could take it up again. "51 The progress report prepared by Lewis and 
submitted to the Main Committee meeting in May 1948 also dismissed the 
Tumut option from within the narrow, two-scheme comparative 
approach.52 On the 'major' issue, the interim report expressed confidence 
in the Murray Scheme and, further, the available power "will be somewhat 
greater than previously indicated. "53 As also reported, the search for 
alpine valley storage had (apparently) moved away from the possibilities 
on the Eucumbene, with that on the Upper Snowy, at Spencer's Creek, now 
the focus of attention. 
The focus of the Main Committee would, likewise, be away from what could 
be done with the Upper Tumut. Again, controversy was being 
choreographed by the Commonwealth, centring on the viability of the re-
diversion proposal.54 The forthright East was now threatening to write a 
49 Hydro Electric Sub-Committee, "Notes of Meeting ... ", 8/J/48, p. I, NAA: ibid. 
50 Ibid, p. 2. 
51 Ibid. At this stage in Lewis' account, he emphasises the lack of charter given to the 
Sub-committee and tbe limited time available (Lewis, 1971, op. cit, p. 26). 
52
• Lewis [?]; "Snowy River Investigations. Notes on Work of Hydro-Electric Sub-
Committee to 7tb of May, 1948", NAA: MP 831, 1955/714 Part I (file 3/9), op. cit. 
53
. Ibid and also see Lewis, 1971, op. cit., p. 27. 
54
. Snowy River Committee, "Notes on Meeting ... 10th of May, 1948", p. 9-10, NAA: MP 
831, 1955/714 Part I, file (3/9), op. cit. 
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minority report if such re-diversion was seriously contemplated. Brewster 
was also techno-politicking. He was actively denying that a dam on the 
Tumut was feasible. This would preclude any Tumut diversion and hence 
require the re-diversion costs to be included in the power-intensive 
option.55 Seven months later he would qualify his view that Blowering was 
an unsuitable site for an earth fill dam.56 
Brewster and the New South Wales water lobby then changed tack, 
proposing a compromise design. This design was to form the basis of the 
argument put to the 'monster rally' of mid August (see below). It persisted 
with the Murrumbidgee diversion but added possible hydro electric 
developments on the Upper Snowy, Upper Tumut and elsewhere to add 
power· to the proposal. It was dutifully adopted, especially as Brewster was 
encouraging the Association by suggesting that the Commonwealth's 
engineers were worried over the (apparently) "terrific costs" of the 
Murray (plus re-diversion) option.57 
In the meantime, Olsen had produced a report on the greater importance of 
water for power and on the value of employing race-lines. The irrigation 
authorities, in league with the politicians, had for too long avoided a 
marginal cost basis by which to justify expenditure on irrigation works. He 
noted that, for example, East's Realities of Reconstruction justified 
expenditures merely according to "increases in business activities and in 
land values."58 Olsen characterised such argument as relying upon 
"Irrigation Nebula"--they did not consider what investment opportunities 
would be foregone by such expenditures. 
Olsen was not only emphasising a claim for water for power, however, he 
was seeking to include the crucial Upper Tooma into his southward flowing 
design. Olsen was continuing his work on the Murray option and was 
developing a Limestone Creek and similar options that, in a similar way to 
55
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the Kiewa development, applied long race-lines, this time linked into his 
Snowy-Murray scheme. Indeed, as Olsen's designs gradually began to catch 
up to the Commonwealth's approach, he realised that a larger scheme would 
allow the Tooma River to also be 'captured'. That is, just as the 
Commonwealth engineers had realised, "to make it pay depends largely on 
how big the scheme is. "59 If the brief could be so extended by Olsen then, in 
tum, Dann was again encouraged to insist that this is "just why I think this 
Tooma proposition should be investigated as part of the Murrumbidgee 
scheme. "60 
As the States had realised that the Tooma could go either north or south, by 
August 1948 they were now close to appreciating what the Commonwealth 
had waiting in the wings. With time also running out, and political 
pressures still coming forward, especially from New South Wales, Rowntree 
thereupon ended his silence. He admitted that he had been hoping New 
South Wales might claim the Tooma. This could have initiated, however, a 
new round of trade-offs for the Snowy. 61 After further discussion of this 
break into new terrain, Olsen objected to such a scenario, but Whitfield, 
from New South Wales, was, as expected, pleased as he realised that "by 
harnessing the Tooma and the Tumut...New South Wales would get almost 
the same amount of w~ter"62 as it would from a simple diversion of the 
Snowy to the Murrumbidgee. Crucially, as well as seeking to enlist the 
States, the result of the High Court challenge was also about to be released. 
The Commonwealth was signalling its intention to proceed, regardless. 
The Hydro Electric Sub Committee then decided that a short, or preliminary, 
report should be prepared for the meeting of the Main Committee on the 
forthcoming Monday. It primarily addressed their current thoughts on the 
two main proposals (fignre 6). A Murray proposal had been prepared; a 
project of 440 megawatts with load factor of 40%. Power developments down 
the Murrumbidgee had also been elaborated. The hitherto hidden option 
which the Commonwealth engineers were working on was then modestly 
canvassed in a mere four Jines: 
59
• Hydro-Electric Sub-Committee, "Meeting ... 4th and 5th August, 1948", p. 22, NAA: 
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Figure 6; Plan from "Snowy Waters", in Australia, Facts and Figures, 
December 1947. 
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A power scheme for the combined development of the Eucumbene, 
Tumut, Tooma and Upper Murrumbidgee areas, carrying the combined 
waters down the Tumut Valley has been envisaged, and it is hoped to 
have time to give this at least preliminary consideration before 
presenting the report.63 
The (full) Main Committee was then informed: they were given a verbal 
summary of the report and hence of the new proposa1.64 This was 
tentatively advanced on the same day as the High Court announced its 
decision that the legislation (of the previous year) to nationalise the banks 
was invalid. 65 This defeat at the hands of an antagonistic High Court meant 
that the post-war reconstruction intent of Labor's policy of "central 
control of the national economy including, if necessary public ownership 
of vital services"66 had suffered a substantial blow. But the Commonwealth 
was determined to press on. 
As investigations by the engineers continued, ostensibly to decide between 
the Murrumbidgee or Murray diversion options, and with the Murray 
Valley Development League feeling relatively confident, the 
Murrumbidgee Valley Water Users Association then organised a formidable 
rally at Narrandera. Consistent with Barwick's earlier advice supportive of 
States rights, the meeting convened a week after the High Court's decision 
to again lobby for its Murrumbidgee diversion option. As mentioned, the 
Association was now favouring a combined Tooma-Murrumbidgee option, 
unaware of other possibilities. And, unlike the approach of the League, 
whose secretary Vernon Lawrence addressed the meeting calling for 
proposals to be examined (a Ia Tom Lang) in the light of "cold 
logic ... according to the facts", the Association was more intent on political 
action, and on holding celebratory 'machine parades' (figure 7). Indeed, 
the President of the Association, Mr. Killen, accused Lawrence of issuing a 
statement prior to the rally designed to dissuade attendance. Lawrence was 
63
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Progress of Works to 6th Aug., 1948", NAA: MP 831, 1955/714, Part I (file 5/9), op. 
cit. 
64
• Snowy River Committee, "Notes on Meeting ... l2th August, 1948", NAA: MP 831, 
1955/714 Part I (file 3/9), op. cit. 
65
'. Love, op. cit., p. 177. 
66
. Galligan, B., The Politics of the High Court, St Lucia, University of Queensland 
Press, 1987, p. 148. 
126 
Figure 7; Photograph of main street, Leeton, circa late 1940s early 1950s, 
from The Leeton and District Progress Association, Leeton, The Garden of 
the Riverina, Leeton, The Association, 195?. 
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suggesting that "the demonstration should be abandoned and the matter 
left to the investigating committees. "67 KiJlen took Lawrence to task for 
attempting to convince people not to attend such a political meeting, going 
on to suggest that "if a decision was made against the Murrumbidgee, the 
matter would be taken further, if necessary over to the courts."68 The New 
South Wales Minister for Agriculture, Mr. Graham, also joined the battle, 
going so far as to accuse Lawrence of "hide and cheek" for suggesting that 
the Association should not demonstrate. He protested that "we have as much 
right to put forward our ideas as anyone else."69 
Not surprisingly, little new information was forthcoming from the 
engineers. Senator W. P. Ashley, Minister for Supply and Shipping, read to 
the meeting a progress report by the investigators. It maintained that 
delays had occurred because "there had been difficulties in obtaining 
reliable data on matters for which such data had previously not been 
required. "70 This perhaps hinted at the combined Tooma-Tumut diversion 
but was couched merely to be consistent with their investigations and in 
terms that did not reveal the new possibilities to the Senator or anyone else. 
The Secretary of the MVWUA, Gleeson, was also soon writing to his State 
Premier, McGirr as well as to Chifley about the "indefinitely prolonged 
investigation. "71 
Akin to Boyd's painting of an autarchic, rural reminiscence, Boat Builders, 
Eden, New South Wales of 1948 (figure 8), Gippsland Country Party interests 
were also responding, re-iterating their own, New States approach. 
Relatedly, on the 24th of August 1948, local residents from the Eden area 
met, coincident with the Premiers' Conference. The community gathered to 
support a Victorian (Hollway and Kent Hughes) inspired resolution that 
Eden and Two Fold Bay should become part of Victoria. This alignment was, 
in effect, with the coalition government of Victoria and against New South 
Wales "which had had the port for almost 150 years and had done nothing 
67
• "Huge Narrandera Rally Demands Action on Snowy", The Albury Banner and 
Wadonga Express, 20 August, 1948, p. 18. 
68 Ibid. 
69 Ibid. 
70 Ibid. 
71 Gleeson to McGirr, 23/8/48 (see Volume 1), NAA: AA197l, Box l, Snowy River 
Dossiers. 
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Figure 8; Painting by Arthur Boyd, "Boat Builders, Eden, New South Wales 
1948" (tempera on board) from Philipp, F., Arthur Boyd, London, Thames 
and Hudson, 1967. 
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so far. •o72 A Royal Commission was again called for by Victoria's coalition 
government to investigate these proposals. 
Concurrently Kent Hughes, a Liberal Minister for Electrical Supply and 
staunch anti-Communist, was negotiating via the Premiers' Conference for 
more coal for Victoria from Coal Board allocations (and soon ordering coal 
from Britain and India).73 Indeed, the development of the Morwell open cut 
and electrified railway to Central Gippsland was linked to this move to claim 
East Gippsland. The Liberal State Council also carried a motion calling for 
the full development of the Murray Valley Region, seeing it as a way of 
encouraging both agriculture and industry.74 The Country Party in 
Victoria still seemed willing to split from the Liberals however, who seemed 
far too eager to swallow their party. 
The Murray Valley Development League was showing the strains of 
complex political allegiances. Greenwood from Kerang, an area which stood 
to gain further water, felt "very strongly that sooner or later, this MVDL 
must take a definite attitude. We've been sitting on the rail for too long, and 
the other fellow isn't. "7 5 Yet Padman continued to hope that the League's 
attitude was that "simply we want a full investigation of the two 
schemes ... and when the investigation is made and all the facts available, 
that it be decided on its merits."76 More broadly, however, even as the 
Current Affairs Bulletin of September 13th sought to advance the issues, it 
too, like the previous ABC forum, was hopelessly behind what the experts 
were now considering, as they had now long moved beyond a simple 
comparison.77 
The Hydro Electric Sub Committee meeting of the 30th of August turned to 
the recently unveiled Upper Tumut possibilities--over 15 months after 
Rowntree had formulated his ideas and with only four weeks now 
remaining for the completion of their report. Lewis drew out the 
72
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importance of the proposed dam on the Eucumbene.78 Rowntree outlined 
his 'broad approach' to the problem. It was a way of using the whole of the 
water from the Australian Alps, providing a solution for developing power 
by constructing a dam on the Eucumbene that was "sufficiently large to 
adequately control the whole of the Tooma and Tumut rivers." This left a 
small opening for Olsen. Both the Tooma and the Tumut could now be taken 
"round to the Murray .. .if we are looking for the best possible (power] 
development." Lewis then firmed in his opposition to the race-line 
approach of Olsen, suggesting that more power would be available through 
the joint approach. 
Loder, as the Chairman of the Main Committee, then wrote enthusiastically 
to the others about the apparently new proposal, "recently" investigated. It 
was of "such importance" that all Committee members should be 
"immediately" informed of its content.79 The importance of a new, large, 
upper level storage just south of Adaminaby, for both irrigation and power 
development, was again emphasised. It would greatly improve the power 
prospects of a Tumut option and offered "the best solution to the adequate 
regulation of the upper Tumut waters. "8° Consequently, Lewis now moved 
quickly to enlist the States, maintaining that "this scheme meets all 
requirements: both those of the power authorities and those of the 
irrigation people. "81 Again, regardless of any High Court decision, the 
Commonwealth with its financial powers, would seek to push on (figures 9 
& 10). 
Bate of the SECV responded circumspectly. Given the snub to Olsen's designs 
and its assumptions about the need for race-lines, Bate warned Loder that: 
... the degree of firmness of the power must be carefully considered ... 
development at relatively low load factor ... presupposes that to cover 
years of deficiency ... reserves of fuel will be available.82 
78
• Hydro-Electric Sub-Committee, "Meeting .. .30tb August, 1948", p. 13ff, NAA: MP 
831, 1955/714 Part I (file 8/9), op. cit. 
79 Loder to Main, 7/9/48, NAA: MP 831, 1955/714 Part I (file 2/9), op. cit. 
80 Ibid. 
81 Lewis, 1971, op. cit., p. 34. 
82 Bate to Loder, 9/9/48, NAA: MP 831, 1955/714 Part I (file 5/9), op. cit. Also see 
Olsen's [?] letter of the 14/9/48 on the same file. 
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Figure 9; Cartoon by Hallett, Charles, "The Lodge - Looking Well Ahead" 
(1949?), (pen, ink & wash), NLA PIC R8855. 
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Figure 10; "Map of Proposed ... Scheme", Water Power, Vol. 3, No. 3, March 
1951, p. 93. 
Fig. 4 (below): Map of proposed Snowy Mountains 
irrigation and hydro-electric scheme. Two develop-
ments are involved: (1) The diversion of 565,000 
ac. ft. of water from the Eucumbene and Tooma 
Rivers to the Tumut Valley and thence to the Mur-
rumbidgee River, with main storages at Adaminaby, 
Lob's Hole, Tantangra and Blowering, and seven 
power stations T.l to T.7, having a total installed 
capacity of 1,180,000 kW; (2) The diversion of 
400,000 ac. ft. of water from the Snowy River to the 
Murray River with main storages at Spencer Creek 
and Jindabyne, and nine power stations (Nos. M.l, 
M.2H, and 2L, M.3, M.4, M.5H, and 5L, M.6 and 
M.7), having a total capacity of 1,680,000 kW 
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Victoria's reliance upon 'imported' coal meant, again, that it was 
vulnerable to what was happening in the black coal mines of New South 
Wales. Angry coal workers, calling for improved conditions by resisting 
potentially dangerous and labour displacing machines, were seeking to 
keep up with burgeoning demands. Strained industrial relations and calls 
for nationalisation of coal mining continued.83 In such circumstances, Bate 
was loathe to rely upon black coal to supply Newport power station and to 
make up for hydro shortfalls. The proposed scheme needed to produce 
'demand' or guaranteed supplies of power if it was to stand alone and 
thence meet Bate's conditions for enhancing coal independence. In short, 
development of briquetting at Morwell (and Kiewa hydro) was still 
preferred by the SECV (figure 11). 
Brewster's initial response was positive, softening his line on B1owering; it 
would now be possible "to reach about 800,000 acre feet [of storage] without 
great difficulty. "84 But it was not long before he returned to the game of 
bargaining with the Commonwealth. He suggested a further counter-
proposal--what came to be called the 'Brewster Scheme'--which was a 
modified Commonwealth proposal plus an intact Jindabyne-Murrumbidgee 
diversion.85 With the support of his Acting Premier, Baddeley, Brewster 
was seeking to push on with (the first stage) of the Murrumbidgee 
diversion.86 Amongst all the politicking and comparisons of rival 
proposals, however, the soil surveys were still to be done. 
The conservative coalition forces were, like the Commonwealth, seeking 
ways to join both sides of the water-power debate. R. G. Casey, now 
President of the Liberal Party, speaking at a Federal Council policy 
committee meeting, favoured massive irrigation development. He had also 
toured the TV A and had at one time favoured the use of "atomic explosions 
to blast a canal from Spencers Gulf to Lake Eyre and thereby change the 
climate of central Australia. "87 The other item on the agenda of the 
meeting was a proposal to draft legislation to ban the Communist Party, if 
83
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Figure 11; Graph, "Victoria's Fuel Requirements", where projected demand 
for fuel sees briquettes from Morwell replace much NSW black coal. From 
SECV, Morwe/l Briquette Project, Melbourne, SECV, 195? 
-----
VICTORIAN FUEL REQUIREMENTS 
e Briquettes manufac tured in smoll s•z.es lbektw) moke on excellent soltd 
fuel for industnof pu,.-poses. Their odvontoges ote high heot value, low 
ash content. absence of smoke. ond str•ct uniformity of s•z.e ond quohty 
135 
the Liberals won power. 8 8 By early October 1948, Casey was meeting with 
Fadden, as Liberal and Country Party politicians were conferencing in 
Brisbane, seeking a way to avoid three cornered elections or to avoid 
continuing attempts by other Liberals to absorb the Country Party. 89 Soon, 
McEwan, the astute deputy national leader of the Country Party, whilst 
praising the Liberals for finally agreeing, after their war time reversal, to 
now "ban the Communists," was also supporting moves to form "anti-
Socialist" coalition governments.90 
In early November 1948, Lemmon reported to Cabinet on the latest designs, 
which brought the Tumut into play.91 With the first third of the Snowy 
water being proposed to be diverted to the Tumut (from the Eucumbene--a 
tributary of the Snowy) and the second third going to the Murray (to make 
up for the water diverted from the Tooma), it would become a question of 
what to do with the final third--send it down the Murray, or, the 
Tumut/Murrumbidgee. The report also proposed that work on the Tumut 
diversion was favoured for "early development" as a way of encouraging 
New South Wales to this design. 
With the new designs (finally) publicly available on the 25th of November, 
community groups were again active. Killen, of the MVWUA, wanted to 
know how soon the water would be available, a major point for proceeding 
with the simpler Murrumbidgee diversion, but Lemmon sidestepped the 
question.92 Representatives of ten East Gippsland Shires were again calling 
for a new State and felt it was time to lodge an "emphatic objection"93 to the 
apparent loss of the river. With the release of the committee reports, the 
Murray Valley Development League, having always agreed to abide by the 
decision of the experts could "only rejoice that they have so agreed. "94 With 
the 'final third' of the Snowy up for grabs, however, the more considered 
response of the League was now to forego its undertaking not to be political 
or act as a pressure group. It sought "to organise popular support and to 
88
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secure support of ... parliamentary representatives. "95 In early February, 
the Executive Council of the MVDL finally agreed to press for the last 
available third to be diverted to the Murray.96 
The Commonwealth, given its continuing constitutional set backs, then 
formulated its explicit rationale for retaining control. Lemmon reported to 
Cabinet that several options existed; to use the Seat of Government 
Acceptance Act, the defence powers and/or to get the States to construct 
parts of the Scheme.97 The Departmental sub-committee soon recommended 
that a Commonwealth Authority, on the model of the TV A, be created to 
design, construct and operate the Scheme.98 Significantly, the cost of 
power was considered to be about half that of power from coal. Indeed, 
Treasury was soon hoping that it could also levy a sinking fund on 
revenue, (nominally) to refurbish plant, but it was also considering 
charging for water.99 The Scheme would save as much coal as was 
currently produced and the power stations would be located securely 
underground. The formal report reiterated the importance of defence 
projects, even "including atomic and aeronautical research."100 
This 'military-industrial' link was, however, to be in co-operation with 
British, not American researchers. Fundamentally, Chifley was seeking to 
insulate Australia from the "dynamic yet unpredictable" US economy.101 
The Chifley government was convinced that both "physical security and 
national economic well being" were dependent upon maintaining 
development programs and a high rate of immigration. Accordingly, it 
sought to "become independent of dollar supplies, to promote intra-sterling 
area trade, and to develop Australia's economy with British and Australian 
capital.'" 02 Consistent with the ALP's fears of US capital repatriating big 
profits, a Sterling autarky was preferred. This would be reinforced later 
during 1949 when heavy equipment for the Scheme would be sought from 
95
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Britain. Although some technical advice would be welcome from the US, the 
government "was anxious, if possible, to obtain contractors [for the 
Scheme] within the sterling area."103 
More broadly, Evatt was seeking a just and equitable post-war global 
political-economic regime, through a democratic United Nations and co-
ordinated, international efforts to stave off the recession, which Chifley 
thought imminent. Wary of US agendas and its risks for economic growth 
and security for labour, Labor was cautious about external balances and to 
continuing fiscal constraint and rationing at home. The new US President 
Truman, however, soon linked his anti-Communist drive with development 
assistance for countries such as Australia.1 04 This provided an opening for 
those prepared to break with Sterling. Indeed, Casey and the Liberal's 
Federal Rural Committee were soon meeting to decide rural policy for the 
1949 elections. 105 
For Labor, to defend their program internally, the importance of the 
Scheme for generating power was to be emphasised throughout, as this best 
related to its strategic or defence-related rationale. This was particularly 
stressed to the States when they met with the Commonwealth in mid 
February. 106 Lemmon offered the States the incentive that the Scheme 
would be completed via their facilities and sub-contractors, along with the 
Commonwealth's. Nevertheless, McGirr and his Minister for Public Works, 
Cahill, were determined to seek a New South Wales controlling authority. 
Cracks within the conservative ranks were apparent, as Hollway and those 
seeking to absorb the Country Party (in Victoria especially), were still 
calling for steep conditions before agreeing to the Scheme--including 
water for the lower Snowy. 1 07 As the meeting date drew closer, this call was 
moderated as it would loose many votes--'Country Party' included--west of 
the range. In the event, a new State, which gained privileged claim to 
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cheap power (although loosing the water!), was called for by Hollway and 
Kent Hughes. 108 Federally, the Liberal and Country Parties were still 
discussing whether to merge or not, although a joint policy charter, 
including "restoration of ... Commonwealth subsidies", as well as banning 
the Communist Party, had been evolved.' 09 
Leaving the States to bicker over the 'final third', Lemmon then stepped up 
the defence-related rationale. In co-operation with the British 
Government, Australia would be the major centre in the Empire for 
developing atomic weapons involving "considerable industrial 
undertakings and special scientific equipment for the splitting of the 
atom. "110 America could also join. The project would be led by Professor 
Mark Oliphant who would take up a post at the ANU to lead the research. In 
line with the emerging Truman doctrine, the US was also soon offering its 
services and TV A expertise. McGirr called a personal meeting with Chifley 
for the 26th of February. 
At the meeting, McGirr again sought a joint construction authority, to be 
followed by a New South Wales controlled operation as proposed by the New 
South Wales Cabinet.111 He re-iterated that New South Wales believed it had 
adequate expertise, finance and constitutional power to undertake the 
Scheme. lndeed, tbe State's l'ub\ic Works De"l'attment was tbe most 
formidable in the country, providing the engineering backbone of the war 
effort. It was also announcing a storage scheme at Menindee Lakes, on the 
Darling (a further stage in Brewster's plans for the Basin) and was moving 
to establish its own multi-purpose Conservation Authority. 112 Chifley 
remained adamant that the Commonwealth's defence powers would suffice 
to ensure control by the Commonwealth. 
Importantly, however, 
Commonwealth would 
a compromise was also advanced. Although the 
continue 
responsibility for constructing 
to push for "direct 
and operating the 
108 
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would be made for "consultation with the States" to avoid duplication and 
overlapping. It would also seek "advice [on] each stage of development." 113 
This was, at least, a new beginning towards an agreement on how joint 
influence could be legally and constitutionally exercised, but whose 
unresolved outcome was to dog the Scheme. Indeed, McGirr soon replied 
that section 100 of the Constitution meant that the Commonwealth would 
have "no power" over the rivers of the Alps. 114 
Surprisingly for financial commentators, Victoria was also stressing its 
independence by an unusual means. The underwriting of the SECV's 
burgeoning loans program was being undertaken "by another State 
instrumentality",115 the State Savings Bank. Similar issues of State 
controlled tax and finance policy would arise as a sticking point in the 
subsequent Snowy Mountains (Advisory) Council negotiations. For now, 
however, the anti-centrist banking forces were asserting themselves as an 
appeal against the High Court's rejection of Chifley's nationalised banking 
legislation was to be heard before the Privy Council (eventually lost on 
July 26th, 1949). Concurrently, against stop-start investment, the New 
South Wales coal miners were protesting, seeking nationalisation and 
pensions, for miners (figure 12). 
On the 4th of March, after the Labor Party Executive met, Chifley 
announced to Caucus that the Cabinet had decided that the Commonwealth 
would control the Snowy Scheme, via its defence powers. This was approved 
by Caucus.' 16 Soon Lemmon's Department was writing to the Attorney-
General's Department, asking that it draft a Bill to set up a Snowy River 
Commission. 117 Chifley also formally replied to McGirr's threat to call on 
section 100 of the Constitution that prohibits the Commonwealth to 
interfere with the State's water rights. Chifley suggested that the proposed 
course of development "would, on the contrary, assist" in making the 
waters "more readily available" for "reasonable use. "118 Further inter-
departmental discussions were concurrently in train on the pros and cons 
1 13
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Figure 12; Drawing, "Noel Counihan's impression of a miner", Common 
Caus e , 19/ 1/46, p. 7. 
·~~ 
~.~ 
1 4 1 
.I 
i 
I 
Noel Counihan'$ impression of 
a miner. 
U will be recalled that Mr. 
Counihan, who is the cartoonist 
of the Victorian "Guardi.an," 
won prizes in the ret'ent Vic-
torian "Australia At War'' ex-
hibition for his studies of 
, Wonthaw miners. .. 
An article on Oounihan's work 
appe&rejl In the December Issue 
of "Procress," the cullura.l 
map.dne with a punch. 
of a three or one man commission, the latter with two assistant 
commissioners. 119 Autonomous, administrative criteria again came to the 
fore: for the inter-departmental committee, a "representational body" 
would be "unsuitable" for a "constructional and business undertaking.'" 20 
Loder was soon in line for the crucial post, but by July he would 
withdraw121 and the "Sydney man",122 Hudson, would be appointed. 
Meanwhile, with the diversion of the 'final third' of the upper Snowy to the 
Murray or to the Tumut now possible, the Shire of Orbost was again active. 
The Greater Gippsland and Snowy Rivers Protection and General 
Development League protested. Catchment protect was a major concern. The 
League expressed concern that the mouth of the river would sand up, 
flooding the alluvial lands immediately upstream. 123 Indemnity against 
financial loss was also sought and the possibility of constructing a 
breakwater was canvassed. Bowden, the federal United Country Party 
member for Gippsland, wrote to Lemmon reiterating the need to indemnify 
locals. He added that dredging the opening could be considered. 124 
The conference of Commonwealth and State Ministers on the 14th of 
February 1949 had agreed that further examination of the lower Snowy 
problem was required. At the meeting, Kent-Hughes, replacing Lienhop as 
Minister for Fuel for Victoria, sought to represent the farmers of the Orbost 
region, along the Snowy River flats. He raised concerns about the long 
term effects on the river itself. 125 The drought of ten years ago had 
lowered flows substantially 
the likely silting up of the 
and concerns were now being expressed about 
nver 
answers. Although he did not, as 
mouth. This and similar questions needed 
foreshadowed in the press, push for a new 
industrial state like his Country Party colleagues, he sought 
"safeguards" .126 
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In late February 1949, the residents of Orbost intensified their efforts. The 
President of the Shire called a public meeting on the 25th of February 
which elected a committee called the Snowy River Protection League. 
Although also supportive of the general intent of the Scheme, there was 
much unease about the fate of the Lower Snowy and that Orbost residents 
"had not so far been consulted in any way" by the engineers. 1 2 7 It was the 
loss of the summer flows that was of particular concern. 
Along with Bowden the deputy Premier (Kent Hughes) was in attendance 
and he suggested that compensation flows from Jindabyne be permitted or 
another dam below Jindabyne be built. 128 The State Rivers and Water 
Supply Commission of Victoria's representative, Green, then reassured the 
residents that even after diversion from Jindabyne, enough (average) flow 
would remain in the river to keep the mouth open; "the river flow had 
often fallen below these discharges in the past without allowing the mouth 
to silt up."129 The engineer also dismissed the possibility of diverting water 
from Jindabyne storage as this would be a relatively minor flow and he also 
believed that the problem of salt ingress was unlikely to arise. He also 
dismissed local knowledge about the need to maintain summer flows as 
lacking precision. 
In early March, Silke (Snowy Shire Secretary) again took up these 
concerns, not with Hollway (Premier of Victoria), but with ChifleyDO Silke 
stressed that the committees were concerned with the national interest but 
"naturally their rights must be protected." Meanwhile, steering a middle 
course, Hollway and Kent Hughes believed that Kiewa should have priority 
over the Snowy Scheme.131 Then, on the 17th of March, a joint meeting of 
the East Gippsland Regional Committee and the Monaro-South Coast 
Regional Development Committee convened in Orbost to further press the 
case for regional development.132 It resolved to argue for power to be made 
127 SR&WSC, Investigations and Design Branch, "Snowy River Development Meeting of 
Orbost Residents 25th February, 1949", p. I (see Volume I, Part "Reports and 
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129
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available to this rugged, coastal region. It opposed the allocation of water 
away from the region, until "local requirements are first satisfied."133 
These included "present and future needs of industrial and rural 
development." 
The joint, regional committees continued to push for development with Two 
Fold Bay, a deep sea port at Eden, being a focus for regional or decentralised 
development. Hollway was happy to pass these resolutions on to Chifley, 
who wrote back informing the committee that this time East, Chairman of 
the State Rivers and Water Supply Commission, had agreed to visit the 
region. 134 The Commonwealth was also moving to quickly contact 
Murrumbidgee irrigators. Lemmon wrote to the Secretary of the MVWUA, 
M. J. Gleeson, in late March to counter Brewster's strategy. Brewster was 
seeking to protect a Murrumbidgee diversion by not informing the MVWUA 
of the cheaper option of regulating water and the feasibility of Blowering 
Dam in the Tumut Valley. Lemmon therefore explained that "regulation 
could be obtained much more quickly and cheaply than by the diversion 
from the Snowy, as it would require the building of one or two major dams 
only. "135 Gleeson, feeling that he had hitherto been misled,136 could only 
fall into line with the Commonwealth. 
The Hydro Electric Sub Committee then convened to consider the altered 
design possibilities. It heard that with a 'fnll utilisation' approach, the 
Murray diversion option had increased nearly four fold to 1600 megawatts 
and the Tumut option to 1000 megawatts. Such a massive increase may 
cause, as Lewis suggested, "complications", and it may prompt the Main 
Committee to ask "'what were you doing in your last investigation?"' 137 The 
delayed consideration of the expanded options was thus now also proving to 
be a possible source of embarrassment to the planners. Indeed, in their 
133
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report to the Main Committee (of May), the Sub Committee put off 
specifying by how much the initial (Tumut) project would be increased. 138 
Concern turned towards the load factors. Initially designed to be around 
40%, as Olsen had redesigned the much expanded options, the load factor 
had now plummeted to 26%. For Olsen (in advance of his own SECV), this 
was a highly desirable outcome, as, in his view, hydro-electric stations "are 
suitable only for peak operation. That is, where steam stations are not 
suitable. "139 Given the long time it would take for the Scheme to be 
compatible with an emerging, integrated electricity grid under such 
assumptions, the Commonwealth engineers were again baulking at their 
own proposals, now wondering about a staged approach. For Lewis, the 
initial stages could see a higher capacity and, as the load develops, "we 
could vary it? It is a very big scheme."140 
In mid April, the Main Committee met and considered the affect of the 
Upper Snowy diversion on Orbost lands. East began by outlining the 
concerns of the community, of the closing of the river mouth and the loss 
of water quality along the river flats. 141 Brown (Post War Reconstruction) 
and Loder were rather unconcerned about the prospects. Loder, from Sale, 
was familiar with the conditions in the Gippsland Lakes, a large group of 
lakes once filled by fresh water. The opening of the lakes to the sea at 
Lakes Entrance had introduced salt water (or at least to Lake Wellington). 
Loder thought that it had had little affect on the adjacent farmlands and 
that the same would hold for the lower Snowy. Main (Public Works) was 
also less than seriously concerned about the lower Snowy. When he had 
chaired New South Wales' 1942-4 Snowy River Investigation, he and his 
technical committee had concluded that the remaining, halved flow, would 
be adequate.142 East hoped that "all that might be necessary is that the bar 
be opened up only once a year." Main extrapolated, wondering whether the 
flow from merely the Victorian catchment would now be sufficient and 
whether water could be specified for release from Jindabyne for 
138
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"compensation. "143 Then, after further discussion, East reiterated that the 
principle problem appeared to be the "loss of the opening of the bar" but 
"if four of us went down that would be ample. It is really just for the 
purpose of 'showing the flag', rather than making any real 
investigation ... " East, Brown, Main, Loder and others as well as their 
officers finally decided that they would travel to Orbost for a meeting on 
Friday the 29th of April. 
In the interim, Lewis reported to the Main Committee on the 
the 
comparisons 
combined being undertaken between the now burgeoning options, 
Murray and Tumut diversion option and modified Murray and Tumut 
diversion options which could now also include a diversion to the 
Murrumbidgee. Doubt had arisen from surveys as to the possible capacity of 
a dam at Adaminaby--of six-hundred and fifty thousand or a million acre 
feet. Pressure was growing for a larger dam or "that a small increase in 
wall height [from 140 to 160 feet] would be practicable and would provide 
the additional amount."144 As previously planned, he also reported that the 
Snowy-Murray design had been modified. It would have a lower load 
factor145 (26%) and lower energy output, due to dropping a storage dam at 
Spencers Creek but demands on upper Snowy waters were increasing as 
Jindabyne would now be used more intensively for (power) demand 
storage. 146 
Whilst demands by the engineers for greater storage were continuing, at 
the lower end of the Snowy River, East and other members of the 
Commonwealth committee met with Orbost residents. Webster, who had 
completed a report on problems and possible options before the trip, 
advised him. 147 Webster down-played the potential problems even as he 
recognised that significant alterations to the rivers flow regimes would 
arise. He (again) estimated that at Orbost, average flows would drop to 47% 
of current flows, that flood flows would be down by 20% and drought flows 
143
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by 66%. Further, during dry periods, the salinity of waters near the river 
mouth due to tidal inflows may "possibly slightly increase" but 
underground waters would remain unaffected. Ultimately, however, the 
lower Snowy flows "will still be substantial" 148 or enough to avoid any 
serious problems. Over the forthcoming decades, he mooted that further 
monitoring reports could be made. 
The land holders were not convinced. In response, a local committee soon 
formed "to place before the Federal investigators" the matters of "great 
concern" to those along the lower Snowy. 149 All Commonwealth committee 
members except Brewster travelled to Orbost and listened to concerns about 
the silting up of the river mouth, threats to the fertility of the irrigation 
flats and rises in river water salinity. East, as reported by the Snowy River 
Mail, suggested that "compensation for known and unknown damages 
would necessarily be recommended" for incorporation in the planning of 
the Scheme. Loder, as Chairman, gave an "assurance that their case would 
be fully investigated before the finding was made." 150 Orbost residents, 
according to Barry (reporting to the Monaro-South Coast Regional 
Development Committee), had also formed the belief that: 
the expert committee in making its final report to the Federal 
Government had been instructed at the request of the Victorian 
Government to make a full investigation into the effect of the proposed 
diversion of the Snowy on settlements below Jindabyne.151 
The primary role for protecting the lower Snowy, as understood by locals, 
still remained with the Commonwealth. Barry also secured support from 
other Shires to "retain for the Region such benefits as might be available 
from the development of the Snowy River Scheme."152 
By late May, the Main Committee was meeting again and returned to the 
lower load factors now being firmly recommended by the Hydro Electric 
Sub Committee who had formally submitted their design report. 153 East 
148 Ibid, p. 18. 
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reported on the concerns of those on the Lower Snowy. Contrary to local 
opinion, he doubted whether the Snowy diversion would affect the quality 
of water for stock supply purposes "as even now there were times when the 
water was not drinkable by stock." The problem of possible silting up of the 
mouth of the river was much more serious. Nevertheless, as foreshadowed 
in the press, a storage of about 30,000 acre feet was recommended as it 
would "probably ensure a satisfactory minimum flow during the three or 
four dry months at the beginning of the year." Yet the committee decided 
that it would omit, in the final report, any mention of possible damage. It 
would favour remedial works "either by providing storage or otherwise, to 
ensure the river mouth being kept open." For Brewster, however, getting 
water inland should not be delayed, and if not to the Murrumbidgee, then 
the remainder of Snowy water should be available on the northern bank of 
the Murray. 154 
In late May 1949, the second reading of the Snowy Mountain Hydro Electric 
Power bill was then debated. For Lemmon, with its cheap electric power 
which was the "most efficient tool of the machine age" the Scheme would 
decentralise populations. Inland cities with populations of a million would 
arise "in our time." 155 Lemmon foregrounded the role of electricity 1D 
powering the nation's "munitions factories and laboratories and its defence 
research installations." The "industrial capacity of the nation" for its 
"defence machine" were the dual constitutional bases for Commonwealth 
control. The offers from President Truman continued. 
Importantly, Lemmon also referred to the concerns of the Snowy River 
Protection League. Lemmon promised that the proposed Snowy Authority, 
even acting outside its prescribed area of activity, "may ... provide some 
small storage in the lower Snowy Valley to augment the summer flow in 
that area." 1 56 Provision had been made, he said, to protect and pay 
compensation to communities affected. Nevertheless, by the time a mid July 
meeting of Ministers ratified an (interim) agreement, these conditions held 
out to local residents and recently reiterated within federal parliament 
would change. In the meantime, Lemmon was also offering a "significant 
154
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concession" to New South Wales. Its Public 
with 
Works Department would be 
the Snowy Authority, the allowed to construct, in collaboration 
proposed dam at Adaminaby, the first 
soon accept the offer.' 58 
of the major works. 1 57 McGirr would 
To return to the matter of protecting the Snowy, the engineers of the Main 
committee were in the process of arriving at a compromise among the 
three governments involved. Consistent with the Constitution, this plan 
would transfer Commonwealth responsibility for protecting the Lower 
Snowy to Victoria. This idea arose in mid June, as the Main committee 
reported its conclusions to Ministers. 
After the replacement of the Tooma water by water diverted from the 
Snowy into the Murray, there remained the question of whether the 
remaining Snowy water should go either to the Murray or Murrumbidgee. 
After diversion of 235,000 acre feet per year from its Eucumbene tributary 
to the Tumut, there was estimated to be about 400,000 acre feet per annum 
available. The former option would produce more power at less cost (155 
megawatts more, at £25 million less). It was also believed that it would also 
produce 'firm' power. Beyond this preference, the committee then 
recommended--and had begun to assume--that "the greatest economic 
value for the scheme can be obtained by designing it to operate mainly on 
peak loads." 159 Designing the Snowy Scheme for a (guaranteed) supply of 
specialised peak power would enable the installation of much larger coal 
fired power stations, making for greater economies of scale overall. A peak · 
power Scheme would come to underwrite fossil fuel grid economics. 
Further, as long anticipated by Loder and Brown, this would also add to the 
leverage of the Commonwealth over the States on the matter of electricity 
infrastructure. 
Mainly upon the economics, the Committee had no hesitation in 
recommending that the balance of water from the Snowy be diverted to the 
157
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Murray. Concurrently, "further investigations" had now established that 
the extra water into the Murray could "be used effectively for irrigation in 
the State of New South Wales"160 (not just the Murrumbidgee). It also 
suggested that construction for diverting Snowy waters inland, which 
could include Eucumbene River waters, be undertaken in the early stages. 
Further, a storage on the Upper Murray of 250,000 acre feet needed to be 
provided and the replacement of diverted Tooma water be accepted from 
part of the water diverted from the Snowy. Finally, in line with the 
constitutional preference of the Commonwealth to be primarily associated 
with the energy or 'defence-related' components of the Scheme and the 
limits which section I 00 of the Constitution places on the Commonwealth 
interfering with State riverine rights, the States were to be responsible for 
carrying out the lower storage works for irrigation needs. 
Reflecting the committee's consultation with the region in April, the 
report then considered the implications for the Snowy. It reiterated what 
the affects might be on the lower Snowy, due to reduced flow. 161 In sum, 
however, it concluded that "some of the fears expressed are not justified." It 
would be preferable to wait and see what deleterious affects arose before 
taking any action. The report then projected that Jindabyne dam was still 
up to 10 years away from completion (actually 20 years). Then and only 
then "the construction of relatively minor works" for improving the flows 
during summer, "would probably overcome the problem." Nevertheless, 
now qualifying Lemmon's previous pronouncements, the Snowy Authority 
"should be required to carry out or to have carried out by relevant State 
instrumentalities any investigations necessary to determine the effects of 
reduction summer flows on the lower Snowy area"162 and to arrange either 
directly or otherwise to have the work done. 
The actual transfer of responsibility to Victoria for the lower Snowy arose 
as the extra water into the Murray--400,000 acre feet per annum according 
to the preferred option--also became a matter of bargaining between the 
States. Even as New South Wales was angling to be the State to get it aU, 
Victoria was seeking a share. In particular, in return for some more water 
from the Murray, Victoria "should accept full responsibility for carrying 
160 Ibid. 
161 Ibid, p. 11. 
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out any works found to be necessary on the Lower Snowy River."163 This 
should not allow for the prospect of a release from Jindabyne. Further, in 
allowing Victoria to share in some of the extra water in the Murray that 
was "coming from a catchment entirely in New South Wales", and because 
New South Wales was prepared to forego the expensive option of re-
diverting the extra water in the Murray to the Murrumbidgee by a long 
canal, "sufficient electric power should be made available to New South 
Wales free of cost, from power generated from the project, for pumping, 
for use on lands adjacent to the Murray. "164 The amended share in the 
Murray should then be I 00,000 acre feet per annum to Victoria and 300,000 
freely pumped to New South Wales (modified again in 1958). The 
Commonwealth, for its part, would again agree to participate in funding 
expansions to the Hume. 
Victoria's share of power from the Scheme was also to be hedged. This time 
on the basis that it already had some hydro electric generating plant 
installed. Under the rubric of resource equity, it would be only after this 
had been added to that expected from the Snowy Scheme, that dividing the 
power according to relative populations in the two states would be done. 
After making allowance for Commonwealth power requirements, it was 
therefore recommended that the split of power be 'two thirds' to 'one third'. 
Concurrently, however, the degraded conditions on the New South Wales 
coal fields were causing many headaches. 165 The underground coal mines 
had been developed in a speculative and haphazard manner by private 
capital. With many mines opening and closing according to the boom and 
bust cycles of inter-war, investment had been low, with picks, carts and 
horses still predominant. As with the wharfies, miners were also hired on 
an irregular basis. Unlike in the La Trobe Valley, few community amenities 
were built and conditions, wages and safety were often poor. These 
conditions had led to antagonistic industrial relations and to a range of 
defensive work practices. Given such unrest, by May 1949, Lemmon would 
be talking up the Snowy Scheme, suggesting that it would spare somewhere 
between 5,550 and 12,500 men from working in coal mines and power 
stations. 166 
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For the Miner's Federation, mechanisation, especially in the coal pillars or 
sections of coal left in mines for long-term structural integrity, would be 
resisted unless conditions dramatically improved. A shorter working week-
-35 hours--would also help offset the affects of 'speed up' mechanisation 
(figure 13). Town and site amenities along with secure and safe working 
conditions were, however, gradually being improved by the Joint Coal 
Board. But Chifley and the Board, given the uncertainties of bank 
nationalisation, were not prepared to fix the investment 'chaos' of the 
industry by nationalisation. 
The momentous coal strike of winter 1949 then arose, with workers seeking 
to act before a feared, post-war recession eventuated (figure 14). The 
Communist-led unions were also refusing arbitration. As Sharkey, the 
General Secretary of the Communist Party put it, they were trying to 
"liquidate reformism. "167 Amidst the mainstream press campaigning hard 
against the Federation (figure 15), strike funds were withheld and union 
leaders jailed. Economic and social life stalled for seven weeks. Crucially, 
for later mining conditions, the A WU was also offering to break the strike 
and to work for piece rates. It was, however, the army that broke the strike, 
to the dismay of many. At the end of the strike, in mid August, Chifley then 
announced intensified plans for mechanising the mines and for expanded 
open cut mining. 
In the meantime, compromises between Liberal and Country Parties were 
evolving as Menzies debated the second reading of the Bill to establish the 
Snowy Authority. Fundamentally, he supported the project, "for the 
ordinary people of this country"168 but he warned that close watch should 
be kept on expenditures. Appealing to his business constituents, while 
noting that the "settled policy of the coal unions [is] to have no 
reserves"169 of coal, he pointed out that the Scheme could act as a strike 
breaker against New South Wales miners. Such a technological defence 
against union action was of "great moment" in preventing industrial 
disruption. He likewise supported the construction of Kiewa. The war 
167 Sharkey quoted from the Communist Review, April 1949, p. 113, in Gollan, Robin, 
The Coal Miners of New South Wales, Melbourne, Melbourne University Press, 1963, p. 
232. 
168
• Menzies, debating the Snowy Bill after the Second Reading, 22/6/49, in 
Commonwealth of Australia, CPD, Vol. 203, Canberra, Govt. Printer, 1949, p. 1345. 
169 Ibid, p. 1340. 
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Figure 13; Cartoon by Toby Jackson, "The idea of continuous miners is that 
we don't continue as miners", from Ross, Edgar, A History of the Miner's 
Federation of Australia, Sydney, Australian Coal and Shale Employees 
Federation, 1970, facing p. 400. 
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Figure 14; Cartoon by anon, "Our Vow - Never Again!", Common Cause, 
17/ll/45. 
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against unionism in the USA, based on the Taft Hartley Act, was also 
firming as Liberal strategy. Menzies also supported 'States rights'. The TVA 
precedent and the defence power basis "is mere humbug ... it is the excuse 
for grabbing all authority in this matter." Especially as the States were 
being brushed aside, the legislation was "tainted ... with serious illegality." 
Allan Fraser, the Labor member for Eden-Monaro, praised his constituents 
as "big Australians ... united in their determination to see that this great 
national work is accomplished." 170 Earle Page, the elder statesman of the 
Country Party, defended the role of "non-Labor governments" in past 
national development projects, primarily for agriculture. 171 The national 
scope of the Agricultural Council, he implied, also offered a structure for 
negotiating various State interests and for arranging long term financial 
security for the projects (now estimated to cost £175 million). 
Within this majoritarian agreement that the Scheme was a worthy project 
(although the 'States rights' Kent Hughes would continue his opposition) 
and the Upper Snowy should be so diverted, confusion as to emphases and 
means was evident in federal parliament. The United Country Party 
member for Gippsland, Bowden, suggested that the welter of combined and 
recombined diversion options during the election year of 1949 was 
misleading many in his electorate. For him, there was still a "good deal of 
confusion" about "what is exactly meant" by the proposal to divert two 
thirds of the waters of the Snowy River into the Murrumbidgee River and 
one third into the Murray River. 172 The belated revelation of the 
massively expanded, combined Tumut and Murray diversion options, 
delayed to protect a Commonwealth role, was straining efforts to keep 
everyone informed. Lemmon replied that all the flow above Jindabyne was 
to be diverted and this was to divided one third to two thirds. The remaining 
flow at Orbost, would be about 53% of the total flow, measured at Orbost. The 
tributaries and catchments below Jindabyne would now be the only source 
to a truncated Snowy River. 
Nevertheless, the Authority would (still) continue to be responsible for 
protecting the Lower Snowy, or this at least appeared to be the intention of 
the government as it framed the Snowy Mountains Hydro Electric Power 
170 Ibid, p. 1351. 
171 Page, Earle, 22/6/49, ibid, p. 1352 
172 Bowden, 117/49, ibid, p. 1912 
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Act. As assented to on the 7th of July, the Bill provided the Authority with 
sweeping powers under a defence rubric to build the Scheme and to 
construct and operate incidental works that were "necessary or desirable 
for the purpose of preventing or mitigating injurious effects of any 
works ... "173 By mid July, however, the undertaking of Lemmon in the 
second reading speech that the Authority would be charged to protect the 
lower Snowy and vaguely reiterated in the Bill itself, had altered. The 
conference of Ministers of the 13th of July ratified the suggestion from the 
late June report. More in line with the wishes of the engineers, 
responsibility for the lower Snowy would now be passed to Victoria in 
return for extra water being provided to Victoria and subject to the Snowy 
Authority making available free of charge "sufficient power to pump its 
share of the water to the areas agreed upon."174 Further, as underlined by 
Geo Weir, the New South Wales Minister for Conservation, "Victoria ... will 
not require at any time that any water be released from the Jindabyne 
storage to the Lower Snowy and so become unavailable for power and 
irrigation. "175 
Victoria's State Rivers Commission appears to have preferred to swap what 
it regarded to be an inconsequential responsibility for protecting the 
Lower Snowy in return for gaining extra water from the Murray. The 
Commonwealth would have been freed from an 'irrigation' or river 
management responsibility remote from the Scheme's designated area 
(even as it took a great interest in the Hume) and New South Wales would 
gain free power for pumping from the northern bank of the Murray. In 
New South Wales many of its politicians and bureaucrats were still 
bargaining on the matter of control. But, consistent with the apparent lack 
of a "clearly defined scope" as a result of the mid 1946 conferences, whicb 
had been assiduously cultivated by Commonwealth, Loder recalled that an 
apparently ever reliable strategy could again be mobilised: 
The decision of the Commonwealth to 'go it alone' under the Defence 
powers had a considerable effect on forcing NSW to final agreement--as 
173
• "The Snowy Mountains Hydro Electric Power Act", in Australia, Commonwealth 
Acts Vol XLVII Canberra, Government Printer, 1949, p. 113. 
174
. See Lemmon1S summary in Conference of Commonwealth and State Ministers, 
1317/49, p. 6, NAA: MPI051, 19551714, Part 5, Snowy River - policy including 
preliminary investigations. 
175
. Weir, NSW Minister of Conservation, to McGirr, NSW Premier, 3/8/49, NAA: 
A2618, Document 3077, Snowy River Development Scheme. 
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it was intended to. Legal doubts were admitted but Brown and I felt that 
by the time it got to the Privy Council if anyone fought it out we would' 
have gone so far it couldn't be stopped. 176 
Loder's overall strategy was, however, still partly reliant on an election 
outcome. About six weeks prior to the election, on the 17th of October, about 
4,000 people descended on the Adaminaby dam site to watch McKell, flanked 
by Chifley and Lemmon, push the plunger in the symbolic beginning to 
the massive earthworks for the dam and for the Scheme.177 Foremost in the 
policy speech of Chifley, given in mid November, was the need to avoid 
unemployment, thus the value of the "huge developmental projects" that 
would "provide the foundation for the expansion of all kinds of 
industry." 178 Through a socially directed infrastructure planning 
program, demobbed soldiers, school leavers and migrants would continue to 
find employment. He rejected the social and economic waste associated with 
less than full employment and the policy of "just a nice six or eight per 
cent of unemployment...to keep the fear of the sack in the hearts of all the 
rest." 179 The Government was keen to embark upon "migration plans on a 
scale not attempted before in this country." These would be "continued 
vigorously" until "Australia has the population she needs to achieve the 
development of all her resources and guarantee her security." 180 It was, 
however, the coal strike, rationing and bank nationalisation issues that 
dominated the election and the Scheme's fate was uncertain as the new, 
Menzies Coalition government took office. 
This review of the interplay between engineering planning and federalist 
politics is a crucial moment in the history of south east Australia's eco-
cultural formation. With the enlarged Scheme, more of the environments 
of south east Australia were to be structured by systems. Beyond choosing 
between one valley or State, many valleys around the Alps were to be 
devoted to serve irrigation and to power the south east Australian 
electricity grid. High, 'rogue' rivers would be diverted through conduits for 
orderly energy transfer. Whole staircases of water would slip silently 
176 Lewis, 1971, op. cit., Appendix 8, p. I. 
117 
"Snowy River Project Started", SMH, 18/10/49. 
178 
"No Glittering Promises", [Policy Speech by Chifley, broadcast on the 14th of 
November 1949), in Stargardt, A. W., (ed), Things Worth Fighting For; Speeches by 
Joseph Benedict Chif/ey, Melbourne, Melbourne University Press, 1952, p. 74. 
179 Ibid, p. 75. 
180
• Ibid, p. 82. 
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through underground tunnels and power city trains through their own 
subways. River valleys would become huge bunkers and long conveyors of 
water to mechanised crops and pastures--'fordist rivers'--with diverted, 
regulated and timed river flows. 
It was, at the time, a politically tenuous outcome. Through what appeared to 
be little more than an uneasy agreement between Labor leaders, buoyed by 
the rhetorics of 'thinking big' and in the midst of a battle against the High 
Court, the Commonwealth Scheme was kept alive. Even as its implications 
for 'Central-State control' outraged the States and private capital, those 
dedicated to the Scheme persisted. In support, the engineers favoured doing 
a 'proper job', planning an integrated Scheme for the whole Alps--if not 
for the Basin as well. If not extending beyond the Alps, it was an integrated 
plan for tunnelling to post-war horizons of nation building via a 
'cathedral' of subway rivers (figure 16). But it was a stumbling toward a 
'light on the hill'. The Commonwealth's expertise, taxation powers and 
responsibilities over rivers were combined with progressive, 
constitutionally circumscribed, then furtive politics. All seemed to presume 
that withholding and/or massaging information was a necessary part of 
the federalist process. 
It could be argued that, in testing circumstances, nation-building 
politicians were seeking to protect a full employment economy whilst 
steering between the security of Sterling balances and multilateral hopes 
for a more equitable and dynamic world economy. At a crucial moment, as 
Chifley became radicalised by threats to his banking and hence planning 
hopes, the push to gain control of the Scheme overcame New South Wales' 
claims. For the Commonwealth engineers, there would be 'no more 
Burrinjucks', that is, no projects compromised by short term strictures. 
Even within the dominant, quantitative engineering assumptions of the 
time, it was a bold, long term plan, fulfilling the hopes of the federalist 
water engineers from at least ten years earlier. 
But the Chifley government was increasingly on the constitutional 
defensive as private banks objected to centralised controls and as 
conservative States battled to retain their own banks. In such 
circumstances, the actions of Loder and his fellow engineers were 
primarily designed to protect the Commonwealth's role within resource 
development--both irrigation and electricity development. This restricted, 
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Figure 16; Photograph, Tumut 2 Tailrace Tunnel, SMHEA, from Collis, B ., 
Snowy: The Making of Modern Australia, Rydalmere, Hodder and Stoughton, 
1990, back cover. 
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pea-and-thimble process of federalist politics also structured the design of 
the Scheme. In the same ways that the railway systems of Australia favour 
their own city-state economies, the division between the two States of New 
South Wales and Victoria is writ large in the north-south division of the 
scheme. In support of this compromise, alpine rivers would be more 
intensively 'suburbanised'. At least the massive amounts of water diverted 
were to be shared between two major rivers. 
To manoeuvre such that the plans for the Upper Tumut especially remained 
hidden, to be used as 'counters' at the strategic moment in the committee 
process, was the primary means. The delay in releasing comprehensive 
design options to members of the same committee, from the co-ordinating 
committee, from other governments and their representatives shows Loder 
and the other engineers as adept institutional politicians. They had a well 
developed sense of how to stage techno-political outcomes as a way of 
defending departmental agendas. This amounted, however, to more and 
more manoeuvring within the enclosed confines of a polity dominated by 
stratagems for gaining the upper hand. 
Rather than allowing or encouraging debate in the media and public fora 
about differing perceptions of productivities or riverine risk, rather than 
cultivating civic capacities, the process impeded outcomes. This arose as the 
Commonwealth engineers sought to with-hold outcomes for the advantage 
of institutional and political cycles. A balanced separation of powers 
implied by a federalist form of government provides the basis of checks 
and balances. But without adequate adherence to the terms of reference--to 
compare two proposals--other bureaucrats were less able to evaluate rival 
proposals and, thence, of going public. Because of the short falls, 
reconciling the local to the universal in a geographically dispersed, 
federal democracy, was impeded. 
The Snowy Shire and South Eastern regional groups and the Snowy River 
itself below Jindabyne had only a brief interval within which to ·intervene. 
Confusing mis-information continued to provide a false impression as to 
who, when and how their riverine interests would be protected as the 
engineers and politicians pressed on with their popular Scheme. 
Commonwealth engineers, even as they effectively challenged Brewster's 
claims over Blowering, came to be seen as remote. Those in the 
Murrumbidgee Valley were merely reacting to what Brewster fed them. As 
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Blowering re-emerged, Brewster himself was embarrassed. Those in the 
Murray Valley, explicitly at least, adopted a technocratic faith in planning, 
placing themselves by default in the hands of whatever the experts decided 
but were eventually forced to 'be political'. On occasions, interest groups 
were articulated by the experts, disabling prospects of infusing local 
knowledges into the often equally worthy, if often abstract, 
'universalising' knowledges of expertise. And by such manipulation, 
engineers were increasing the risk of how they would be perceived 
outside--and within--the political process. 
Without broader, overlapping powers enabling an awareness of the 
limitations of rival systems, the engineers were less able to mount internal 
critiques. Olsen, for example, even as he sought to critique irrigation, was 
not attuned, along with the Commonwealth's hydro engineers, to the doubts 
of the Commonwealth's Rural Reconstruction Commission. East sought to 
critique Brewster's support for the re-diversion canal as wasteful, but, as a 
fellow irrigationist, was not demanding that soil surveys be completed. 
Symptomatically, the suggestion to contain the Scheme within the 
multipurpose Conservation Authority proposed by New South Wales was 
over-ruled by a Commonwealth intent on using its defence powers. 
Defensively, Commonwealth engineers avoided making plans available and 
could only call upon their own resources when evaluating alternatives. In 
short, the defence powers were convenient for securing control but did not 
encourage the development of institutional bases for the critique of rival 
options. 
Engineers were being forced to ghost the political process rather than 
feeding or enhancing the ability of politicians to debate issues. 
Overlapping Commonwealth responsibilities across all fields may have 
provided greater confidence in being able to counter rival institutional 
critique. Greater access to the plans of all the engineers would have arisen. 
Instead of seeing the outcome as a worthy victory for the nationally 
interested Commonwealth against the parochial states, therefore, the 
evolution of the scheme is also a moment of an enclosed, increasingly 
defensive federalism. 
These problems were compounded by a faith in autonomous expertise. The 
'logic' of the expanding, 'broader vision', 'full utilisation', 'master plan' 
approach to technology supported the engineers as they combined the 
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proposals and kept them hidden. Although an imaginative solution, this 
'full utilisation' approach to harvesting the water cycle was favoured as it 
supported only majoritarian, instrumental political forces. Arising in the 
context of an earlier 'Lilienthal-like' hegemony of planning as 'scientific', 
planning imperatives joined with a political acceptable outcome as, 
supposedly, a democratic achievement. Greater consultation may have 
evolved a more modest, staged and co-ordinated array of possibilities, 
taking advantage of the rival Kiewa option and modest Snowy options. A 
lack of broadly constituted Commonwealth powers also meant an enlarged 
outcome. Given these institutional and political shortfalls, the outcome 
implies the success of a technocratic strand within Australian engineering 
culture. 
In sum, even as a way of defending against the chaos of markets, the 
political process was a factor to be second-guessed, to be factored into the 
plans. Their goal was to achieve the techno-politically suitable outcome 
whilst avoiding debate. Politics is recognised, but, given a circumscribed, 
constitutional role, politics is merely another 'parameter' of federalism 
which the engineer--and politician--has to take into account when 
designing infrastructure. Politics becomes less of a process by which 
outcomes may be significantly recast or re-interpreted as part of discussion 
and inclusion. But as the High Court was proving antagonistic on parallel 
issues, there was little enthusiasm for well balanced, institutional critique. 
Nevertheless, the conservative parties had begun to catch on. The need to 
transcend the city/country and power/water split had dogged their side of 
politics. How the two could be made to work together, by conservative 
political compromises, within a broader production-consumption or 
resource extractive approach, was the great task taking shape as Menzies 
came to power. 
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Chapter 4: Now Bloomed by Diesel Fumes 
The third planning choice considers the increasingly elaborate methods 
used to argue for a further enlarged Scheme. As Adaminaby Dam was 
tripled in size to become Eucumbene Dam, the Commonwealth was faced 
with continuing opposition from the States, doubts by engineers and much 
opposition to its centrist, planning role. But the new Menzies government 
was determined to persist, this time according to its own political priorities. 
Within seven months of the Menzies Coalition government taking office, 
and after two years of stressing international Cold War polarities, Mao 
Zedong had came to power in China and the Korean War had commenced. In 
the rapidly developing Cold War context, the need to place the economy at 
readiness for war then emerged as an imperative for the new government. 
As legislative attempts to ban the Communist Party proceeded through 1950, 
'Australia Inc.' public relations soon suggested that a "good Australian" 
would recognise the need to "work more intensely" for the quick 
completion of hydro projects for defence and security. An Australian would 
also be able to recognise the "the shadow of an international communist 
conspiracy" (figure 1). These advertisements, from the AWU's Australian 
Worker, also suggested that it would be "foolish" to imagine Australia 
surviving "unaided" against such a threat. 
Facing such a threat, defence was connected with the need to address the 
dollar shortage. In contrast to Chifley's doubts, this soon involved a re-
orientation for Australia away from the Sterling area.' In a parallel move 
to that of the Democrat President Truman, a National Resources Security 
Board (NSRB) was formed.2 Justifications for development were to be 
addressed to the Board, which would review them in terms of the need to 
secure funding for defence, a new priority under the incoming 
Government. Joining external and internal strategies, it sought to build a 
new economic relationship with the US that would intensify economic 
development, enable defence preparations whilst easing inflationary 
pressures.3 
1
• Australian membership of the Sterling bloc meant that it had to restrict the amount 
imported from the US, that convertibility between dollar and sterling currencies was 
restricted and that preferential tariffs were given to British exports. 
2
• Lee, D, "Cabinet" in Prasser, S. et al (eds) The Menzies Era, Sydney, Hale and 
Iremonger, 1995, p. 129. 
3
• Lee, David, Search for Security, Sydney, Allen and Unwin, 1995, pp. 108 and 143. 
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Figure l ; Advertisement, "Are You a Good Australian?", The Australian 
Worker, 18/10/50, p. 4. 
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Specifically, during July and August 1950, after some preliminary inquiries 
by Casey,4 Menzies was in Washington securing a large dollar loan from 
the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD and, 
later, World Bank). Australia constructed a case for a loan as it would 
modernise Australian agriculture by importing capital intensive 
equipment and raise output. Inter alia, it would counter the Sterling 
trading bloc and also address regional security consistent with US interests: 
Particular emphasis is given to agricultural production in which 
Australia has a pronounced comparative advantage. It is argued that the 
developments proposed will; (i) help restore a workable pattern of world 
trade; (ii) build up the population by permitting migration at a 
substantial rate; (iii) strengthen Australia as the focal point in South 
East Asian affairs.5 
As the US Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, characterised the visit, 
"Menzies ... slipped into town hardly noticed and in a day and a half was 
gone again with a loan of two hundred and fifty million dollars from the 
World Bank for Australia's great water and power development. "6 After 
committing to supply troops to Korea, Australia had quickly become a 
privileged borrower, the Asian Director of the Bank bemoaning the 
"liberal attitudes"7 shown towards this Australian coup. In short, given the 
"main target" of the American's was to end the Sterling trading bloc and to 
institute a "global economic order"8 to protect trade and security, Australia 
and the Snowy Scheme, which led submissions, gained a highly favourable 
reception in Washington. By the mid 1950s, in fact, Australia would be the 
largest single borrower from the Bank and would be receiving almost as 
much as the whole of Asia combined and more than the whole of Africa.9 
This capital inflow would supply equipment of all sorts, but specifically for 
agriculture, to build the many dams and irrigation projects that the 
4
• Casey to Menzies, 23/2/50, NAA: M3759, 45, Correspondence. Snowy Mountains 
Hydro Electric Authority and Minister for National Development. 
5
• Bank Mission Working Party, "Tentative Programme For Preparatory Work", 
15/11150, p. 2, NAA: A462, 559/119, Dollar Loan - Advisory Panel - Bank Mission 
Working Party - "Economic Development In Australia". 
6 Mason, E. S. and Asher, R. E., The World Bank Since Bretton Woods, Washington, The 
Brookings Institution, 1972, p. 272. 
7 Ibid. 
8 Lee, op. cit., p. 7. 
9 
"Big Borrowing", Industrial Victoria, October 1955 (Vol. 7, No. 7), p. 491. 
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submission emphasised. This approach down played the importance of 
manufacturing, an area of most concern to the Americans. As the President 
of the Bank reported to its directors, the Australian government was "not 
wishing to give high priority to a further general expansion of 
manufacturing capacity"' 0 , except in so far as it would support agriculture 
and mining in particular. The application of large American earth moving, 
land clearing and other agricultural machinery would thence enlarge the 
Scheme, expand the scope for US interests and lead the shift away from 
Sterling. The British, however, were proposing co-ordinated aid for the 
region via the Colombo plan. 11 
With Menzies having secured an International Bank loan in July 1950, it 
was not long before United States Bureau of Reclamation (USBR) engineers 
were arriving in Australia. The Assistant Chief Construction Engineer of 
the USBR and a tunnelling expert, W. A. Dexheimer, came in November 1950 
and set about challenging assumptions. It had been planned that 
construction was to be carried out by both day labour and contract 
methods12 but Dexheimer stressed other possibilities. He argued that "the 
present staff will be entirely inadequate unless the greater proportion of 
the investigation, design and construction for initial work is accomplished 
by outside means."13 For Casey, as reported by Treasury, "if the design work 
is to be done at all in the near future", especially given the scale of the 
nation-wide construction program, preparation of detailed specifications 
for the Upper Tumut works would need to be negotiated with overseas 
contractors. Looking to the 'Big Eildon' dam project in Victoria constructed 
by Utah, Casey also supported an incentive-based contract approach to 
Cabinet. 14 
A bold policy approach, relying on US capital-intensive methods, had been 
formulated. But translating the aims of the Menzies government into a 
10
• Annex II, "The Main Lines Of Development in which the Bank Proposes to 
Participate", annex to Report by the President of the Bank to Executive Directors, 
"Commonwealth of Australia", 10/8/50, World Bank Archives (New York). 
11
• Lee, Search for Security, op. cit., p. 144. 
12
• Casey, Cabinet Submission, 7112/50 for the meeting of the 13/12/50, NAA: A571, 
1956/1038 Part 5, Snowy Mountains Scheme. 
13
• Dexheimer, W. A, "Report on Snowy Mountains Development...", 23/ll/50, p. 35, 
NAA: A462, 318/5, Snowy Mountains Hydro-electric Authority - Employment of 
American technical personnel 
14
• Casey, Cabinet Submission, 7/12/50 for the meeting of the 13112/50, NAA: A571, 
195611038 Part 5, op. cit. 
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federalist or internaJly workable political strategy, via such a deal, was also 
required. Menzies, as noted in the previous chapter, initially supported a 
greater role for the States.15 Then, within the bureaucracy, from March to 
June 1950, Bailey and others in the Attorney General's Department had 
vacillated about the worth of a defence justification for the Scheme. 16 With 
section 100 of the Constitution in mind, they believed that the associated 
water supply aspects "appears to be clearly outside the Commonwealth 
powers. "17 Instead of Chifley's defence rationale, Bailey therefore 
suggested two agreements, one between the States and the Snowy Authority 
"dealing with the generation and distribution of electricity", and the other 
between the Commonwealth and the States, "dealing with irrigation on the 
basis of a grant of financial assistance by the Commonwealth to the 
States. "18 
Advice to Menzies from within his Prime Minister's Department did not, 
however, favour even this limited, joint approach. The Secretary of the 
PM's Department, Brown, feared that even this option would cause the 
States to demand joint contro1. 19 For Brown, it was worth taking the risk of 
proceeding because "later, when the scheme is declared to be 
unconstitutional, it invites the States to join with it in providing the 
necessary legal basis to salvage a great national undertaking." However, "if 
an immediate challenge is made [by the States], this course has less to 
commend it." A third approach was again offered; "the only other course 1s 
inaction--just go ahead and stall the States off."20 
Meanwhile, both the two major States were seeking to secure their 
electricity supplies, independently. The severe electricity shortages of 
winter 1948, and those anticipated for winter 1949, had prompted the New 
South Wales government to declare a state of emergency. Efforts to meet the 
current post-war backlog had, however, resulted in an "unco-ordinated 
scramble to get four similar jobs done at once" resulting in each job being 
15
• Loder to Brown, 16112/49, NAA: A462, 318/2, Snowy Mountains Hydro-electric 
Scheme - Agreement between Commonwealth, NSW and Victoria. 
16
. "Opinion", draft, Bailey to Loder, circa June 1950, p. 2, NAA: A432, 1978/7044 
Part I, Snowy Mountains Hydro Electric Scheme - Agreement and Legal Problems. 
17
• "Snowy ... Scheme", report by Acting Parliamentary Draftsman, 6/9/51, PRO: VPRS 
1163/P, Box 936, file P52/4432, Snowy River. 
18
• Bailey to Brown, 18/7/51, NAA: A462, 318/2, op. cit. 
,._ Brown to Menzies, 4/10/50, NAA: CP608, Bundle 211, Snowy Mountains Hydro 
Electric Scheme - Agreement Papers. 
20
. Ibid. 
168 
"unduly prolonged ... and cost inflated."21 The rate of demand for power was 
estimated to be doubling every ten years.22 Appointing Conde from the 
Electric Light and Power Supply Corporation (Balmain) as Emergency 
Electricity Commissioner to co-ordinate rationing between the separate 
generating authorities, by March 1950, Cahill had also introduced a bill to 
co-ordinate generation via a New South Wales Electricity Commission.23 A 
junior player, the Electricity Commission of New South Wales (Elcom) was 
formed. For its part, the SECV, as well as seeking to build Kiewa and Morwell 
Briquette, was seeking loans in London and was planning further 
extensions to Yallourn Power Station.24 Stations at Morwell, Richmond and 
Spencer Street would also contribute25 (figure 2). 
In parallel with its coal independence policy the SECV had also begun a 
significant public relations campaign. In 1948 it had published Three 
Decades, a colourful review of its 'company' history. Then, from 1949, it had 
initiated a film documentary series producing Power From Kiewa Waters 
and Pageant of Power. Further material would be produced, such as Let's 
Visit Yal/ourn, a guided image-text tour of the "astonishing" scale of the 
Yallourn Open Cut and the sublime wonders of megatech26 (figure 3). 
Image making mobilised by the instrumentalists emphasised the mind-
boggling scale and massive transformation of place wrought by the 
technology. Most importantly, the mobilisation of these images could 
provide another device in the competition for scarce financial resources, 
especially as the gap between planning and constitutional powers, as 
interpreted by the States in particular, would continue to widen. 
Similarly, from its moment of establishment, the Snowy Authority formed a 
publicity program. Gray, a journalist, was hired and began to draw upon 
the precedent of national significance set by the American TV A as a model 
for Snowy Scheme publicity. Already a nationally recognised icon of 
development, the Snowy Authority should, he believed, emphasise "the 
national importance of the task ... what is needed is information at all levels 
21 
"How Electricity Failures Handicap Development", SMH, 4/9150. 
22 Conde, H., "Blackouts will be over by 1953", Daily Telegraph, 17110/50. 
23 Wilkenfeld, George, The Electrification of the Sydney Energy System 1881-1986, 
Ph. D Thesis, Centre for Environmental and Urban Studies, Macquarie University, 
1989, p. 178. 
24
• Harvey, C., Ya/lourn Power Station: A History 1919 to 1989, Melbourne, SECV, 
1993, p. 248. 
25 
"Premier Hits Back at Mr. Casey", Swan Hill Guardian, 16/2/51. 
26
. SECV, Lets Visit Yallourn, Melbourne, SECV, 1953. 
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Figure 3; Pamphlet, SECV; "Let's Visit Yallourn", Melbourne, The 
Commission, 1953 . 
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of population and using the most diverse media to sustain interest and 
develop it at all stages of the growth of the project."27 To reach the general 
public film, radio, newspapers, magazines, display advertising, exhibitions, 
lecture tours and conducted tours of the site should all be emp Joyed. 
Journalists appointed by the Authority should also prepare magazine 
articles and also radio segments. Gray proposed a budget of between 30 to 50 
thousand pounds per year. Hudson was, initially, cautious: the best 
publicity, he believed, would be for the Authority to do its work "quickly 
and well. "28 
On the other hand, Hudson welcomed the filming of the project from the 
very first days of the Authority. He also favoured doing most of the work 
in-house, although the Film Division of the Department of the Interior, 
working on behalf of the National Film Board, would need to assist, at least 
initially.29 Similarly, newsreel companies were to be allowed to make films 
"of general public interest", provided that they agreed to show the films to 
the Authority "for checking" before exhibition.30 Indeed, in evolving its 
own skills and in-house style, the Authority would learn from both 
government and private film makers. 
Consequently, from late 1950, Litchfield Films was permitted to shoot a film, 
Rubber Builds Dams, for Dunlop, including scenes from the emerging 
construction sites. Drawing parallels between the recent war effort, with 
Cooma the "frontline base" for earth movers and the "supply dump" for 
lyres whilst housing the "men who plan this battle", Dunlop "is proud to be 
taking an important part."31 The scheme was heralded as "another Kokoda 
Trail, with the prize of victory almost as important." Concurrently, the 
Communist Party Dissolution Act had just been passed by a torn, Labor-
controlled Senate but was soon challenged in the High Court by the 
Communist Party of Australia and by several unions.32 Menzies was 
21
. SMHEA/Gray, L., "Preliminary Comments and Recommendations on Publicity 
Programme", 19/12/49, p. I, in NAA: A2915, Bl, Snowy Mountains Hydro-Electric 
Authority - Public Relations - General Policy. 
28
• Hudson to Secretary, SMHEA, 28/12/49, NAA: ibid. 
29
• See for example Hudson to Stanley Hawes, Producer-in-Chief, National Films Board, 
1917/50, in NAA: A2915, B242 Part I, Snowy Mountains Hydro Electric Authority -
Public Relations - Filming of Project by Snowy Mountains Authority. 
30
. Ibid. 
31
. Litchfield Productions Pty Ltd, "Rubber Builds Dams", [film script], circa 
November 1950, NAA: ibid. 
32
• Lowe, D., Menzies and 'The Great World Struggle: Australia's Cold War 1948-1954, 
Sydney, University of New South Wales Press, 1999, p. 65. 
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expressing great fears about an imminent world war, requiring extensive 
economic mobilisation for defence. In the film script, in line with the more 
dire perceptions of international and local crises, the battle for peace, 
conducted by machinic and manly efforts against an intractable nature, 
continued: 
... the men who are building the dams must get through ... the river fights 
conquest every inch of the way ... Roads must be forced through what was 
virgin bush ... Men and machines must fight their way through ... Men and 
machines combine in an assault on nature ... 33 
Competition for investment funds was also steadily growing. By February 
1951, the SECV feared that the Snowy Scheme, unless scaled down, would 
slow down its own projects.34 The SECV remained keen to proceed with its 
own lignite first approach; "the requirements for peak load low load factor 
[hydro J plant over the next 20 years ... are practically non-existent. "35 City 
based thermal peak plant would suffice and any new hydro was out. Thorn, 
the Engineer for Production for the SECV, would elaborate these views later 
in the Institution of Engineers Journal. He would not accept the paradox 
that, as was being proposed for this megatech hydro scheme, "the annual 
value .. .increases as the load factor decreases and the cost per kilowatt-hour 
increases! "36 A strict replacement of hydro for thermal was preferred, not 
a complementary peak and base load systems combination (figures 4 & 5). 
The US designers were, however, seeking to expand the Scheme for such a 
complementary role. As the new Assistant Commissioner, Tom Lang, 
reported, Dexheimer was "by no means certain that the Adaminaby Dam 
was being built in the right place."37 By mid 1951, a dam of up to 3 million 
acre feet was being mooted.3 8 Dexheimer also suggested that because of its 
deep shafts, tunnels and race-lines, "parts of the project appear very 
questionable economically."39 In short, Dexheimer was seeking significant 
33 Ibid [emphasis in original]. 
34 
"Snowy River Plan Impeding Victoria", The Age, 24/2/51. 
35 SECV, "Notes on the Snowy River Project", 13/3/51, p. 1-2, PRO: VPRS 8892/1, 643, 
50/13585, Snowy Mountains Hydro Electric Scheme. 
". Thorn, W. "The Application of Low Load Factor Hydro ... to Thermal Generating 
Systems ... ", The Journal, Institution of Engineers, Australia, Vol. 24, April-May, 
1952, p. 92. 
37 Lang to Brown, 10/5/51, NAA: A462, 318/5, op. cit. 
38 Minute, SMHEA, 17/5/51, NAA: A5638, AF233, Adaminaby Dam - alternative sites. 
39 Dexheimer, W. A, "Report ... ", 23/11/50, p. 34, NAA: A462, 318/5, op. cit. 
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Figures 4 & 5; For two graphs of daily load curves, which firstly define 
peak, intermediate and base load concepts then show how old steam plant 
and Tumut etc plant fill the need, see "Total Interconnected Daily Load 
Curve, Day of Maximum Demand, 1955 and 1963" (fig. 3) in Aston, F. J., and 
Wilson, J., "Planning the Development of the Electricity Supply Industry 10 
New South Wales", The Journal of the Institution of Engineers, Australia, 
Vol. 36, December 1964, p. 297 and also "Typical daily load curve of 
interconnected system, winter 1963", (fig 3.4 ) in Diesendorf, W. , The Snowy 
Mountains Scheme: Phase 1 - The Upper Tumut Projects, Sydney, Horowitz, 
1961, p. 34. :~poe 
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design revisions, based less on race-lines and more on earth filled dams for 
large storage and upon the new earth moving equipment. He also appeared 
to be angling for the employment of US Bureau engineers by stressing the 
scale of work under review and by raising doubts that still existed about the 
viability of the Scheme. 
In line with the strategic aspects of the expansion and the need for 200 or 
so engineers from overseas, Casey supported Dexheimer's conclusions to 
Cabinet.40 Detailed design work, specifically the preparation of 
specifications and contract drawings for much of the Upper Tumut project 
would soon go to the USBR, a development which assisted major US 
contractors, well used to tendering according to such a system. The 
training of Australian engineers at the USBR would act as a cover for the 
strategic involvement of the Bureau. As its Act prevented the Bureau from 
providing services to foreign governments if they could be adequately 
provided by private capital, the Australian Embassy in Washington advised 
that "it would assist in overcoming this difficulty if the project could be 
given a training slant ... "41 Both private and public capital in the US were 
suffering from layoffs as a short recession in the US had arisen and the 
extra work was welcome. Hudson soon reported that it had "been arranged 
that nearly all major works will be executed by contract, in most cases by 
the employment of large overseas firms. "42 
After the Senate refused to pass Menzies' legislation to introduce private 
bankers onto a Commonwealth Bank Central Bank board,43 from March to 
April the country was in Double Dissolution election mode. Primarily, 
however, the High Court had rejected the Communist Party Dissolution Act 
as this was only permissible during a time of war. A proposed constitutional 
amendment to ban the communists (and to control labour) was the major 
issue. As expenditure restrictions were being relaxed, Menzies cleverly 
linked the resulting inflation to the industrial influence of the 
communists. Menzies won the election and a workable majority in the 
40
. [Bunting to Casey], Cabinet Decision of the 30/3/51, 5/4151, NAA: A571, 
1956/1038 Part 5, Snowy Mountains Scheme 
41
• Cablegram, Australian Embassy Washington, to Casey, 19/4/51 and see O'Donnell 
to Nette, 27/4/51, NAA: ibid. For later developments, see NAA: A462, 318/5, op. cit. 
42
• Hudson to Spooner, early June 1951, NAA: M3759, 48, Correspondence. Snowy 
Mountains Hydro Electric Authority and Minister for National Development. 
43
. Butlin, S. J., "Australian Central Banking, 1945-59", Australian Economic History 
Review, Vol. XXIII, No. 2, Sept. 1983, p. 161-3. 
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Senate and, although conceding five seats in the House, could thence push 
on with efforts to ban the party. 
Behind the scenes, seeking to counter inflation, senior bureaucrats were 
suggesting that co-ordinated, deflationary (Keynesian) policies be 
adopted.44 Coombs was also working on the longer term task of setting up 
Special Account deposits by which the lending of the private banks would 
be regulated. This would not be completed until mid 1956.45 In the 
meantime, for the increasingly crucial bureaucrats, the immediate 
problem remained one of how to keep rates of interest low, with 
expenditure hopes for infrastructure burgeoning, nation wide (figure 6). 
By mid June, Menzies was foreshadowing to the Loans Council that 
development--and defence--priorities must be set in this "scramble ... for 
resources. "46 New South Wales, however, was becoming more and more 
concerned by the delays in negotiating the Snowy Scheme.4 7 Yet with 
pressures mounting on the overall levels of expenditure, others in New 
South Wales saw the 'socialist' Snowy Scheme as the project to be cut. The 
Australian Monthly magazine, a Packer or Consolidated Press publication, 
took direct aim at this largest of government jobs, this "Loafers Paradise" as 
the article characterised the Scheme.48 Also critical was the strident anti-
communist, W. C. Wentworth, as were others who were against the project. 
Now, however, after the May election, concessions were seemingly made. 
Firstly, a new Minister was given the 'glamour' portfolio of National 
Development. Senator Spooner, a senior New South Wales Liberal and 
bankruptcy accountant, replaced Casey who went to the crucial External 
Affairs. Spooner was appointed, arguably, to keep Snowy finances in check 
(and to press for the mechanisation of coal mines). He was quick to defend 
the Scheme. Secondly, Kent Hughes, the ex Victorian Minister for Electrical 
Undertakings and now in federal parliament, had been appointed Minister 
for the Interior as well as for (Loder's) Department of Works and Housing. 
44
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Figure 6; Map; "Australia. Some of the Main Developmental Projects", from 
(fig. 1) Commonwealth Engineer, 1/1/51, p. 220. 
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He had been a vocal critic of the "raw deal" the States were getting under 
uniform taxation as they were being asked to finance much of their own 
works programs from loans rather than that left over from federal 
revenue.49 After the reshuffle, however, it was Spooner who now had 
ministerial control of the Scheme. Then, in response to the co-ordinating 
and strategic emphases of Menzies, Treasury was conceding the need to 
"return, in some degree, to the conditions of a directed economy."50 
Further articles in the Packer Daily Telegraph followed, however, 
criticising the apparent wastage on the Scheme.51 Similar questions were 
also asked in the House. The next day, however, Menzies responded by 
outlining how war preparations related to long term development: 
... many of the steps that will have to be taken to strengthen the economy 
against the danger of war will also provide firm foundations for future 
national development and for a stable, prosperous and peaceful 
community life.52 
Specifically, at a time when the country was vigorously debating the anti-
communist referendum, which was narrowly lost in mid September, a two 
pronged approach to the Scheme emerged. A continuing centralised, or, 
very limited States-rights approach to the Scheme was to be tried. Bailey's 
legal strategy had emerged in combination with Brown's fait accompli 
approach--the two were by no means inconsistent. The government now 
sought "to represent the generation of electricity as the substance of the 
scheme and the provision of inland water for irrigation as merely 
consequential thereon. "53 At a time of Cold War emergency, it sought 
Commonwealth control via the defence or electrical power aspects, backed 
by its financial powers, which offered the inducement of financial 
assistance for irrigation. The draft was sent to the two Premiers in late July, 
1951.54 
49
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The centrality of plans for the Scheme was then underlined as expenditure 
priorities were set. With the Commonwealth using its casting vote against 
the four major States, the Loan Council slashed the funds available to the 
States infrastructure programs by 25%. In the case of Victoria, which was 
the most seriously hit State, especially as it had the most ambitious 
development program underway, funds were cut by 30%.55 The Kiewa 
Hydro Electric Scheme, Eildon Dam and Morwell Briquette and Power 
projects came under severe pressure. The number of workers employed at 
Kiewa was cut by two thirds and work at Morwell was halted, with the 
project eventually halved. New South Wales would also see major projects 
such as the Warragamba Dam and Cahill Expressway delayed, as was the 
importation of 'package' power plant. 
Even though it was vigorously opposed in the Loan Council--the four major 
States opposing it--the Commonwealth had determinedly used its casting 
vote to force the measures through. The Commonwealth would now provide 
in particular, financial assistance from revenue sources such as to make up 
the shortfall from what was available from public borrowing, but only to 
the amount--and hence for the purposes--deemed desirable by the 
Commonwealth.56 Even as State projects would have yielded power more 
quickly, support for the Scheme better met both external and Coalition 
needs. 
Of significant concern, however, was that the issue of Treasury bills--even 
as a surplus was projected--provided intermediate financial assistance. This 
could erode the value of the currency. The new private bank members of 
the Central Bank Board were against this approach of underwriting a 
portion of (what was left of) the State's capital programs as being "wrong 
in principle" ,57 that is, it was, to them, centrist or socialistic. Nevertheless, 
m line with the desire of the Secretary to the Treasury, Wilson, to keep the 
emerging Commonwealth (Central) Bank away from fiscal policy, a short 
expansion of credit arose.58 While the malleable, multipurpose Snowy 
Scheme continued to be supported, it was now aligned, politically, with 
" various letters, Sept-Nov 1951, NAA: A462, 412/6, Reduction in Governmental 
Programmes submitted to the Loan Council. 
56
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centrist banking, and could now be painted as a threat to monetary stability 
as well as to the financial autonomy of the States. 
Significant tensions also arose within the Authority over the expanded 
Scheme. The need for many overseas engineers--and the larger dam--was 
not universally welcomed. Hudson complained to Lang about his hiring of 
USBR expertise, that it " ... would mean handing over the planning and 
design work almost in its entirety to the United States organisation. "59 Lang 
was soon forced to moderate his enthusiasms.60 Secondly, local engineers 
such as Olsen (now working for the Authority) favoured the upper, smaller 
site61 and, latterly, a two stage approach. Rowntree (and Potter of the 
Public Works Department of New South Wales) also insisted that a larger 
dam would not be justified for many years to come. A two stage approach 
would secure useable and therefore more valuable storage in the short 
term and also relieve construction demands until later, if needs be.62 
In January 1952, Hudson resolved the impasse by opting for the larger 
design--one of the largest in the world at that time, to be based on the 
design of the (ill-fated) Teton Dam in the US. In line with the strategic 
issues at stake, locally and internationally, and hoping that US engineering 
expertise and construction methods 
become the Eucumbene Dam. As it 
would speed work, Adaminaby was to 
was to 
irrigation component, to 
be for 'general regulation', 
replace Blowering which 
it also 
had included 
been put 
a large 
on hold. Overall, this was also a win for New South Wales, or, at 
least, Bridge Street. Achieving complementary economies of scale, it would 
guard against unreliable (hydro) peak power production. On the other 
hand, Elcom was against the granting of too much power to the 
Commonwealth, fearing that it might move to develop the Clarence Valley 
in Queensland and thence, as with the TV A, establish a competing grid, and 
subsequently, add steam plant.63 
59 Lawler, P., note for file, 10/9/51, NAA: A462, 318/5, op. cit. 
60 Ibid. 
61 Hudson to Lang, 19/6/51, NAA: A5638, AF233, op. cit. 
62 Rowntree, "Report on Two Stage Development..." 30/10/51 and Campbell, D. E., 
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63
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In line with the expanded plan and the US construction regime, and as 
these management techniques came to involve piece-rate or bonus systems, 
an even more demanding construction (as well as financial) schedule 
would arise. Eucumbene dam was to stay with the New South Wales Public 
Works Department, however, to be built with their own day labour and 
machines and without piece-rates. It aimed to finish by 1962.64 
Concurrently, the Snowy Authority and the federal government, in 
parallel with the move to the new contract approach, were seeking to 
establish a less expensive--for the contractors and Authority--
Commonwealth industrial arbitration jurisdiction via the 1951 changes to 
the Conciliation and Arbitration Act.65 This soon came up against the 
problematic reliance upon defence powers, as they sought to justify the 
Commonwealth's control of the work.66 Nevertheless, Justice S. C. G. Wright 
was given the task of securing sole jurisdiction in February 1952, under the 
rubric of the need to replace the mish-mash of State and Federal awards. 
In the meantime, Hudson issued instructions to the New South Wales Public 
Works Department, which was engaged in constructing the dam via day 
labour methods, to transfer their activities to that site.67 In implicit support 
of such expansion, the President of the IBRD toured in March, and "denied 
that [the Bank] had expressed any disappointment at the lack of a positive 
long range programme for developing Australia's resources. "68 In the face 
of this developing economic co-ordination and emphasis, Victoria, 
however, would continue to challenge the validity of the uniform taxation 
legislation, which was underwriting the Commonwealth's increased 
powers. 
Over the same period, the Authority had learnt about self promotion from 
the experience of the film, Rubber Builds Dams. Hudson wanted to combine 
these possibilities with a more 'official line', or government-sponsored, 
approach. Since March 1951 moves were underway to make a film along the 
64
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65
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lines proposed by the Department of Interior's Film Division. Then, as 
Unger recalls, "as a protection against adverse publicity", it was decided 
that the public would be encouraged to tour the Scheme "to see how their 
money was being spent."69 In August 1951, just as the 'horror' federal 
budget was being announced, a cinematographer was sought. Private film 
makers were also knocking on the door, offering to "complete emergency 
jobs in very short time.•OO Crucially for developing in-house capacities, a 
budget of eighty thousand pounds per year, enormous for the time, would 
be provided for publicity.71 
Treasury remained wary of what the Scheme may cost it. The preliminary 
discussions during 1949 had included interest, depreciation and even 
sinking fund charges, which it sought responsibility for determining. 
Now, however, a draft agreement suggested that power would be charged at 
the average cost of production only.72 Treasury preferred the alternative 
that "the average cost of production shall be as determined by the 
Treasurer. "73 Indeed, Treasury believed that it was being kept on the 
outer ,1 4 despite Fadden being closely involved. It seems that Fadden and 
Menzies, along with the bureaucrats Brown (Secretary of PM's Department) 
and Bailey (Attorney General), were key strategists75 in crafting a political 
deal with the Country Party to shore up the Coalition's commitment to the 
Scheme. 
In fact, since August 1951, and concurrent with the Korean wool boom, 
John McEwan, the Minister for Commerce and Industry, had been 
developing a policy which favoured food production. This was advanced as 
a crucial, even strategic need.76 In early February, McEwan then presented 
his approach to Cabinet, which agreed to an "Agricultural Expansion 
Policy" to meet defence requirements, to feed a growing population and to 
69
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pay for dollar loans.77 As with representations to the International Bank, 
labour policy and secondary industry policy were to be directed to assist. 
McEwan then announced a Commonwealth-wide programme of agricultural 
expansion. In fact, rural production was getting set to jump by 50% in the 
next ten years78 (figures 7, 8, 9, 10). 
This internally brokered agricultural priority would be fought out between 
successive reports of the NSRB committee's on electric power and then 
irrigation from December 1951 to February 1952. The electricity 
commissions reiterated their view that short term power production, not 
long term peak power plus irrigation water, was the preferred outcome.79 
Hudson set out his views to the subsequent irrigation review. In line with 
Menzies' concerns about imminent war, he emphasised the Scheme's 
strategic, underground construction. Then, and pointedly against State 
electricity commissions, he argued that the combined use of hydro and 
thermal power "would give greater overall economy."80 He stressed the 
ability of the Scheme to contribute to food production, which would, in 
turn, support population and export income, thus assisting the dollar 
shortage. Confident in the expanded vision, he reiterated his belief that the 
cost of producing electricity, as estimated two years previously, would be 
half that of black coal stations. 
Accompanying this competition between systems, the filmic promotion of 
the Scheme continued. A new film made by the Department of the Interior 
was completed in April 1952. It combined both the official, national 
development narrative style of an earlier National Film Board script with 
shades of the Dunlop Rubber film. It narrated a simple history of the 
conception of the Scheme, interspersed with phrases such as the " .. .lonely, 
inaccessible country ... ", where the "pioneering work ... in the early stages 
conditions are rough ... ". Then, "in comes heavy earth moving equipment, 
materials and machinery" and a "growing body of workmen cut into the 
71
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Figures 7 to 1 0; Graphed comparison of horse numbers and tractor numbers 
1938-50 in Holder, R. F., Australian Production at the Cross Roads, 1952, p. 49 
(26/ 10/54), and advertisements from Australia Today; "Looking Ahead" 
"Mechanisation Means More" (27/ 1 0/52) and "To Every Management 
Seeking New Markets" (26/ 10/50). 
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heart of the alps ... "81 Not as crudely assertive as the Dunlop film, but it used 
metaphors dramatically, to highlight the battle for occupation. 
With its own economic goals, Victoria's opposition to the Scheme across the 
bureaucracy (with the exception of East), remained, as Premier McDonald 
suggested to Spooner, "deep rooted."82 In April, McDonald announced that, 
after the massive budget cuts, he believed that the right of his State to 
"exercise its constitutional powers" was being impaired, that it was being 
"robbed of its financial independence."83 Under uniform taxation, Victoria 
had to transfer more tax out of the State. McDonald was thus wishing to 
move quickly to the High Court to challenge uniform taxation. Menzies 
(initially) welcomed the opportunity to contest the challenge, suggesting 
that such a change "would weaken the Commonwealth's power to control 
the country's economy. "84 But without rises in interest rates to follow 
inflation, public loans were beginning to fall short of the amounts called 
for (figure II). 
During April-May 1952, Treasury remained circumspect about a broad 
construction program85 , unconvinced by Hudson's assertions to the 
Security Board.86 Further, several within federal Cabinet, especially the 
Minister for the Interior, Kent Hughes (who was also in charge of 
Commonwealth film production), were still wanting (according to Hudson) 
"to economise in every direction."87 For Spooner, given the recent press 
coverage to which Hudson was now quite attuned, it would be preferable if 
an internal inquiry was conducted "rather than it be done at the request of 
some one else following, perhaps, a public discussion on the matter."88 
Nevertheless, to Menzies, Spooner continued to argue that even though 
political odium would accrue as a result of cutting State programs, "even 
more criticism than this will be directed by the public against the 
81
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Figure 11; Cartoon by Armstrong, "The Pumpkin Tree" , The Argus, 2314/52. 
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Commonwealth government unless the scheme is continued vigorously. "89 
A short, in-house review of costs was now proposed,90 to be done by Snowy 
staff. Treasury remained sceptical but, agreed, in an exasperated tone, that 
it "would probably be time saving. "9 1 
On the international scene, Australian support for the US against British 
capital was continued throughout 1952. As the Korean War backed wool 
boom ensued, a balance of payments crisis arose, and Menzies applied 
import restrictions "most heavily on British goods. "92 Similarly, in May, 
prior to going to London, Menzies was in Washington and was angling--
hopefully--for military aid.93 Internally, problems were mounting. The 
States remained willing to outvote the Commonwealth on the Loans Council, 
pushing for more loan money. The corrective reaction--to restrict credit--
enabled a further avenue of attack by the Packer press, on the 
"severe ... controls choking enterprise" and on the "financial 
jiggerypook"94 of centralised, Keynesian credit. This was readily extended 
to attack the Commonwealth's financial control of public works. Spooner 
publicly replied that such criticism was "rubbish", as such ploys were 
meant to obscure the unco-ordinated competition between the States for 
funds and "to hide their own inadequate planning."95 
The controls, which were being sought by Coombs, for example, would have 
prevented the government from artificially underwriting cheap interest 
rates in the first place. The credit squeeze was applied too late: inflation was 
running at 20% and rates on government loans a mere 4 and 112%. Then, 
by winter unemployment had rocketed to 4% and a swing was on against 
Menzies.96 By June, even the Sydney Morning Herald was reporting that 
the World Bank was now critical of the lack of short term development 
focus. It "doubted the wisdom" of "driving to finish" the Scheme and 
suggested, instead, that smaller electricity projects would "provide 
89
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desperately needed electricity more quickly. "97 Support from the US, at 
least for extra aid, appeared to be denied. To protect the expanding vision, 
Hudson had learnt the Cold War rhetoric of the government and was 
arguing accordingly. Australia was alone in Asia and unless it did 
something to "produce for the starving millions" then "we cannot survive 
as a country. "9 8 
Brown and Spooner continued to differ about whether it was best to push 
for an agreement at all. By June 1952, it had been 10 months since the draft 
had been forwarded to Victoria. It was eventually decided, following 
Spooner, to push for some action on Victoria's part.99 Then, in July, given 
the mounting inflation and pressures for more money, and with his control 
slipping, Menzies reversed his earlier stance on uniform taxation, offering 
to consider returning taxation powers to the States. 1 00 Rather than the 
strengthening fiscal control and constraint via centralising credit, a 
return of taxing powers to the States, via rejoining expenditure raising and 
spending responsibilities, would restore fiscal probity. 1 01 
By July 1952, however, a second (relief) instalment of the IBRD dollar loan 
was announced. The President of the Bank denied that the Bank was urging 
a "go slow" on the Snowy Scheme. 1 02 East and the State Rivers Commission 
continued to be an ally of the Scheme. 103 Yet, as the Victoria stood to 
receive only 100,000 acre feet of water from the Murray (three times more 
going to the New South Wales bank), McDonald thought that the power 
problems much outweighed such a relatively small amount of water. 
Victoria was still getting "a very raw deal." 104 
In response to the internal criticism from Treasury (and Kent Hughes) the 
economic review had been prepared by Anderson (National Development) 
and Dann (Snowy Authority). Although costs had inflated from £225 
97
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million to £433 million, they assured Spooner that the Scheme was still 
cheaper than coal. 1 05 Given the international pressures Spooner, could not, 
however, accept such untabulated, "bare statements." 106 Even though 
tabulated costs were then made available, Raggatt, as Secretary of the 
Department of National Development, counselled Spooner that a 
comparative review of the sort he may have been expecting was beyond 
their capacity. 107 The complex comparisons and economic teams required 
to analyse various scenarios of multipurpose megatech development were 
only just being assembled in other parts of the world. Raggatt sought to 
reassure Spooner that the Scheme would prove to be cheaper. 108 Brown was 
concluding that US capital was more required than ever.109 
Varying the program by at least delaying and hence dropping Blowering 
expenditure commitments from cost estimates,110 helped Spooner argue to 
Menzies that the Scheme was still cheaper. 111 He would, by October, 
appreciate the difficulties of making simple cost comparisons for a project 
that, he had now been convinced, would form a complimentary peak power 
role to 'base load' thermal plant. 112 Spooner therefore remained willing to 
support the estimate that Snowy power would be half the price of coal fired 
power. An adept practitioner of 'Canberra bashing', shifts in estimated 
expenditures were then used by the Cahill government to embarrass 
Menzies, as Blowering and other dam cutbacks were blamed on the 
Commonwealth. 113 
Concurrently, as the cutbacks were catching up with a SECV still committed 
to a large program, the Central Bank, under Coombs, noted that the cuts to 
the SECV's program were justified not because its investments were 
necessarily ill-conceived but "as a disciplinary measure." The Bank 
remained uncertain, however, whether the over-commitment had arisen as 
a result of a maverick construction program. The McDonald government, 
105 Dann and Anderson, "Interim Report ... ", 517/52, p. 3, NAA: Al058, Fl506, op. cit. 
106 Spooner to Raggatt, 817/52, NAA: ibid. 
107 Raggatt to Spooner, 2/9/52, NAA: ibid. 
108 Raggatt to Spooner, 2/9/52, NAA: ibid. 
109
. Lee, Search for Security, op. cit., p. 152. 
110
• Raggatt to Spooner, 26/9/52, NAA: Al058/l, Fl506. 
111
• Spooner to Menzies, 10/10/52, NAA: A462/16, 318/13, Snowy Mountains Hydro 
Electric Scheme - Financial Requirements. 
112
• Spooner, "The Snowy Mountains Hydro Electric Authority", 23/10/52, NAA: 
Al690, 1963/1538, Economics of Snowy Mountains Hydro Electric Scheme. 
113 
"Work Halt On Big New South Wales Dam", SMH, 3/10/52, p. 4. 
189 
given the larger cut-backs it had to bear, appeared "keen to adopt just such 
a course" thence necessitating a bail-out. Either way, if it were the only 
way to stave-off severe financial embarrassment, the Central Bank offered 
the SECV short term loans. It was also an opportunity to play a role in 
setting overall government expenditures. 114 To the chagrin of the Bank, 
however, Menzies favoured an internal, State-based review of the SECV's 
finances. 115 
Meanwhile, Kent-Hughes raised questions about the Scheme's costs, 
specifically, its public relations costs. 116 The maker of the film for Dunlop 
Rubber, Litchfield Film Productions, had sought to tender for film making 
rights for Snowy Authority work and was objecting to the work being done 
by the government Department of Interior which had just released its film 
of the Scheme. 11 7 It also objected, upon the basis of information supplied 
by Kent Hughes, to Metro-Goldwyn Mayer being given rights to produce a 
short film, especially as it had only recently arrived in Australia. Litchfield 
was also a film maker for Cinesound Newsreels and believed that the 
Authority would gain much greater coverage than with MGM although the 
Authority disputed this. For Hudson, if Litchfield had made a similar offer to 
that of MGM, it would have been "snapped up quickly. "118 
By September 1952, agreement had been reached with MGM on the content 
of two ten minute films. The first would be for exhibition in commercial 
cmemas and would, it was hoped, receive wide international distribution, as 
well as extensive local screenings. The second would be to accompany 
lectures and discussions "on the Scheme as a major national 
undertaking. "119 This latter film would be shot by the Authority's Did 
Gadsby, as he followed the MGM crew around the construction sites, but 
would be edited by MGM. It would also provide the Authority with the 
independent or in-house skills it was after, a way around the demands of 
both the Department of the Interior and of the private companies. 
114 Memorandum, 9/9/52, RBA S-a-2430, State Electricity Commission of Victoria--
Request for Financial Assistance. 
115 Memorandum, 21110/52, RBA ibid. 
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118 Hudson to Spooner, 1017/52, NAA: ibid 
119 Gidley [MGM] to Hudson, 17/9/52, NAA: ibid. 
190 
In the MGM film, reflecting the Menzian emphasis upon national defence 
plus the Authority's own editorial input, the rough and virtuous 
"battleground" of the Scheme was again to the fore. Recalling earlier Cold 
War themes, the need to populate to defend the country, to thwart those 
wishing to "seize what they consider to be our under-developed and 
undeserved birthright" were imperatives that required the large-scale 
development of irrigation and power potentials. Yet the role of the 
"melting pot" of nationalities was also given greater play, possibly as a 
result of the Jubilee Prize winning success of the film about a migrating 
Ukrainian couple, Mike and Stefani made by the Department of the 
Interior, shown at the first Australian film festival held in January 
1952. 120 As a further theme, the MGM script writer had hoped to be able to 
add something about "upsetting the Balance of Nature", plus, then, the 
"Plan to improve nature. "121 Fundamentally, however, it is Hudson's 
burgeoning, multi-purpose system of national purpose that excites with its 
urgency at the end. The Scheme is: 
no make-shift expedient to patch up a national lack of power. It is a long 
range plan, yielding results from 1954 onwards for the security of our 
nation. 122 
To Spooner, in September 1952, Hudson suggested that Victoria would soon 
be in need of peak load plant for electricity supply and that any agreement 
would control its price. Hudson also pointed out that via regulation, both at 
the expanded Hume and in the Upper Snowy, more than 370,000 acre feet of 
water would be made available for the use by Victoria, not merely the 
100,000 as claimed by the Premier. 123 Spooner then wrote to the Victorian 
Premier. Rather than allowing "differences of opinion" to arise at a stage 
"where substantial expenditure" had been incurred, Spooner favoured 
discussion within the proposed Advisory Councii. 124 
Deepening the stand-off, Victoria answered by formally issuing a writ in 
the High Court challenging the Commonwealth's uniform taxation 
120
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legislation and, by implication, in support its own financial autonomy. 125 
Within two months, however, McDonald had lost the December election 
(fought on electoral redistribution issues) and was replaced by Labor's 
Cain, the first majority Labor government in Victoria's history, boosting 
Labor's hopes federally. Although it was against Labor policy, the High 
Court action was not withdrawn. Indeed, within a fortnight of Cain taking 
office, the SECV's annual report was calling for "£30 million a year 'for 
some years"' and pressing its claim to be the cheapest producer of 
electricity in Australia. 126 As a half Senate and New South Wales poll 
approached, further political pressure was applied by Cahill by blaming 
cuts to works programs on Menzies and by pursuing the uniform taxation 
issue (figure 12). 
The development of Guthega on the Upper Snowy, which was proceeding 
apace was, arguably, well within the Commonwealth (Seat of Government 
Acceptance) powers. The contracts for the Upper Tumut, which the 
Commonwealth was working towards letting, were another thing. Cain 
believed that the upcoming conference should "consider the effect of the 
Agreement as a whole" 127 , specifically its implications for Victoria's 
finances. The politically defensive Menzies was hinting that the recent 
meeting of Commonwealth Prime Ministers might offer new financial 
possibilities. Although staged to attempt a Sterling bloc renewal, 128 Menzies 
used the talks as a way of suggesting that State works programs could now 
be secured, although these appeared little more than the Commonwealth 
re-imposing "national priorities. "129 Spooner was in the US having further 
talks with the International Bank. 130 With an election in the offing ·in New 
South Wales for mid February, however, and loans for public works, 
inflation, banking and uniform taxation still at issue, negotiations on the 
Snowy would have to wait. 
After the New South Wales election result, in which Cahill increased his 
125 
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majority, Menzies qualified his support for ending uniform taxation131 
(figure 13). In March 1953, with contracts beckoning, a first meeting 
(finally) convened to review the draft agreement. Hibberd, from Treasury, 
advised Spooner not to open up costing assumptions for review, as this 
would enable the States to become spoilers.132 Spooner went in 
optimistically, hoping to apply the two pronged carrot and stick approach 
for a quick agreement. 133 He sought to openly invite the States to 
participate in an Advisory Council if they supported an agreement. Because 
it was now time to consider calling tenders for the Upper Tumut works, 
connected to Eucumbene Dam, specifications for which had now been 
completed, he urged that the "closest co-operation" was, now, required. 134 
Victoria, which had only two representatives present (neither of whom 
were East), continued to object to the cuts they were suffering. Galbally, 
the new Minister for Electrical Undertakings, had "grave constitutional 
doubts" on the issues of the Commonwealth developing such resources as 
water and power and also about the proposed method of financing the 
Scheme. His battle, as with Kent Hughes, was with the Snowy Scheme: 
We have some horizontal plant at Morwell at the present time, all we 
have to do is make it vertical and it works. We are not interested in 
Snowy at the present time until we get some of our thermal stations and 
our hydro scheme working. 135 (figure 14). 
The Assistant General Manager of the SECV, Willis Connolly, later predicted 
that the weight of opinion within the SECV for many years would be that it 
had invested far too heavily in hydro plant. Such plant had (like the pre-
Eucumbene Snowy), been designed with long race-lines and without large, 
inter-seasonal storages. Coal stock piles and older, base load plant, thence 
used for peak service, were preferred. 136 Given the reliance upon 
electricity revenue (especially the Murray diversion) for cost recovery, 
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and because the Tumut project was the first to be constructed, New South 
Wales was more sympathetic. 
Rumblings, however, continued on the matter of industrial control. 
Renshaw for New South Wales required that the area over which the 
Authority would have construction control, and therefore industrial 
coverage, be restricted. Secondly, the States were pushing for a clause in 
the Agreement which stipulated that they be closely involved in planning 
the Scheme to ensure that the cost of power would be acceptable to them. 
Drawing a parallel between the negotiations between the United Nations 
and communist armies in Korea, this part of the Agreement would come to 
be characterised by bureaucrats as the P'anmunjom clause. They--the 
States--wanted some costs to be borne by the Commonwealth and the 
financing of the Snowy should not interfere with the States' own programs 
of developmentl 3 7 
Continuing its objections, and armed with legal advice from Barwick, 
Victoria announced on the day of the next meeting of Ministers that, 
beyond the writ on uniform taxation, a High Court challenge on the Snowy 
proper would be mounted because the State was "pressed for funds for State 
electrical undertakings. "138 After its internal review of the SECV's 
financial plight, the Victorian government was also seeking to increase its 
call on short term loans from the Central Bank from £7 to £13 million. 13 9 
Spooner, seemingly, then softened his approach as he offered an 
invigorated Advisory Council upon which the States could outvote the 
Commonwealth (although, it remained advisory only). The Commonwealth 
agreed that the Snowy Scheme should be seen as being complimentary to 
the States' electricity grids and that the Advisory Council had the power to 
make recommendations about "the nature, order, sequence and rate of 
construction of the works of the Authority. "14° Crucially, the price of 
electricity to the States would be according to cost; the Authority "neither 
makes a profit nor a loss." 141 The yardstick to be applied, to ensure that 
137 Spooner to Menzies, 30/3/53, NAA: A462, 318/2, op. cit. 
138 
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costs for electricity from the Scheme did not get out of hand, was to be the 
costs of producing electricity from thermal, coal-fired stations. The 
P'anmunjom clause had been agreed. Given the special value of peak 
power, this would later cause significant problems. 
Following Joint Coal Board precedents, the Commonwealth was hoping to 
trade underpinning legislation from the States for continued financial 
support. Yet the Council remained purely advisory and hence the States 
still believed that the emphasis was back to front--it should be the 
Commonwealth which acted as a (temporary) agent for the States in 
constructing the Scheme, not instituting a permanent Authority. The 
Commonwealth was also demanding the right to transmit power from the 
Scheme via its own lines. Fundamentally, Spooner was now seeking to force 
the pace and, although "to some extent...against the spirit of this 
Agreement", to gain approval for largely unexamined Upper Tumut 
contracts in order to begin construction at the end of winter. 
Galbally remained opposed to such interim approval, to "any contract being 
let" until an agreement had been reached. But, given that Enticknap, for 
New South Wales, was quite plain that his State supported an Advisory 
Council, as currently drafted, clearly Victoria would be outvoted even if it 
formally sought to delay Tumut contracts. The SECV had, however, regained 
control of its apparently dire financial position but by misleading the 
Central Bank. After having provided relief loans, the Bank was now 
"disturbed" by the "lack of frankness" of the Commission about hitherto 
undisclosed sources of finance. 142 
Especially given Enticknap's support, on the 5th of May, Spooner 
announced the calling of contracts for the Tumut stage of the Scheme. He 
emphasised that the contracts would be "a radical departure from the cost-
plus system" with the vast bulk going to US contractors. 143 The apparently 
defence-related design of underground construction was also emphasised, 
as was the "paramount importance to the nation." 144 Concurrently, . the 
States were becoming concerned about escalating interest rates. In fact, 
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Hudson was conceding that they would increase the cost ratio of the more 
capital intensive hydro to thermal "from about 1/2 to 2/3. "145 
Controversy then erupted in Melbourne via The Age about the cost 
increases for the Scheme. Keeping the pressure on, Eggleston, during May, 
took up Thorne's objections to the cost of hydro as peak power outlined in 
his Institution of Engineers paper of April. Eggleston claimed that it would 
cost £550 million to complete the Scheme146 and called for a public inquiry 
into costs, recalling how Monash had impressed on him during the 1920s 
that hydro power should supply "only the basic load." 147 Defensively, 
Spooner reiterated that the Commonwealth was now proposing to use 
electricity from the Scheme for the Commonwealth's own defence factories 
in Melbourne, Bendigo, Mulwala, Ballarat, Villawood, St. Marys and 
Lithgow, as well as for an "atomic energy project. "148 This was to occur 
under the rubric of meeting the defence needs of the Commonwealth and 
under the new war-footing of the economy. 149 
In a further blow against an Advisory Council acting as a productive 
clearing house for the competing plans, McMahon (acting for the ill 
Spooner) suggested that the best means to check the economics of the 
Scheme was to rely upon tender estimates. 150 This would again protect the 
Commonwealth from having to reveal its cost assumptions, especially as the 
Advisory Council was about to convene. Not surprisingly, the Advisory 
Council immediately began pushing for a "comprehensive statement" 151 on 
the nature, cost, sequence and rate of progress of all works being 
undertaken by the Authority. In August, at the next Ministerial 
conference, Renshaw suggested, following Galbally, that an outside 
consultant be appointed to examine the question of the economics of 
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sharing base and peak loading investments as it would "give us an 
independent view on the matter. "152 
Meanwhile, the Department of the Interior's film had been showing in 
cinemas around the country since May 1952. For Hudson, the cost was high 
compared to that recently contracted for the films with MGM. He wanted to 
pay only half of what the Department of the Interior wanted, about the 
same amount as it was costing the Authority for the MGM 'short'. Hudson 
further complained that its release had been too late. 153 Primarily, by so 
fending off the Department of the Interior and countering Kent Hughes, 
he aimed to allow the Authority to develop its own in-house production 
team, including cinematographic capacities and editorial control. The 
Authority's own film, Wealth from Water, was made concurrently with the 
MGM film, although it took until late 1953 to have a sound track added. 
It was a beginning for film production within the Authority which had 
learnt from both MGM and the Department of the Interior. Each year 
thereafter at least one film would be made, ensuring greater control of the 
manner in which the Scheme would be presented to a wide range of 
audiences. Wealth from Water avoided the machinic masculinity of Rubber 
Builds Dams but again took up the heroic, modernising themes of 
pioneering work in a harsh terrain. Like the commissioned MGM material, 
it blended such ideas with a more official, record of the progress achieved 
theme. Crucially, too, the underlying economic rationale given for the 
Scheme was that of water for both irrigation and power, both commodities 
for defence. The film begins with Drysdale-like emphasis upon the dry 
inland, then shows how water for power plays a prominent role in the 
benefits of the Scheme. The scenes of city life and manufacturing balance 
the irrigation and farming scenes. 
Masculine derring-do for national security nevertheless remains 
prominent in the film. Whilst the scenes of surveying and construction 
roll by, the sound track also announces that the men who work here are 
"rugged men to whom discomfort is merely incidental to the satisfaction of 
pushing forward a great work". Optimistically, as trigonometric stations are 
cleared by bulldozers on precipitate mountain sides, "major accidents are 
152 
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very rare." 154 Much time was devoted to the details of the work being done 
within an often isolated and snow-bound terrain. Sending supplies through 
a blizzard underscored the importance of remote out-workers. Audfences 
for the film included the employees of the Authority itself. It showed 
widely during the following year (1954) to audiences at agricultural shows 
and to schools and community groups. 
Within the on-going negotiations, capital cost estimates were still 
increasing due to the enlargements and because of increasing labour and 
material costs. Hudson reported that it was the latter factor that was mainly 
responsible for price rises. He went on to argue that the proposal to 
increase Adaminaby to Eucumbene Dam was well justified. The Authority 
"will be able to guarantee 50% more kilowatt hours in any month of any 
year. "155 This would make the peak power (enhanced irrigation) Scheme 
more advantageous to the States. But Cabinet still remained keen to protect 
the principal financial role (and position) of the Commonwealth. That is, 
although Spooner reported that the cost of the Scheme would still be "no 
more than two thirds" of coal systems, a range of interest depreciation and 
even amortisation charges were to be retained. These costs, he believed, 
should not be specified in the agreement as this "might react, at some 
future time, to the detriment of the Commonwealth.'" 56 
At the following Advisory Council meeting, New South Wales found that it 
was now under attack, given the proposal to increase Eucumbene Dam's 
capacity to three and a half million acre feet Spooner, with the full 
support of the Victorians, wrote to the Minister of Works for New South 
Wales, Renshaw, emphasising the advantages of the new high-speed 
methods; "a change from day labour methods would be desirable in the 
interests of efficiency and economy."157 New South Wales countered by 
calling for greater design control given the money it was to pay. 158 In mid 
October, recalling Chifley's concerns, Renshaw added that local 
sovereignty was at issue too: 
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The profits made ... go outside Australia, plant equipment and materials 
are usually brought into Australia often to the detriment of Australian 
industry, many Australian firms are excluded from tendering and the 
heavy contractual commitments may I suggest become embarrassing 
from a budgetary point of view where very large funds have to be 
provided. 159 
Similarly, Renshaw was not at all keen to support the proclamation of a 
federal industrial award for those on site. Industrially, Catholic Action, the 
anti-communist 'movement' within the ALP was challenging the A WU. In 
the industrially volatile atmosphere of spring 1953, when compulsory 
unionism in New South Wales was being pushed by Cahill to bolster 
Grouper influence, 160 the retention of a state-based award for the A WU was 
proving crucial in New South Wales. That is, with the routing of Federated 
Ironworkers and Transport Workers union officials under anti-ballot 
rigging challenges and under threat of having its own autocratic practices 
challenged by the Groupers, 161 the consequent rise of the Groupers "was 
an affront to traditional A WU aspirations of holding the balance of power 
in the ALP." 162 
This challenge to the power base of the AWU in the New South Wales ALP 
played out on the Snowy Scheme. The A WU's state coverage of the Snowy 
Scheme's burgeoning--3000 or more--workforce was under challenge as 
the Commonwealth court suspended all quarterly wage rises. The Snowy 
Authority's Counsel (and Grouper sympathiser), John Kerr, was "most 
anxious" 163 to prevent wage adjustments, as could be allowed by Justice 
Taylor, reputed to be an 'A WU judge' on the State bench (see next chapter). 
Against the prospect of having to conform to a Commonwealth jurisdiction, 
away from Taylor, the A WU was soon suggesting that, as the works area had 
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not been proclaimed, the Court had no legal jurisdiction.164 If it claimed 
any, the A WU could challenge the validity of the Authority's Act in the 
High Court. 
For its part, as well as seeking to press on with "peak steam ideas," 165 the 
SECV maintained that increasing interest rates were making the 
comparative economics of the Scheme much less secure than 
Commonwealth costings. 166 Connolly had been making some in-house 
estimates plumping for £630 million167 adjusted downwards for his 
Minister to £600 million. He therefore argued that money should be 
diverted "to bring the Kiewa and Morwell projects to a reasonable 
production stage. "168 Connolly was left wondering whether the Scheme 
would have to be subsidised, or, like in the US, the Federal government 
would "apply a specially low interest rate."169 
This was taken up by New South Wales' interests who called for a reduction 
in interest charges from 4 and 112 to 2 and 112 per cent. 17° Concurrently, 
the New South Wales Cabinet had decided to reiterate its longstanding 
priority of water for irrigation from the Scheme. 1 71 Yet, as predicted by 
Brown, New South Wales had now got most of what it wanted from the 
Scheme and could now use it as a 'political football', threatening to walk 
away from the Murray component. Compounding matters, Coombs, the day 
before the next conference, admitted that efforts to control the lending 
policies of trading banks, and inflation, had failed. 1 72 
At the next meeting of Ministers in late October 1953, Victoria remained 
generally opposed. New South Wales offered further opposition, suggesting 
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that the Commonwealth was being insincere as clauses to the agreement 
were being modified after discussions. 17 3 The concerns of the New South 
Cabinet were also put. Although all concerned knew that power revenue 
would pay for the Scheme, electric power was characterised as a "secondary 
consideration." By stressing the need for food and as feared by Brown, it 
was turning back the federal Coalition's strategic priority for food 
production on itself. The lack of openness on the part of Treasury as to its 
own costing assumptions and the interest rate to be applied then came to 
the fore. Indeed, with the States talking about (Connolly's) mooted £600 
million cost, a united front was intensifying. 
With a federal election only just seven months away and the 
Commonwealth risking financial thence political embarrassment and loss 
if the Tumut contracts were delayed, Spooner sensed that the two Labor 
governments were primarily manoeuvring to embarrass the 
Commonwealth. If further political mileage was sought, Spooner 
challenged especially New South Wales to make cost an issue, even if the 
Scheme "may be doomed as a result." He suggested that, in order to avoid 
controversy, all wait for tender quotes. He continued to demand that the 
Snowy Authority be allowed industrial control over the Cooma area, 
purportedly for the erection of a vaguely defined (Commonwealth 
controlled) uranium plant. Renshaw responded that there was "a war m 
Europe over the Danzig corridor." That this small territory stayed under 
State awards was crucial for the A WU's attempts to avoid being sidelined by 
the Groupers in New South Wales. 
With Victoria still vehemently opp,osed, and now in league with New South 
Wales, Spooner then changed tack. He agreed that the States should have 
the right to examine each stage of the project and be able to pass judgement 
on its acceptability. Although it may be difficult for inter-dependent stages 
to be so approved especially given the stand off in the High Court, "let's try 
to do it." Given such rights of review the States, however, would now have 
to accept to pay what the Scheme was to charge--without interest rate and 
other concessions. This 'proposals principle', or, 'October compromise' as it 
was dubbed--again satirising Cold War federalism--would also suit the 
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Commonwealth. Much rewriting of agreement clauses would have to be 
done and further delays could be expected. 
The Daily Telegraph reported the next day that the conference had agreed 
to the terms put by New South Wales. There was now to be, as the headline 
put it, "State Control Of 'Snowy"'. The "Commonwealth Government will not 
construct any new section without first getting the consent of the two State 
Governments." There were to be "no white elephants" --this continued the 
line of attack against the 'wasteful central government'. And in line with 
the primary objective of the dominant water bureaucracy, the design was 
to be re-orientated; "water 'before power'. '11 74 
Unsurprisingly perhaps, given the Commonwealth's overall strategy of 
delay, albeit with signs of concession, this compromise soon began to 
unravel. Draft agreements supplied by the Commonwealth did not match 
expectations, 175 Tumut works appeared to be going ahead regardless176 and, 
crucially, the Commonwealth Treasury was still not supplying financial 
criteria 177 Consequently, there arose three quick-fire notices, one from 
each electricity authority, that overseas experts would be called to examine 
the economics of the Scheme. Without any movement from Treasury, and 
thus any real chance of making accurate financial comparisons between 
proposals, the Labor States were now preparing to force an independent 
inquiry. 
Spooner began to re-assert to the Cabinet sub-committee a role for 
negotiated rather than forced settlement. He advocated on-going 
agreement negotiations in parallel with a staged approach to economic 
justification and construction rather than demanding a quick settlement. 
He acknowledged that "proceedings may be held up for political 
reasons. "178 Hibberd reiterated his concerns. Given the supposed October 
compromise, there would be "a series of unending hagglings with the 
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States. [The] Scheme will always be a political tool of [the] States."179 New 
South Wales, in particular, was prone to make trouble given that, once the 
Upper Tumut is underway, "the water interests in New South Wales ... will 
have got most of what they want." 
In response, Spooner noted that it was already the case that "we are so deep 
m these works there can be no turning back. "180 Less assuredly, the idea 
that the Scheme might be economically unjustified just "can't be so." 
Against the strategic advice of bureaucrats and engineers, however, he 
again stressed his political sensibilities. Financial and technical 
disagreements would, of course, arise, he recognised, but an "exchange of 
views" would eventually "benefit the Scheme as a whole." Hibberd 
remained concerned that all projects "stand on their own feet economically 
as a producer of electricity. "18 1 
In early December Spooner began to accede to pressure to call a review but 
Treasury remained adamant about keeping the costing criteria to itself 
until the States had signed. The preferred strategy of Treasury was that 
they were "not going to answer these questions in theory"182--not without 
first seeing capital estimates. As such, Hudson's hopes that either the 
Authority or Advisory Council would undertake a review were also 
frustrated as he could gain no financial data from Treasury for this 
purpose. 183 Treasury was aware that the SECV, as it pleaded for co-operative 
support for its stalling projects, had shrewdly gained extra money from the 
Central Bank. As the States maintained that Treasury retained considerable 
latitude in deciding the level of their financial commitments, bickering 
about the provision of reliable plant costs then arose amongst Hudson, 
Conde, Lewis and the SECV. Without these the States could not agree to 
accept or reject a proposal yet, by agreeing to such a revamped approach, 
they had foregone the right to cost guarantees! 
The next meeting could at least agree to attack the Minister for Works for 
New South Wales, Renshaw, about his determination to push on with day 
labour methods for constructing the Eucumbene dam. It suggested that he 
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visit the State Rivers project at 'Big Eildon' and to "take advantage of the 
experience gained ... on the relative merits of contract work and day 
labour. "184 Such pressure would continue throughout the political tumult 
of 1954. 185 
The States were also moving to take advantage of the Sterling bloc's formal 
wish to help finance Commonwealth works. Given Britain's burgeoning 
defence commitments to NATO, however, which were being forced on them 
by the US, the amount of money available was limited. Nevertheless, 
throughout January 1954, State Premiers met with the British Chancellor of 
the Exchequer, Butler, seeking to bolster Loans Council resources. Butler 
encouraged the implicit support being given to this States rights approach 
to control works expenditures, agreeing that "the priorities for works was 
the responsibility of the States. "186 
This renewed association could also provide private banking with a 
rationale to exist independently of the supposedly inflexible stranglehold 
of a Central Bank slowly evolving under Coombs. Similarly, the 
'independent' State-banking associations of the SECV, as it was still 
straining to finance its delayed investments, could provide such a 
rationale. In toto, however, given the combative attitude between the 
governments, little co-ordination and agreement had been reached on the 
central matter of the Snowy Scheme proper as inflation and battles over 
monetary and taxation controls, as well as industrial court control, . were 
being fought out across the Scheme. As Raggatt himself conceded in early 
1954, "it is difficult to measure the progress towards an agreement which 
has been made at these conferences." 187 
In parallel to this stand-off, the Authority would soon complete further 
films. Harvesting the Snows, an updated version of Wealth From Water, was 
possibly one of the best films made by the Authority. It retained a record of 
progress slant, using graphic, on-site shots of the work being conducted, 
but was better produced. To the images of impressive machines and the 
formidable scale of the works, it added scenes depicting the high-voltage 
184
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power-line riggers, grappling with cables high above the ground. The 
slowly rising Eucumbene Dam site with its huge earthen wall, its 
engineering complexity as well as constructing machinery, were also 
featured. It applied roaring engine sounds and rising, fanfare music scores 
evoking a sense of the technological sublime. 1 8 8 Overall, the Authority 
chose to encapsulate the Scheme under the twin goals of irrigation and 
power and with the now standard national security undertone. The harvest 
was to be for the children of the workers of the Scheme who "will inherit 
Australia secure and free from want." 189 
The Authority then made a film for the Department of Immigration, 
Together we Build, featuring the many nationalities combining to 
construct the Scheme. Celebrating a multicultural or, at least, mixed 
workplace, the migrants are highly valued for the complex skills they have 
brought from overseas. Upon their historic embarkation they are whisked-
off to the Alps. Workmen were soon practicing their carpentry skills, with 
others demonstrating cartographic, instrument making and other prized 
skills. After dedicating themselves to hard work for their new home, they 
were then welcomed into local communities and are depicted as 
participating within fund raising and civic activities. As an English 
migrant teaches English, all come to newly dedicate themselves to nation 
building. With many European nationalities featured, along with overseas 
technology, the migrants thence become emblematic of the success of a 
nation at Cold War. Hard work ensures success for the migrant and .nation. 
Then, during the local 'naturalisation' ceremony, a highly skilled 
Germanic migrant receives his first cup of tea as an Australian citizen. A 
rite of passage is presented to stiffen the resolve of both locals and migrant 
workers. Labouring, skill, community harmony and renewal are 
synthesised into a strengthened nationality. As orchestral music swells up 
the narration affirms that "together we build so that from the snow caps of 
Australia's roof will flow power and life for the future progress of 
Australia. "190 
188 Nye, David. E., American Technological Sublime, Cambridge, Mass., MIT Press, 
1994, p. xvii. 
189 SMHEA, "Harvesting the Snows" (1954,20 mins, snd, col.), Screen Sound Australia, 
Cover Tile No. 6917. 
190 SMHEA, "Together We Build" (1954, snd, col.) NAA: A5688, 20, Cine Film 
"Together We Build" 
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This film along with Conservation on the Snowy and All things Flow, also 
presented an altered approach. As did Where the Hills are Twice as Steep, a 
twenty minute color film, commissioned in 1956 to 'document' the progress 
of the works since the start of the year. Moderating whilst refiguring 
allusions to Cold War battle, the in-house assimilationist theme and 
narrative approach was deepened in Where the Hills are Twice as Steep, the 
title being a line from the Banjo Paterson poem, 'The Man From Snowy 
River'. 
Workers are again depicted as being hard working and even daring, just 
like the rider from the poem. They break all international · tunnelling 
records, quickly joining muck trucks and moving rapidly--too rapidly--to 
the dust laden rock face to resume drilling. This time, however, the film 
sought to establish an association with national icons. The film took up the 
daring and hardworking ethos of the mountain stockmen and used it to 
similarly present the workers on the Scheme. It extended the ideas of 
Together We Build and Wealth From Water, seeking to subtly encourage 
farmers to regard the workers and the Scheme as continuing, not 
threatening, tradition. Advertisements for heavy machinery would make 
similar associations (figures 15 & 16). 
In mid 1957, Conquest of the Rivers, a 26 minute color film, was released. 191 
It furthered the technique of reconciling tradition to emergent power by 
re-presenting icons of national mythology. As with other films, it was 
produced and photographed by Harry Malcolm and supervised by Did 
Gadsby. Margaret Hudson, the daughter of the Commissioner, also took part 
in the writing of scripts, as did Ralph Peterson. 
Conquest of the Rivers, took as its story a farming family that had been 
displaced by drought. 192 (figures 17 to 21) Amongst scenes of dry, 
'Drysdale-like' Western Division stock runs, there arises whirly whirly's of 
wind and dust, with ponderous, tragic music. The fleeing water-bore 
drilling contractor is then depicted lamenting dried out and dust filled 
water tanks, under broken windmills. "Here, in this thirsty wilderness, 
there tried and failed a man." The family then escapes from the drought 
191
. SMHEA, "Conquest of the Rivers", (1957, snd, col.), NAA: A5688, 487, Cine Film 
"Conquest of the Rivers" 
192 Clark to The Librarian, The Commonwealth National Library, 19/6/57, NAA: 
A2915, B242 Part I, op. cit. 
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Figures 
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1952 
Pix, 
& 16; Advertisements; International Harvester, The Riverlander, 
(associating speed and security); 
22/11/:58, p. 28 (reconciling new 
Caterpillar, 'Man from Snowy 
machinery via traditions of 
horsemanship) 
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Figures 17 to 21; A sequence of images from the Snowy Authority film, 
produced by Harry Malcolm, Conquest of the Rivers (1957, snd., col.). 
Images reproduced from Screen Sound (Canberra) Cover Title Number 6910. 
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stricken interior as the father comes to work for the Snowy Authority, 
noting that here "was water which could bring life to that parched and 
thirsty country I was leaving." 
The film increased the tempo or drama of the sheer scale of construction 
work depicted. As the now ex-farmer is inducted via a tour of the Scheme, 
he witnessed, for example, startling scenes of an explosive-filled hillside 
being detonated to provide earth fill for Eucumbene dam. As the warning 
whistle echoes throughout the valley, a wombat takes cover. Then, as white 
cockatoos scatter into a stark blue sky, the charge brings down a whole 
hillside. In an early version, moderated for the final cut, the scanty gum 
trees all collapse quite alarmingly, like hapless ten pins in violent unison, 
as the earth slips away beneath. With earth moving machinery then able to 
move in to quickly transport the fill, a new poem is then sung. Challenging 
old values, yet with a theme of continuance, there is now a: 
new kind of faith which moved mountains ... where bullock teams once 
crawled with caution and drovers rode behind their weary herds ... 
suddenly a thousand horses roared a challenge to the hills, now bloomed 
by diesel fumes. 
The water drilling contractor could, therefore, find a similar but renewed 
role. As he began work as a 'diamond' driller of rock core samples, moving 
confidently about the road-less terrain on horseback, he combined his 
singular horsemanship and drilling skills with the 'thousand horses' of the 
Scheme. 
As well as re-presenting Drysdale-like metaphors, the film reconfigures 
the 'Man from Snowy River' ethos, extending the use of the 'Man from 
Snowy River' theme first used the year before in Where the Hills are Twice 
as Steep. The purpose of the Scheme and its massive organisational ethics 
are rejoined to those of the farmers of the interior who are asked to take up 
the challenge. As Hudson commented on the photographic exhibitions that 
were touring country and city agricultural shows at the time, "the Murray 
and Murrumbidgee Valley people are our best supporters" 193 (figure 22). 
Seeking a stronger bond with the farming communities, the film would be 
193 Hudson, SMHEA Minute, 16/5/56, NAA: A5628, 1962/637, Authority's Public 
Relations Exhibitions - Policy. 
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Figure 22; Photograph of the Snowy Authority's touring 'mobile display 
unit' see G. V. Lawrence, "The Snowy Comes West", The Riverlander, Jan. 
1957, p. 19. 
The Snowy Comes West 
By G. V. Lawrence 
\ 
The people of the Murray-Murrumbidgee had a splendid opportunity to study the project of the 
Snowy Mountains Hydro-Electric Authority last year when, in direct response to a suggestion 
from the M. V.D.L., a mobile exhibition was sent out to eight agricultural shows. 
fhe Authority has always been notable both for the 
rgy and skill with which it carries out its mighty 
c and for the trouble it takes to tell and show the 
paying public all about it. The Commissioner, Sir 
Iiam Hudson, has a special interest in the valleys 
he West where the Snowy water will begin to flow 
. 959. The mobile exhibition was shown at the agri-
ural shows at Corowa, Leeton, Wagga Wagga, 
ngaratta, Kerang, Shepparton, Mildura and finally 
\!bury and was displayed in a large marquee built 
:cially for the purpose. Around the walls was a 
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toured extensively by the Authority within the regions. By so remaking the 
Drysdale, water for the thirsty land style, Conquest of the Rivers won an 
Australian Film Institute award (silver medallion) for documentary in 1958. 
Again, reassuringly, migrant workers are seen as contributing to and 
assimilating into this modernising, 'worthy yeoman' ethos. Photo-elastic 
stress models as abstract icons, were also applied to celebrate the 
underground, defensive Scheme, highlighting the award winning 
investigations of engineering science in predicting rock behaviour 
(figure 23 ). But, overall, farmer friendly public relations were playing an 
increasingly crucial role. They were arising in place of institutional 
innovation or inter-state processes of design review through an effective 
Advisory Council or federal electricity body. 
What can we conclude from the manner of political negotiations and the 
increasingly sophisticated publicity by the Authority, which has l)een 
explored in this chapter? An implicitly, bipartisan, 'full utilisation', 
develop and populate approach was taken up by Menzies. Keynesian co-
ordination continued but the enclosed, technocratic aspects of federalism 
under Chifley were giving way to another directive form of federalism, 
itself strained by its own strategic closures. Menzies had hoped that his deal 
for US dollar loans in return for US-led expertise, contractors and 
equipment would secure the internal political terrain as the more efficient 
(larger and high speed) regimes would lessen inflationary forces, 'increase 
productivity and legitimise his government. Yet the need to co-ordinate 
federally controlled investments, primarily into large, US sponsored 
megatech, led to furtive tactics and to short term affects which were 
having contradictory tendencies. Cold War federalist tactics stressing co-
ordination for security along with US methods and attacks on unions--
something akin to the 'Truman Doctrine'--began to take effect. Competing 
instrumental planning 'philosophies' of the emerging south east 
Australian electricity grid clashed as the Scheme was further enlarged. The 
shift from Adaminaby to Eucumbene Dam to attempt to improve its 
economics and advantage agriculture created further inflationary, techno-
political and cultural strains. 
Fundamentally, bringing global-political and thence internal coalition 
forces into alignment meant that the existing electricity systems were to be 
co-ordinated with the Snowy Scheme (not vice versa). It was firstly the 
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Figure 23; Photo-Elastic Stress image of underground power station, from 
cover, Qantas Empire Airways, Vol. 29, No. 2, February 1963. 
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Snowy's irrigation and then electricity profile, which had to be set. The 
Tumut development was to proceed ahead of the Murray development even 
as electricity production was to finance the Scheme. Following USBR advice 
(instead of local engineering compromises), the Scheme was (again) 
enlarged for a long-term irrigation and peak power role, hoping for 
expanded--more viable--complementarities. Food production became a 
national strategic priority. Energy, although a strategic plus, tended to be 
displaced by agriculture in the Scheme's priorities if not politics. This, as 
well as the greater scale, also enabled the employment of USBR staff and US 
contractors. 
Concurrently, along with continuing bureaucratic scepticism towards 
federal fora, a Cold War co-ordination of works program was instituted. 
Under the rubric of the need to meet defence needs first, to prepare the 
nation for "war in three years", a fait accompli strategy was persisted with. 
Politically, Menzies was then caught between, on the one hand, the. 
necessity and opportunity to intervene and, on the other, the claims of 
excessive regulation from a range of sources, especially conservative 
media, political, banking and business interests. 
Beyond any strict economic rationale, the sudden change of plans required 
more games of bluff and counter bluff. Tripling the size of Adaminaby to 
produce guaranteed peak power and to enhance irrigation possibilities 
required careful negotiations with Treasury and with some--but not all--
State commissions. In particular, the mooted but constitutionally insecure 
and politically unsupported Advisory Council was delayed until the 
Commonwealth had secured implicit support from New South Wales and 
until contracts crucial for New South Wales were in the offing. Victoria, 
the SECV in particular, began to rail against the changes being imposed on 
its investments into lignite for peak power. Their still experimental hopes 
for achieving energy independence, as well as securing institutional 
autonomy for the SECV, were curtailed by a sharp cut to both Kiewa and 
Morwell. On the other hand, with the apparent tacit support of McDonald 
thence Menzies, the SECV appears to have bluffed several million pounds of 
bridging finance out of the Central Bank. 
Elcom and Conde were in a more intermediate position, between 'Bridge 
Street' and the possibilities of peak power for a modernising, black coal 
fired grid. Elcom supported the claim to institutional autonomy by the SECV 
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but was forced to compromise with the State's water bureaucracy. Its own 
system also stood to gain significantly from the Scheme. New South Wales as 
a whole, however, had been favoured as its less economic half of the 
Scheme was begun first and it had gained a larger dam--Eucumbene--
although Blowering would be deferred. 
Nevertheless, given Victoria's anger and the political mileage which New 
South Wales Labor could gain by supporting Victoria's--Liberal or Labor--
claims, this delayed forum for negotiations thence became a venue for a 
range of issues. Constitutional rights, uniform taxation, inflationary 
and/or Commonwealth-centred financing polices and the related role of 
private versus central banking gained an airing through the techno-
political negotiations of the Council. That Menzies initially appeared to 
favour a greater role for the States and private banks soon opened up 
various avenues of attack as especially inflationary forces and 
unemployment mounted. 
Taking advice of Brown especially but without much legitimacy for its co-
ordinating role, the Commonwealth was slow to openly involve the States. It 
took eighteen months to evolve the budget cuts of August 1951 and then 
another eighteen months for the Commonwealth and States to formally 
meet to discuss the agreement. By then, Spooner was hopeful that the 
Scheme was too far gone for it to be significantly challenged by the States. 
Although under strain, the Commonwealth was showing some 'strategic 
intelligence'. Despite the constitutional difficulties, it was willing to play 
Treasury off against the Snowy Authority and the Department of National 
Development on the one hand, and the States on the other, and to gradually 
enlist New South Wales. Circumventing the more strident States rights, 
anti-centrist elements, Kent Hughes was put in charge of Loder's 
Department of Works and Housing. In this, Menzies and Fadden were 
increasingly rendering any single, corporate force ineffective. This 
overall, if 'messy', shifting or triangular strategy persisted amongst a 
federalism in many ways at odds. 
The alternative Advisory Council, with its consultative powers, could have 
been an avenue of progress. But Commonwealth bureaucrats and Ministers, 
to the increasing frustration from Spooner, deemed such co-operation too 
risky within this highly competitive federalism. Latterly, even the two 
Labor States were going against their Party's uniform taxation policy and 
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using the occasion to challenge Menzies. Also under challenge from the 
more strictly 'free market' proponents such as Packer and Wentworth, as 
inflation and cut backs saw Menzies' popularity fall, and then as the 
economics of the Scheme began to fade in comparison with rival, short-
term proposals, campaigns to sustain loyalty for the Scheme emerged. 
Under some protest from within government (especially Kent Hughes), the 
long term hopes for the Scheme were supported through a sustained 
publicity campaign. 
After early Cold War themes of battling nature--or the 'enemy within'--for 
national security whilst balancing manufacturing and agricultural goals, 
the question for the Authority became one of how to legitimate an 
intensifying agribusiness tradition. From the thrill of the machinic-
masculine yet anxious, populate or perish forerunners, the Authority 
evolved an in-house style. Re-focussing the Cold War imperatives of loyalty 
and hard work, whilst increasingly serving the imperatives of farming, it 
sought to identify diesel driven methods with remade traditions. After 
associating migrant workers and the Scheme with the adept horsemanship 
of Alpine mustering tradition, the Authority drew upon the Sydney 
Morning Herald's campaign of the mid 1940s. A farmer displaced by 
drought could now find work on the Scheme whilst renewing his 
occupational role and drought proofing the interior. 
Accordingly, older traditions were reconciled to and remade by the 
emerging corporate forms. The Authority continued to emphasise skill and 
dedication by evoking awe towards the task. It then sought to resolve the 
threats of the new methods and a migrant workforce by encoding them 
with recuperating, nationalist mythologies. Skill with large machinery in 
place of adept horsemanship plus dedication to work in a rough if friendly 
Australian terrain also continued to displaced any overt battle between 
nations. Themes of hard work in a virtuous, masculine battle against nature 
for a renewed nation, predominated. Denials of indigenous cultures, the use 
of a predominantly migrant labour force being assimilated under hard 
driving labour regimes plus its agribusiness assumptions also establish the 
Scheme's cultural characteristics. Unsurprisingly, the Scheme of the early 
1950s may be considered as a site--predominantly--of Anglophone 
remaking. 
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The machinations and manoeuvring of the committees and the Advisory 
Council, rather than public relations exercises, held the key to resolving 
the institutional problems. Given the competing definitions of (systems) 
efficiencies and the complexities of the choices on offer, an alternative and 
resolute approach by the politicians, and chief negotiators, was required to 
transcend the bureaucratic stand-offs and technicist arguments. Spooner 
and the Commonwealth chose, however, to largely ignore the constitutional 
'cats cradle' of an Advisory Council. But in a manner similar to the internal 
politics of federalism, Menzies appears to have been working to play US and 
Sterling financial possibilities off against each other. Supposedly lending 
some support to the Sterling push, Menzies may have been grandstanding 
whilst encouraging the States to take up the weaker financial association. 
Such an approach also encouraged private banks and anti-centrist, 'anti-
socialist' control of banking approaches. States-rights and London-
orientated banking forces could join together to attack the Menzian-
Country Party agreement to pursue the 'centrist' and thence 'inflationary' 
Scheme. The States combined to force an apparent overturning of the 
Commonwealth's control over the Advisory Council. As the Commonwealth 
could shift the focus of agreement negotiations between financial and 
constitutional powers, that is between 'cost' versus 'control' options for 
State involvement, this proved to be a further stalling tactic. Finally, as 
inflation and other cost pressures on the Scheme began to mount, 
industrial pressures aimed at challenging the AWU in New South Wales, 
were intensifying. 
In sum, at this time of highly competitive federalism fired by the 
opportunities of global finance for capital intensive development, large 
technical systems and various, state-based authorities were competing 
mightily rather than co-ordinating their efforts. Without a participatory, 
fluent broking forum such as a workable Council, the complex and shifting 
factions of federalism were at odds, and were further strained by efforts to 
secure a putatively military-agricultural nation with burgeoning works 
programs. This three-way battle, but especially with Victoria, obviated 
communicative planning despite the fact that work had actually 
commenced and was to intensify. Against a Commonwealth which chose 
delay and filmic propaganda to confident negotiations, rival State-based 
systems were still pushing forward against an even more enlarged · 
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Chapter 5: Infrastructure's Migrants & Uncle Toms 
After the ploys and counter ploys of 1953, and as the 1954 federal election 
was approaching, hidden federalist strategies were again at work (figure 
I). This would lead to the next design change to be considered. To intensify 
the use made of Upper Tumut plant, the diversion from the Tantangara 
Reservoir would be to Eucumbene rather than directly to the Lower Tumut 
via the Yarrangobilly project. Similarly, an intensified construction 
timetable would emerge as would new challenges as the management 
hierarchy was faced with a predominantly migrant workforce. With 
altered plans, new construction methods and Cold War industrial 
competition between unions intensifying, plus the burgeoning number of 
non-English speaking workers, the challenge for politicians, union 
leadership and management, now included cross-cultural industrial 
relations. Calling for new skills and/or enabling greater returns for 
workers across a range of occupations, there was now the added question of 
whether the increasing numbers of often 'unskilled' migrant workers 
would be used as sheer labour power, as a soldier-labourer equivalence 
(figure 2) for the machines of construction--and politics. 
In the first instance, Elcom was securing some important design revisions, 
to enlarge the Upper Tumut works. Conde began moving to have the load 
factors of the Tumut power stations increased, as this would provide more 
continual supplies of electricity, lessening the need for it to install plant. 1 
Even as Elcom was moving to support the development of electricity 
production at the coalfields (of the Hunter and Illawarra valleys) and 
eventually a peak (Snowy) and base load (coalfield) combination, in the 
short term it remained desperately short of relatively constant supplies of 
power. 
Accordingly, both the Snowy Authority and Elcom had been meeting in 
secret to intensify the Scheme's intermediate load characteristics, but not 
in a way that would allow the SECV to withdraw? Positively for Spooner and 
1
• Conde to Lewis, 16/12/53, NAA: MP558, 1953/1647 Part I, Snowy Mountains 
Advisory Council - Establishment of Technical Committee and Hudson to Anderson, 
19/1154, NAA: A987, E909 Part I, Snowy Mountains Advisory Council Minutes 
2 Jewell (Engineer for Design and Construction, SECV) to Connolly, 9/2/54, PRO: VPRS 
8892/PI 646, 1954/4492, Interim Snowy Mountains Advisory Council. 
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Figure 1; Advertisement, Shell, "Playing Draughts with Mother Nature", 
SMH, 2214155. 
·. 
Playing draughts with Mother Nature ... As a resu_Jt 
of a col01111al game with nature, millions of tons of precious water 1\,u 
soon be diverted every year into tho Murray nnd Murrumbidgee Vnllcyg, 
bringing new wealth and pr011pority to our growing country. Mountain 
l<>rrcnts will be harncAAed in tho largeRt Commonwoalt~ devolopmont.lll pro· 
jrct of all time, involving 7 major dnm A, 8.'5 mil011 of tunnols, 400 miles 
of mcelln011 And aqueducta and 17 power RtntionR pro-
ducing cnoug~ power to aupply t he prcacnt ru•cdR of tho 
w~olo nation. AA is UMual in large-Acnlo unrlorl.llkin~H, 
a Jar~" proportion of tho I'XtcnRive rnn~c of pl't'rnlrurn 
productll bclllg UHCd cnrricA tho quality l:ihCill hraod. 
THil 8 Hl:LL COMPANY OJr AUSTnALIA LIMITED CtNCORPOnA.T£0 IN GnEAt fiAITAI ""'1 
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Figure 2; Advertisement; "Atlas Copco", Daily Mirror, 10/4/59. 
The ATLAS COPCO equip":'ent has been a partner in th• 
development of the Snowy Scheme right from the beginning. 
The efficiency :md reliability of the A TL-'.c; 
COPCO compressors and rock drillin~ equipment. 
and of the SANDVIK CORO~fA:'oi"T drill it~.I. 
are constantly being enjoyed br all ma jor COD• 
tractors to the !cbeme. 
ATLAS COPCO al~o baa a full 
range of compreSIIors uHI :~ir tool.a 
for 'fechanical Engint-erin~ 'I' ork· 
shops. Chemical lnd~&ry. 'food. 
working lndwtry. Garages md 
P aint Spray in~ Works b o p a. 
Fanl.lerl!. PTospecton. 
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Hudson, there were also growing "internal differences of opinion"3 on the 
worthiness of hydro-based peak power between Thorn and Webster of the 
SECV4 This latest design 'agreement' also allowed Spooner to reassert to 
Cabinet that the Commonwealth could now, again, control the design and, 
with little risk, provide a guarantee to the States "against power costing 
more than equivalent thermal power. "5 
After the discussions with Elcom, Hudson then revealed to the full Advisory 
Council that diverting the waters from the Tantangara Dam (or from the 
Upper Murrumbidgee) into Eucumbene rather than directly to the lower 
Tumut would save on expenditures (figures 3 & 4). That is, by not 
developing the Yarrangobilly project, the water could, instead, be diverted 
through Upper Tumut plant already planned. This would soon be 
complimented by efforts to divert Tooma water to Adaminaby earlier than 
planned. Lewis would later estimate that the former change would mean 
foregoing 29% of the energy otherwise available from the Yarrangobilly 
proj ect.6 As such, however, this now intensified approach was further 
reason to quickly provide tunnels and the much larger Eucumbene dam for 
the Upper Tumut project 7 In the immediate term, as engineers debated 
whether unlined tunnels would increase or reduce flow rates, the changes 
also meant that the calling of tenders had been delayed. 8 
Given this alteration, to feed more tunnels into the larger dam, the clear 
majority on the Advisory Council remained firmly opposed to Renshaw's 
and the New South Wales Department of Works' method of building 
Eucumbene. That is, they remained keen on the new contract methods of 
construction in place of 'day labour' methods.9 Hitherto, nation-wide, the 
3
• Webster to Thorn, 19/2/54, PRO: VPRS 8892/PI, 646, 1954/13812, Snowy Mountains 
Hydro Electric Scheme. 
4
• Thorn to Connolly, 16/3/54 & Webster to Thorn, 19/2/54, PRO: ibid 
5 Spooner, Cabinet Submission, 112/54, p. 3, NAA: A571, 1953/826 Part 16, Snowy 
Mountains Hydro Electric Authority - Draft Agreement with State governments. 
6 Lewis, "Snowy Mountains Advisory Council: Technical Committee", 12/1155, NAA: 
MP558, 1953/1647 Part 2, op. cit. 
7
• "Minutes of Meeting of the Interim Snowy Mountains Advisory Council", 23-
24/3/54, p. 6, NAA: A987, E909 Part I, op. cit. 
8
• Gilfillan, W. R., "Commonwealth-States Negotiations Which Preceded The Snowy 
Mountains Scheme", 'Second Draft', p. 18 (Document 3421), NAA: A2618, Documents 
3416 to 3422, Snowy Mountains Authority Historical Material Press Cuttings 1950-
1967 and departmental papers. 
9
• "Minutes of Meeting of the Interim Snowy Mountains Advisory Council", 23-
24/3/54, p. 2, NAA: A987, E909 Part I, op. cit. 
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Figures 3 & 4; Graphic of altered layout for Scheme; SMH, 11/1 1/55, and 
cartoon by Eyre, "Another Failure", SMH, 15/5/52. 
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predominant method of construction was that of day labour. Government 
departments such as the powerful (and A WU linked) New South Wales 
Public Works Department, organised plans and materials and hired workers 
to work as directed for fixed rates, over day shifts and as money became 
available. But with the construction of Guthega on the upper Snowy well in 
hand (via a Norwegian contractor which also brought most of its own 
workers), the focus was now shifting to the major projects to be completed 
by the new contract conditions favoured by the Menzies government. 
The overseas contractors, especially the US-led consortia, well used to 
working under 'contracting out' conditions now being introduced via the 
Snowy Authority, would tender for whole contracts, for completed tunnels, 
dams and power stations. The emphasis for these firms was upon capital-
intensive plant being driven hard and fast with incentives and bonuses for 
the best returns. All had to commit to a concerted, round-the-clock 
'campaign' within a highly mechanised 'production-line of the mine'. 
High-powered diesel driven earthmovers sped across the terrain. Multi-
level, rail mounted drilling platforms or 'jumbos' allowed crews to 
simultaneously drill blast-holes, increasing the rates of tunnelling. As had 
been long desired by most engineers, these methods avoided the stop-start 
nature of design and construction. 
Rivalries, however, were intensifying. Industrially, the Groupers were 
asserting themselves both within the unions and ALP. Firstly, the social 
vision of these Catholic-inspired, anti-communist activists was linked to the 
Scheme and its populating aims. It fitted well with Santamaria's agrarian 
Catholicism combined with a 'Christian Democrat' role for a revamped ALP. 
That is, for Santamaria, the Government, via the Scheme: 
was about to strike a match, and out of the fire a new social order could 
be built...it could be a Christian social order based on the small farm, the 
small industrial unit, the small social unit, the small town. 1 0 
If optimistically, both the migration program and the Snowy Scheme could 
see Catholics migrating to rural areas and thence provide the Catholic 
Church with "great accessions of strength" and thus "completely transform 
10
• Address by B. A. Santamaria to the National Catholic Rural Movement, April 1951, 
quoted in Murray, R., The Split. Australian Labor in the Fifties, Melbourne, Cheshire, 
1970, p. 113. 
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the leadership of the Labor movement. "11 But with competition for umon 
numbers intensifying, it would be the migrant workers who would soon be 
courted by the Groupers. 
With its own concerns, and with the Menzies coalition unexpectedly 
scraping home by seats if not votes in the controversial spy scares of the 
'Petrov' federal election of late May 1954, Treasury was again insisting that 
"there is no justification for not compounding interest during 
construction." 12 Design changes were causing further debate about how to 
account for irrigation or power components. Hudson was suggesting that 
charges for water be considered. 13 An independent review of the whole 
Scheme was still favoured by Conde. 14 Again given Menzies' unexpected 
win, the States and the electricity commissions were combining through 
the Advisory Council to force a review of how the Scheme would integrate 
with the State's electrical systems by hiring Ebasco to review the project. 15 
The Menzies government was continuing to push for control by a single 
Commonwealth industrial judge to oversee the Scheme. This, it was hoped, 
would bring costs under the legislative control of a Commonwealth 
industrial jurisdiction more willing to contain 'margins' or wage increases. 
Secondly, after legislation by Chifley, boosted by Menzies and investigated 
by Justice Dunphy for federal parliament, unions were under increasing 
pressure to allow their elections to be conducted under the auspices of the 
Industrial Registrar. Overall, by autumn 1954, with alterations to the Upper 
Tumut project in prospect, the pressures to shift to new methods of work, 
construction management and industrial control were intensifying. 
For its part, the large Australian Workers Union, fast becoming the 
predominant union on the Scheme was, by 1954, attacking both the · 
communist and Grouper unions. Post-war, as we have seen with the miner's 
11
• Santamaria, B. A., quoted in Short, Susanna, Laurie Short: A Political Life, Sydney, 
Allen and Unwin, 1992, p. 206. 
12
. Hibberd to Spooner, 25/5/54, NAA: A571, 1954/123 Part 2, Snowy Mountains 
Authority - Capital Charges. 
1'. Hudson to Hibberd, 16/6/54, NAA: A571, 1963/4932 Part I, Snowy Mountains 
Hydro Electric Authority - Financial Directives. 
14 Renshaw to Galbally, 26/5/54, PRO: VPRS 8892/PI 646, 1954/4492, Interim Sno>ry 
Mountains Advisory Council. 
15
• "Minutes of the 9th Meeting of the Interim Snowy Mountains Advisory Council", 
22/6/54, p. 4, NAA: A2915, A53 Part I, Snowy Mountains Hydro-Electric Authority 
Proceedings of Interim Snowy Mountains Advisory Council. 
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strike and given its shrinking rural workforce, it was keen to defend its 
autonomy. The rival organisation for union dominance--the combined 
Australian Council of Trade Unions (ACTU)--was also emerging as a 
national governing body. But, seeking to preserve its autonomy, the A WU 
was refusing to affiliate and had been attacking the ACTU as being in 
league with communists. 16 
Strategically, as a 'company union' rarely supportive of strikes, the A WU 
was willing to allow piece-rate conditions. For the Snowy Scheme--with its 
large workforce--it preferred a New South Wales industrial jurisdiction, 
under Justice Taylor, the head of the New South Wales Industrial 
Commission. In tune with the contractors and the A WU itself, Taylor's 
approach was to achieve "uninterrupted production ... to achieve a high 
level of construction activity unhampered by work stoppages. "17 In fact, 
the most expensive hearings for this approach--accident and safety 
hearings--would figure in only 2 out of 186 hearings. Nevertheless, in 
contravention of the thrust of the Commonwealth Arbitration Commission's 
jurisdiction and concerns, Taylor would grant many hearings and 
concessions on the matter of special allowances. 18 
On the other industrial hand to the Snowy Authority therefore, in 
sympathy with consortia that preferred piece-rate conditions and under 
the industrial jurisdiction of Justice Taylor, the A WU was in a strong 
position. But its ballots were often corrupt; "ballot-rigging in A WU 
elections, particularly in Queensland and New South Wales, was as 
traditional as gift giving at Christmas. "19 The AWU, although close to 
contractors was, therefore, vulnerable to Cold War industrial rivalries. 
These industrial factors, including the intensification of work about to 
16 Hagan, J., A History of the Labor Party in New South Wales 1891-1991, Melbourne, 
Longman Cheshire, 1991, p. 149 and Hearn, M. and Knowles, H., One Big Union, 
Melbourne, Cambridge University Press, 1996, p. 214. 
17
• Kleinsorge, Paul L., "Industrial Relations on the Snowy Mountains Project: The 
Development of a System of Conciliation", Journal of Industrial Relations, Vol. 12, 
1970, p. 298-9. 
18
• Ibid, p. 296. 
19
• Guy, Bill, A Life on the Left: A Biography of Clyde Cameron, Kent Town, Wakefield 
Press, 1999, p. 85. For a full description of AWU rorts, see the report by the Federal 
President of the ALP; Bums, T. J., A Selection of Submissions Received by the Federal 
Executive Council When Investigating Complaints Re The New South Wales Branch of 
the Australian Labor Party, Sydney?, The ALP, 1970?, NLA, MS 4985, Box 128, File 
79. 
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occur, would profoundly influence the manner in which the workforce 
was protected within the rapidly changing industrial conditions. 
All of these factors may be seen at work in the example of Jerzy Bielski. In 
particular, his story highlights the experiences and cross-cultural issues 
affecting migrant workers. From 1951 until 1958, Bielski, a Polish-born 
political refugee, was employed by the A WU to lead its campaign to better 
inform--and enlist--the many migrant workers now gaining work on the 
Scheme. 
Born in 1921 in Warsaw with a Jewish mother and Catholic father, he had 
experienced much by his arrival. As a rebellious youth, he became a 
member of a nationalist student collective, active in 'Zadruga' (an old Slavic 
word for that which inspires collective action) as its publicist. Being 
Polish-nationalist, it was also anti -German and anti-Jewish. In 1936, 
however, he joined the International Brigades (upping his age) to fight the 
fascists in Spain. When World War Two came, he fought for the Polish 
Underground, having to evade or escape from both German and Russian 
military forces, being eventually captured by the Nazis and sent to 
Auschwitz concentration camp. There, as well as suffering terrible 
physical hardship and mental anguish, he worked as an electrician. 
Typically, he also became a representative for political prisoners. This, plus 
his longevity in the camp, placed him in a relatively well-informed 
position about the knowledge that Nazi officers had of the atrocities. After 
being liberated from this deathly junction of Speer's transport efficiencies 
(figure 5), he became a significant witness for the Nuremberg war trials.20 
He became the leader of the Polish Socialist Party in the US zone in 
Germany. As well, he became the leader (General Secretary) of the Polish 
Workers Trade Union for West Germany and also a Vice President of the 
International Socialist Solidarity Committee for West Germany. Bielski 
found work as a manager of a camp for ex-prisoners, near Bremen, 
organising displaced persons. He edited one of the largest Polish language 
weeklies published in West Germany, the Literary Review, serving a Polish 
readership in the country of over I million21 
20 Interview with Bielski, 8/3/96. 
21 Letter from Bielski, 4/5/96. 
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Figure 5; Photograph by Lee Miller, "Trains at Dachau: Prisoners have died 
on the short march to the camp" (J 945). From Livingston, Jane, Lee Miller 
Photographer, London, Thames and Hudson, 1989, p. 79. 
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Upon arrival in Australia, he found work at the Commonwealth Printing 
Works in Ultimo. After being recommended by a leading Polish trade 
unionist in the United States, Mr. Alojzy Adamczyk, to Dougherty, the 
President of the A WU, Bielski then agreed to work as an organiser, at first 
on a probationary basis. As he had been hired as an organiser for migrant 
workers, he had to negotiate workplace problems faced by workers who 
had a first language other than English.22 He soon visited many 
construction, factory, refinery and farm work-sites. In February 1951 he 
began writing in English and Polish in The Australian Worker. This was 
soon extended into German, Italian and French so as to encourage migrant 
workers to belong to the AWU. 
Identifying with and idealising the tradition of unionism for his 
readership, he argued that the A WU was "the oldest and the most reliable in 
the Australian Trades Union Movement in its fight for the victory of 
democratic ideals ... (the] AWU is the pride and hope of Trade Unionism."23 
Bielski's regular half page in The Australian Worker 
workers with history and industrial coverage 
sought 
of the 
to acquaint 
union, the migrant 
role of the local 'rep' and the relatively inexpensive cost of the A WU ticket. 
He appealed for readers to write in and express their concerns. Less 
positively, however, he could also take a conspiratorial view, also writing 
about how the Liberals were "infiltrating" New Settler Leagues.24 
One problem stood out. He soon found that assimilationism was a convenient 
means by which some managers intimidated migrants. Passing through the 
uncertainties of a cross-cultural and industrial 'rite of passage' (figure 6), 
migrants were vulnerable to an industrial discipline, toward becoming a 
compliant and subservient work-force. Bielski reacted, sometimes 
contentiously, by haranguing, berating and slandering the perpetrators of 
intimidation and those who denied rights and proper wages. Prepared to be 
outraged where others would be fearful, but also controversial in his 
methods, on occasions he would 'find himself' amongst some minor brawls 
and fights between men and supervisors. Bielski was able to enlist far more 
migrant workers than any other AWU organiser. The State Secretary, 
22 Interview with Bielski, 25/5/97. 
23 Bielski, J., "Appeal to Migrants", The Australian Worker, 28/2/51, p. 11-12 
24 [Bielski], "Report on Liberal Party Activities for New Australians" (circa late 
1953), NBA: M44 [AWU Head Office], Reel 35, "Bielski File on New Australians". 
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Figure 6; Photograph, "Citizenship Convention, Canberra, 1958", 
Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs photograph. No. 
5 8/11/9 . 
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THE stage tableau featu red 
at t he Albert Hall depicted 
the =!ssimilation of migrants. 
H showed, •Ymbolically, the 
part newcomers are playing 
in our development and also 
how they merre into their 
new homeland. A photo-
;:raph!c display, i n the Albert 
Hall ante-room, show e !1 
ntig-rant children learning, at 
schools, at universities and at 
sport, to become our future 
ritizens. The display of more 
than 100 pictures was titled 
- "Tomorro,~'s Austral ian~''. 
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Oliver, soon regarded Bielski as "a magician" as a result of his abilities to 
swell membership. 
As well as employing Bielski, the A WU New South Wales Executive had been 
considering the implications of the Snowy Mountains Act. The Scheme 
increased membership such that it brought "increased delegations to the 
State Labor Conference and the Labor Council. "25 These were crucial given 
the emerging turmoil between industrial factions. After the fall of the Cain 
Victorian government in April due to the loss of support from the Grouper 
faction, the AWU in New South Wales then sought to further protect itself 
from Grouper intervention. Re-aligning itself with left unions, it gained 
assurances from the Trades and Labour Council that no Groups would be 
formed within its ranks.26 
By 1954, therefore, and contrary to the added support to membership 
numbers by compulsory union legislation being introduced by the pro-
Grouper Cahill government, the autocratic A WU was keen to ensure that no 
rival membership faction could emerge. Accordingly, the A WU was now 
determined to "deny membership to Asians, communist and 'new applicants 
it considered undesirable'. "2 7 Contrary to the apparent support given to 
Bielski, this "White Australian union" was also becoming "most selective" in 
handling applications from migrants.28 
Inter-State rivalry on the Scheme remained intense. Presumably by way of 
informing Ebasco of the federalist politics of the situation, an article 
appeared in the London Financial Times. 29 Expressing more the concerns 
of Victoria and the SECV in particular (possibly via the federal Minister 
Kent Hughes and Connolly) and promoting a continuing London financial 
connection for the States, it took a strident 'States Rights' approach, 
especially on the related issue of uniform taxation. It characterised the 
Commonwealth's involvement as being "tactless and overbearing" and 
"ultra vires its Constitution" such that the Snowy Authority was appointed 
25
. Dodkin, Marilyn,· Charlie Oliver; A Political Biography, MA Thesis, University of 
Sydney, 1990, p. 23 
26 
"Why Groups Capitulated to AWU", Century, 18/6/54, p. 3. 
27 Hearn and Knowles, op. cit., p. 217. 
28 
"AWU First to Bump Trouble", Century, 22/1/54, p. 6. 
29 Unattributed Article; "Heat in the Snowy Mountains; Problems Facing Big Project", 
typed transcript from Financial Times [London], 15/9/54, from NSW Treasury (Special 
Bundles), SRNSW: 13/10079, SB 210, Snowy Mountains Agreement 
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by ''force majeure." The SECV, in fact, was secretly evolving another 
possible layout for the Scheme. It redirected all the water from the Murray 
Scheme tributaries back into the larger Eucumbene Dam and then down the 
Tumut with the result that "all regulation [would be] reasonably 
justified. "30 Yet as this jibe at the enlarged Tumut 'irrigation' project would 
have eliminated the Snowy-Murray development it was politically 
impracticable.3 1 
The engineers were also coming up against the difficulties, both 
conceptual and practical, of calculating the cost of alternative scenarios. 
Compounding matters, by way of defending their own institutional 
positions, the engineers were favouring a systems-centred approach from 
the point of view, in each case, of their own systems.32 Who would operate 
the Scheme was also being brokered, and competing definitions of 
efficiency emerged. The Authority and Elcom both suggested that for 
optimal operation they alone should be in charge.33 (figure 7) 
An 'opportunity cost' approach, one that would optimise a range of 
combinations of large, multipurpose systems across three states, was 
horrendously complex. International forums were only now (mid 1954) 
working through the (itself limited) problem of how best to combine hydro 
and thermal electricity generation options.34 Accordingly, a simple 
'equivalence' method was still preferred, especially by Conde,35 even 
though this approach could drive the Snowy Scheme design into a higher 
load factor, towards aping the thermal stations to which it was being 
30 SECV, "Modified Snowy Mountains Scheme", 23/5/55, PRO: VPRS 8892/Pl, 648, 
1955/17581, Water Power. 
31 Hudson to Loder, 8/7/55, NAA: MP766, 1959/347 Part 3, Snowy Mountains 
Advisory Council. 
32
. See, for eg, Snowy Mountains Hydro Electric Authority, "The Storage Capacity of 
Adaminaby Dam, The Generating Capacity at Station Tl and the Capacity of the 
Eucumbene-Tumut Tunnel", 7/6/54, p. I, NAA: MP558, 195311647 Part 3, Snowy 
Mountains Advisory Council - Establishment of Technical Committee 
n See various correspondence, September to December 1954, NAA: CP608, Bundle 
2/2, Snowy Mountains Hydro Electric Scheme - Agreement Papers 
34
• De Luccia, R. E., "State of Hydro-Electric Power Development in the United States", 
Fourth World Power Conference, London, Percy, Lund, Humphries and Co, 1950, p. 
2091 and see Fulton, A. A. and Peattie, J. D., "Integration of Hydro and Thermal 
Generation in Great Britain", Proceedings of World Power Conference, Sectional 
Meeting, Brazil. 1954 [and others] and Haldane, T. G. N., and Blackstone, P. L., 
"Problems of Hydro-Electric Design in Mixed Thermal-Hydro-Electric Systems", Proc. 
I. E. E., Vol. 102, Part A, No. 3, 1955. 
35 Palmer, Engineer for Planning, SECV, "Notes ... 29th and 30th June, 1954", PRO: 
VPRS 8892/Pl 646, 1954113812, Snowy Mountains Hydro Electric Scheme. 
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Figure 7; Diagram, from SMHEA Cabinet Submission, Appendix F, p. 5, 
30/11154, NAA: CP608, Bundle 2/3, Folder 2, depicting the supposed problems 
which would arise with divided control. 
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compared. Either way, however, Cabinet had decided that "the 
Commonwealth should push up the cost of Snowy power towards the ceiling 
of equality with thermal costs."36 Through the politics of the ceiling clause, 
and taking advantage of the fact that Treasury was still to announce its 
costing criteria, as large an (irrigation) Scheme as possible was to be 
squeezed out of the State's electricity revenues. 
By September 1954, a complex, cost-shifting deadlock had set in. The 
Authority was calling for greater effort by the States in examining the 
economics of the intensified Upper Tumut works. For Hudson, they were 
now better suited to New South Wales' short term power needs and 
financially less expensive. As well, Hudson stressed the extra value of peak 
power--potentially an adjunct to coal.37 The States, however, would not 
seriously review the economics until the Commonwealth Treasury revealed 
their rates for calculating costs for the Upper Tumut works, costs which 
were now to be shared with the Murray project. Treasury, however, was 
calling on the Department of National Development and the Snowy 
Authority to finalise designs for the Upper Tumut works before it 
determined the capital charges.38 But, as Raggatt suggested to Spooner, 
given Cabinet's position, this was leading to "suspicion as to the 
Commonwealth's intentions. "39 Fundamentally, the States preferred the 
'independent' Ebasco review, even as Ebasco preferred an 'opportunity cost' 
approach. As Raggatt conceded to Hibberd, the decision-making process 
remained difficult and had now become "cyclical. "40 
Spooner, Raggatt and Hudson thence combined in a joint Departmental and 
Authority submission to argue against the strictures being imposed by a 
Fadden-led Treasury.41 They claimed that an on-going constitutional 
nightmare was still in the offing unless an Agreement was reached. 
Unmoved, Treasury was allowed to retain its 'right of review'. Nevertheless, 
36
. Cabinet Committee, Minutes of Meeting, 7/7/54, NAA: A571, 1953/826 Part 14, op. 
cit. 
3 7 Hudson to Spooner, "Proposed Commonwealth - States Agreement, Ceiling Price 
Clause." [and attachments], 15/10/54, NAA: CP608, Bundle 2/2, op. cit. 
38
• Hudson, SMHEA Minute, HTreasurer's Financial Directive (Compounding Interest)", 
20/9/54, NAA: A2915, A53 Part I, op. cit. 
39 Raggatt to Spooner, 20/10/54, NAA: CP60811, Bundle 2/2, op. cit. 
40
• Raggatt to Hibberd, 2119/54, NAA: ibid. 
41
• Annexure to Appendix E, p. 4, Spooner/SMHEA, "Submission Relating to 
Commonwealth-State Agreement on the Snowy Mountains Hydro-Electric Scheme", 6th 
December 1954, NAA: CP608 Bundle 2/3, Snowy Mountains Hydro Electric Scheme -
Agreement Papers. 
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Hudson had other avenues along which to push. With the (delayed) 
approval of contracts for Upper Tumut works, the design revamps and 
continuing doubts if not outright opposition to the plans, the Authority, 
since August (not long after the election) had been moving to re-constitute 
the industrial arrangements under which work was being carried out.42 
At this crucial juncture, industrial relations across the country were in 
turmoil. Since the unanticipated, 'Petrov election' failure for the ALP of 
May and the continuing anti-communist scare mongering, Evatt had 
changed tack and moved against the 'minority groups' within the ALP. He 
believed their attitude had been counterproductive and that the Groupers 
had been playing for a time when they would be stronger.43 On the 5th of 
October 1954, Evatt accused Santamaria, the Catholic Social Studies 
Movement and the fervent anti-communist 'Grouper' supporters within the 
Victorian and New South Wales ALP of being disloyal to him and to the 
party. This was a boon for the AWU. As historians of the AWU have 
commented, "with a single statement Evatt had lifted the A WU's reversal of 
support for the groups from the realms of self interest to a struggle to save 
the soul of the Labor Party."44 The role of the AWU would now prove 
crucial for displacing of the Groupers. But given the cost pressures, Hudson 
was now seeking to displace the AWU from its New South Wales' industrial 
jurisdiction for Snowy workers. 
As mid summer arrived and at the height of the first major construction 
campaign, the Authority and the A WU became embroiled in a significant 
industrial dispute. The unions were resisting having to appear before a 
Commonwealth industrial court and were striking to retain their status 
under the New South Wales Industrial Court.45 A complete stoppage of work 
had occurred from the 21st of January with 600 men joining 100 tunnellers 
from the Eucumbene-Tumut tunnel with Taylor seeking to arbitrate. An 
ambit claim of double their hourly rate was sought.46 At the same time, 
Justice Taylor was himself appearing before a tribunal. He had been 
42
. Spooner to the Attorney General, J. A. Spicer, 30/8/54, NAA: Ml505, 1199, Snowy 
Mountains Agreement - Water Clauses. 
43 Short, op. cit., p. 210. 
44
. Hearn and Knowles, op. cit., p. 218-19. 
45 Kerr, J and Watson, V., "Opinion", 3111155, p. 3, NAA: A432 195311023, 
Australian Workers' Union - Application for Snowy Mountains Hydro-electric 
Authority Award 
46 
"600 Workmen Strike at Tunnel", SMH, 212155, p. II. 
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brought before the Royal Commission on Espionage to answer allegations 
that he had been mentioned favourably in correspondence between 
Moscow and Australia and had inadvertently revealed the name of an under 
cover agent to communists during his dealings with communist unions.4 7 
The contractors themselves, however, were keen to increase incentive 
payments being supported by the A WU, which continued to support piece-
rate conditions.48 Indeed, Clark, the Authority's industrial officer, was 
convinced that "the union and the contractor" would do "everything 
possible" to gain State coverage at an early date.49 Hudson feared the 
increased wages bill, mooting an extra £40 million over the life of the 
project.50 The Authority was increasingly caught between an inability to 
insist on a Commonwealth jurisdiction due to constitutional doubt 
surrounding the Act and a 'schedule of rates' contract provision. Latterly, 
this automatically passed wage increases directly onto contract prices and 
hence back to the Authority, although it would be later altered to 
encourage contractors to resist wage increases.51 
Concurrent with the industrial action, the momentous January 1955 A WU 
Annual Convention then began and provided further scope for attacking 
the Groupers. The migrant presence was, again, a key. Keon, the Labor 
member for Yarra and regarded as a future leader of the ALP if the Groups 
seized control of it, had been hoping to enlist Bielski and his burgeoning 
migrant worker base. Keon therefore provided Bielski with information 
about a campaign to assist in the organisation of migrant workers for the 
Industrial Groups.52 In short, Bielski in his role as a migrant worker 
organiser had learnt of a planned Grouper push against Dougherty. Bielski, 
after having decided against joining his forces with the Groupers, then told 
47 Australia. Royal Commission on Espionage, Official Transcript ... 28th January, 
1955 ... NAA: Ml507, 33, [Papers of K. H. Bailey ... ] S. C. TAYLOR ... transcript of in-
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48 
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50 
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of the "whispering campaigns" being mounted against Dougherty by the 
Groupers.53 
This evidence of Bielski's about the move by the Groupers against the A WU, 
along with "fear of rival organisation"54 , then encouraged the A WU to 
move openly against the Groupers during the convention. The consequent 
breach was "of fundamental importance, and decisively swung the balance 
of power against the Groupers."55 After the decisive Hobart Federal ALP 
Conference of mid March 1955, which saw the split with the Groupers 
emerge in the federal party, the New South Wales branch of the A WU was 
still, however, outnumbered at the New South Wales Labor conference. 
Given the victory of the non-Grouper forces at the federal level, the New 
South Wales outcome remained fluid. 
During this crucial period, the Authority remained as determined as ever to 
get wage costs down and to undercut the power of the A WU. It announced 
on the 3rd of February 1955, in response to the tunnellers' strike that it 
intended to go to the Commonwealth Court. Consequently, the men refused 
to go back to work, although after Taylor ordered that their claims would 
not be heard until a return to work, they returned on the lith. The 15th of 
February then saw the Commonwealth reveal its plan. The Executive 
Council prescribed the industrial area within which the Authority and its 
Act would have power. This, in turn, precipitated a race for industrial 
jurisdiction.56 A summons from the Authority for parties to appear in the 
Commonwealth jurisdiction soon arrived. The contractors, who were 
primarily interested in ensuring that "they are not financially prejudiced 
in the matter", unevenly supported it.57 
Until the Commonwealth Court had delivered its judgement, the New South 
Wales Industrial Court, under Taylor, remained the rival jurisdiction. 
There, John Kerr, acting for the Authority, believed that the union and 
Taylor were acting in a conspiratorial manner as they were meeting 
during an adjournment in Taylor's room; "the matter has all been 
53
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arranged. "58 Oliver had been informed of the Authority's determination to 
persist with the alternative jurisdiction, and informed Taylor that "they're 
gonna stop the case."59 The day after quickly concluding the hearing of 
evidence, on Thursday March the 3rd, two working days before the 
Authority had announced that it would be persisting with a submission to 
the Commonwealth Court, Taylor, then rushed to deliver his judgement. 
Taylor began by admonishing the Authority. Going for another jurisdiction 
was "a move completely lacking in tact. "60 Taylor also emphasised the speed 
at which the American joint-venture contractors operated and which 
"conditions the entire enterprise. "61 He granted a substantial increase in 
pay for tunnelling crews and suggested that distant places allowance for 
workers under State awards should be extended to other awards. Crucially, 
he similarly directed all parties to seriously consider the introduction of an 
incentive payment system for the project, to be decided within two (short) 
weeks. 
Even given the intensified practices, Hudson remained convinced, 
however, of the need to press for another jurisdiction. As the crucial 
matter of incentive payments for workers was still before the New South 
Wales Industrial Commission, the Authority still believed that is entitled to 
take the matter up with Justice Wright of the Commonwealth Conciliation 
and Arbitration Court. John Kerr, appearing for the Snowy Authority, and 
Lionel Murphy, appearing for the unions, began arguing the case. 
Before White could reach a decision the A WU, now with support from the 
New South Wales TLC, then played its main card. It took out an application 
in the High Court challenging the validity of part of the Snowy Act.62 On 
the 6th of April 1955, the New South Wales branch unions employed by the 
Authority combined to lodge an application to the High Court seeking to 
restrain the Authority from proceeding with its action in the 
58
• Renfree to Bailey, 28/2/55, NAA: ibid. 
59
. Charlie Oliver interview, by Raxworthy, R, "Australians at Work - Union Leaders" 
Vol. 1, Tape TRC 2387, side 3, NLA. 
60
• Justice Taylor, Industrial Commission of NSW, "Judgement", 3/3/55, p. 2, NAA: 
A432, 1953/1023, op. cit. 
61
. Ibid, p. 8. 
62
• Barwick, Kerr and Watson, "Joint Opinion", 9/8/56, NAA: A432, 1955/372, Snowy 
Mountains Hydro-electric Power Act - Writ of Prohibition and "Message from Mr. 
Bell", 1113/55, NAA: A432, 1953/1023, op. cit. 
240 
Commonwealth Arbitration Court for a federal award.63 Concurrently, the 
situation within the New South Wales ALP remained uncertain. As the anti-
Grouper, pro-Evatt forces were asserting themselves, it was rumoured that 
Renshaw may be moving to replace Cahill.64 
Within the bureaucracy, perhaps given that the AWU's influence within 
(New South Wales') Labor Party circles was holding fast, Spooner 
speculated that any final agreement by the States was "likely to be 
conditional on a clarification of the position regarding the rate of interest 
and the accounting methods."65 Then, with the AWU-New South Wales High 
Court action pending and Bolte now about to replace Cain in Victoria 
(consequent to 'the split'), even Fadden seems to have begun to Jean 
Spooner's way.66 Incentive rates, under Taylor's jurisdiction, then became 
fait accompli although, as mentioned, contractors would also be encouraged 
to resist such increases via an altered Act. 
The tunnel between the Upper Tumut and Eucumbene (or Adaminaby) dam 
was now progressing considerably faster than expected67 due to the Kaiser 
Group's incentive methods. This would produce earlier revenue for the 
Authority,68 something that it was ever under pressure to achieve. By 
Winter 1954, to assist in bringing forward the date by which the Upper 
Tumut works would be in production, the Authority had also decided to 
divert the Tooma waters to Adaminaby at an earlier date. It was soon 
writing to the Public Works Department, asking it to increase the rate of 
placement of fill for the Dam.69 By extension, for Hudson, it had become 
"obvious that it will be impossible to complete Adaminaby Dam on time if we 
continue to use day labour methods. "70 He was now hoping to achieve 
completion of the dam a year earlier than originally planned. Hudson also 
63
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remained keen to persist with his long term goal, characterising the 
deferral of Yarrangobilly as temporaryn 
Closer to the industrial realities for workers, however, Bielski was now 
becoming sceptical of the internal workings of the industrial system and of 
the A WU itself. He was coming to understand how the mutually sustaining 
economic ties worked between the ALP, the A WU and the Labour Law firms. 
Changes to compensation acts were increasing compensation payments, 
rather than protecting workers from unsafe conditions in the first place.72 
In parallel, by January 1956, the USBR was strongly advising that contracts 
should be amended to ensure that "unsafe condition or practices" should be 
"immediately corrected."73 Throughout the latter years of the decade, 
however, the Cooma-Monaro Express would contain reports of major 
accidents on the Scheme with shocking regularity. 
Indeed, federalism had been slow to react, especially for the migrants who 
were now dominating much of the unskilled work force. Since 1947, 
International Labour Organisation conventions had refined the obligations 
of a state within federalist systems, with the Commonwealth Department of 
Labour and National service greatly aiding the ILO initiative.74 It would 
take until September 1958, however, for a full, national convention to be 
held in Canberra, buoyed by the Second World Congress on the Prevention 
of Occupational Accidents held in Brussels in May 1958.75 In the meantime, 
or over the previous five years, I, 130 workers would be killed in industrial 
accidents in New South Wales and there were "something like 500,000 
industrial casualties in the same period in New South Wales."76 
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Hudson would eventually report to the belated Canberra conference that 
the rapidly changing circumstances of the civil engineering construction 
site and the intensified regimes of work, especially given the arrival of the 
US contractors, were increasing the risks. 77 By then, however, the piece-
rate regimes, to encourage high rates of tunnelling in particular, would be 
stepping up to an even higher rate. 1959 would be another year of setting 
'tunnelling records'. Given the rapidly changing technologies being 
deployed, this was more a measure of the rate of exploitation than 
productivity. In short, as the Cold War politics of the 1950s were being 
played out, it would take over ten years for the problems of a rapidly 
changing workplace to be identified. 
Nevertheless, by then, the Authority began to prepare safety handbooks 
for the workers. But, in conformity with the assimilationist tenor of the 
times, these were initially made available only in English, to encourage the 
workers to learn the language, even at the pain of serious injury it seems, 
although the initial safety talk was also delivered in German and Italian as 
wel1.78 Subsequently, by 1960, the Authority took up an initiative to 
translate booklets into workers first languages. This initiative was actually 
set in train by the workers themselves, by an Italian worker in the 
mechanical workshops, Mr. V. Capelletto, who had already begun the job in 
his own time.7 9 
At mid decade, however, although sensing the industrial carnage that was 
unfolding, Bielski was faced with the implications of the improper use to 
which his membership drives were being put. Bielski had come to believe 
that duping of Snowy workers via the rorting of A WU membership tickets 
had been occurring. Tickets had either not been supplied, or, the voting 
coupons of those belonging to migrant members in particular had been 
removed, presumably to illegally garner votes. A slush fund could be 
formed from the un-receipted moneys. This would protect the A WU from 
further 'internal interference', especially as it was during 1955, in a major 
77
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industrial battle against the Groupers within the State union movement 
(figure 8). 
As suspected by Bielski, and as would be made clear later in the decade by 
Clyde Cameron, "ten of thousands of [AWU] members never see a ballot 
paper", returning officers were being appointed by siting officials and 
from 1955 no opening dates for federal positions were being announced.80 
Symptomatically, Oliver complained that the Groupers, via compulsory 
union membership legislation, had been seeking to increase their numbers 
at the State Labor Conference (since 1953).81 As Oliver would later 
comment, it would prove "a struggle" to increase numbers on the State 
Executive but "if you pay the piper you are entitled to call the tune ... but the 
'Movement' is still calling the tune."82 
For Main, the head of the New South Wales Public Works Department, the 
new method--if not rivalries--were eroding local engineering capacities. 
The replacement of the first major Australian contractor by a US 
contractor was troubling. Allied Constructions was the first major 
Australian company to gain a contract, constructing the diversion tunnel 
under the Eucumbene dam wall, necessary to allow the river to flow by as 
the dam was being built. With the design changes to the enlarged dam, 
however, severe technical and financial difficulties for the company had 
arisen.83 The contract was then removed from the control of the company. 
Then, with the Public Works Department now pushing for extra machinery 
to increase its day labour embankment fill rates, the USBR was advising 
that it be done by a contractor capable of higher rates of work.84 
Main soon emphasised the importance of local control of construction 
work. Similarly, although he conceded to Hudson that contract methods 
intensified the rates of work, this did not mean that day labour methods 
would delay construction deadlines.85 But as Hudson was now seeking to 
bring the completion date forward, the political risk of delaying the much 
80 
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Figure 8; Table, "Points for Ballot Riggers", The Voice of the Rank and File, 
September 1962, p. 1. 
Official Organ: 
Council for Membership Control of A.W.U., 
C/o Box 654, Broken Hill. 
Reg1stered in Ausrrorio for Transmission by Post os a Periodical 
SEPTEMBER, 1962 Price 6d. 
POINTS FOR BALLOT RIGGERS 
Point One: When you rig a ballot, give yourself a king-size majority. Your 
opponent will then find it almost impossible to get a Court Inquiry. 
Point Two: ~ever have a voters' roll! No-one can then check on the 
"Crookies." 
Point Three: Don't publish an analysis of voting returns! It makes it too 
easy for Job Reps. to detect alterations to ballot papers. 
Polnt Four: Have a ballot box in your office - it is so handy!, Especially 
when the voting coupons you have pinched, begin to spoil the shape of your 
-pockets. 
Point Five: "Appoint" your own Returning Officer! The rank and file can 
never be trusted to elect the "right" man. . 
Point Six: Distribute your own ballot papers - and never leave ballot papers 
on jobs that are certain to vote against you!. -
Point Seven: When pinching voting coupons, don't tear them off - use a 
guillotine! A membership ticket without voting coupons looks better that way. 
Point Eight: Never mark all your ballot papers the same way! Put in tbe 
"key men" and split the rest among the "also rans." A sJide r ule is handy for 
this exercise: 1 
Point Nine: If you can't steal enough voting coupons from tickets issued, 
take them from the tickets that will be "lost" or cancelled! Better still, print 
your own voting coupons! It's dead easy if you've got a printing press and the 
right papel". No-one can ever find out! 
Point Ten: If your opponents still beat you, ,et your Executive to declare , 
t11e ballot nuU and void! It can then "appoint" you to your position for another 
three years. 
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awaited production or electricity from the Scheme--for New South Wales--
was also weighing on the New South Wales Public Works Department. 
Even though the financial risks outlined by Hudson appeared "unduly 
large", Main then became concerned that Hudson may now be able to place 
"the responsibility on this Department for any delay" and hence "should 
the Department continue to carry out the work by day labour, the full 
blame for any delay will rest with this Department whether it is justified or 
not. "86 In view of the short term demands for supplying power to his State, 
he advised his Minister, Renshaw, that the embankment contract, instead 
of being done by day labour, should now go out for tender. Although 
conceding to the new regime of work being prosecuted by contractors, the 
Menzies government and the A WU, Main then reminded Hudson, or hoped 
that he would now recognise, that payment of bonuses "tend to minimise 
labour disturbances ... "87 Hudson was pleased--ecstatic--about such 
prospects for his own organisation, awaiting "further developments with 
great interest. "8 8 
In support of the hitherto rival AWU, the President of the ACTU, Monk, and 
the Secretary of the New South Wales Trades and Labour Council, King, had 
concurrently forwarded to Hudson a copy of a resolution. It had been 
passed by a meeting of unions held in mid June 1955 in order to restrain 
the Authority from applying to the Commonwealth Arbitration Court for 
industrial coverage. Under threat of proceeding with a High Court 
challenge to the validity of the Act, the resolution called upon the 
Authority to withdraw its claim for a federal award by the 27th of July.89 
After the momentous 'split' of the ALP during February to April, the loss of 
a confidence vote in the Cain Labor government in Victoria, and the 
delicate April compromise in New South Wales backed by Federal ALP 
support, a compromise had been reached. An A WU-ACTU alliance in 
defence of a non-sectarian ALP was moving to defend the Snowy power 
base of the New South Wales A WU.90 
86 Department of Public Works, NSW, Minute by Main, 1917/55, SRNSW: ibid. 
87 Main to Hudson, 20/7/55, SRNSW: ibid. 
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In a last ditch attempt to gain federal industrial jurisdiction, however, 
Spooner wanted to put out a 'Cold War' press release against "sabotage"91 
occurring at work sites. After departmental advice, explicit references to 
the A WU were replaced, although the Cold War rhetoric of maintaining 
power supplies for the purpose of defence remained: "if Australia is again 
called on to defend itself'' and to "shoulder responsibilities to its allies" were 
key phrases in his call to patriotism.92 Yet, two days after the deadline of 
the ACTU and New South Wales TLC to stop its High Court action had passed, 
Menzies decided against pressing the matter. The best way to proceed was 
not to mention defence in the Agreement in line with the doubts often 
expressed by Barwick, for one, on the matter. 93 The dubious use of defence 
powers against a now more unified union movement seeking to protect the 
AWU and ALP, was materialising for Menzies. 
Nevertheless, the notorious Bankstown Observer or Browne-Fitzpatrick 
affair, which would see a journalist and publisher jailed by parliament, 
would result in further allegations against Justice Taylor. The local MHR 
for Reid, Morgan, was alleging corruption in Bankstown Council. As well as 
allegations of corrupt practices by a "Mr Big", a "Mr Wig" had allegedly 
provided classified documents to those accused, allowing them a way of 
counter-attacking Morgan. Stan Keon, who had now left the ALP to become 
Deputy Leader of the Anti-Communist Labour Party, then alleged that as 
part of a war time appointment, Justice Taylor was the source of the 
documents.94 Next to the original front page article in the Bankstown 
0 b server which attempted to silence Morgan by accusing him of being part 
of an immigration racket, was also an article seeking answers from 
Renshaw. It short, Browne and Fitzpatrick were seeking to implicate not 
only Taylor, but "NSW Ministers in alleged corruption" especially, it seems, 
Renshaw .95 
The whole affair contributed to further confusion within the federal ALP 
as it was uncertain whether to defend Browne and Fitzpatrick due to the 
91
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failure by Menzies to allow them legal representation when they appeared 
before parliament on charges of seeking to intimidate an MP. 
Alternatively, the ALP could decide that the attacks were an attempt to 
smear and intimidate a Labor MP. When the vote was taken, it was a "day of 
confusion and clashes of opinion within the Labor Party."96 In the lead-up 
to a crucial conference, inter-faction intrigues had been further inflamed. 
A special conference of the New South Wales ALP, held to determine the 
States approach to federal intervention against Groupers, then saw a record 
number of affiliates from all factions attending.97 
Meanwhile, Hudson continued to argue for interest rate concessions given 
the irrigation and defence benefits of the Scheme.98 More positively, the 
organisation appointed to review the Scheme was offering some 
preliminary views. Although Ebasco was predicting a significant fall in 
thermal production costs, it was suggesting that beyond a 6.3% growth rate, 
a 10 or even 12% per annum growth which would "increase the basic value 
of Snowy power by as much as 15%."99 Similarly, Ebasco favoured the new 
generation and transmission possibilities. It preferred a grid with large or 
base load thermal plant on coal fields remote from the cities, combined with 
hydro peak power, plus energy interchange possibilities. 
Ebasco conceded, however, that the development of the larger boilers for 
lignite had yet to be proved. The high moisture content of lignite required 
more engineering. Nevertheless, with innovations from Yallourn 'B', such 
as pre-drying hoppers plus 'partial separation firing' which separates out 
the more combustible components to maintain flame stability, in 
combination with improvements in coal milling or crushing, larger units 
were built. 10° Crucially for SECV doubts, such units were not possible 
without significant innovation being required for the larger (Hazelwood 
power station) boilers a decade or more away. 
In short, Victoria remained far from satisfied. Bolte, as the new Premier of 
Victoria, launched his own High Court challenge, in this case to the 
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uniform tax arrangements. At the time Bolte assumed power, he complained 
that the amount of tax returned to Victoria was "hopelessly inadequate". By 
September the system was "iniquitous" and by Christmas eve the policy 
"compelled" Victoria "to conform to policy dictated by the 
Commonwealth." 101 This called for the filing of a writ against the 
Commonwealth in the High Court. 
The Authority again complained that a lost industrial jurisdiction would 
affect "the future cost of the Scheme seriously" and continued to press the 
defence rationale on the government. 1 02 Spooner was becoming more 
insistent that concessions from Treasury were warranted to avoid 
"protracted argument. "103 Concurrently with Victoria's new writ, however, 
and sensing the possibilities for delaying an outcome, the New South Wales 
Works Minister, Renshaw, argued that "it will not be possible" to complete a 
draft agreement until the Courts ruling on Victoria's application had been 
examined. 104 Amidst the struggle over jurisdiction and costs, the USBR 
came forward with its own advice. It now made "strong recommendations" 
to the Authority for a moderated embankment construction program lest 
there arise an "inferior job of construction."105 
Then, in a crucial shift, by mid January 1956, Menzies was less than 
prepared to challenge the A WU action in the High Court "because of the 
doubts which he felt as to our ultimate success." Menzies and Bailey were 
now considering compromising with New South Wales. They now felt that 
"the industrial provisions were not of supreme importance." 106 As Spooner 
reported to Menzies, New South Wales would "precipitate trouble" if the 
Government sought agreement before the High Court case. 1 07 Charges of 
"sabotage" were again being heard on the Adaminaby Dam site. 1 08 
Determined, however, to continue the battle to end the power of the A WU 
Hudson and Raggatt thereupon took "some trouble" to find out what was 
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behind Renshaw's delaying tactics. Continuing to be inspired probably by 
the legion of allegations surrounding the Browne-Fitzpatrick affair, not 
least against Taylor and Renshaw, they were eventually unable to point to a 
"deep plot" or conspiracy. 109 Consequently, the pressure--via Renshaw--
that the A WU was bringing 
power base (and the ALP), 
to bear to protect its own membership and 
plus the absence of 
against Taylor or Renshaw, was now convincing 
bureaucrats, that it was time to move on. 
any substantive evidence 
the Coalition, if not the 
At the end of January 1956, in a further important compromise move, 
Spooner suggested to his colleagues Hudson and Raggatt, that all parties opt 
for a non-compounding period for the next ten years or, as was soon to be 
agreed, up until the Scheme was producing 3,000 million kilowatt hours per 
year. 110 Still sceptical, Hibberd reiterated his concerns. In the "absence of 
any evidence" that thermal power costs would undercut Snowy power 
(although Ebasco's view was that they could fall steeply), and given that 
"huge quantities of water for irrigation [would be] thrown in free", 
Spooner's desire to provide "'concessions' on price" appeared (using one of 
Spooner's own phrases) "an academic one."111 That is, it was a purely 
political move in response to the pressure being brought to bear by New 
South Wales. It had given "something in the nature of an ultimatum" that 
interest be charged at a 3/4 per rate lower than the bond rate and physical 
lives be adopted for depreciation purposes. Hibberd argued that to "cloak 
the concession" by substituting simple for compound rates of interest held 
"grave dangers." It would, in effect, reduce the price of Snowy power by 
approximately 15%. New South Wales would estimate that these conditions 
would save the State about I 0% over the alternative, Treasury scenario, up 
to the change over date. 1 1 2 
With all the changes afoot, Spooner was called to Cabinet to justify what was 
being proposed. In his draft Cabinet Submission for the meeting, he stated 
that he feared "the challenges" to the "constitutional validity" of the Snowy 
109 Raggatt to Bailey, 23/1156, NAA: A432, 1978/7044 Part 5, Snowy Mountains 
Hydro-Electric Scheme - Agreement and legal problems. 
110
. Spooner, "Cost of Production", p. 4, [attachment to] Spooner to Hudson and Raggatt, 
31/1/56, NAA: CP608 Bundle 2/3, op. cit. 
111 [Draft] Treasury Minute, Hibberd, "Snowy Mountains Authority", 2/2/56, NAA: 
A571, 19541123 Part 2, op. cit. 
"
2 NSW Cabinet Minute, "Snowy Mountains Hydro Electric Scheme ... ", 2/8/57, NSW 
Premier's Department, SRNSW: 13/10721, 64/1142/B, Snowy Mountains Hydro Electric 
Authority - General. 
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Act by the A WU. Further, he conceded that in his negotiations with the 
States "in the closing stages of negotiations some 'horse trading' has taken 
place and it is for Cabinet to decide whether the net result is acceptable to 
it. "113 He continued that throughout the negotiations, the States had 
pressed for interest rates to be set at terms lower than the long term bond 
rate--3/4% lower when Cahill made his most recent call. Spooner had, 
however, resisted the precedent of such a concession "even as a quid pro 
quo for State legislation validating the Commonwealth's constitutional 
position." Yet, as he had become convinced that "there is no prospect of the 
States signing an Agreement unless some such concession is made" ,1 14 he 
suggested a compromise. 
Two proposals were put to Cabinet: to charge compound interest only after 
ten years (later amended to when the Scheme began producing 3,000 
million kilowatt hours per year) and to depreciate costs over a 70 year 
period instead of 50 year period. Spooner favoured following USBR 
financial practice for dual purpose schemes--where the federal 
government contributes. He suggested that, for the Snowy Scheme, "the 
water costs £70m" 115 which was roughly equivalent to the 15% or so which 
would be cut from what the States would have to pay. It was also a 
proportion of what Victoria was claiming it had been denied under uniform 
tax legislation. Spooner conceded that it was: 
not easy to defeat the Treasury argument on this point on logical 
grounds. But I have no hesitation in recommending that we should make 
the concession rather than that we should face the future without an 
agreement with the States. 1 16 
Fadden, as Treasurer, put his views. He took up Hibberd's central concern 
about the implications of concessionary finance for federalist 
infrastructure more generally. Specifically, Spooner's proposals "tend to 
cloak the real intention ... [they provide] a benefit of about £4m. per annum, 
of indefinite duration, to the two States when the Snowy Scheme is 
113 Spooner, Draft Cabinet Submission, 10/2/56, p. 2-3, in NAA: CP608, Bundle 2/3, 
op. cit. 
114 Ibid, p. 4. 
115 Spooner's typed notes for Cabinet Submission (no. 45), p. 4, 2112/56, NAA: ibid. 
116 Spooner, handwritten notes appended to p. 10, Draft Cabinet Submission, 10/2/56, 
NAA: ibid. 
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completed. "117 In a comprehensive win for Spooner and the Authority, 
however, as well as for the A WU, if not for the hard pressed workers, 
Cabinet decided on the 21st of February, 1956 to set the financial terms 
largely as requested by them. 1 18 But disagreement and rancour continued 
between the parties especially directed at Hibberd. For Raggatt, the State 
electricity commissions had a right to "load their annual costs with 
relatively heavy depreciation in order to accumulate funds for investment 
purposes" and to keep their criteria to themselves. 119 
Soon the stand-off in the High Court abated, at least on the industrial front. 
In mid 1956, Barwick, Kerr and Watson advised the Commonwealth to 
withdraw from confrontation, as did the Authority. 120 The piece-rate work 
regimes and lack of strikes was also working for the contractors and, with 
projects coming in under time, also for the Authority. As a sympathetic 
industrial relations academic characterised the situation, "as far as the 
Authority was concerned, Judge Taylor's methods had paid off'121 , even as 
the hard working Hudson commented that this was the time when "the 
Authority surrendered"122 to the AWU. 
Increasingly, the Scheme was also projected as heroic, as a project beyond 
politics. It was difficult to relate Cold War industrial struggles to the cosy 
deals between the A WU and contractors. It was a concrete bubble, 
expanding ever outwards, precarious but defiant against entropy, against 
disordered rock and rivers (figure 9). Within this photographer's cave, it 
was cool form, a cognate structure sensed by the engineer. But it was also 
drilled through rock-dust, noise and Cold War institutional rivalries. And as 
part of these Cold War rivalries, a new institution had arisen. After the 
'boiler makers case' which threw into doubt the right of the Commonwealth 
117
• Fadden, Cabinet Submission, "Commonwealth-State Agreement on the Snowy 
Mountains Hydro-Electric Scheme", 18/2/56, p. 5, NAA: A571, 1954/123 Part 3, op. 
c j t. 
118 Cabinet Submission and Decision, 14&21/2/56, [see blue folder] and [Department 
of National Development?], "Snowy Mountains Scheme - Proposed Agreement", 3/2/56, 
NAA: CP608/1, Bundle 2/3, op. cit. 
119
. Draft letter, Raggatt to Hibberd, circa 9th March 1956, NAA: MP766, 1959/347 
Part 4, Snowy Mountains Advisory Council. 
120 Barwick, Kerr and Watson, "Joint Opinion", 9/8/56, NAA: A432, 1955/372, op. 
cit. 
121
. Kleinsorge, Paul L., "Industrial Relations on the Snowy Mountains Project: The 
Development of a System of Conciliation", Journal of Industrial Relations, Vol. 12, 
1970, p. 293. 
122 Quoted in ibid, p. 292. 
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Figure 9; SMHEA official photograph; "Looking downstream towards the 
surge chamber in Guthega Tunnel" (1955) . Reproduced from SMHEA, A 
Pictorial Record of the Snowy Mountains Scheme, Cooma, The Authority, 
1999 [?], fig. 76. 
76 GUTHEGA 
1955 
Looking downstream Cowords 
chc surge chomber m 
Guchego Tunnel 
253 
Arbitration Court to both arbitrate and apply penalties, a separate court 
was created. Even as the appointment was called "blatant and offensive" 
and a "political outrage", the former Attorney General, Senator Spicer, was 
appointed to lead the new Commonwealth Industrial Court. 123 
Although the predominantly migrant work force took a while to 
collectively respond, beyond often leaving the Scheme in fear of their 
lives, this change would allow Bielski to challenge the industrial 
conditions. The proper election of delegates to the Trades and Labour 
Council was also important for, as fully bona fide delegates, they could vote 
for affiliation of the A WU with the ACTU and thus participate in the 
reformulation of the Labour Movement's migrant policies. It could also 
reform the A WU itself. This also meant that, in return, Bielski would have to 
move against members of the AWU hierarchy. 124 
In preparation, Bielski began to develop his views, through his Australian 
Worker column, that Labor must do more to win migrants. With over half a 
million people becoming eligible for naturalisation and voting rights, the 
result was "new and varied shapes and forms in the community" and 
"revaluations, revisions in relationships ... a two way process rather . than 
the one sided acceptance of certain forms, habits, standards ... "125 This two 
way process also meant that the ALP "has to expect that the New 
Australians' point of view will attempt to penetrate Labor ... the outcome of it 
could be co-operation and integration. "126 Long term residents and recent 
arrivals, both respecting differences, could be changed by the process 
(figure 10). Bielski also advanced an implied threat: 
... the traditional two party parliamentary system of balanced 
power ... may be the subject of drastic reshuffling if migrants refuse to 
identify their political aims with existing party platforms. More political 
parties may emerge on the Australian horizon ... or the old parties will 
have to accept some new ideas and new attitudes. 127 
123
• d'Alpuget, B., Mediator: A Biography of Sir Richard Kirby, Melbourne, Melbourne 
University Press, 1977, p. 149. 
124 Interview with Bielski, 8/3/96. 
125
. Bie]ski, J., "Labor Movement Must Win Migrants", The Australian Worker, 
2118157, p. ll. 
126 Ibid. 
127 Ibid. 
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Figure I 0; Photograph, International Club Float, Cooma Festivals of the 
Snows, 1958. Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs 
Photograph, No. 58/17/13. 
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Despite him holding these views, H. V. Evatt convinced Bielski to persist 
within the AWU and ALP. Even though it was an anathema for most union 
officials, by October 1957, with the behind-the-scenes support of Evatt and 
other senior figures, Bielski then drew on his organisational skills to 
convene a large meeting at Sydney Trades Hall. It saw 120 trade union 
officials attend, representing about 70 trade unions. Eight resolutions were 
passed which focussed principally on the need for a campaign to explain to 
migrants Labor's political policies, in their first languages, to counteract 
conservative campaigns. 128 Throughout 1957, Bielski had gained 
considerable support from workers at a range of construction sites, 
including Eucumbene, for reformed union elections and better migrant 
educational activities. 129 
At the A WU Annual Conference in late January 1958, Bielski stepped up the 
campaign to support migrant workers focussing especially upon extending 
language services. 130 Walsh seconded the motion, suggesting that workers 
did not know what safety measures to adopt or laws to observe especially, 
for example, during the difficult jobs involved in tunnelling.131 A watered 
down motion was, however, carried calling for the matter to be merely 
referred to the Branch executives. 
Not unexpectedly, a confrontation then arose between Bielski and Oliver. 
The resolutions at the A WU annual conference had confirmed the 
suspicions of the A WU Executive that Bielski was seeking to change the 
union and that he was a danger to them. In early February, Bielski was 
called into Oliver's office and then allegedly assaulted. 132 This was soon 
followed by an attempt to dismiss Bielski because of apparent neglect of his 
duty--whilst recuperating! 133 After he had recovered, Bielski brought 
charges against Oliver but these were dismissed. Bielski then began to 
organise a petition amongst migrant workers against the Executive. The 
petition signed by 556 members of the AWU sought that the forthcoming 
128
. Bielski, J., "Labor Campaign for New Australians", The Australian Worker, 
30/10/57, p. II. 
129 Interview with Bielski, 8/3/96. 
130 
"72nd Annual Conference of the A WU", The Australian Worker, 5/3/58, p. 6. 
131
• "Debate on Language Problems Referred to Branch Executives", The Australian 
Worker, 5/3/58, p. 6. 
132 This account is from an interview with Bielski, 8/3/96. 
13 3 Dodkin, op. cit., p. 109. 
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union elections, as Bielski put it, be "supervised, controlled and conducted" 
according to the Conciliation and Arbitration Act rules. 
A submission was then made to the Commonwealth Industrial Court by 
Bielski, alleging that the AWU was "disobeying its own rules in not. calling 
for nominations for delegates to the ALP conferences and Labour Council 
meetings. "134 Oliver responded by bringing charges against Bielski of 
unlawfully possessing "blank foolscap paper and stationary". Bruce Miles, 
acting for Bielski, protested that the proceedings were issued for the 
"purpose of destroying the man's character" .135 
Before Justice Dunphy of the Commonwealth Industrial Court, Bielski then 
maintained that migrant workers "had not received membership tickets 
after paying union subscriptions and had been denied the right to vote. "136 
Bielski believed that Oliver's election as Secretary to the New South Wales 
A WU had been, in effect, falsified during the previous years. Union tickets 
had never been issued and the voting coupons on these tickets had been 
used by Oliver to vote himself in. 137 Clyde Cameron was also stepping up his 
attacks on the "tyrant at the top"--Dougherty--claiming in federal 
parliament that a few unions "literally control their unions with a rule of 
terror" by abusing their independent right to make and interpret the rules 
of the union. 13 8 Such a case would also challenge the arrangements 
between contractors and unions as they traded piece-rate conditions for 
union access to workers. 
Bielski submitted 26 statutory declarations from men working on the Snowy 
Scheme that claimed that their membership tickets had not been issued 
even though they had paid their fees. Peter Sartori swore that: 
I have not received this ticket yet although I repeatedly asked the 
Employment Office ... The same happened to about 200 men, who stay with 
me at the East Camp, Cooma. Myself and the others wanted to vote in the 
134 
"Orders For A WU To Show Cause", SMH, 2015/58, p. II. 
135 
"Prosecution 'Inspired,' Court Told", SMH, 3/6/58, p. 9. 
136 
"Orders For AWU To Show Cause", op. cit. 
137 Interview with Bielski, 27/11195. 
138 Guy, Bill, A Life on the Left: A Biography of Clyde Cameron, Wakefield Press, Kent 
Town, 1999, p. 161. 
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1957 AWU N.S.W. Branch election but we could not obtain ballot papers 
and the tickets were not given to us. 13 9 
Men with names such as Albertini, Galassi, Reirsenhofer, Koutsakis and 
Chene were also affected and were also prepared to make declarations. 
Bielski also said that be bad been nominated for "the position of Federal 
vice-president and [New South Wales State] branch secretary" in the 
forthcoming union elections and be wanted all persons "entitled to vote to 
be able to do so." 140 Dunphy agreed that these matters deserved a bearing 
before the forthcoming ALP conference in June.14 1 
Consequently, before the Commonwealth Industrial Court, Mr. Isaacs and 
Mr. Kilduff, instructed by the solicitor, Bruce Miles, appeared for Bielski. 
Lionel Murphy, instructed by the A WU Labour Law firm of Carroll and 
O'Dea, appeared for the union. Then, before Justices Spicer (ex-Attorney 
General under Menzies), Dunphy and Morgan, Murphy soon put the main 
basis of the A WU's defence; "I do not concede the jurisdiction of the Court...l 
will be arguing ultimately that the Court bas not jurisdiction ... "142 He would 
explain this during the proceedings. Kilduff then began to develop the case 
that the A WU was not electing delegates but appointing them and was 
therefore not calling for elections. 143 
As foreshadowed, however, Murphy objected to the claim by Bielski in his 
affidavit that be was a duly qualified member of the AWU. 144 The bench 
supported hearing this claim as it was a matter of "mixed law and fact." 
Interpretation of the A WU rules could again be relevant. Almost 
immediately therefore, the question of Bielski's own membership bona 
fides became an issue. 
Kilduff sought to turn the attention of the Court to the manner in which 
the A WU bad been appointing delegates to the Trades and Labour Council 
139 Statutory Declaration by P. Sartori (signed 20/3/58), in Bielski v. Oliver; 
Commonwealth Industrial Court, B No. 12 of 1958, NAA: B208 Bl2 OF 1958, Between 
Jerzy Steve BIELSKI and Cecil Thompson OLIVER and others ... 
140 
"Orders For AWU To Show Cause", SMH, 20/5/58, p. II. 
141
• Spicer, J. A., Court Order (Commonwealth Industrial Court), B No. II of 1958, 
NAA: B204 B II OF 1958, Between Jerzy Steve BIELSKI... 
142 Court Proceedings, 3/6/58, Bielski v. Oliver; Commonwealth Industrial Court, B 
No. II of 1958, NAA: B208, Bll OF 1958, ibid. 
143 Ibid, p. 23. 
144 Ibid, p. 42. 
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and Labor Party conventions. Kilduff asked Oliver about how the amount of 
money mentioned on the front of a document related to the apparently 
extra delegates listed on the back. For Kilduff, this went to the "very heart" 
of the matter, that the respondents "cannot form their own rules" when 
appointing delegates. Kilduff was trying to suggest, as Murphy put it, that 
"there are too few or too many delegates." For Murphy, however, this was a 
matter "collateral" to the hearing, a view sustained by Justices Spicer and 
Morgan. 145 
Kilduff then tried another tack. He wondered why the amount paid for each 
delegate to the ALP convention appeared excessive or whether Oliver and 
Dougherty "are using this particular form of representation for their own 
ends." 146 Kilduff was seeking to ask why the AWU appeared to be buying 
off its own delegates. Justice Spicer immediately challenged the question. 
Similar to the earlier ruling, this matter was deemed outside the reasons 
given in the Court Order that sought to re-schedule the elections. 
Murphy then countered. He asked Oliver whether Bielski was an organiser 
or a member of the union. Oliver replied that Bielski had not been 
employed as either an officer or as an organiser for the union; "no, he was 
not employed as an organiser" but "he was employed on anything on which 
we could use him." 147 This Oliver reiterated; "Yes. I say yes ... Not a bona fide 
member." 148 Dougherty would later confirm this view. Oliver also rejected 
the contention that Bielski's 'membership' implied that he had relevant 
skills. 
Murphy then called for the dismissal of the proceedings on the grounds 
that Bielski was not a member of the union: 
... a stranger to the organisation is not entitled to come along here and 
say that things are being done irregularly .. .! submit that the evidence 
here discloses that the claimant is not a member of the organisation. 149 
145 Court Proceedings, 4/6/58, NAA: ibid, p. 93. 
146 Ibid, p. 96. 
147 Ibid, p. 99. 
148 Ibid, p. 105. 
149 Ibid, p. 118. 
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Justice Morgan, however, was prepared to hear evidence of Bielski's 
membership bona fides, based on him having been treated as a member. 
Kilduff then submitted that Bielski had been employed in relevant trades 
prior to his appointment (in the Commonwealth Immigration Centre then 
Printery). The justices agreed that much evidence existed that Bielski had 
been treated as if a member, such as his appointment to A WU's 72nd 
convention. For Kilduff indeed, the union was being very opportunistic, if 
not manipulative: 
... this is a question of approbation and then reprobation. There is an 
attempt...from one side to say 'Oh yes, this situation exists,' and then 
when it comes up before a judicial inquiry to reject that...[but] the 
evidence which is before your Honours [on Bielski's bona fides). .. is 
almost irresistible. 1so 
By the next day, Isaacs, now appearing for Bielski in place of Kilduff, 
arrived fortified to argue the single matter of Bielski's bona fides for 
membership. He began by protesting that a technicality should not be the 
reason for the case being dismissed. Isaacs then presented A WU reports, 
union newspaper extracts and 27 letters all describing Bielski as 
"organiser". Isaacs also argued that Bielski was qualified to join the union 
as the phrase 'usually employed' should be relaxed; "it covers the case of a 
person wanting to come into the industry, a new arrival from 
overseas ... "151 Bielski's organisational work for refugees in Europe was not 
directly referred too. Nevertheless: 
the Court could very easily understand that the exigencies of the. 
situation might require appointment of some person with a particular 
capacity, some person with a particular flair for language and so forth--
some person with a particular ability who is not a member but 
nevertheless whom the Executive think is a good person to act 
temporarily as an organiser. 152 
Justices Spicer, Morgan and Dunphy reserved their decision until the 
following Monday when they delivered a split decision. Justice Spicer and 
Morgan found that Bielski was not a member of the union and thus found 
150 Ibid, p. 144. 
151 Court Proceedings, 5/6/58, NAA: ibid, p. 183. 
152 Ibid, p. 193. 
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against Bielski's claim calling for fresh elections. Justice Dunphy found 
that Bielski was a member of the union but limited this reinstatement to 
apply only to the election of delegates to the Trades and Labour Council 
only. As he was in a minority, this decision did not take effect. 153 
In contrast, perhaps in anticipation of future cases and in support of his 
original decision to allow the matter to proceed, Dunphy offered a strong 
dissenting judgement, claiming Bielski's membership and official status 
within the union was "beyond doubt." Oliver's evidence that "I never did" 
regard him as an organiser Dunphy found "so incredible as to be suspect of 
bias." Further, it was difficult in such circumstances, to understand why 
Bielski, "who by reason of his nationality and gift of tongues" and who had 
been "responsible for enrolling thousands of new members of the union, 
was to be forced out of the union unless it was for some ulterior reason." It 
was up to the union in such circumstances to show why the appointment 
was invalid, not vice-versa, and which was something that the Court itself 
had a duty to ensure occurred. 1 54 
Bielski, nearly forty years after the trial, maintained that Dunphy had told 
him that Spicer feared that the A WU could fall to the communists if Bielski 
won the trial. 15 5 The left of the ALP was seeking at the time to replace 
Oliver as senior Vice President of the State ALP, to be effected at the 
forthcoming State conference. 156 If the court allowed Bielski's call for 
fresh elections, Bielski could have assisted this outcome. Ironically, Spicer 
was forced back into supporting the AWU although not Bielski's union 
membership and the Snowy workers (figure II). 
Clyde Cameron would soon rejoin the fight against "tyrants" within the 
A WU and to reform the union (figure 12). Bielski had had enough however, 
especially after having been shot at by an unknown gunman firing 
through a window Bielski had just stepped away from. 157 Bielski was also 
having to appear before the Central Court on charges of having stolen 
stationary and paper from the A WU with Oliver claiming that Bielski "was a 
bit of a half-baked intellectual." Oliver also estimated that 25% of about 
153 Court Proceedings, 9/6/58, NAA: ibid, p. 217. 
154
. "Bielski v Oliver and ors.", in MaJor, Jean (ed.), The Federal Law Reports, 1956-
1961, Sydney, Law Book Co., 1961, pp. 269-70. 
155 Interview with Bielski, 27/11/95. 
156 
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157 
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8,000 AWU members in NSW were New Australians. 158 On the 5th of 
December the charges would be dismissed. 159 
Concurrently, Bielski protested to the ALP Committee of New Australians 
that unions offered "no real protection" to migrants and that the ALP was 
treating migrants as "second class" citizens. Senator Ormonde and the State 
Assistant Secretary of the ALP, Tony Mulvihill, desperately counselled 
against any precipitate action, fearing electoral repercussions. 160 
However, rather than staying within the conventional union movement to 
fight, the outraged Bielski was moving on. He had decided to form his own 
migrant worker's union announcing in late October, the formation of the 
New Citizens Council (NCC). 
Its objects covered a wide range of matters consistent with a social or 
political organisation and was set up initially as a protest against the 
failures of the A WU, the ALP and the 'Liberal Party backed' Courts. Against 
probable charges of playing a 'race card', it emphasised universal human 
rights, that anyone, from whatever background, could expect 
"protect[ion]. .. against discrimination and victimisation" and sought to 
advance "freedom and civil liberties" .161 With its companion organisations 
of the Industrial Workers Union (IWU), a more formally or extensively 
specified union162 focussing particularly upon industrial matters, and the 
Interpreters Institute, a range of hitherto unrepresented occupations could 
be unionised and the dangers of language barriers better mollified. 
From 1959, a fierce campaign then erupted against the NCC. The New South 
Wales Trades and Labour Council--where the A WU was again influential--
began by mooting an investigation into the NCC.' 63 The NCC soon replied. It 
stood for a broad range of ideals but, basically, "we believe in free trade 
unions ... free of racketeering, free of Dave Becks and Jimmy Hoffas."164 
158 
"Union Officer 'Distrusts Intellectuals'", SMH, 1817/58, p. 9. Also see "Union Man 
Denies New Australian Threat To His Job", SMH, 5111/58, p. 16. 
159 
"Former Union Organiser Discharged", SMH, 5112/58, p. 5. 
160 Reid, Alan, "New Aust. group in ALP row", Daily Telegraph, 1/10/58. 
161
. "Rules of the New Citizen Council" (undated, circa 1959), NAA: A1533, 
1959/1223, New Citizen Council. 
162
. See "Rules of the Industrial Workers' Union of Australia", (undated), NAA: ibid. It 
applied for registration under the same Act as the NCC on the 3/10/58 and was 
granted registration on the 23/3/59. 
163 
"Migrant Union Inquiry", Daily Telegraph, 15/6/59. 
164 
"Unions Reply", Daily Telegraph, 15/6/59. 
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Then the 'White Australia' Sunday Mirror's headline for its leading front 
page article in late June 1959 announced 'FOREIGN THREAT!' and began to 
expand on the matter. It was "a 'foreigners only' industrial organisation" 
and was "a direct threat to Australian's working conditions and way of life 
generally" with potential to be a "force with industrial and political aims 
completely alien to Australia's." 165 
Then in a way that continued the concerted nature of the campaign, Monk, 
the President of the ACTU, took a "very serious view" of "such type of 
nefarious activity"166 due to its implied--for Monk--exclusionary or even 
racist basis. Even though it had been the A WU which had been screening 
migrants and sacking Bielski, the New South Wales Minister for Labor and 
Industry, Maloney, then announced that the Act would "be amended to 
prevent registration of New Australian Organisations as trade unions. "167 
The New Citizens' Council was specifically targeted and followed "a decision 
by the NSW Labour Council to investigate the NCC and charges by union 
leaders that it was 'dangerous' and 'industrially dishonest'." The trade union 
movement itself was moving to ban the union. 
Throughout the last half of 1959 and into 1960 the matter was hotly · 
contested. The Sydney Morning Herald had also become confused. Given the 
controversy, it now advised that migrants "should be thinking of 
themselves as Australians, not as 'New Australians'" 168 (figure 13). Then in 
October it was announced that the State government was seeking to ban the 
"sinister" party/union by legislation. 169 The NCC thereupon threatened to 
organise a Sydney to Canberra protest march of supporters to highlight the 
right to form a trade union and to protest the treatment of migrants as 
mere "work horses. "170 
Further controversy ensued. With guidance from Clive Evatt and Jerzy's 
wife, Joan Bielski, in a desperate and controversial move, the NCC decided to 
16
'- "Foreign Threat!", Sunday Mirror, 2116159, p. 1. 
166
. See Monk in "Harmful to Migrants" [referenced to be from Sunday Mirror, 21/6/59] 
in AWU, Beware of the New Citizens Council, Sydney, AWU, 1959, NBA: E158/12/l 
[AWU collection] 
167 
"NSW To Bar Migrant Trade Unions", Canberra Times, Tuesday 
168 
"New Australians and Unions", SMH, 25/6159 [Editorial] 
169 
"Pseudo Union", Daily Mirror, 2/12/59. 
170 
"Protest March Threats", The Sun-Herald, 6/12159, p. 23. 
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23/6/59. 
Figure 13; Cartoon by Tighe, 'Ah, Mrs 'Arris -- Dis is what I Call Da New 
Australian!", The Bulletin, 21110/59 . 
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protect itself from further legal attack by becoming a political party. One 
commentator, Peter Coleman writing in The Observer, then came to the 
NCC's and Bielski's defence. He suggested that "it is a bit late in the day for 
Labor and Liberal politicians to start complaining when it is their narrow 
assimilationist policies or their indifference that has goaded the New 
Australians into forming this new party." 171 That is, "Australia's Uncle 
Toms", as the article was entitled--with probable reference to Dougherty 
and his political supporters--were refusing to partake in any 'two way' 
dialogue or to recognise quickly enough the particular concerns and 
fundamental rights of fair representation for migrants. 
Eventually, the NCC provided an important service for getting migrant 
workers out of their many and varied difficulties. It dealt with 
unemployment, marriage difficulties, discrimination of all sorts, finding 
ways around housing shortages and around restrictive council by-laws 
which often prevented migrants from building their own homes. The NCC 
also followed up compensation claims inadequately settled by main stream 
solicitors. Coming to perform tasks not undertaken by mainstream 
unionism, problems of adequate recognition of trade qualifications was also 
an important aspect of the work done by the NCC. Bielski was gradually 
recognised as an adviser or source of reliable advice for recommendation. 
He conducted a trade recognition committee and if he thought that a 
worker had proper papers and sufficient experience, the worker would be 
accepted. Bielski would also come make representations to Ministers and 
Government Departments to facilitate the bringing of migrant relatives to 
Australia. 172 Cheap travel or chartered flights were also developed (figures 
14 & 15). Unfortunately however, further pressure would see him end his 
role as a maverick for migrants by the end of the 1960s (figure 16). 
Finally, what can be concluded from these interrelated developments of the 
1950s? The workings of federalism, aimed at achieving changes to the 
Tantangara, Tooma and associated Upper Tumut projects, saw pressures flow 
through the construction program and thence the migrant workers of the 
Scheme primarily. Initially, Hudson and then Spooner had been optimistic 
that the compromises reached with Conde and Elcom, which, although not 
pleasing the SECV, would allow for Agreement to be reached. In the Cold 
171 Coleman, P., "Australia's Uncle Toms", The Observer, 5/3/60, p. 5. 
172 Interview with Bielski, I 0/3/96. 
267 
Figure 14; Cartoon by Unk White, "Road Closed New Australians at Worki'It's 
his turn to boil the billy', Bulletin, 26/9/5 1, p. 16. 
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Figure 15; Advertisement from The New Citizen, October-November-
December 1969, "Special Flight for Christmas and New Year." 
Special Flight 
for Christmas and New Year 
Because the Australian authorities have not yet 
approved the introduction of our own aircraft. for 
which so many members have been waiting, we 
have in the meantime arranged a SPECIAL FLIGHT 
by JET AIRCRAFT at charter concessions for the 
convenience of those members wishing to travel 
to Europe during the Christmas holidays period. 
The flight by jet aircraft will 
DEPART SYDNEY on MONDAY. 
15th DECEMBER. 1969. 
ARRIVE in VIENNA on TUESDAY. 
16th DECEMBER. 1969. 
ARRIVE in LONDON on TUESDAY. 
16th DECEMBER. 1969. 
The return flight also by jet aircraft will 
DEPART LONDON on FRIDAY. 
23rd JANUARY. 1970. 
DEPART VIENNA on FRIDAY. 
23rd JANUARY. 1970. 
ARRIVE in SYDNEY early in the morning on 
SUNDAY. 25th JANUARY. 1970. 
Members wishing to participate in this flight 
are requested to forward immediately to this 
Council their name, address and telephone number 
together with a deposit of $80.00 (children under 
12- $40.00}. All deposits must be forwarded to 
the Council not later than on 18th October, 1969. 
Further particulars will be sent by letter to those 
applying. 
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Figure 16; Cover photo of Bielski, "Bielski and his Migrants: Trouble Shooter 
and Maker", Nation, No. 38, February 27, 1960. 
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War climate of mid decade, however, amidst shifting geo-political forces, 
other corporate interests were in play. As the Authority remained 
determined to achieve the long term goal of an uncompromised peak power 
design, they had to compromise with Conde. With delays then altered and 
intensified construction programs in the offing, pressures mounted on the 
industrial front. Consequently, Hudson remained keen to gain a federal 
industrial jurisdiction. Even as the cost advantages of piece-rate methods 
materialised for Hudson, he remained determined to move his work force to 
the cheaper jurisdiction. 
This aggravated Cold War rivalries. Seeking to force the A WU out of the New 
South Wales jurisdiction threatened to prevent access to the sympathetic 
jurisdiction under Justice Taylor. Taylor himself appeared to be under 
attack on at least two occasions and attempts to smear the New South Wales 
Minister of Public Works, Renshaw, arose as Menzies and the Groupers 
sought to end the power of the AWU. The AWU, or Dougherty and Oliver 
primarily, were in the middle of a battle royal with the New South Wales 
Groupers who were a threat to their autocratic control of the A WU and, 
hence, to a favourable outcome of the split for the ALP. 
The A WU was happy to disenfranchise workers for the purpose, it seems, of 
shoring up its own regime, perhaps by buying off delegates to broader 
union bodies, by keeping voting coupons, and by doing deals with the 
contractors to protect a 'membership' base. Large US contractors in 
particular, whose main concern was to avoid having the rate of work and 
profits reduced, appeared to have co-operated with the A WU to ensure the 
piece-rate work regime remained well supported by the A WU--the non-
Communist union on the Scheme. 
The migrant workers were represented by, amongst others, Bielski, an A WU 
organiser. Having spent much of his formative years fighting in Spain and 
northern Europe and then spending his 'university years' at Auschwitz, he 
was not as polished or free of personal antagonism as some may have 
preferred but, supported by his wife and legal advisers, he was capable of 
significant "cultural reflexivity. "1 7 3 Prior to but especially consequent to 
Auschwitz, he saw life--and politics--in machiavellian, dog-eat-dog terms 
and was just as inclined to fight. He asserted and promoted industrial and 
173 Cope, B. and Kalantzis, M., Productive Diversity, Sydney, Pluto, 1997, pp. 152-3 
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legal rights of migrants and used his diverse cross-cultural skills through 
his journalism, organising and negotiating skills to pioneer migrant 
friendly unionism. Although criticised by both sides of politics, as most 
chimed together in support of the new methods and protected themselves 
by failing to reform industrial conditions, he could sense what was absent 
from the deals of Cold War. He relished attacking the powerful and gave 
migrants a respected voice. 
In the process, not least by representing the concerns of Snowy workers, 
his power base grew. It grew to the point of almost up-ending the A WU 
power clique, not long after its leadership was threatened by the Groupers. 
The court took a narrow view of the matters at stake, choosing to ignore the 
matters of procedural fairness within the AWU, which Bielski's legal team 
emphasised. As such, the outcome arguably lacked natural justice and 
Bielski's claim, along with those of many Snowy Scheme workers, failed. 
Indeed, if it were not for the paradoxical or even contradictory defence of 
A WU autonomy by the court, Bielski stood to become a significant figure in 
mainstream unionism. He offered to remake union responses to migrants 
ten years or more before the practical issues, which he had long tackled, 
really became important for the ACTU. 
With regard to work practices of the 1950s, a Chifley-style, more cross-
culturally adept construction regime, with an early and sustained focus on 
safety followed by an openness to migrant concerns, had been lost. The 
competitive, piece-rate dangers of the 'efficient' new contractors being 
forcibly promoted by a corporatist AWU, Menzies and, even more arduously, 
by Hudson were foremost. Greater rates of pay may have enabled some 
migrants to save for a stake in their new homeland, but many would leave 
as they realised the risks they were facing within the production-line of 
the mine. 
In the frenetic if often stalemated race to gain various upper hands, 
opportunities for the cultivation of local skills, for a local engineering 
company via co-ordinated, local planning, management and training 
possibilities, had been compromised as most conceded to the exploitative 
economics of the new contractors. Specifically, Allied Constructions had 
been nearly wiped out. More happily, however, some engineering training 
occurred, albeit by way of justifying and facilitating the USBR planning 
and hence new contractor involvement (also see previous chapter). From 
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1958, the Thiess company from Queensland won contracts to build much of 
the Tooma project. As these originated from an A WU strong-hold, the 
contracts would be for US style, piece-rate (corporatist union) work 
practices. These issues and the extent to which local work place standards--
for both engineering and labour were affected such as via accommodation 
conditions--deserves much further research. Overall, a modest, staged 
approach to building Eucumbene, favoured by the Department of Public 
Works, although threatening the completition of the 'full' Scheme and/or 
returns on investment, may have led to a better quality of outcomes. 
The crossed purposes of federalism for this Commonwealth financed yet 
State legalised design change continued a difficult process of determining 
outcomes, especially in the context of post-war opposition to uniform 
taxation. It was really the willingness of Fadden, Cabinet and Menzies to 
leave Hibberd to fight it out with Hudson and Spooner, which placed 
inordinate strains on the whole process. Only once the Scheme had been 
well and truly put in train were they prepared to offer financial relief and 
then only with two High Court cases looming. Little, if any, agreement 
seems to have arisen to place the financial dealings of both the States and 
Commonwealth electricity commissions on an agreed, let alone open basis, 
to prevent cost shifting. Consistent with the now chronic strategy of 
delaying open discussions on this large and complex project by way of 
seeking to retain control, Cabinet was unwilling to make any Agreement 
before things appeared relatively settled and the matter then forced. 
Spooner was left in the middle of a protracted federalist wrangle, fired by a 
willingness on the part of governments to introduce US-style 'contracting 
out' practices. Ironically, however, such practices were supported by the 
A WU as it favoured piece-rate work regimes. The fundamental issue for the 
union was not work practices but union numbers as its incentive policy 
meshed with the consortia to advantage its strength and to protect itself 
from the Groupers. The institutional integrity or independence of the 
industrial courts was also questionable as they faced the strains of Cold War. 
Again, therefore, given the difficulties of the Agreement process and the 
inter-state rivalry of system builders, many of the strains were ultimately 
passed on via the delays, Cold War rivalries and industrial deals, to the 
migrant workers themselves, over 120 of whom were killed, ultimately, m 
industrial accidents on the completed Scheme. 
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Chapter 6: Enclosing Circles of the Basin.' 
Unlike much of the previous history of the Scheme, the next major design 
change, to the Eucumbene-Geehi tunnel, represents a partially successful 
if contradictory challenge to the dominant, post-war, 'full utilisation' water 
planning ethos. Playford, as Premier of South Australia, would soon 
challenge the simple quantitative paradigm with his concerns about 
falling riverine water quality. Consequently, he would ensure that water 
could not flow from the Upper Murray (Geehi) catchment to the Upper 
Tumut catchment. Even though the new interconnecting tunnel would JOIU 
the three major catchments and allow water from the Upper Snowy to be 
diverted to Eucumbene and thence to the Tumut catchment, Murray water 
would remain in its catchment. At the same time, however, indigenous 
heritage and non-quantitative indigenous claims to water, with their own, 
if implicit, altered planning emphases, continued to be neglected. 
When we compare settler and indigenous resource-related histories of 
alpine occupation, some broad parallels become apparent. If settler society 
celebrated alpine mastery in Paterson's The Man From Snowy River, so too, 
over the ages, Aboriginal heritage has valued and mythologised the region. 
In August 1844, for example, fragments of a Creation Story of the Snowy 
River were told by "Maneroo" (Monaro) Aborigines, from the "Biggah" 
(Bega) and other groups. It was recorded in broken phrases by George 
Augustus Robinson, the Chief Protector for the Port Phillip Aboriginal 
Protectorate, and recounts the movement of the moon and a 'water mole' or, 
perhaps, a platypus: 
The Moon made the rivers, took a large quantity of sea water to the 
mountains beyond Maneroo, ie Snowy Mountain, on its journey among 
the mountains it was scented by the Water Mole which smelt the water 
when the Mole rested. The Moon went a long long way and the Water 
Mole still tracked on and finding the Moon asleep struck a yam stick into 
the water, where it gushed out and formed the river, and the Moon was 
thus 'kubbah big sulky'.2 
1
• This chapter has gained much from conversations with Wayne Atkinson, Paul Reed, 
Albert and Rachael Mullet, Henry Reynolds, Vince Bulger, Ozzie and Ben Cruse, Mike 
Young, Chris Allan and Tams in Donaldson. 
2
• Clarke, Ian D., The Journals of George Augustus Robinson, Chief Protector, Port 
Phillip Aboriginal Protectorate, Vol. 4, Melbourne, Heritage Matters, 1998, p. 174. 
274 
In hunter-gatherer Aboriginal societies, knowledge of and an ethical 
relation to the land is recounted through lyric myth and ritual. The terrain 
directly affected by the construction of the Snowy Scheme itself is the 
heritage of Aboriginal peoples (figure I). 
It is the land of the Ngarigo and neighbouring tribes such as the Walgalu 
and Ngunawal to the north, the Jaitmatang to the west, the Yuin to the east 
and the Bidwell to the south (and of the Snowy River Valley) or the Kurnai 
including the Krauatungalang (inhabiting the lower Snowy) of East 
Gippsland. These Aborigines, possibly part of a broader, highland 
'federation' of tribes, had originally moved into the highlands as long as 
21,000 years ago with numbers increasing 3000 years ago possibly because 
of the harvesting of the aestivating Bogong moth.3 
As with much of the detail of indigenous occupation of the Alps, evidence 
of when exploitation of the moth began or from when occupation itself 
arose is far from certain. Kamminga anticipates evidence of occupation 
from as long ago as before the last ice age.4 Perched above the Snowy 
River, the significant Cloggs and New Guinea caves reveal evidence of 
human occupation as far back as the most recent glacial period. A sort of 
"general contact and co-operation" apparently existed between the Ngarigo 
and neighbouring tribes, although enmity seemed to exist between the 
Djilamatang and the Ngarigo.5 The Ngarigo people were often proud and 
independent, seen by other Aborigines (and as translated by Lhotsky in 
With thanks to Mike Young of the NSW National Parks and Wildlife Service (Jindabyne) 
for drawing this story to my attention. 
3
. Horton, David (General Editor), Encyclopaedia of Aboriginal Australia, Aboriginal 
Studies Press, 1994, p. 783 and Flood, Josephine, Moth Hunters of the Australian 
Capital Territory: Aboriginal Traditional Life in the Canberra Region, Canberra, J. M. 
Flood, 1996, p. 7. 
4
• Kamminga, Johan, "Aboriginal Settlement and Prehistory of the Snowy Mountains" in 
Scougall, B (ed), Cultural Heritage of the Australian Alps: Proceedings of the 
Symposium Held at Jindabyne, New South Wales, 16-18 October 1991, Canberra, 
Australian Alps Liaison Committee, 1992, p. 114ff. Also see Johnson, Jan (et al), 
Kosciusko National Park Baseline Heritage Study 1991 (Aboriginal Sites), Sydney, 
NSW National Parks and Wildlife Service, 1992 for a discussion of research. 
5
• Gardner, Peter D., "Aboriginal History in the Victorian Alpine Region", in Scougall, 
B (ed), Cultural Heritage of the Australian Alps: Proceedings of the Symposium Held at 
Jindabyne, New South Wales, 16-18 October 1991, Canberra, Australian Alps Liaison 
Committee, 1992, p. 92. 
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Figure 1; South eastern Australian map segment from Horton, David, 
"Aboriginal Australia" (map), Canberra, Australian Institute of Aboriginal 
and Torres Strait Islander Studies, 1994. 
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T 
1834) as being a "'wild tribe"'6 , and inter-tribal fights were common.7 
According to Gardner, "Europeans introduced new elements [such as 
scarcity of resources] which probably made these clashes more frequent 
and severe than in former times. "8 
Only sparsely populating the harsher terrain, the Ngarigo occupied these 
regions with varying altitude depending on the season, although 
Jindabyne Valley may have been occupied throughout the year.9 Other 
scholars think this altitude was too high for winter camps. 10 For the 
Aborigine Max Harrison, the Snowy Mountains, except when the bogong 
moths abounded, were also regarded as a "no-man's land. "11 Nevertheless, 
alpine sites have been found at Perisher Gap, 1830 meters above sea level. 
With its greater access to sunlight, the southern side of Thredbo Valley was 
also occupied. 12 Indeed, this valley exhibits an "abundance of prehistoric 
sites" and possibly formed a major route for Aborigines on their way to 
moth-hunting outcrops. 13 
Given this familiarity, the very acts of 'discovering' the interior by 
Europeans involved many Aborigines acting as guides and helpers using 
their intimate familiarity with the land. For the Basin itself, Thomas 
Mitchell's explorations of the Murray-Darling River System in 1836 drew 
heavily upon the experience of a Bathurst Aborigine, John Piper.14 During 
preparations for Sturt's expedition of 1844-45, an Aboriginal Toonda drew 
"a plan of the Darling for 300 miles, also of the Murray a good distance both 
above and below its junctions."15 On the other side of the Alps, Gippsland 
explorers, McMillan and Strzelecki, were also greatly assisted and perhaps 
even saved from death. 16 
6
• Seddon, G. Searching for the Snowy: An Environmental History, Sydney, Allen and 
Unwin, 1994, p. 125. 
7 Kamminga, op. cit., p. I 08. 
8
. Gardner, op. cit., p. 96. 
9
• Seddon, op. cit., p. 115. 
1° Kamminga, op. cit., p. 101-2. 
11 
• Max Harrison, transcript summary of interview, interviewed by Sue Wesson, 
3015194, Australian Alps Oral History Project 1994, unpublished report, 1994, p. 56. 
12 Kamminga, op. cit., p. 106. 
13 ibid, p. I 09. 
14 Reynolds, Henry, With the White People, Ringwood, Penguin, 1990, p. 5. 
15 Ibid, p. 15 
16 Gardner, op. cit., p. 96. 
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By earlier this century, however, often as a result of the devastating affects 
of small pox as well as venereal disease, tribal Aborigines of the Monaro 
Tablelands, the Snowy Mountains and of the south-east highlands 
themselves--including the Ngarigo--had been largely displaced from the 
upland regions of the Australian Alps. Further, "undoubtedly many 
Aborigines were killed by settlers", 17 although, importantly, they did not 
disappear altogether. 18 One such massacre was reported by Robinson, who 
believed that such indiscriminate reprisals for sheep stealing amounted to 
"barbarous justice. "19 (figure 2). 
For artists such as Arthur Boyd, the social inter-actions were also 
accompanied by identity crises, often destructive of an indigenous sense of 
self worth. Elwyn Lyn reviewed, in 1958, the 'Love and Death of a Half Caste' 
series of paintings by Boyd, describing them as: 
a fantastic and symbolical presentation of the complex of emotions 
associated with a blackman's marriage to his half-caste bride. To love a 
half caste is to aspire to love a white; to marry her is to affront residual 
tribal feelings. Only when the blackman is dead does the vision of a 
white bride cease to haunt the pictures as a rival of the half caste. The 
main source of fantasy in these paintings is the blackman's 
ambivalence; from this comes the ambiguity of the symbolism, the 
mixture of whimsy and horror, of harshness and charm.2° 
Similar emotions arise as competing mythologies of land and water play 
across a stark form. In Boyd's unsettling depiction of a figure upon life-
giving waters, amidst deathly colours for both indigenous and settler 
societies, the ancient landscape was a place of contortion and the angst of 
propitiation (figure 3). 
Competition for access to water, beyond the now predominant, 
'conservation as full utilisation' approach, was also a struggle between 
non-Aboriginal communities. By the late 1950s, with dam construction 
booming around the Alps, qualitative water rights issues were a matter of 
17 Kamminga, op. cit., p. 103. 
18 Gardner, op. cit., p. 93-4. 
19 Clarke, op cit, p. 53-4. 
20 Lynn, Elwyn, "Chagall Goes Native: A Sydney view of Arthur Boyd's paintings", 
Nation, October II, 1958. 
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Figure 2; Map, "Other Massacre Locations--Gippsland" in Gardner, P. D., 
Gippsland Massacres: The Destruction of the Kurnai Tribes 1800-1860, 
Ensay, Ngarak Press, 1983, p. 90. 
Other Massacre Locations - Gippsland 
........ 
..... 
..... 
...... 
..... 
I. Wanigal Ck. 
2. Gammon Ck. 
3. Mouth Wanigal Ck. 
4. Freshwater Ck. 
5. Butchers Ridge 
6. Slaughterllouse 
7. Brodribb 
8. Brodribb II 
279 
Figure 3; Painting by Arthur Boyd, "Figure in a Landscape (Nude Washing 
in a Creek)", 1961, Plate 98 in Pearce, Barry, Arthur Boyd Retrospective, 
Sydney, Art Gallery of New South Wales, J 995, p. 114. 
~8 Figun• in landscape (Nudt• wasllltt~; in a Ctrl'k Ill) 1961 
nd. lt•rupt'l'll on t·orrrposilrnn lrnard IC>O.O ~ 111:1.0 
~r;:rwcll.r. 
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serious concern for those at the other end of the Basin. Adelaide and its 
expansion relies heavily upon the lower Murray for much of its water 
supply. The quantity and quality of the water and hence its source, route 
and manner of arrival to South Australia were soon to become intensely 
contested. 
Since February 1956, Playford, the South Australian Premier, had expressed 
disquiet as to whether his State's interests were being adequately 
protected.21 He assumed that because the Scheme was being financed out of 
Commonwealth revenue--or so he suspected--South Australia could expect a 
share of the extra water flowing into the Murray, especially under the 
River Murray Agreement.ZZ This agreement controlled water availability 
during times of plenty and during periods of declared restriction, or 
drought. Latterly, South Australia was entitled to three thirteenths or about 
23% of the flow, a fixed proportion. Under normal flow conditions, it was 
entitled to a yearly minimum quantity of water, or broadly, enough to fill 
Lake Victoria--from where most in South Australia obtain their water 
supply--and such as to maintain specified, monthly flows. Hence, if 
diverted water was deemed to be Murray water, South Australia could claim 
more water during the critical period of (declared) restriction. 
Yet the quality of water and its cyclic or seasonal advantages for renewing 
the brackish water in Lake Victoria was not recognised by the River 
Murray Agreement. The major philosophy of development in the Basin--
full utilisation--was focussed more on quantitative outcomes rather than 
qualitative measures. Without a formal copy of the proposed Snowy 
Agreement, Playford could do little to substantiate his fears that his State 
would be paying for some of the Scheme and was being prevented from 
influencing outcomes. Menzies was also resisting any claim by Playford. 
Indeed, it would take ten months and another approaching settlement 
between the three upstream governments for South Australia to make 
another major move. The interim saw the parties haggling over uniform 
taxation and interest rates (see previous chapter). 
Importantly, however, Aboriginal relations to land were also at stake. 
Aboriginal landscape was brought forth by ancestral beings, whether 
21
. "Snowy Plan Threat by S.A.", Daily Telegraph, 212/56. 
22
• Playford to Menzies, 27/2/56, NAA: Al209, 195611872 Part 1, Snowy Mountains 
Hydro-Electric Scheme - Agreement with the States. 
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human or plant or animal or 'natural' beings, by travelling across the land 
and imbuing it with action and meaning. Long journeys across country tell 
of epic struggles involving various human emotions. Indeed, this knowing 
may also outstrip modern scientific knowledge and can include events even 
of ancient geographic times. Events, for example, as retold by Aboriginal 
dreaming stories from 30,000 to 8,000 years ago. That is, such accounts may 
also include "stories about ancient and large-scale events such as rising sea 
levels and changing river courses ... "23 
One such change saw the Cadell Tilt block rise just north of today's 
townships of Echuca and Moama and saw the Murray and Goulburn rivers 
change course. Running north across today's usually quite flat landscape 
between Moama and Deniliquin is a gentle fold or drop in the landscape of 
about 12 meters.24 Both the Murray and Goulburn rivers once flowed across 
this line to a confluence further west but, as the land rose, the Murray 
headed north and the Goulburn deviated south, both flowing around the 
uplifted terrain. The Edward River which now flows into the Murray via 
Deniliquin is this old Murray water course and forms an 'anabranch' of the 
Murray as it leaves and then flows back into the river. Large lakes were 
formed behind the fault. The area, still today, contains lakes--the Barmah 
and Moira Lakes being the largest. The Barmah Forest, with its large stands 
of red gums, also evolved to be seeded and sustained by the cycle of winter 
floods. These events from thousands of years ago are retold as part of the 
Yorta Yorta's Biami dreaming. Aboriginal dreaming recalls when this land 
of the Yorta Yorta clan--and later in the area of the Cumerangunga 
reserve--was subject to a large flood which saw the Murray again cut 
south, to rejoin with the Goulburn. It then resumed flowing west leaving 
the Edward River as its anabranch which also reduces the size of the 
Murray around Echuca25 
For the riverine terrain, other Aborigines also tell a lengthy and complex 
story of an attempt to spear a Murray Cod. Successive attacks beginning at a 
water hole led to the fish fleeing "making the channel which became the 
23 Goodall, H., Invasion to Embassy: Land and Aboriginal Politics in New South Wales, 
1770-1972, Sydney, Allen and Unwin, 1996, p. 5. 
24 Coulson, Helen, Echuca-Moama: Murray River Neighbours, Red Cliffs, Sunnyland 
Press, 1981, p. 134-8. 
25
• Conversation with Wayne Atkinson, May 1996. 
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Murray river. "26 Further myths for the Aborigines of the lower Murray 
tell of the cod being followed by Ngurunderi who 
followed the great Murray Cod down the River, poling his canoe. The 
sound of the canoe pole frightened the Cod and as a result it swished its 
tail, making the bends of the River; the wash of the water went over its 
banks, forming swamps.27 
By spearing then cutting up the fish and throwing parts of it back into the 
water, all the fish of the river were also made. Similarly, for Ella Anselmi of 
Yorta Yorta, the creator of the Murray was Biami, forming the rivers via 
the embodiment of a snake; "the old lady walked along with a stick and the 
snake followed her and made the rivers and streams. "28 
As well as the cosmological schema, describing how land and people came 
to be, other stories also tell of what to do, for example, when flowers bloom 
or seasons change. For the often mobile bands moving through the land 
according to seasonal rhythms, knowing which lands had surpluses at 
different times was crucial. Aboriginal stories tell when it was time to leave 
the mountains, after hunting for moths, for example. As recounted by Eddie 
Kneebone, a Pangerang man from North East Victoria, the spirit of the 
mountain would sleep during summer under the warm sun. But with so 
many Aborigines moving around the mountain, by Autumn the spirit 
would be woken. Mists rising from the mountains would signify the rising 
of the spirit. Soon it would be time to break camp and leave the mountain as 
the spirits body "was so huge it blocked out the sun and froze the 
ground. "29 The blanket of white snow which then covered the mountain 
was the body of the spirit having emerged from the ground and by then 
Aborigines would have to leave for the low lands. 
26
• Mudrooroo Nyoongah, Aboriginal Mythology: An A-Z spanning the history of 
aboriginal mythology from the earliest legends to the present day, London, Thorstons, 
1994, p. 115. 
27
• Berndt, Roland M., et a!, A World That Was: The Yaraldi of the Murray River and the 
Lakes, South Australia, Melbourne, Melbourne University Press, 1993, p. 223. 
28
• Anselmi, Anna, evidence to Federal Court Australia, Victorian District Registry, 
General Division, Yorta Yorta Claim, Proceedings, Melbourne, Auscript, 1996, p. 769. 
29 Kneebone, Eddie, Taped Interview (No. 4) with Sue Wesson, Wesson, Sue, Australian 
Alps Oral History Project 1994, unpublished report, 1994. 
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Kneebone has described the regular, seasonal movements for those groups 
who, although not from the Snowy Mountains, lived and moved along the 
Murray River Valley in the north east of Victoria and thence into the 
Victorian Alps. During spring, as the river-flats flooded, groups moved onto 
the open plains where vegetation was increasing and fauna was breeding, 
to where there was now plenty of water and abundant food and wildlife.30 
With the onset of summer, and the drying out of the plains, the Aborigines 
would move back to the river-flats, especially to meet with other groups, 
for an annual 'tribal' gathering. Then "many ceremonies would have taken 
place, initiations, marriages, trading, settling of disputes, renewing 
alliances and friendships." The all-important arrangements to travel over 
others' territory to participate in the Bogong Moth feast would also be 
made. The Aborigines would then move into the highlands--up the Kiewa 
and Mitta Mitta Valleys--and feast on the moths until the weather turned 
cooler in March. Returning to the river valleys, they would burn the grass 
along the way "to ensure regeneration in the following year." 
They would return to the river-flats for autumn, as little water now 
remained in the dry interior but the permanent water ways, although 
often reduced to a string of water holes, would provide good food supplies 
for the hunter-gatherers. They could venture inland to burn some grass 
lands and drive fauna into the foothills, where the Aborigines would spend 
the winter months. Offering better shelter amongst rocky outcrops and 
below tree cover, the Aborigines would find food from the vegetables and 
herbs of the forests and from the animals which would retreat away from 
the thinning plains. With the coming of spring, they would again move out 
of the hills and onto the plains. Each season would thus see the Aborigines 
moving across the plains. They would move to find better food and shelter 
in either the mountains during summer, the river during autumn, the 
foothills for winter and back to the plains for spring. With such movement, 
'travelling light' technologies were preferred.31 
In more resource rich regions, in contrast, where populations were (and 
are) much larger and regions smaller, territories are more sharply 
30
• Kneebone, E., "Interpreting Traditional Culture As Land Management", in 
Birckhead, J. el al (eds), Aboriginal Involvement in Parks and Protected Areas, 
Canberra, Aboriginal Studies Press, 1992, p. 228. 
3 l Mulvaney, John and Kamminga, Johan, Prehistory of Australia, Sydney, Allen and 
Unwin, 1999, p. 88-9. 
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maintained or take a more clearly defined form.3 2 The Y orta Y orta for 
example and other groups along the Murray had "developed such sustained 
harvesting of the rich fish, game and plants there they lived virtually 
sedentary lives in villages ... "33 In a manner similar for hunter gathering 
groups, they would disperse during the winter months when food from the 
river was less abundant. Nevertheless, for much of the year, they trapped, 
hunted and fossicked for a wide variety of foods including fish, waterbirds, 
yabbies, wallabies, emus, kangaroos, mussels, turtles, frogs, water lily and 
reeds. 34 Canoes, fish weirs, nets, carry bags, sticks and spears were 
employed to gain their food. 
As with the other hunter gatherer groups, the Aborigines of the south 
eastern uplands would move around according to annual hunting and 
gathering cycles. In the lower plains across what is now the Australian 
Capital Territory, for example, wild turkeys, emus, platypus and yam daisies 
as well as fern and bulrush roots all contributed to the dietary needs of 
Aborigines as would fish, shellfish, yabbies, fruits and eggs, lizards and 
snakes.35 Indeed, before being decimated by smallpox, Aborigines were 
noted for their relative numbers and health in these valleys, the 
neighbouring Tumut Valley in particular. The fish in the rivers and the 
abundance of water which attracted much wildlife provided for excellent 
hunting grounds. There were the seasonal Bogong moths as well. 
Our narrative of the planning changes to the Snowy resumes in the mid 
1950s with the seasonal campaign of construction again moving into high 
gear. By this point, however, round the clock shifts were underway and 
plans were being set for irrigation areas (figure 4). Concurrently, from 
October 1956, Cahill decided to cease his States 'arms length' attitude to 
Victoria's own challenge and decided, against federal ALP policy, to co-
operate with Victoria in seeking a return of income taxing powers to the 
States.36 In late November a parallel High Court writ was lodged by Cahill. 
The States were pressing for an alteration to interest charges levied on the 
32 Pardoe, Colin, "The cemetery as symbol: the distribution of prehistoric Aboriginal 
burial grounds in southeastern Australia", in Murray, Tim, Archaeology of Aboriginal 
Australia: A Reader, Sydney, Allen and Unwin, 1998, p. 203. 
33 Goodall, op. cit., p. 12. 
34
• Fahey, Charles, Barmah Forest - A History, Melbourne, Department of Conservation, 
Forests and Lands, 1988, p. 2. 
35 Flood, 1996, op. cit., p. 11-12. 
36
• "N.S.W. Moves Against Uniform Tax", SMH, 10/10/56, p. 4. 
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Figure 4; Map, "This is Where Our New Farms Will Be", Farmers Newsletter, 
Large Area No. 24, Sept 1957 [see NAA: A2618, Document 2400]. 
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Scheme, that the States would only have to pay interest at a rate "not 
greater than" the long term bond rate.37 Since December Bolte had also 
been pushing for more water from the Murray38 and was gaining 
significant concessionsH This would help him, during late 1957 and early 
1958, to cut a deal with the Country Party to get the Agreement ratified by 
his Upper House. 
With these regional initiatives, by August 1957, both States were close to 
signing, aided by the fact that the uniform tax issue was moving towards 
resolution by the High Court in the Commonwealth's favour.40 On August 
the 7th, New South Wales Cabinet then approved the latest draft Agreement 
which, as the Sydney Morning Herald now openly reported, would involve 
charges "reduced by about I 0 per cent" up til the time the Scheme was 
generating 3,000 million kilowatt hours a year.41 
The very next day, however, Playford telegraphed Menzies, again 
demanding a copy of the Agreement especially as it appeared from press 
comments that it involved "a serious infraction of this States rights over 
River Murray Waters."42 He followed up with a letter threatening a further 
High Court challenge and urged that Menzies provide a copy of the (draft) 
Agreement to him.43 A copy could confirm the cross subsidies he suspected. 
The Commonwealth continued to cajole the States into signing before South 
Australia had a chance to see the Agreement. Then Playford wrote again, 
believing that "water reaching the Murray from any source becomes part 
of the Murray and subject to, and available for, all the purposes of the 
River Murray Waters Agreement. "44 
In the meantime, the uniform taxation wrangle was resolved. In October 
1952, Victoria had taken out a High Court writ by way of challenging the 
Commonwealth's expanding control over taxation. As no agreement was 
37
• Fadden to Menzies, 30/4/57, NAA: M1505, 1196, Snowy Mountains Hydro-electric 
Authority - Miscellaneous. 
38
. Letter from Bolte to Cahill, 3/12/56, PRO, VPRS 1163/P, box 1119, file P57/4681, 
Snowy River--Agreement. 
39 Playford to Menzies, 22/8/57, NAA: A1209, 1956/1872 Part 2, op. cit. 
40 
"No Change Expected in System of Levying Income-Tax", SMH, 24/8/57. 
41 
"Cabinet Approves Draft of Snowy Agreement", SMH, 7/8/57. 
42 Telegram from Playford to Menzies, 8/8/57, NAA: A1209, 1956/1872 Part 2, op. 
cit. 
43 Playford to Menzies, 22/8/57, NAA, ibid. 
44
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reached, it had done so again in December 1955, being joined by New South 
Wales in the action in November 1956. In late August 1957, however, 
although the High Court found invalid the requirement that income tax be 
paid to the Commonwealth before that due to the States, it upheld the right 
of the Commonwealth to make tax re-imbursement grants. Under Section 96 
of the Constitution, these were conditional upon the States not levying 
income tax. Consequently, given the reliance of the States upon these 
grants, "this was the end of legal challenges to the uniform tax system. "45 
Three weeks or so after this High Court decision the Agreement was signed 
by the New South Wales and Victorian Premiers, on the 18th of September 
1957. It required only ratification by parliamentary legislation. 
Immediately it was signed, Menzies forwarded a copy of the Agreement to 
Playford.46 The Adelaide Advertiser then published a long article on the 
25th and the controversy became public. To the dismay of New South Wales, 
the Commonwealth then back flipped. It recognised the force of South 
Australia's technical point that section 45 of the River Murray 
not by an Authority or by 
Agreement 
the referred only to diversion 
Commonwealth.47 Section 
by a State, 
100 of the Constitution guards against any 
Commonwealth interference of the water rights of the States and this is 
reflected in the River Murray Agreement. By conceding to Playford, the 
Commonwealth was putting pressure on New South Wales to negotiate 
concessions to the downstream State. Regional, riverine water quality 
issues were now threatening to revise definitions of efficient water usage. 
On the 16th of October, Playford then proceeded with his threat to mount a 
court challenge to restrain the Commonwealth from diverting the Tooma 
River and to seek clarification on what now constituted River Murray 
Water with the Snowy diversion proceeding.48 He suggested that the plans, 
as hitherto conceived, were insufficiently aware of the specific importance 
of the Murray for Adelaide: 
The whole future of South Australia from a development point of view 
depends entirely upon the River Murray. This year 80% of our entire 
45
• Mathews, R. L. & Jay, W. R. C., Federal Finance; Intergovernmental Financial 
Relations Since Federation, London, Nelson, 1972, p. 229. 
46 Menzies to Playford, 18/9/57, NAA, 1209 1956/1872 Part 2, op. cit. 
47 Menzies to Bolte, 10/10/57 (emphasis in original), NAA: A1209, 1956/1872 Part 3, 
op. cit. 
48 
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population are completely dependent upon it, even for household 
water ... and the flow of water [is also] necessary to keep the river to a 
reasonably low saline content.49 
The 'full utilisation', 'intruders in the bush' were not entirely welcome by 
Playford. In a manner dramatised by the grim expressionism and 
'antipodean interiors' of Tucker, versus the emergent, international yet 
nationalising abstractions of Rose, at least two contrasting senses of how 
recontextualised knowledges should work were again at stake (figures 5 & 
6). The abstractions of Rose leap out of the canvas. His elan of paint, like a 
geyser of steel and concrete, offers symbolic support for a shift in 
perceptions. A confidence in construction arrives, as I-beams radiate from 
the interior, supporting hopes for a renewed map of eastern Australia. 
With parrots perched around grave, 'antipodean heads' playing against 
chance, Tucker's ancient, stony epic of an interior, however, is wary and 
sanguine. But, beyond any essential characteristics of place, as the tale 
therefore sees the two card players pitted against each other, it could also 
be read as depicting a satire of problems arising with institutional stand-
offs. Both are antipodean in the sense of cultivating local possibilities in 
relation to overseas influences, but arrive at different conclusions. 
In late October, Menzies suggested that the River Murray Agreement, 
whilst keeping the Snowy Agreement out of the matter, be amended. It 
should recognise that the Tooma diversion was a diversion by New South 
Wales under the terms of the River Murray Agreement and that the matter 
be referred to the River Murray Commission. This put the onus on New 
South Wales. It could also allow both the upstream States to resolve the issue 
by working together. It was not until early December that New South Wales 
would agree to the referral.50 In short, New South Wales' apparent 
oversight of the importance of the State-based legalities of the River 
Murray Agreement seemed to be costing it another 100,000 acre feet of 
water to Victoria as a way of ensuring that both upstream states would 
combine against South Australia. Meanwhile, as a result of doubts about the 
adequacy of protecting downstream farmers against floods, a 
supplementary Agreement was being negotiated. This would also provide 
49
• Playford to Menzies, 17110/57, NAA: 1209, 1956/1872, Part 3, op cit. 
50 
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Figure 5; Painting by Albert Tucker, "Gamblers and Parrots" ( 1960) 
reproduced from Uhl, C., Albert Tucker, Melbourne, Lansdowne, 1960, p. 80. 
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Figure 6; Painting by William Rose, "Construction", (1956), reproduced in 
National Art Gallery of New South Wales, The Artist and the City, Sydney, 
The Gallery, 1983. 
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the means by which more water would be made available to Victoria from 
the Murray. 
Playford resolved to continue his attack as he remained sceptical of the 
benefits of more storage.51 Specifically, for Dridan, the South Australian 
Water Commissioner, a lower level in the Hume was particularly likely 
during drought years and hence any extra storage in the Alps was 
superfluous.52 This seemed to ignore the fact that it was during wet years 
that the storages in the Alps would be filled and then, during dry years--
low levels in the Hume or otherwise--this extra water could be released. 
Such an advantage would still be highly dependent upon the operating 
protocols of the upper level storages and of the Hume, as well as the 
amounts water drawn from the rivers, and these circumstances were far 
from clear. Further, exactly which part of the Basin--the Murray or 
Murrumbidgee--would be given preference, especially as it was in the 
northern part of the Scheme that the large Adaminaby storage was sited, 
remained in doubt. The water Commissioners of the three States were at 
embarrassing Jogger-heads over the possible permutations. 
How do these kinds of negotiations compare with those typical of 
Aboriginal society? Traditional Aboriginal societies had their specialised 
roles, which also culminated in alpine meetings. Firstly, finely honed and 
highly detailed knowledges about what cyclic or seasonal events presaged 
availability of resources, defined clan roles and responsibilities. Women 
and children would normally gather vegetables, hunt the small prey and 
fish, whilst the men would hunt the larger animals, but such divisions 
were far from absolute. Customary rules also prescribed which person, of 
what age and status and sex, could hunt given animals. Women have also 
been crucial for the passing down of the land and the spiritual knowledge. 
This time, in sharp contrast to settler society which was still pushing on 
with its frontiersmanship approach, women also had, and have, an 
important role. 
Rules governed the distribution and consumption of food. This knowledge, 
as well as helping to maintain a balanced diet, also established social 
51
• Spooner's notes on meeting held on the 24/10/57, NAA: Al209 1956/1872, Part 3, 
op. cit. 
52 Dridan to Playford, 12/11/57, copy attached to Playford to Menzies, 13/11157, 
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hierarchies and maintained an individual's identification with the land of 
the clan.53 Status and seniority within the clan or tribe would also be 
maintained. As such, these knowledges were themselves crucial for 
economic and cultural maintenance. They also sustained populations and 
resource availability for thousands of years in the more highly arid 
environments of the Basin itself. 
Such a relation to the land thus involved a form of care for its continued 
health and fertility. The use of natural resources, for example, may also be 
regulated via the creation of sacred sites, which prohibited hunting and 
food gathering with their general area, often creating, in effect, game 
sanctuaries. Water holes and river banks may be deemed to be inviolable 
areas allowing fecund 'reserves'. More active practices were also employed, 
which would actively modify the environment by the transplanting of 
trees, the rotation of fishing areas and, as mentioned, by the controlled use 
of fire. 54 
Such relations to land would tell of mutual rights and obligations both in 
relation to when and how to use resources but also in relation to others. As 
a series of creative (or totemic) powers created the world, members of each 
clan are responsible for maintaining the spiritual and hence physical 
health and welfare of the landscape and its resources. Thence, 
mythological stories hold the societies' lore/law as well. On his journeys 
through East Gippsland, Robinson had also reported the "excellent 
sketches" made by Aborigines on the inside of bark.55 Via such methods, a 
sophisticated array of social and economic relations would thus be enacted. 
They would maintain both land and culture as resources were gathered and 
shared according to the lore of the tribe. Knowing not to be greedy is also a 
key element of this knowledge, guarded against via a high degree of 
reciprocity in Aboriginal societies. 
Such reciprocity meant that sophisticated processes of consultation would 
be enacted. Similarly, inter-tribal relations play an important part, 
economically and culturally. Consequently, tribal boundaries, often related 
". Mulvaney, John and Kamminga, Johan, Prehistory of Australia, Sydney, Allen and 
Unwin, 1999, p. 79. 
54 The Law Reform Commission, The Recognition of Aboriginal Customary Laws, 
Canberra, AGPS, 1986 (Vol. 2), p. 121. 
55
• Clarke, op cit, p. 146. 
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to natural features or based upon river catchments, would blur as tribes 
shared terrain and resources during difficult years or at times of 
abundance, for example. As such, neighbouring clans have responsibilities 
over adjacent lands. Especially if the dreamings were at risk due to 
population falling, for example, territories were again shared. Overlapping 
frontiers rather than firm boundaries thence formed between 
territories.56 
Many of these cultural-resource relations, for the alpine-related peoples, 
found a major expression via the Bogong moth ritual. In the first instance, 
by following the Bogong moth into the alps as it 'hibernated' or aestivated 
from the heat of the plains during the summer, the moth made food sources 
more viable. Indeed, "compared with other regions the highlands lacked 
staple vegetable foods or good aquatic resources. "57 Nonetheless, tubers 
may have provided an adequate staple5 8 but the moths were clearly 
important. Caught in nets, they were a rich source of protein with a 
"pleasant nutty taste" and Aborigines would temporarily displace the 
"leanness recorded during the winter months"59 as they fed on the moths 
amongst the high peaks. 
Co-jointly, the moth fest may also have been an important ceremonial rite-
-for men it is often thought60 --rather than for purely dietary reasons.61 
Groups from all sides of the range, from the Upper Murray, the Monaro 
High Plains, the Snowy River Valley and the Omeo High Plains, would 
converge on the upper parts of the highlands during the summer months. 
Aborigines from the Murrumbidgee, Tumut and neighbouring valleys--the 
Ngunawal, Walgalu, Djilamatand, Wiradjuri, Jaitmatang and Ngarigo--would 
also seasonally migrate up the alpine valleys of Mount Kosciuszko and 
nearby peaks. Each group would be organised to ensure that supplies of 
moths would be adequate and the hunting would not proceed until they had 
all arrived. 
56
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By meeting with neighbouring or overlapping tribes, Aborigines would 
share resources which were rare in neighbouring 'regions' and share 
economic surplus. Sharp rock shards for hunting, gum from trees, saplings 
for spears and pigment for painting were often reciprocally exchanged.62 
In doing so, they would again enact rights and obligations. Importantly, 
with these meetings, initiation and marriage ceremonies could take place. 
These elaborate, multi-layered and reciprocal relations, with their long 
standing knowledges, would thus co-jointly manage resources. As a result, 
and again in parallel with White society, but as far back as 4000 years ago, 
an historically significant '"intensification' in economic systems" arose.63 
That is, as the Aborigines converged on the upper slopes, the groups would 
meet to exchange greetings and to conduct social ceremonies and a 
renewed Aboriginal culture of south east Australia has been mooted to have 
emerged as a result. 
On the eastern side of the range, there is a corroboree ground, now 
inundated by Lake Jindabyne, which was used as a meeting place for east 
coast Aborigines before they would meet further up the range with other, 
inland groups.64 A second, perhaps more significant corroboree ground 
also exists at the foot of Mount Crackenback. Travelling up from the 
western side, Via Broken Cart and Pigeon Square and up through the 
Goobarragandra and Peak River valleys, Aborigines would meet at Yallowin 
(Aboriginal for meeting place), in the Tumut Valley.65 Just as Aborigines 
would gather at eel or fish dams or traps along various inland rivers, the 
Wiradjuri would come from as far away as Yass to hold corroborees at 
Yallowin before seeking out the bogong moths.66 Several hundreds would 
gather, again making the valley a significant one for "interchange and 
cultural mixing. "67 
62
. Mulvaney and Kamminga, op. cit., p. 94-5. 
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For initiation ceremonies, the men would travel to the borah rings or 
corroboree grounds, earlier known as the 'Black Fella Rings' on the 
southern side of Bogong Mountain.68 Based on ethnographic reports and as 
described by Sams: 
Prior to the first gathering in October/November, smoke signals were 
used to signify the approach of the tribes. On arrival at Yellowin big 
corroborees were held and then all the men went away for a week or two 
leaving the women and children behind ... the men and young initiates 
retired to the top of the range to a place where there were boring 
. 69 nngs ... 
A stone arrangement still exists on the south western shore of Blowering 
and points towards a further, higher site, the Yolde site which provided a 
place to camp before ascending the mountains for moths.1° An hour or 
two's walk away, to the north west, is the Yellowin site. Unfortunately, 
agricultural activity and inundation by Blowering dam waters has most 
likely hidden or destroyed campsites within the Tumut Valley. As has been 
shown with recent efforts to protect Aboriginal burial grounds on the 
shores of Lake Victoria, water management regimes can also operate to 
protect such Aboriginal heritage.71 
With such seasonal activity, Aboriginal camp sites were scattered across the 
Alps. They were often along the best routes to and from the granite 
outcrops, which sheltered the moths. Located nearby to rivers and within 
easy reach of fishing possibilities, they were accompanied by ritual sites. 
For winter retreat, the lower Snowy Valley was particularly favoured for 
its relatively sheltered and hence comparatively mild climate, as was the 
Tumut Valley. The Monaro High Plains, however, being windswept, cold and 
less fertile, had less use for the Aborigines. Nevertheless, on the western or 
Murray side of the Alps "extensive campsites around Corryong on the 
Murray River probably reflect the winter habitat of the Djilamtang tribe 
[and] to their south, the Jaitmatang were probably centred on Lake Omeo, 
68
. Hoad, Col, What was the Aboriginal Presence in the Snowy Mountains?, 
]unpublished m/s], Tumut, Tumut Library, 1996, p. 3 
69 Sams, op. cit., p. 11 
70 Ibid, p. 37. 
71
• Hope, Jeannette & Murray Darling Basin Commission, Lake Victoria: Finding the 
Balance. A Response to the Competing Interests of Cultural Heritage, Environment and 
Resource Use [2 Vols], Canberra, The Commission, 1998. 
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where again winters are mild. "72 Jindabyne Valley, relatively high up the 
Snowy River, was "a well used camping place"73 and accessible to research 
until flooded by the darn. A ceremonial camping ground, possibly used 
pnor to the moth hunts by the local Ngarigo, exists near the junction of 
Snowy River and Wollondilly Creek, now submerged by Lake Jindabyne.74 
Axe grinding grooves in stone are also believed to exist at this location. 
Chapman has continued the investigations along the shores of Lake 
Jindabyne as the action of water has exposed (and is eroding) the 
previously overgrown or submerged rnaterial.75 A 'pebble tool factory', for 
the grinding of stone tools, plus scatters of stone artefacts and hardened 
clay fireplaces are also apparent. They are being moved or eroded as the 
darn level fluctuates however. Similarly in the Turnut Valley on the other 
side of the range, the campsite "on Yallowin Creek ... being a very large 
site ... [is] now unfortunately covered by the waters of Blowering 
Reservoir. "76 That is, even though rock art, shell middens or fish traps 
have not been sighted in the Kosciuszko National Park/ 7 the region 
contains Aboriginal heritage of significant historical and cultural worth. 
Recent finds also include the spectacular kangaroo tooth necklace (figure 
7). For Johnson, in sum, the region has "an important Aboriginal heritage, 
representing as it does Aboriginal adaptation to one of the extremes of the 
Australian environment. "78 
These historic patterns of occupation and land-use were disrupted by the 
new darns. Burrinjuck, Talbingo, Blowering and other reservoirs, just as 
they have displaced traditional stock routes, have also interrupted 
traditional lines of indigenous communication. The Talbingo Reservoir, for 
example, has altered the relation between Yellowin, a traditional meeting 
place (also see below) and McPherson's Plains, a site of food.79 
72 Flood, 1980, op. cit., p. 194 
73 Ibid, p. 190. 
74 Kamminga, 1992, op. cit., p. 107. 
75 Chapman, V. G. "The Jindabyne Valley in Southern Uplands Prehistory: An 
Archaeological Investigation", MA Thesis, ANU, 1977, p. 3. 
76 Flood, 1980, op. cit., p. 179. 
77 Johnson, Ian (et al), op. cit., p. 52. 
78 Ibid, p. 107. 
79 George Martin, Taped Interview No. 6, accompanying Wesson, Sue, Australian Alps 
Oral History Project 1994, unpublished report, 1994. 
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Figure 7; Photographic plate, "Necklace of Kangaroo Teeth ... ", from 
Mulvaney, D. I. and Kamminga, J., Prehistory of Aus tralia, St Leonards, 
Allen and Unwin, 1999. 
Plate Ill Nl'l'klac·c of ka11grtroo /('(•/II. 11/IIISIIJIUd iarn (111(/lui/IIIIU'nloun {ilfl/1(1 ll illr IIIC' Coo11111 l111na/., 
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The scale of dams was as dominant as ever. To better appreciate what South 
Australia stood to gain, in terms of increased quantity of water availability 
at least, Menzies continued to insist that Playford go to Cooma to be better 
informed. The Authority was suggesting that the storage capacity of the 
whole Scheme--about 4 million acre feet--would substantially improve the 
water available for "the whole Murray System."80 If make-up flows for the 
diverted Tooma could be made from any available source, as per the River 
Murray Agreement, the diverted Tooma water could be made up from stored 
Darling River water. This could arise especially as the new storage at 
Menindee on the Lower Darling was near completion, although this lesser 
quality source could well affect the quality of water at South Australia. 
Potentially compounding the concerns of South Australia about water 
quality, the Snowy Authority was also proposing revisions to the Snowy-
Murray development. It was proposing to connect this project, or at least 
Island Bend on the Upper Snowy, via a higher level tunnel to the 
Eucumbene-Tumut project. Technically, this move had many advantages. 
Instead of 75% of the flows of the Murray project being regulated mainly 
by Jindabyne, the amount could be increased to 94% by joining Island Bend 
to Eucumbene.8 1 Crucially, the proposal would also dramatically increase 
the Authority's chances of quickly raising the water level of Eucumbene as 
water would flow from Island Bend to Eucumbene rather than to Jindabyne, 
increasing inflow by 50%, improving its economics.82 Further, via 
pumping plant at Jindabyne and by diverting the water at 700 feet higher 
than initially proposed, the new proposal would obviate the need for 
underground or 'underwater' power stations deep beneath collection 
points. M3, for example, was to be 1300 feet below the surface. Now, 
however, such power stations could be sited at the foot of the mountain on 
the Murray side without loss of energy. The high level tunnel would retain 
the 'head' of the water collected from the main range. It would allow the 
siting of power stations above ground, now much favoured for economical 
reasons and the defence-related rhetoric was now passing. The apparent 
technical imperative, often foregrounded by the Authority as driving the 
80 SMHEA[?], "Snowy Mountains Scheme - Benefits to South Australia" [circa mid 
November 1957], NAA: Al209, 1956/1872 Part 4, op. cit. 
81
• Hudson, draft Cabinet submission, 4/12/57, "Snowy Mountains Scheme - Snowy-
Murray Development - Amendment to the Proposals of the Commonwealth and States 
Snowy River Committee", p. 2, NAA: A987, Ell46 Part I, Snowy Mountains Scheme -
Modified Snowy Murray Development. 
82 Ibid. 
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proposal, requiring the relocation of the Geehi Dam higher up the valley 
due to possible landslips at the lower tunnel location, could now also be met. 
But the higher level tunnel ran the risk of compounding the difficulties 
with South Australia as water could be more readily shuffled around the 
Scheme if the Upper Snowy was to be connected to the Tumut. Indeed, the 
Authority had avoided providing any submission to Spooner on the matter 
as "we were anxious to avoid the risk of any new issue causing delay to the 
completion of the ... Agreement."83 Any mention of more elaborate 
possibilities for the interchanging of water, of allowing water to flow both 
ways between Gee hi (on the Upper Murray) and Eucumbene, was studiously 
avoided as well; "the distribution of water between the Tumut and the 
Murray, as laid down in the proposed Commonwealth/States' Agreement, 
will not be affected ... "84 
Indeed, Spooner quickly replied to the interchange design hopes of 
Hudson. They involved uncertainty for the States, especially Victoria (and 
hence South Australia). How could they be sure that they were getting the 
agreed split of water if such water could be readily interchanged between 
Island Bend and Eucumbene? For Spooner, Victoria would have parted with 
the "actual physical" connection to "a large volume of water" and would 
"look carefully" at the position.85 The subsequent provision of new 
safeguards for the Agreement may mean further confusion and delays. It 
was therefore decided (yet again) to avoid making the matter explicit to the 
States until after the Agreement was approved by State parliaments.86 
These concerns did not extend to Aboriginal peoples. Earlier in the century, 
Aboriginal families such as the Mundy's and Hoskin's had mustered 
brumbies from around the Delegate ranges, supplying horses for the army. 
Delegate Aborigines would also travel down to the coastal plains, around 
Bega, and hunt for shell fish, collect plants for medicinal purposes and to 
make reed baskets.87 They would also trade with the Warradjuri using 
83 Hudson to Spooner, 4112/57, NAA: ibid. 
84 Hudson, draft Cabinet submission, 4/12/57, NAA: ibid. 
" Spooner to Hudson, 12/1/58, NAA: ibid. 
86 Hudson to Spooner [letter not sent] 14/4/58, NAA: ibid. 
87 Ellen Mundy and Colleen and Margaret Dickson, interviewed by Sue Wesson, 
29/5/94, summary transcript, in Wesson, Sue, Australian Alps Oral History Project 
19 94, unpublished report [and tapes], Canberra, Australian Institute of Aboriginal 
and Torres Strait islander Studies, 1994. 
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possum skins. By 1957, however, the Delegate Reserve was closed, forcibly 
pushing remaining Aborigines--with traditional associations with the 
Alps--further away and into Bega. During the 1950s further pressures 
towards displacing communities were continuing via the new seasonal and 
pastoral work. 
In the plains especially, even for the hitherto strong Sandhills Aboriginal 
community several kilometres from Narrandera, seasonal work was 
drawing Aborigines away.88 This community had established itself after the 
dispersals or 'wrecking' of stations, especially Warangesda.89 It grew to 
provide a refuge against destructive assimilationist policies and maintained 
its autonomy from Narrandera such that it was also "a claim for separate 
and independent co-existence. "90 But given the attractions of fruit picking 
and that "in the mid 1950s, the assimilation policy allowed family 
settlements to grow only in areas where Aborigines were needed as fruit 
pickers" ( 1 the Sandhills community was itself under pressure. 
Similarly, Aborigines from the Brungle station near Tumut, and Erambie 
near Cowra were drawn to the fruit picking season, especially after the 
assimilationist neglect and abuse of their reserves. Brungle was one of the 
first missions, established under Queen Victoria's reign. It was given to the 
Aboriginal people, as Vince Bulger, recalls, "never to be taken off them." 
Although Brungle was a self-supporting mission, with its own school, dairy 
cows, vegetables and other crops and even its own sporting teams, Vince, 
who identifies as a Wolgalu and a "mountain man", nevertheless rc:;calls 
that it was also a "very sad" place, "just like being in jail." Aborigines would 
be paid only in rations but would venture from the mission to harvest corn 
and millet and to pick apples.92 Similarly, from October to May, Aboriginal 
families would follow the fruit picking opportunities in the Murrumbidgee 
Valley and "escape from the decay of Brungle and the autocratic managers 
of Erambie. "93 
88
• Read, Peter, A Hundred Years War: The Wiradjuri People and the State, Canberra, 
Australian National University Press, 1988, p. 97. 
89 Ibid, p. 77. 
90 Ibid, p. 82. 
91 Ibid, p. 97. 
92 Bulger, Vince, interviewed April 1997. 
93 Read, op.cit., p. 102. 
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During the 1950s the reserves were still neglected. Attempts to assimilate 
Aborigines via town housing programs were failing. Further, town 
council-planned Aboriginal housing was being segregated from the town 
proper. A more general "spacial politics"94 arose within several towns of 
the Basin as they sought to exclude Aborigines from purchasing blocks of 
land, sharing hospitals and schools, theatres and public conveniences. 
Although in the heart of the MIA at Griffith, efforts were also made by the 
Griffith citizens to help Aborigines "move from the reserves to the town."95 
Because of these poor conditions and hostile circumstances, many 
Aborigines began to move away from the country towns. They sought 
better living conditions and more secure work in the burgeoning 
industrial centres of the coast--whilst also often retaining a sense of their 
belonging to their land. Thus, for Goodall, "moving away has neither 
severed their sense of relating to their home country, nor has it removed 
the idea that a custodial relationship to land is an important part of an 
adult's social role."96 But for those that remained, those clinging to 
reserves which were still scattered throughout the Basin often on the 
banks of its rivers, the offers of inducements to leave and the knocking 
down of shacks as opportunities presented themselves to the Board, 
continued. Out of the 700 houses initially envisaged in the early 1940s, by 
1961, only 54 houses had been built for the whole State. The forcible 
removal of children of 'mixed' parentage was also occurring. Further, 
the Cowra Whites had held out against accepting anyone, the Griffith 
council had used assimilation to get rid of a few fringe-camps, the 
Brungle residents had left only after their morale and dwellings were 
smashed, and the rehousing at Yass had left most of the people with 
nowhere to live97 
In sum, whether living on the ever-threatened reserves along the river 
banks of the plains, on the fringes or within the often hostile farming 
towns, or amongst the remote cities along the coast, the cultural dislocation 
of Aboriginal life in the east of the Murray Darling Basin under forcible, 
assimilation policies was severe. 
94 Goodall, op. cit., Chapter 20. 
95 Read, op. cit., p. 108. 
96 Goodall, op. cit., p. 296. 
97 Read, op. cit., p. 112. 
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The parallel effort to remake the rivers in conformance with a full 
utilisation vision for a greater Australia continued. Menzies was pushing 
Playford to refer the matter of the high level interconnection to the River 
Murray Commission.98 The River Murray Agreement, as interpreted by 
Barwick for Menzies, meant that South Australia had no claim to "net 
additional" water flowing into the Murray from the Snowy Scheme:99 
Playford was prepared to consult again only via another conference of 
Ministers. 100 Given that the upstream States tended to dominate this forum, 
and the likelihood that this 'technical' forum would not provide the 
solution which Playford was after, and given that Menzies had indicated 
that legal avenues would also be difficult for South Australia, Playford 
reiterated his desire for a political solution. 
Nevertheless, the River Murray Commission met on the 20th and 21st of 
March 1958 to consider the matter. It agreed that the Snowy and River 
Murray Agreements were incompatible in-so-far as the latter provided 
only for diversion by a State.' 01 The New South Wales Cabinet had also met 
and on the 25th of March had approved the Snowy Agreement Bill but also 
decided that the Bill should not be proclaimed until the situation with 
regard to the River Murray Agreement had been finalised. 102 
Subsequently, and not unexpectedly, when ratifying legislation was 
introduced by the Commonwealth Parliament on the 17th of April, 1958, 
Playford responded by issuing a writ the next day to protect South 
Australia's share of the Murray water and the quality of water it was to 
receive. Its focus was upon the legality under the River Murray Agreement 
of diverting the Tooma from the Murray. The writ also claimed that water 
diverted into the Murray from the Snowy should be subject to the terms and 
conditions of the River Murray Agreement. South Australia should have a 
right to a share of the diverted water. 1 03 Playford reiterated that 90% of 
reticulated water in South Australia came from the Murray and he was 
concerned to improve this supply, especially to cover drought periods. 
98 Menzies to Playford, 31/12/57, NAA: Al209, 195611872 Part 4, op. cit. 
99
. Bailey to Menzies, 23112/57, NAA: Ml505, 1199, Snowy Mountains Agreement 
Water Clauses. 
100
• Playford to Menzies, 3/1/58, NAA: A1209, 195611872 Part 4, Snowy Mountains 
Hydro-Electric Scheme - Agreement with the States. 
101 Winston to Bailey, 26/3/58, NAA: ibid. 
102
• Cahill to Menzies, 3/4/58, NAA: ibid. 
103 
"Details of South Australian Writ", circa 20/4/58, NAA: A1209, 1956/1872 Part 
5, op. cit. 
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Concurrently, efforts were being made to change the River Murray 
Agreement. Clause 45, the Commonwealth suggested, should be amended 
such as to allow the Tooma diversion to "be treated as water diverted by the 
States of New South Wales and Victoria" thus protecting the Commonwealth 
against legal action. Other amendments were also sought to clause 46 and 
51; "to replace diverted water from any convenient source."104 Primarily, 
South Australia was to be offered a better deal for water during dry years in 
return for the right to make up this water from the Menindee storage. New 
South Wales would gain greater flexibility in supplying Adelaide but would 
also have to provide more water to Victoria from the Murray. Nevertheless, 
better access to fresh water for Adelaide was still under threat. 
In particular, New South Wales was not prepared to make up extra flows 
now due to South Australia from the additional water flowing directly to the 
Murray from the Scheme. It was paying for the diversion of water via the 
electricity charges on Snowy power and did not concede any legal 
requirement under the River Murray Agreement to do so. 1 05 That is, New 
South Wales wanted greater flexibility. It wanted to be able to replace the 
Tooma diversion with water from the new Menindee storage propos.ed for 
the Darling. Water naturally flowing into the Murray but now to the Upper 
Tumut via the Tooma diversion could be made up from turbid, non-snow 
melt sources. This would allow it to continue its long term plan to develop 
the Murray-Darling basin, to focus water availability at the MIA. This also 
became a New South Wales Cabinet directive to govern their 
negotiations.' 06 
The planned interconnection then became public, presented by Authority 
engineers--and New South Wales--as offering a more flexible and efficient 
use of storage (figure 8). But, it was admitted, the interchange would 
probably favour New South Wales as it was the Snowy waters which would 
have to go north, to the larger storage. As Eucumbene could also take more 
of the storage requirements, the press was speculating that Jindabyne 
township could be saved from being submerged.' 07 
104 Heffron to Menzies [no date], NAA: ibid. 
105 Brown to Menzies, 27/5/58, NAA: ibid. 
106 Spooner to Menzies, 5/6/58, NAA: A1209, 1956/1872 Part 6, op. cit. 
107 
"Change in plans for Snowy", Sun-Herald, 116158, p. 9. 
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Figure 8; Map from; "Changes in Plans for Snowy", Sun Herald, 1/6/58. 
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At a meeting of Ministers, all Playford could do, at least initially, was stick 
to a claim for extra water as a result of the diversions. Playford, however, 
moved to emphasise the value of freshets: 
They are uncontrolled waters and they are of extreme importance to us 
because they are one means we have occasionally of sluicing out the 
river and getting rid of some of the saline matter which otherwise 
gradually accumulates and gradually so impregnates our water with salt 
as to make it unusable.' 08 
Freshets from the Murray system were especially valuable as they were of 
higher quality than from the Darling. However, the 'efficient' high level 
diversion and the modified River Murray Agreement were threatening, 
together, to close out this source of renewing water into Lake Victoria. 
Hudson was then called upon by Cabinet to explain how the altered design 
would protect South Australia. His submission was now, however, in line 
with Spooner's earlier wishes. He now explained that South Australia's 
concerns would mostly be met. The Upper Snowy water stored at Island 
Bend could be transferred to Eucumbene and thence down the Tumut, but 
the Geehi water would have to be dumped into Jindabyne as the Geehi 
storage was at a lower level than Eucumbene. Consequently, too, "any water 
diverted by gravity from the Geehi River to Jindabyne Reservoir for 
storage would be pumped back to Geehi Pond and not to the higher level of 
Lake Eucumbene. "1 09 This would be done by placing a limit upon the power 
of the pumps at Jindabyne (as well as by not installing gates in tunnels) 
ensuring water could be pushed back only as high as Geehi. 1 10 
Treasury remained sceptical of the economics but with complexities 
mounting and an Agreement so close the deal went through the Advisory 
Council. 111 Menzies now assured Playford that the physical arrangement 
precluded illegal diversions out of the Geehi catchment; "Geehi water will 
not be diverted to Lake Eucumbene either by gravity or by pumping from 
108
. "Conference on The Snowy Mountains Agreement and The River Murray Waters 
Agreement", 6/6/58, p. E2, NAA: A1209, 195611872 Part 6, op. cit. 
109
• SMHEA Cabinet Submission, "Proposed Amendments to the Snowy-Murray 
Development" June 1958, p. 11, NAA: A987, Ell46 Part l, op. cit. 
110 Hudson to Bunting [Secretary, Prime Minister's Dept.], 10/2/60, NAA: A987, 
E1146 Part 2, op. cit. 
11
'- Spooner to Fadden, 25/8/58, NAA: A987, E1146 Part 1, op. cit. 
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Jindabyne. "112 Although it took the next twelve months for Playford's 
concerns to abate, and for Menzies to write on the matter, this assurance 
that the Upper Murray (if not Upper Snowy) water would not be part of the 
long term 'Brewster plan' for the Basin--to focus water availability on the 
MIA--formed the basis of the agreement with Playford. 113 
New South Wales and Victoria continued to hold, however, that South 
Australia was getting the better deal. They wanted, as a final compromise, to 
be able to review aspects of the River Murray Agreement. A period of 
restriction could be declared by a three quarters majority (instead of a 
majority) making it easier to out-vote South Australia. Secondly, Clause 51 
be amended to specify more completely the methods of apportioning water 
without worrying about evaporation and water losses as much as Playford 
wanted. Thirdly, and crucially for the two upstream States, the River 
Murray Agreement would be extended into a Basin-wide Agreement; "it 
should be made clear that Victoria and New South Wales may provide South 
Australia's share from any convenient source in such proportions between 
themselves as they shall decide. "114 
The outcome was that South Australia would gain the (net) water diverted 
from the Snowy counted as River Murray water, at least during times of 
restriction or drought. The three thirteenths would be taken from a larger 
overall pool. By way of protecting flows but also qualities, water would also 
be prevented from flowing from the Geehi to the Tumut. South Australia 
also managed to resist many of the proposed changes to the River Murray 
Agreement but had to accept an amended (automatic) method of 
establishing that a period of restriction existed based on storage levels. 1 15 
Nevertheless, South Australia had to be satisfied to take water from "any 
convenient source", as defined by the two other States. Indeed, with the 
Menindee storage becoming a crucial means of allowing New South Wales 
to meet its undertakings to supply the lower Murray, this new, albeit 
qualified flexibility to the Snowy Scheme's water interchanges (figures 9 & 
10), was a further victory for upstream States. In particular, along with the 
112 [draft letter] Menzies to Playford, circa February 1959, NAA: A987, Ell46 Part 2, 
op. cit. 
113 Menzies to Playford, 5/4/60, NAA: A463, 1958/2436 Part 2, op. cit. 
114 Conference, "The Snowy Mountains Agreement - The River Murray Waters 
Agreement", Attachment A, 3/7/58, NAA: Al209, 1956/1872 Part 7, op. cit. 
liS. "The Snowy Mountains Agreement - The River Murray Waters Agreement", 
Conference, 3/7/58, p. 6, NAA: ibid. 
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Figure I 0; "Principal Diversion and Distribution of Irrigation Water" [pre 
Victoria's extra 100,000 acre feet] Snowy Mountains Hydro-Electric 
Authority, "Progress on the Snowy Mountains Scheme", 5th World Power 
Conference, Vienna, World Power Conference, 1956. 
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broadening of the quantitative emphases of the River Murray Agreement, 
it marks a partial yet significant victory for Brewster's and New South 
Wales' long term, '20 year' plan (from the late 1930s) for the Murray 
Darling Basin, to serve the MIA. 1 16 
New South Wales signalled its concurrence. A week later Bolte indicated 
that his Cabinet was willing to agree. Playford then announced that as a 
result of South Australia amendments, providing his State with more water 
in a drought period, the Snowy Agreement had been settled. 1 17 The 
Agreement--with supplement--was formally proclaimed on the 24th of 
September, 1958. 
Qualitative concerns remained. Ever since the Hume Dam was mooted and 
then begun in 1919, speculation arose as to what the affects of river 
regulation would be on the Barmah Forest or riverine wetlands. The 
flooding patterns of the Murray--flooding during winter and spring and 
receding during the summer--had long been acknowledged to be the means 
by which the forest seeded itself. With irrigation diversions and damming 
of flows, however, these regimes were gradually changing. Since the early 
1930s in particular, when the Hume Dam was about to be (finally) 
completed, speculation arose as to what the affects might be and by the late 
1930s it was decided to put in place a weir at 'the Gulf'. The increased flow of 
irrigation water during the summer months down the river was keeping 
the water abnormally high in parts of the forest, whilst the damming of 
the river was also keeping flows low in winter/spring. The weir would at 
least prevent abnormally long summer flooding. And by 1944 the problem 
of the lack of winter flooding--leading to falling rates of seeding--was also 
of concern. Tindale, the forester responsible, also believed that poorly 
timed or too long a flooding could drown previous seedlings. 1 1 8 Cattle were 
eating seedlings and this he believed to be the main problem. In 1950, a 
quarter of the 77,000 acres of the forest available for grazing was then 
closed. 
116 Warrell, E. G., "Notes on Commonwealth-State Relationships in Regard to the Snowy 
Scheme", p. 6 (Document 1869), NAA: A2618, DOCUMENTS 1869 TO 1886, Notes on 
Commonwealth-State Relationships ... 
117 Jones to Craig, 15/7/58, NAA: A1209, 1956/1872 Part 7, op. cit. 
118 Fahey, Charles, Barmah Forest - A History, Melbourne, Department of 
Conservation, Forests and Lands, 1988, p. 54. 
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By 1953, however, the Murray Valley Development League and many local 
residents were noting the significant damage which had been caused to the 
forests by the irrigation weirs and dams and the loss of flooding cycles. 11 9 
Many were calling for regulators to be placed in the inlet channels to the 
forests to prevent undue summer flooding as irrigation water passed down 
the river, although others were fearful of whether this may increase flood 
levels. From the early 1960s experiments were conducted seeking to 
establish the affects upon the forest of grazing. 12° Contra previous 
assumptions, the investigations concluded that cattle apparently aided 
regeneration by reducing the weeds and grasses which were in 
competition with the sapling seedlings. In November 1967, the Barmah 
Forest was reopened to cattle. 
To return to Cumeragunga, nearby to Barmah, the war years had seen a 
further deterioration. Policies decided upon in 1939 had been delayed and 
further efforts were made to close down the reserve mainly via attrition. 
The authorities then sought to formally close the reserve in 1953 with the 
Board officially requesting that the Lands Department revoke all but 200 
acres of reserved land. Again, like in the 1930s, the cottages were also 
allowed to run down to encourage dispersal and because, the Board 
suggested, the land was "'no longer needed by the Aborigines. "'121 Even 
though this general revocation did not take formal effect, the majority of 
the reserve was leased out. And "the remaining acreage, including the 200 
acres to be retained as an Aboriginal reserve, was being farmed 
by ... Europeans" and thus because "'the land up to the doorsteps' was leased, 
residents worked elsewhere as farm labourers." 122 Yet "in the late 1950s 
Cumeragunga residents began to investigate the possibility of obtaining 
control of the reserve once again." 123 Aided by the mainly European 
Aborigines Advancement League from Victoria, the residents began to seek 
access to the lands which their forebears had cleared. In particular, the 
residents began to investigate in 1959 "the possibilities of co-operative 
119
• Lawrence, G. V., "Notes for Guidance of Red Gum Inspections Echuca .... l953", 
11/5/53, CSUA, RW214/419. 
120 Ibid. 
121
• Barwick, Dianne, "Coranderrk and Cumeroogunga: Pioneers and Policy", in Pennay, 
D. H. and Epstein, T. S., Opportunity and Response: Case Studies in Economic 
Development, London, Hurst, 1972, p. 64. 
122 Ibid, p. 64. 
123
• Fahey, op. cit., p. 9 
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farming, and to petition for the use of the land still reserved."124 In 
Melbourne too: 
m 1960 the Cumeragunga exiles in the Kew branch of the Victorian 
Aborigines Advancement League ... launched a Land Committee and began 
to prepare a detailed plan for the reclamation of the remaining 1500 
acres of reserve which were leased to the whites, then the 
redevelopment of farming there125 
Aboriginal land co-operatives were also being formed during the late 1950s 
and early 1960s in north east New South Wales. The famous Yirrkala land 
claim and bark petition in northern Australia were not alone. By February 
1963 in fact--a couple of months before they learnt of the Yirrkala land 
challenges--the Cumeragunga people "presented a case which drew on the 
communities memory of their history on the reserve." 126 In April 1964 
White farmers leases were cancelled. Rural Aborigines then met in October 
1965 and concerned themselves especially with land. As well as calling for 
the building of houses on reserves where Aborigines desired to live the 
government was requested to address the rural employment of Ab!)rigines 
"in its decentralisation plans, so that pressure would cease being applied to 
make people move away from the area of their choice. "127 
From late 1965, a New South Wales Joint Parliamentary Committee of 
Inquiry into Aborigine's Welfare was also set up to visit and report on 
many centres throughout New South Wales. It also took evidence from 
Cumeragunga in July 1966. But it took until May 1966 for an agreement to 
be signed allowing Aborigines to proceed with farming. Meantime, at 
Brewarrina in the north however, "the move to West Brewarrina in 1966 
meant the loss of access to hundreds of acres of reserve lands in the 
west.'" 28 Then, after the 1967 referendum was won, enabling the counting 
of Aborigines in the census and granting powers over Aboriginal affairs to 
the Commonwealth (with little effective change in the immediate wake of 
the outcome), a report of a New South Wales Joint Committee was tabled: 
124 Barwick, op. cit., p. 64. 
125 Goodall, op. cit., p. 310. 
126 Ibid, p. 310. 
127 Ibid, p. 323. 
128 Ibid, p. 319. 
312 
It was an even greater shock than the federal government's retreat over 
the referendum ... rather than endorsing Aboriginal criticisms, the 
report accused the Board of being too slow and hesitant in its 
assimilation activities ... The committee recommended a far more 
aggressive assimilation, in which Aboriginal people were now to be 
under surveillance from many more authorities which all demanded 
normative compliance with 'white standards' ... It acknowledged that good 
crops were now being harvested at both Cumeragunga and Cabbage Tree 
Island, but it was scathing about Aboriginal desires to farm land 
collectively .1 29 
But the evidence given to the committee suggested that efforts had long 
been made and were continuing to be made to advance the reserves by 
farming. Especially at Cumeragunga, attempts had been made since 1960 to 
regain control of the reserve by ending the leases to 'European' farmers. 
By 1964 the Aborigines Welfare Board had at least agreed in principle to the 
farming project. Kevin Atkinson, as manager of the farm on the reserve, 
outlined to the committee how the community had waited for years for 
permission before finally going ahead with some farming. Vealers had 
been raised and wheat also grown, using a tractor and a combine, donated 
by the Victorian Aboriginal Advancement League and irrigation was also 
being considered for the growing of fruit and vegetables. 130 Even though 
the committee encouraged Atkinson to investigate the irrigation prospects 
of the property, this was done mainly for the purpose of emphasising the 
need for the community to get on with assimilating. 
The Acting Convenor of the Advancement League, Edith Bacon, reminded 
the committee of the efforts of the past. Early in the century wheat had 
been grown on the reserve and "in 1930 this was a flourishing community 
with forty six cottages, a hospital and a church. Approximately 1,000 people 
were living on the reserve of between 2,800 and 3,000 acres,"131 although 
as the 1930s passed, the conditions collapsed. 132 But the committee was more 
concerned about the on-going economic prospects rather than 
maintaining indigenous associations with land. They were pre-occupied 
129 Ibid, p. 328-9. 
130
• Parliament of New South Wales, Report from the Joint Committee ... upon Aborigines 
Welfare, Part II - Minutes of Evidence, Sydney, Govt Printer, 1967, p. 444 [in New 
South Wales, Joint Volume of Papers ... 1967-8, Sydney, Govt Printer, 1968] 
131 Ibid, p. 447. 
132
. Barwick, op. cit., p. 62. 
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about future prospects for work in such an isolated area, about the steps 
made to involve irrigation expertise to determine the prospects of 
deploying water on the farm and whether any firm plans were in place to 
get the property producing, even though the lease was yet to be formally 
signed. 133 The committee, in short, was more concerned about the 
motivation of the community or its ability to do the work rather than about 
the barriers in their way or of how assimilationist policies were inhibiting 
a sense of place, purpose and cultural maintenance--for the Aborigines. 
But then Stan Davey, who had assisted Pastor Douglas Nichols and others in 
the formation of the Aboriginal Advancement League of Victoria in 1957 
and who was a minister for the Church of Christ and was now a Director of 
the League, was heard. He acknowledged that the community was remote 
but, as with the decentralisation arguments often put by rural 
communities, this should not mean that the community be broken up. He 
also challenged the assumptions of the committee that an often autocratic 
or condescending assimilation was the best approach. For Davey, the 
Aborigines "have the right to be consulted about plans for their future and 
must be consulted about them for the plans to be successful." Assimilation 
often did not allow for this self determination without which there was less 
chance of self reliance. And thus in a spirited defence of the need for 
community cohesion based on the land, Davey, a 'whitey', challenged the 
assumptions of the committee in no uncertain terms: 
There is a sense of community and cohesion amongst these people. It is 
not a matter of poor people clinging together. Secondly, there is an 
attitude towards the land among them that we do not have. There is a 
respect for land. Land is not be bought and sold and exploited, but it is 
something to which these people belong. This goes right back into the 
roots of tribal life. They had tribal land that was known thoroughly. All 
the animal and plant life was known and respected. They did not wander 
nomadically in a way that disregarded their own tribal area. They 
wandered within a set area and they looked upon it as being their 
land. 134 
Ill Parliament of New South Wales, 1968, op. cit., p. 446. 
134 Ibid, p. 459. 
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When the committee turned the question around, and asked whether the 
option of staying in the reserve was actually a limiting option, Davey again 
stressed self-determination. For him, deciding the best option always 
involved "people's limited knowledge" but "if we can expand that 
knowledge by giving them as much insight into the possibilities they may 
still make the choice. If these people do not choose, it will be 
unacceptable. "135 The possibilities of self determination and for cultivating 
diversities of development and occupation of land were therefore, again, 
apparent. As with Ferguson twenty years previously, they were still being 
put forcefully and eloquently, at least within the submissions, if not via the 
conclusions of the inquiry. As with other claims to make something more 
from development rather than merely compounding sameness, via the 
assimilation of Aborigines and to have them conform to the drift to the 
cities or to Anglo cultures of employment, other possibilities and values for 
inclusion were also being fought for. Similarly, the current generation of 
Yorta Yorta are seeking to claim return of lands and water. For Wayne 
Atkinson at the Federal Court hearing into granting such rights: 
Our philosophy is ... based on maintaining the environment...and using 
some techniques to manage it, such as fire to regenerate growth and to 
increase wildlife population ... What has happened with the control of the 
water systems in the Murray Darling Basin is contrary to this 
philosophy. It is environmental vandalism on a large scale. I am 
frightened that what is happening here will turn the forest into a 
wasteland, as has happened in other parts of the world where similar 
practices have been used, and failed. "136 (figures 11 & 12). 
Taking this interplay between the last stages of the design and impact on 
Aboriginal people together, we can see that qualitative water rights issues, 
whether affecting indigenous heritage within the Alps and Murray 
Darling Basin or the supply of water to Adelaide, have been part of Snowy 
Scheme histories. The 'formal bias' of systems-centric assumptions have 
been challenged in the past. Along with the abstract, geometrised place and 
space of the engineering drawing boards, along with its quantified figures 
and flows, there have existed parallel traditions. From the early 
explorations of the Murray Darling Basin and of the Australian Alps 
1
"- Ibid, p. 460. 
136 Atkinson, Wayne, "Statement of Wayne Roderick Atkinson", 17/9/96 [provided as 
evidence to Federal Court on the Yorta Yorta claim]. 
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Figure 11; Painting by Clifton Pugh, "A Crucifixion on the Salt Plains" 
(painting), April 1959, reproduced in Nolan Gallery, The Antipodeans. 
Another Chapter, Melbourne, Fine Art Press, 1988. 
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Figure 12; Painting by Albert Tucker, "Cockatoos, Barmah", (1964), 
reproduced from Uhl, C., A /bert Tucker, Melbourne, Lansdowne, 1960, plate 
31. 
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themselves, the intimate awareness of terrain, climate and flora and fauna 
of Aborigines provided knowledge for the 'discovery' of the these lands. 
Many have even suggested that the particular ways in which Aborigines 
have cultivated the 'grasslands' of the interior also provided a basis for the 
subsequent wave of settlement and cultivation. Either way, the lived 
relation to place of indigenous peoples has continued to evolve. Despite 
being often hidden from view, the wisdom of place of indigenous people's 
has also been ever present. Within the bold 'full utilisation' ethos itself, an 
awareness that more than a quantitative relation to the rivers and water-
use is required, and has been included into the design of the Scheme. 
The maintenance of Aboriginal cultures by their own traditions of myth 
and ritual have, like Euro or US-centric traditions, also placed water and 
land in a crucial relation to human presence. Dreaming stories of the 
creation of the lands-and-the-rivers plus the rituals of meeting and moth 
hunting have regulated the closely connected social and land-use activities 
of traditional Aboriginal societies. Cultural memory of, for example, the 
Yorta Yorta, even dates back to when river courses changed due to 
geological upheavals. Traditional sites of meeting and ritual also still exist 
at the places where pre-European invasion Aborigines once thrived. For 
example, on the shores of Jindabyne as well as Blowering and Talbingo, 
significant sites have been identified. 
The dominant traditions, although also placing an importance upon 
symbolising water and land, have done so such as to favour the massive 
remaking of place and space. Dry-and-dusty engineering scenarios--in 
need of massive 'relief'--and their technocultural representations, held 
sway throughout the major period of design and construction. The post-war 
development of the Snowy Scheme has seen an intensification of 
quantitative symbols and engineering practices for remaking place 
according to such 'fordist river' assumptions. The images of Lang, Drysdale 
and Rose encourage greater amounts of stored and regulated water as the 
confident option for a landscape and riverine system apparently more in 
need of massive interventions because of its highly variable cycles of 
scarcity and flood. 
The design change to the Scheme forced by the actions of the 'marginal' 
city of Adelaide is therefore an important precedent, not just as it sought to 
maintain water quality for Adelaide but as it offers an alternative to the 
3 1 8 
quantitative emphasis. The alteration to the high level interconnection 
between Eucumbene and Geehi, was designed such that water could not flow 
out of the upper Murray catchment or from Geehi across to Eucumbene 
(albeit that a similar diversion from the Upper Snowy River was 
supported). This prevented fresh water flows or snow melt from being 
diverted from the more direct route to South Australia via the Murray. It 
therefore went some way to maintaining fresh water flow regimes in 
Murray. Arguably, it is often inter-catchment transfers that are the most 
disruptive to bio-diversity and to riverine health. A 'formal bias' of systems 
builders of the 1940s and 1950s, to push on with the building of larger dams, 
under a scientistic approach to water management, thus came under 
challenge. Although the wasteful Chowilla dam would soon be mooted by 
Playford and the revised River Murray Agreement had its quantitative 
scope extended, an implicit and sometimes contrary relation had been 
recognised; that to benefit an urban population marginal to the Scheme, 
riverine cycles should be maintained. 
Via such an implication, the orderings and cultural geographic remakings 
of the engineers and of the various water commissions appear as having 
their own, more obvious assumptions. Foremost, the rhetorics of 
technological autonomy and the sensitivities of mobile, if also renewing, 
overseas expertise may be less attuned to the cultural and geographic 
combinations of locale. In contrast, painters such as Albert Tucker, offered 
a wary tale. He suggested that local differences imply environmental risks 
beyond those appreciated and which include co-joint risks of attitude or 
institutions. And culturally, during the same period, various indigenous 
traditions of place (however hybridised with settler traditions) were being 
denied, although Arthur Boyd expressed the tragedy of the existing 
outcomes. Aborigines were still being pushed off reserves by these very 
same pressures for intensified land use. As the new orchards and 
productivities of the irrigation areas arose, Aborigines often became 
dependent upon these new and often uncertain forms of itinerant labour. 
Removal from reserves, the taking of children and the assimilation policies 
seeking to erase indigenous cultures, continued during the 1950s. 
A range of Aboriginal traditions or Aboriginalities have, however, 
continued. Especially with the recent land rights victories in the High 
Court, they are again re-asserting their claims to cultural co-existence. In 
particular, the Yorta Yorta claim recently heard before Victoria's Federal 
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Court challenges the totalising assumptions of the earlier water planners. 
Aborigines, often with disrupted relations to place and traditions, are re-
asserting their presence, their traditional associations and developing 
their own current ideas on water and land management. Assumptions of 
empty lands and highly extractive approaches to rivers are being 
questioned by Aborigines seeking respect for their prior and continuing 
presence and by their own sophisticated and parallel knowledges and often 
interwoven histories. Similarly, sites of Aboriginal cultural significance in 
the Kosciuszko National Park, and as affected by the Scheme, may pose 
further challenges to the preponderant, scientistic heritage of post-war 
engineering design. Even as imported planning idioms have failed in the 
past to make much of overseas precedents for including Aborigines, a more 
inclusive space for differences is being sought. Finally, and in parallel 
again, the meeting grounds of the Alps have also led to cultural 
transformations for indigenous society. Just as for post-war reconstruction 
society, but possibly for thousands of years, the Alps, with its resources, 
Aboriginal heritage and inter-tribal associations, has represented a crucial 
site of Aboriginal meeting and renewal. 
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Chapter 7: Conclusion--Interpreting A "Spinning Reserve" 
Even though the Snowy Scheme has seldom been used as a 'spinning 
reserve' generation facility (figure I) this important systems security 
function can provide a useful metaphor for the technical, social and 
environmental crucible which is the Scheme. The spinning reserve 
function refers to the ability of the rotating water turbines, under low load, 
to come quickly up to full power and thence to protect the overall system 
from failure due to sudden load shedding. The Scheme's capacity could 
restart the power sinusoid in the south east Australian electricity grid. As 
metaphor, spinning reserve may also be applied to critically examine the 
joint processes which have come into play in the Scheme itself. 
The Scheme as designed and constructed has been in circulation, with 
varying fluency, has passed through spirals of communication and 
interpretation. It IS a multi-purpose reserve or container whose 
technocultural choices have varied symbolically, politically and 
technically. Analysis may therefore focus on the socially spinning aspects 
of spinning reserve and upon its institutionally circulating 
characteristics. Spinning reserve, by suggesting an alternative to ways in 
which large technical systems use nature as a standing reserve--to plunder 
nature--may also suggest senses in which natural resources have been 
husbanded, their potentials enhanced as well as degraded. Accordingly, the 
continually re-interpreted, open character of the Scheme, along with the 
closures and oversights of its dominant spirals, plus its qualities of re-made 
place, will be stressed in this concluding review. 
Principally, the Scheme was inspired by US models and processes of multi-
purpose, river basin and regional planning. The regional aspirations 
arising thence highlighted the interplay between local geographies and 
interpretations of design possibilities. The construction of post-war 
regional identities (the vying borderlands) occurred in parallel to the 
design options of the Scheme. Various prospects, and hence designs, for 
electrified landscapes, well-watered and revitalised farmlands as well as 
proto environmental and other initiatives were also accompanied by 
reinvigorated political possibilities for the regions. These initiatives were 
bolstered by the 'think big' rhetoric of a nation seeking to populate or 
perish. The strengthening of central government emphases, drawing on 
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Figure 1; Graph, "Snowy Mountains Council. Incident of Monday 28.11.66 at 
12.07 Hrs. 250 M.W. of Generation Lost at Vales Point Through Prime Mover 
Trouble" in Snowy Mountains Council. Visit to Works Operation Centre, 
February 1967. Summary of Address to Council, Cooma?, The Snowy 
Mountains Authority?, 1967, fig. 6. 
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US TV A precedents, also threatened to break federalism out of an easily 
contained continuance of State-sponsored development. 
Accompanying the Commonwealth's strengthened hand, a diversity of re-
aligning interests participated. Regionalism was invigorated, politically 
and geographically, by re-interpreting overseas programs and by drawing 
on local cultures of development under a federalism empowered to enable a 
fusion of horizons of local aspirations. An interpretive flexibility of 
designs arrived with this expanded horizon as local approaches to 
development gained a semi-autonomous position. US precedents also boosted 
grass roots, politically-empowered regionalism so as to provide statutory 
responsibilities to regional planning authorities. This, in turn, arose via a 
reading of the TVA planning methodology as participatory. Regional 
development was interpreted, in the manner of Mumford, to favour local 
environments. Significant soil and forestry conservation initiatives were 
proposed by Henderson, for example, a proto eco-feminist. Within 'full 
utilisation' regionalism, it was suggested that federalism be re-aligned to 
accord with cultivating ecological diversities. Replacing the States, a more 
diversified, locally responsive federation of many regions in association 
with the Commonwealth, can be glimpsed. This occurred despite the fact 
that those who were attempting to redress the neglect of borderland 
regions, and were themselves more closely aligned with river basin or 
even ecological regions, were not necessarily looking for an ecological 
federation. 
It was the moment of danger, the threat of invasion and then the shift from 
British to US hegemony during and after World War Two, that encouraged 
other possible re-figurings of national development. Development 
programs were actively appropriated not only by interpreting overseas 
models but by selecting from the various positions on offer. Re-
contextualised overseas technocultures were, indeed, the main source of 
openness/multi-stability as US capital slowly came to replace Sterling. 
Thus, the mild, hybrid nature of the Scheme from an Anglophone (and 
European) cultural perspective; a bric-a-brac of shifting influences. A 
changing combination of symbolic, technological, planning and financial 
stratagems. 
The longer standing, conservative, New States approach of the lower Snowy 
(cross border) region was boosted. They had been long-term campaigners 
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for regional justice. The New States strategy for this coastal region arose, 
however, at a time when the States were being down-played by the 
Commonwealth and as the newly emergent regional enthusiasms for and of 
the interior were burgeoning. Although proposing a political realignment, 
because of the hegemony of 'water for the thirsty land', the Snowy region 
would be outbid by the more far-reaching horizons--technically, 
geographically, politically and economically--of the alternative 
transformations on offer. With the new transmission and tunnelling 
technologies interplaying with the new full utilisation approach to 
planning and thence with the new regionalism, the lower Snowy, hydro-
industrial option became a (mere) survival from the interwar period. 
Symptomatically, their claims for regional justice were being 
circumvented by the majoritarian claims for development made possible on 
the other side of the range via the inter-basin transfers of water. 
During this period of planning enthusiasm local Aborigines were wishing 
to pick up on Indigenous American New Deal aspirations. As well as being 
pushed back on to reserves, Aborigines were pushing for their reserves to 
become a basis for enhancing their rights to economic independence. The 
1944 'Powers' referendum offered hope for such prospects. Without this 
change, however, and without much in the way of legal or constitutional 
rights, this most marginal borderland continued to be neglected, especially 
as pressures to intensify agriculture emerged. The bold appropriation by 
Bradfield and Idriess of the boomerang as symbol for their well-watered, 
defensive line of population in the interior, which also inspired the Snowy 
Scheme, is symptomatic in this regard. Without constitutionally recognised 
rights or treaties (unlike in the US) indigenous aspirations for the Barmah 
forest, for example, or hopes for salvaging heritage sites from the 
foreshores of the artificial reservoirs of the Scheme, have been easily 
defeated or ignored. Much of the indigenous relation to the history of the 
Scheme has been one of neglect, assimilation and denial. As irrigated 
agribusiness intensified land use pressures, Aborigines found themselves 
reforming around fruit and crop picking employment prospects whilst 
being denied access to expanded agricultural possibilities on the former 
reserve lands. 
The nation building process, from this perspective, was a strategy to shore 
up rather than open up. Implicitly, the Scheme has been a 'scheme' or 
strategy to exclude indigenous borderlands or first nations from an 
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intensified Anglo-Celtic nation, remaining strange to their cultural 
aspirations or grammars of life. Because of the failure to make more of 
indigenous overseas precedents, hegemonic development was re-inscribed, 
possibilities were contained and Aborigines were re-enlisted into 
exclusionary and hence intensified forms of control. Nevertheless, long 
indigenous association to lands, whether via the Aboriginal Reserves, 
agricultural labouring and community memory and via the cultural sites 
themselves within the Alps (also affected by the construction of the 
Scheme), have persisted. 
The opening up of possibilities for reorientating or reformulating cultural 
identities was filled with fearful as much as progressive or optimistic 
possibilities. Contesting the optimistic New Deal or 'New Dawn' planning 
and democratic enthusiasms of post-war reconstruction were conservative, 
cultural-political forces. A re-inscription of Anglo-Celtic cultural desire 
was a dominant theme, against the fear of being 'alone in Asia', which the 
isolation of World War Two was seen to imply. It hence involved a large 
measure of consensus around a White Australia population policy. 
Reconstruction was seen as a way to secure a white cultural outpost, to 
populate Australia with Anglo-Celtic thence European migrants or face 
'race suicide'. 
Spinning reserve may signify this process of re-inscription into dominant 
modes of planning, of being unable to break with dominant technocultural 
assumptions and traditions. Against indigenous and/or water quality 
emphases, spinning reserve exhibits its own momentum, its unsettling 
formal biases, its spirals of systems serving inertia. From Bradfield's 
verdant vision and Drysdale's newly surreal droughts, which became 
images of national identity, to the Authority's films and its repeated 
Drysdalesque imagery, the quantitative, 'water for the thirsty land' 
imperative, financially supported by ever more energy intensive 
scenarios, has been often remade. The quantitative, full utilisation cultural 
geography has remained an ever-ready cultural hermeneutic resource, a 
strongly forming then informing cultural characteristic throughout. 
The major legitimating device of the administrative class in this regard has 
been their metaphors of fact. Although also yearning for a greater 
rationality in public policy after the set backs of depression and war, such 
desires tended to displace broadly constituted communicative and 
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institutional practices. Symbols produced by technocratic consciousness 
were crafted to argue for technological autonomy, pseudo-objective or 
idealised efficiencies, unencumbered by contradictory values. Similarly, if 
aligned to an energy intensive scenario, was the Murray Valley 
Association's early, if uncertain, confidence in opting for an 'apolitical' 
approach to planning. Such a 'scientific' and, hence, supposedly apolitical 
approach to designing the regions tended to also suit a defensive 
Commonwealth government. After the loss of the Powers referendum of 
1944, the Commonwealth's uniform taxation and defence powers would have 
to suffice. Reflecting this strategic weakness, any planning initiatives 
tended either to be hidden or communicated in terms of this dominant, 
policy-epistemic order. 
From the early stages of the design therefore, although variously 
interpreted or significantly contested, communicative possibilities were 
being circumscribed by a scientistic planning hegemony, apparently as a 
result of a limited and limiting interpretation of US planning heritage. 
Sometimes guided by a politically savvy but also by an uncritical, full 
utilisation, engineers approach, the planning process more readily 
migrated into the backrooms of the government departments and began to 
assume a technologically determined character. The administrative criteria 
of an emergent, apolitical, post-war expertise, serving its own full 
utilisation criteria, thus became crucial in determining how much self-
serving momentum existed within the design options. The fading of a 
proto-environmental role for the Commonwealth, as per the concerns of 
the Rural Reconstruction Commission, was symptomatic. The need to 
undertake soil surveys in tandem with other measures of comparative 
economic analyses gradually faded as the instrumentally aligned 
departments of the Commonwealth were preoccupied with their own 
survival. Not having access to on-going advice to critique the irrigation 
enthusiasms of the States, the Commonwealth's role became narrow and 
defensive. Although the Snowy Authority would pursue soil conservation 
in the Alps, this meant that the Basin itself would remain without a 
Commonwealth Authority. 
Inevitably, however, values insinuated themselves into the process. 
Administrative criteria varied, depending on institutional location. It was a 
matter of what was efficient, productive or workable for whom, for which 
corporate aims. In fact, although the senior engineers were publicly-
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minded, had a high level of competence and were incorruptible, their 
internecine, federalist battles were evolving such as to significantly 
compromise the process. The move into the field by the recently constituted 
Commonwealth Department of Works, without overt constitutional powers, 
soon inflamed the States. 
Nevertheless, beginning under Chifley and continued under Menzies, a 
highly active, Keynesian state, even if often technocratic and directive, 
replaced the stop-start state of pre-war. Via the catchment transfers of 
water on offer, embryonic river basin regionalism was transformed as the 
Commonwealth sought to use regionalism to play-off the two main States 
against each other. Regionalism became a largely instrumental device for 
expanding the power and scope of a uniformly systematising central 
government. The majoritarian regions of both the Murrumbidgee and 
Murray came to be served, as were the two major State capitals. 
Nevertheless, a much more nationally co-ordinated and full employment, if 
majoritarian, economy emerged in concert with the Scheme. 
From 1949, the primary means by which divergent interests could be 
included in the spinning reserve process, was through the inter-
governmental forum for the Scheme, the Snowy Mountains Advisory 
Council. It had been proposed by Chifley as a means of negotiating the 
disagreements between the States and the Commonwealth. Large technical 
systems need equally adroit social innovations to control them. 
Unfortunately, however, the Council was not convened until mid 1953, after 
the decision to move the Adaminaby Dam site to the Eucumbene Dam site. 
Under Menzies, the prospects for decisive institutional reform appeared 
more remote as fearful, Cold War cultural tactics of 'war in three years' in 
Asia came forward. The internal political strategy of forming a coalition 
with the Country Party was preferred instead of allowing for extensive 
(inter-departmental then public) discussions of possible technocultural 
outcomes such as a staged or moderated construction program. The 
agribusiness-first scenario also complemented US global interests. At a time 
of recession in the US, USBR expertise was kept employed, US (and other) 
construction companies gained entree to Australia to assist. Whilst securing 
this deal with US expertise plus gaining loan funds to speed agribusiness 
outcomes, Menzies' and Fadden gained a US-style, multipurpose, 'think big' 
project. 
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Although Menzies appears to have been relatively adept at playing off US 
and Sterling interests, the furtive and fait accompli tactics alienated State 
Premiers and power interests and led to over-investment in irrigation 
preferences. Strained relations also created industrial turmoil (exacerbated 
by the McCarthyist tactics of Menzies) and hence stalled potentials for 
progressive change across a range of fields. Nevertheless, via strained 
consultation, a qualified peak power Scheme was forced by New South 
Wales, a more staged approach was adopted, financial and hence legal 
compromises were reached and compromises with South Australia were set. 
Even as Menzies sidestepped more open economic review, States rights and 
the energy intensive and manufacturing interests of Collins House (and 
Sterling), he protected the Coalition and maintained a Keynesian hold on 
the economy. 
As films, in particular, aimed to circumvent broader federalist processes 
such as the Advisory Council, the role of public relations appears counter-
productive. The Authority sought to reconcile farmers to this 'socialist' 
project by drawing a parallel between the traditionally adept 
horsemanship of the 'Man from Snowy River' and the 'thousand horses' of 
the modernised earth movers of the Scheme. Within a land 'dry and dusty', 
the solution of fordist rivers became an easy association, whilst 
sidestepping open political debate. A spectacle of progress, obfuscating the 
geo-political shifts and planning choices, arose to defend a shaky role for a 
co-ordinating, centralising government. 
The technical training overseas of engineers also entailed a significant 
amount of window-dressing for the inter-play of global economic power, 
seeking to limit Australia's role within large agricultural systems. Arising 
from the Snowy Authority engineering experience, however, has been the 
Snowy Mountains Engineering Corporation. The inclusive and democratic 
capacities of its expertise remains to be considered. A comparison between 
pre and post-war dam construction quality, as influenced by US skills 
transfers, and how productivity gains were shared with the arrival of new 
contract methods, also remains to be fully undertaken. Technoculturally, 
however, the outcomes appear limited. 
Industrial change increased dependencies in so far as it amounted to 
deskilling. Cold War industrial pressures saw piece-rate, intensified and 
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exploitative work regimes more extensively deployed. As the '$5 day', 
fordist production-line was applied to rock tunnelling and to earth moving, 
however, increased wages were supported. Achieving results earlier than 
planned also (probably) resulted in windfall profits for the contractors and 
significantly assisted the Snowy Authority in its battles with the States. 
A polarised attitude towards technological change appears to have existed 
amongst the unions. Stemming from events surrounding the 1949 coal 
strike, the A WU sought to displace rival mining unions who, for bitter 
historical and political reasons, were implacably opposed to new 
technology. Although never seriously threatened in its coverage of 
unskilled construction work by other unions, the A WU uncritically 
embraced the supposed inevitabilities of the new technologies, readily 
accepting the intensification of work. By also avoiding strikes, this 
corporatist unionism was abetted by the American contractors and by a 
sympathetic judge. Fundamentally, however, with World Bank loans 
arriving in parallel with predominantly US contractors and construction 
methods, along with the deal to back off from manufacturing scenarios in 
return for agribusiness and hence irrigation first emphases, plus the 
willingness of Menzies to attack unions, these all combined to push the 
long term and break neck speed scenario forward. 
Relatedly, as contracts were revamped, a local engineering firm, Allied 
Engineering, was nearly sent broke, although Thiess, again with its close 
links to the A WU and American-style approach, would eventually thrive. A 
more thorough examination of the issue would need to explore the 
Scientific Services Division of the Authority, the training gained along 
with improvements in engineering skills and the distribution of other 
aspects of the benefits of technological change. This should include how 
research was deployed to protect and upgrade the quality of working life. 1 
Against the corporatist outcomes, however, forces arose to contest the 
dominant tendencies. Bielski and his multi-lingual column in the 
Australian Worker newspaper and other efforts, provided a more migrant 
friendly unionism. Bielski and his Snowy workers thence staged an 
important challenge to the union-contractor work regime, but given that 
1
• Also see Robinson, Fergus, A Study of Occupational Health and Safety Practice in 
the Construction of the Snowy Mountains Hydro-Electric Scheme, Sydney, National 
Occupational Health and Safety Commission, 2000. 
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Cold War industrial politics had polarised political possibilities, this 
emergent, migrant friendly unionism of Bielski was prevented from 
reforming the A WU. 
Menzies' attempt, arguably, to further 'the split' by exposing the New South 
Wales A WU to pressure, via a transfer of Snowy workers to the 
Commonwealth industrial jurisdiction, was thwarted, however, by a more 
united labour movement. In the process, Justice Taylor, as the lynch pin 
for the A WU in New South Wales, came under Cold War related scrutiny and 
accusation. Paradoxically, it appears that the large US construction 
consortia were less willing than Menzies and Hudson to break the A WU's 
New South Wales jurisdiction for Snowy workers. 
The evidence suggests that a more cross-culturally adept Labour movement, 
symbolised by Bielski, was sacrificed to shore up the political-industrial 
status quo. AWU influence over and loyalty to the ALP, which stopped the 
split in New South Wales, partly relied upon ballot rigging and other rorts 
at the expense of migrant workers. Rather than upending the control of 
the A WU, Bielski's charges of corruption were ignored by a court prepared 
to protect the existing clique rather than risking a 'left' take-over via, or, 
consequent to Bielski. Under it all, after having sought internal reform and 
after having been intimidated, Bielski reacted against union management. 
His migrants union began to threaten radical separatist political action 
whilst remaining open to all. 
Similarly, spinning reserve, as a potential container of differences, also 
suggests that further socio-technical relations of inclusion be addressed, 
including a gender critique of the Scheme. The work of Jocelyn Henderson 
was significant as it contested not only the privileged, public corporatism 
of the men but their preference for overarching systems. Throughout the 
histories of the Scheme, the role of masculine daring has, in fact, been 
prominent, especially in the filmic representations. Via a critique of this 
'frontiersmanship', or via a gendered reading of the filmic and public 
representations of the predominantly masculine actors, the 'conquering of 
nature', the extractive approach to the water cycle becomes apparent. The 
apolitical and determinate planning styles of the men--for example, their 
priestly metaphors of fact--tended to support a 'realist', masculine role, 
bolstering their public presence according to dominant styles of public 
discourse. Further work is needed, however, to elaborate this gendered 
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critique. Further research is also required into whether women gained 
access to areas dominated by men, especially the technical engineering 
work of the Scheme itself.2 Because migrant families and their subaltern 
women were removed by their location in and from construction 
townships, more work on the conditions of reproduction, of amenities and 
accommodation, needs to be done. 
As the Scheme developed, options emerged that addressed a challenge to the 
full utilisation approach. Turning again to the metaphor of spinning 
reserve, especially its last term, we might ask whether instead of treating 
nature as a 'standing reserve', as a store to be raided, it may be considered 
whether the Scheme has also been a recycling or sustainable reserve, 
supporting and improving bio-diverse eco-cultures. Yet the only really 
significant inclusion of bio-diverse concerns in the Scheme's planning, 
came with Playford. South Australia, at its lower riverine margin, managed 
to alter the design of the Eucumbene to Geehi interchange. Although not 
challenging outflows from the Upper Snowy catchment, it wanted to 
ensure that water could not flow out of the Upper Murray catchment to the 
Murrumbidgee. Incidentally, the Kosciuszko Park was also created and a 
dam on Spencer Creek was avoided. 
Nevertheless, the Scheme was designed against variable river flows, 
introducing a major, cultural geographic re-alignment or 'break', 
transforming riverine cycles into fordist rivers--containers and 
conveyors for the cycles of mechanised agriculture. From a regional 
perspective, the overall result has been that bio-regional aspirations 
emerged as a device for expanding the scope and power of uniformly 
systematising and globalising modes of land use. 
Within a peak load and base load paradigm of complementary hydro and 
coal fired power production, the initial construction phase appears as 
another significant re-alignment. The arrival of the interconnected south 
east Australian electricity grid is physically signified by the incomplete 
Kiewa Scheme and the briquette factories at Morwell. System-wise, the re-
alignment seemed most powerful to the manufacturing State of Victoria and 
its hopeful lignite methods. That is, the expanding grid had at least one 
2 For a substantial beginning, see McGoldrick, Kirsty, Snowfraus: The Women of the 
Snowy Mountains Scheme, East Roseville, Kangaroo Press, 1998. 
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other means, and therefore one other socially informed choice, as to where 
and how to persist technologically. With an agribusiness-hydro 
combination coming forward in concert with a shift to a complementary 
base/peak load specialisation of generating plant, this also caused a shift 
for the SECV. Instead of briquetting being the primary area of research, it 
shifted to examine the problem of pre-drying shafts for coal prior to it 
being combusted within larger, base load boilers. Such boilers were now 
being demanded by the new US-style grid--which itself was being installed 
to complement agribusiness. Consequently, this revised, overall systems 
paradigm, caused a major reverse salient or frontier of research and 
development for the SECV to shift. 
There was, therefore, no pure systems engineering. Especially given the 
global and local forces involved, the south east Australian electricity 
system, in terms of its directions of growth or change, was socially shaped. 
As the technological innovations of larger dams and boilers were also built, 
they were shaped by such social forces as directive federalism, corporate 
unionism and intensified work rates. Overall, via its earlier interest in US 
planning if not construction methods, 'Bridge Street' asserted itself over 
the SECV. 
Similarly, just as Victoria's State Rivers and Water Supply Commission was 
forced to take a back seat under Cain during the early to mid 1950s (to avoid 
splitting Victoria's opposition to the Scheme as planned), Elcom was forced 
to moderate its liaison with the SECV by the more powerful water 
bureaucracy within New South Wales. Nevertheless, the intermediate 
position of Elcom helped it to force a compromise. The revised Upper Tumut 
project which drew water from the Upper Murrumbidgee (or Tantangara 
Dam) to intensify flows through the Upper Tumut power stations provided 
more intermediate power which was much needed by a New South Wales 
suffering from severe blackouts. 
If one puts aside for a moment the ideal, diversifying and inclusive spiral 
of the spinning reserve metaphor, the rules and processes of federalism 
stand out as the prime mover in the Snowy context. The Constitution not 
only provides the States with prime responsibility over resource 
development but it also, under Section 100, prohibits the Commonwealth 
from interfering with the States rights over the rivers. When it came to the 
development of the Snowy River, however, the Commonwealth used the 
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Seat of Government Acceptance Act, giving it exclusive right to develop the 
Snowy for power (for the ACT). It had partial financial control, something 
it used to great effect. It also had the defence powers, under which it has 
sought to argue that the Snowy Scheme falls to Commonwealth control. 
Both Coalition and Labor Commonwealth governments have since sought to 
apply all of these means to ensure the federal Minister has a strengthened 
hand with the States. 
Nevertheless, we have shown that such cross-purpose constitutional 
difficulties, without matching Commonwealth powers over water, 
electricity and the environment, aided and abetted the retreat of discussion 
of design options into the bureaucracy. System-serving expertise from all 
the resource development departments was forced to play a game of bluff, 
delay and counter-bluff. Costing criteria, design scenarios, financial 
resourcing, all become matters of heated internal dispute and delay. With 
on-going departmental rivalry and thence delayed release of options, 
public exposure and discussion of issues, such as in the University of 
Sydney Current Affairs Bulletin, was often behind the game, unable to 
discuss the actual options being considered. Expert officials, even on the 
same design committees, would also be prevented for years from becoming 
fully informed, let alone enabling informed politicians and publics of all 
sides to emerge. In this context, the legitimation crises of representation 
arose. Photographically, conquering and sublime symbols of engineered 
order against chaotic nature replaced stories of vying social forces. 
An enclosing policy-epistemic order was, in the case of the Snowy Scheme, 
arguably exacerbated by the narrowness with which 'scientific', rational 
planning, was instituted. In particular, the complexity of the Agreement 
negotiations represents a low point in the possibilities of legislative 
transparency. It was, perhaps, the legislative equivalent of the mish-mash 
of railways built by competing States. A warren of changing stipulations 
and qualifications crafted by bureaucrats loyal to given circumstances of 
financial secrecy between governments was compounded by a directive, 
largely uncompromising Commonwealth and by their own desires to 
protect their technocorporate interests. A stand-off federalism, only slowly 
evolving towards innovative compromise, with every reason for the 
bureaucrats to insist on extensive legal protections, was the rule. The 
design emphases or compromises should not have required so many years 
to achieve. 
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As disputes over uniform taxation powers and industrial relations were 
circuitously negotiated via the Scheme, the States did eventually force the 
Commonwealth to discount the price they would have to pay for the Scheme 
by 10 or 15%. As a result of the Commonwealth's constitutionally dubious 
position, the broader prospect of co-operative federalism was adversely 
affected as a result of the processes of negotiating the Scheme. Although 
the Scheme was informed by and was informing of broader social 
processes, the indirectly balanced financial versus resource development 
powers of the federalist political process worked against fluently and 
inclusively progressing the often competing claims within a changing 
world of social, political and cultural values. Democratic processes were 
often truncated within a set of often overarching, hidden ordering 
assumptions of scientific design (exclusive of values) and by a strategic 
minded federalism which, at the same time, it both helped shape and 
inform. It is difficult to suggest how a broader democratic capacity for 
technological decision making or an open engineering culture was. 
advanced by this most capital intensive and hence transformative of 
projects. 
Ultimately, perhaps, the Scheme could be judged as it complements the 
potentials of place. As a massive cultural geographic change to the eco-
cultures of south eastern Australia, did its relational--or antipodean--
qualities enhance inclusive and sustainable relations of place, or was it a 
degrading recontextualisation of overseas practices, corrupting the 
potentials of remaking localities? Technoculturally, outcomes were 
articulated more by the supposed imperatives of 'the system'. Most 
significantly for institutional possibilities, political strategies often arose 
to protect an enlarging system. Defence-related rationales suggest that the 
Constitution became 'hydro-electrified' as it was interpreted to suit. 
With its booming quantitative assumptions of how best to manage . riverine 
and soil resources, the Scheme's public rhetoric appears as either defiantly 
bold (as in 'Bradfield's boomerang') or far from assured. If the former, the 
rush to build big and fast may be a mark of its success; its determination to 
ward off recession under Chifley, its playing off Sterling and US interests 
under Menzies, signs of its antipodality. Modernisation tended towards 
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fordist agriculture (and away from manufacturing).3 The London backed 
Collins House and the fiscally conservative, States rights group was 
eventually displaced by the modernising, fiscally expansive liaisons of 
McKell and Chifley and then by Menzies and Fadden who took up the 
possibilities of State planning and the Keynesian, New Deal possibilities. 
Paradoxically, its scale as well as its implicit and explicit anxieties indicate 
cultural dependence. From Bradfield's millenarian visions to its huge dams, 
big loans and break-neck speed, the Scheme suggests a measure of 
desperate occupation. Consequently, the market it provided for large scale 
extractive equipment and expertise during times of hot and cold war in 
return for financial support, has corporatised many local capacities--
although how skills were also transformed is far from having been 
assessed. Nevertheless, its hidden and objective strategies, the denial of 
indigenous rights, the anxieties of driving hard and assimilating a Cold 
War, out-worker labour force, similarly speak of a dependency on centres 
of power. The Scheme continually over-subscribed to (narrowly read) US-
style development in its 'search for security'. 
Consequently, it was a risky proposition. In a land in need of introduced 
methods to grow food, the Scheme's cleared lands and irrigated soils 
impacted forcefully against the (highly) variable-dependent riverine 
ecologies and on the salt laden terrains of the interior. Running through 
its history, there has also been a strong strain of cultivating nature to 
defend a nation. At the same time, especially given the defence-related 
rhetoric, the economic/military/strategic underpinnings of the Scheme 
are strong. This massing of machinery in the Cold-war era and the 
accompanying, often exploitative approach to labour and the environment 
suggests that the project was profoundly underwritten by strategic ploys. 
Post-war becomes 'post' war for a nation ill at ease in its geographic locale. 
Yet if the five design choices are interpreted according to the critical 
heuristic spinning reserve, significant counter-vailing influences were 
also at work. For example, active efforts of remaking away from the 
compounding of socially and environmentally degrading practices. The 
technologically deterministic rhetorics of the inevitable efficiencies of 
3
• For an international history of the emergence and politics of the post war "fordist 
food regime" see Friedman, Harriet, "A Sustainable World Food Economy" in Keil, 
Roger et al (eds), Political Ecology: Global and Local, London, Routledge, 1996. 
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ever more regulated or fordist rivers, on occasions, recognised its own 
limits. Worthy agricultural and energy productivities need not be totalising 
imperatives (figure 2). Democratic and inclusive community demands for 
the Snowy River region, as distinct from closed, technocratic regimes, have 
been noted. The arrival of many migrants to work on the Scheme 
diversified Australian culture and, eventually, the services provided to 
workers. Along with migrant workplace initiatives and environmental 
design challenges, new institutional fora also arose, if too late to be 
effective at the time. Indigenous land and water rights have continued and 
have been fought for across the planning and construction histories of the 
Scheme. 
If, however, the Scheme is measured by its commitment to an inclusive and 
diversifying, living with differences agenda for nation building, then its 
neglect of indigenous cultural geographies remains a most significant 
shortfall. As such, with its deeply problematic riverine environmental 
heritage, too, it fell far short of finding "a way to reaffirm the value of 
locality without falling into the reactionary trap of blood and soil. "4 
4 Williams, Rosalind, "Cultural Origins and Environmental Implications of Large 
Technological Systems", Science in Context, Vol. 6, No. 2, 1993, p. 401. 
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Figure 2; Advertisement; "Will There Ever Be Enough?", International 
Harvester, Murray Valley Annual, 1951. 
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Bibliography--The Eucumbene Files 
Following is a list of reference sources used in the thesis. 
PRIMARY SOURCES 
Archival Material 
Archive material has been the primary source for this thesis especially as 
it has thrown light on the processes of decision-making within the context 
of an evolving post-war federalism itself, influenced by the negotiations 
germane to the Scheme. For particular files also see footnotes. Note that the 
references below deal mainly with files up to the early 1960s only. 
* Commonwealth 
Given the long running and inter-linked aspects of decision making, the 
Commonwealth records on the Scheme are extensive. Under Curtin and 
then Chifley, the primary departments were those of Prime Minister 
(especially NAA: A461, AJ423 Parts 1-5 & NAA: A462, 318/2-5), Post War 
Reconstruction (series NAA: AAI971/66 & CP194 & CP43 & MP679) and the 
Department of Works and Housing (NAA: MP831, 1955/714 Parts I & 2 & MP 
1051, 1955/714 Parts 3-9). Little has been sighted from Defence and the 
Bureau of Agricultural Economics although they may have been important 
policy fora. The Department of the Interior also played a role as did ·the 
Attorney General's Department (series NAA: A432 & A469 & Ml505) which 
became more involved as did Treasury, especially under Menzies via Fadden 
(series NAA: A571/149 & A571/164). 
Under Menzies, the Department of National Development replaced the roles 
of Post War Reconstruction and Works and Housing. The Ministerial files of 
Senator Spooner (NAA: CP608 Bundle 2/1-3 and Bundle 5/-) are also 
significant although his files are much less ordered than those of his 
Secretary, Raggatt, and of the Department more broadly (see NAA: A987 'E' 
series, especially E232 viz 'Agreement' negotiations). Gilfillan has indexed 
this Departments Snowy files (see NAA: A2618, Folder 10, Document 1223). 
Treasury files also burgeoned under Menzies, as did those from the Snowy 
Mountains Hydro Electric Authority itself (series NAA: A2915, A5628, A5638 
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etc). These files cover an enormous range of relevant activities, with 
selective review being necessary. Everything from health and safety, 
pictorial and filmic activities, the dealings with Adaminaby residents, to 
the more bureaucratic dealings between governments and the technical-
economic issues faced by the engineers themselves, are included. 
* New South Wales 
The Premier's Department files are un-ordered and patchy but provide 
important links in the negotiations (Premier's Dept; see selected files from 
series 13/17020 to 17022 and 64/1142A). New South Wales initiated the 
project under McKell and then was the prime recipient of water and power. 
Its continuing and often strained negotiations with the Commonwealth are 
crucial. The principle departments were those of the Water Conservation 
and Irrigation Commission (series SRNSW: 18/1581 onwards), the Electricity 
Commission of New South Wales, Elcom (Pacific Power: see series 18/2206 & 
18/2285) and the Public Works Department (see series 18/4023 & 27). The 
PWD files were only beginning to be transferred when checked. The 
Departments of Local Government and of Conservation also played roles, 
although their files have not been as extensively investigated. 
* Victoria 
The Premier's Department (PRO VPRS 1163/P: 46/2405, 52/4432, 55/4546, 
58/1620, 59/929) and Attorney General's Department contains important 
files but the bulk of relevant material, which is well indexed, is from the 
State Rivers and Water Supply Commission (PRO VPRS: 6008; 46/12400, 
47/7787, 50/4912, 53/26771, 56/39534, 58/6660, 58/6888--and others) and the 
State Electricity Commission of Victoria (PRO VPRS: 8892/P1, 640-660). 
* Regional/ Aboriginal/Other 
Records from regional centres are important sources given the links 
between the Scheme and regional development (and also see Post War 
Reconstruction files). Charles Sturt University (Wagga Wagga) provides 
files on the Murrumbidgee Valley Water User Association (meeting 
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